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Abstract 
Whilst economic, social and cultural rights benefit from a better protection 
worldwide than when they were first recognised in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights 1948, they remain criticised for being too vague and, thus, not legally 
enforceable. This is particularly relevant to the right to health, since it embraces 
complex ethical, economic and legal issues often calling into question its substance. 
Such criticisms, nonetheless, threaten its implementation: how can key actors 
contribute to realising a right of which they do not understand the meaning? This 
thesis, therefore, aims at clarifying what the human right to health entails, and will 
focus on how this can be done through supranational monitoring. Mandated to 
supervise the implementation of human rights instruments, supranational human 
rights bodies (SNHRBs) embody the most authoritative interpretation of the right to 
health. When evaluating whether or not states comply with their obligations and 
when justifying why, SNHRBs effectively delineate the legal content of this right. 
Therefore, this thesis will analyse how SNHRBs contribute to clarifying the legal 
content of the right to health in the course of their quasi-judicial monitoring 
procedures, and how their interpretation can be optimised for that purpose. I will 
particularly study the interpretation of the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (United Nations) and the European Committee of Social Rights 
(Council of Europe), for they are the most illustrative of how supranational 
monitoring of the right to health feeds into its substance, and vice versa. Such 
comparative analysis will enable me to develop a theoretical account assisting 
SNHRBs in interpreting the legal content of the right to health more clearly, to 
highlight ‘best practice’, and to discuss compatibility between universal and regional 
standards. As a result, this thesis lies primarily in international human rights law but 
will also involve aspects of public international law and, modestly, public health. 
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
The problem with the right to health is therefore not so much a lack of 
codification, but rather the absence of a consistent implementation 
practice through reporting procedures and before judicial and quasi-
judicial bodies as well as an ensuing lack of conceptual clarity. These 
problems are interrelated: a lack of understanding of the meaning and 
scope of a right makes it difficult to implement and the absence of a 
frequent practice of implementation in turn hampers the possibility of 
obtaining a greater understanding of its meaning and scope. (Toebes)1 
The object of the thesis 
Acknowledging criticisms on the vagueness of the right to health 
The right to health is a social right that is widely recognised in international human 
rights law as well as in domestic law, and whose realisation is supported by 
numerous academics, NGO workers, and physicians. In 1946, states adopted the 
World Health Organisation (WHO) Constitution, recognising that:  
The enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the 
fundamental rights of every human being without distinction of race, 
religion, political belief, economic or social condition.2  
Almost seventy years later, this statement resonates across various international and 
regional human rights treaties, the most noteworthy perhaps being Article 25 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),3 and Article 12 of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).4 Its recognition is 
however not limited to international human rights law. Social rights are being 
                                                
1 Brigit Toebes, The Right to Health as a Human Right in International Law (Intersentia/Hart 
1999) 346.  
2 Constitution of the World Health Organisation, as amended 1946, Preamble. 
3 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, Art 25. 
4 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966, Art 12. 
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increasingly constitutionalised and many countries now protect the right to health in 
their constitutions.5 
This right has nonetheless been subject to repeated criticisms over the last seven 
decades, on the basis that its content is excessively vague and impossible to define 
with precision. While American legal scholars have formulated particularly high 
levels of scepticism, concerns have been expressed worldwide.  
Firstly, the right to health is often criticised for not relying on solid conceptual 
foundations. It is not the purpose of this thesis to justify the legitimacy of the right to 
health, or to summarise existing literature on health and social justice, as 
considerations of space would not allow it. However, it is fundamental to highlight 
the lack of consensus on this issue, as it impedes the possibility to develop a meaning 
for the right to health, which, in turn, threatens its application in practice. Certain 
authors argue that no adequate philosophical grounds justify the existence of a legal 
right to health. Those authors tend to view the right to health as what Fried calls a 
‘bottomless pit’,6 which results in a rather minimalist approach to human rights law 
(e.g. O’Neill,7 Cohen,8 or to a lesser extent, Griffin,9 Rawls10). 
Secondly, economic, social and cultural rights (ESCR) have long been criticised for 
being too vague, programmatic and unrealistic;11 and the right to health is no 
                                                
5 Eleanor D Kinney and Brian Alexander Clark, ‘Provisions for Health and Health Care in 
the Constitutions of the Countries of the World’ (2004) 37 Cornell International Law Journal 
285. 
6 Charles Fried, Right and Wrong (Harvard University Press 1978), Chap 5 ‘Positive Rights’. 
7 Onora O’Neill, ‘The Dark Side of Human Rights’ (2005) 81 International Affairs (Royal 
Institute of International Affairs 1944) 427. 
8 Joshua Cohen, ‘Minimalism About Human Rights: The Most We Can Hope For?’ (2004) 
12 Journal of Political Philosophy 190. 
9 James Griffin, On Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2008).  
10 John Rawls, ‘The Law of Peoples’ (1993) 20 Critical Inquiry 36. 
11 E.g. O’Neill (n 7); Michael J Dennis and David P Stewart, ‘Justiciability of Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights: Should There Be an International Complaints Mechanism to 
Adjudicate the Rights to Food, Water, Housing, and Health’ (2004) 98 American Journal of 
International Law 462. 
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exception. On the contrary, it gives rise to particular concerns in this regard, which 
even its supporters admit.  
Toebes, for instance, declares that: 
An economic and social right that is characterized by particular 
vagueness is the international human right to health.12 
Whilst Ruger asserts that: 
One would be hard pressed to find a more controversial or nebulous 
human right than the "right to health” […].13 
It is not the purpose of this thesis to demonstrate the justiciability of the right to 
health,14 or to summarise existing literature on ESCR. This would go beyond the 
scope of this project. Nevertheless, it is crucial to report the existence of concerns 
regarding the vagueness of the right to health, sometimes even legitimate, as they 
indicate confusion on what this right means, which, in turn, threatens its realisation. 
Two elements seem to be particularly criticised in that respect. First, the vagueness 
of its normative scope, as it is often argued that the formulation of ‘the highest 
standard of health attainable’ could result in considerable costs and unrealistic 
expectations. Second, the vagueness of the requirement for states to ‘progressively 
realise’ the right to health, as authors frequently contend that states can use the latter 
to justify an insufficient implementation of this right. Such criticisms, therefore, 
point at the importance for the normative scope of the right to health and the 
obligations it creates, to be appropriately interpreted. This includes addressing 
adequately both individuals’ needs and states’ resources.15 
                                                
12 Brigit Toebes, ‘Towards an Improved Understanding of the International Human Right to 
Health’ (1999) 21 Human Rights Quarterly 661, 661. 
13 Jennifer Prah Ruger, ‘Toward a Theory of a Right to Health: Capability and Incompletely 
Theorized Agreements’ (2006) 18 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities 273, 273. 
14 See for that purpose Conor Gearty and Virginia Mantouvalou, Debating Social Rights 
(Hart Publishing 2011). 
15 See Norman Daniels, Just Health: Meeting Health Needs Fairly (Cambridge University 
Press 2008). 
 
4 
Thirdly, the increasing adjudication of the right to health in countries such as South 
Africa, Colombia, Brazil, and India, and its potential for being exported have 
recently triggered another wave of criticism. This thesis does not aim to discuss the 
adjudication of the right to health in domestic courts or to summarise existing 
literature on the leading case law in that respect. Considerations of space do not 
allow it. However, it is crucial to mention the concerns raised in that regard, as they 
both reflect and contribute to a confusion of what the right to health means, which, in 
turn, threatens its realisation. Various politicians and academics fear that courts are 
given power to make budgetary decisions in healthcare. They argue that such power 
should be kept between the hands of the legislator for democratic reasons, and that 
courts are not equipped to reach such decisions. These concerns were expressed, for 
instance, by the UK Joint Committee on Human Rights, in the light of the South 
African experience, 16  or by authors such as Sunstein. 17  Furthermore, several 
academics have recently started to use empirical evidence to demonstrate that the 
adjudication of the right to health reveals negative outcomes in certain jurisdictions. 
According to authors such as Ferraz, Wang, Brinks and Gauri,18 claimants involved 
in such litigation are usually well-off. Brinks and Gauri argue that decisions granting 
them access to treatments benefiting a large section of the population, including the 
poor, may be beneficial to the wider population in the long run. However, Ferraz and 
Wang highlight that decisions can grant access to expensive treatments that only 
benefit a minority, taking away resources that could be used for wide-scale health 
programmes. Such concerns reflect the need for the right to health to be interpreted 
in a way that complies with human rights law requirements while being suitable for 
adjudicatory purposes. 
                                                
16 Joint Committee on Human Rights, ‘A Bill of Rights for the UK?' (Twenty–ninth Report 
of Session 2007–2008) HL Paper 165-I, HC 150-I, paras 182–191 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200708/jtselect/jtrights/165/165i.pdf> 
[accessed 8 September 2015]. 
17 Cass Sunstein, ‘Against Positive Rights’ (1993) 2 East European Constitutional Review 
35. 
18 Octavio Luiz Motta Ferraz, ‘Harming the Poor through Social Rights Litigation: Lessons 
from Brazil’ (2010) 89 Texas Law Review 1643; Daniel W Liang Wang and Octavio Luiz 
Motta Ferraz, ‘Reaching out to the Needy - Access to Justice and Public Attorneys’ Role in 
Right to Health Litigation in the City of Sao Paulo’ (2013) 18 Sur - International Journal on 
Human Rights 159; Varun Gauri and Daniel M Brinks, Courting Social Justice: Judicial 
Enforcement of Social and Economic Rights in the Developing World (Cambridge University 
Press 2010), Chap 8. 
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To conclude, criticisms raised against the right to health target: the weakness of its 
conceptual foundations; its excessively vague, programmatic and unrealistic 
formulation; as well as the inadequacy of its adjudication; all outlining the same 
issue. The legal content of the right to health (i.e. a normative content fit to practical 
considerations) is not clearly defined. Such lack of conceptual clarity, however, 
affects key actors in the realisation of this right and can thus hinder its 
implementation. How can states, supranational human rights bodies (SNHRBs), and 
NGOs contribute towards realising the right to health if they do not know what it 
means? As a result, it is fundamental to clarify what this right entails. So far, 
nonetheless, little research has attempted to delineate the legal content of the right to 
health and even less so by using the most authoritative source in human rights law: 
its interpretation by (quasi-judicial) SNHRBs. 
Clarifying the legal content of the right to health through supranational 
monitoring 
The role of SNHRBs in clarifying the legal content of the rights they are mandated to 
monitor is crucial. SNHRBs supervise the implementation of the right to health at the 
international and regional levels of human rights protection, through various 
monitoring procedures (mainly states’ reporting and individuals’ complaints). While 
some SNHRBs dealing with the right to health may have similar competence than 
judicial bodies (i.e. when reviewing the admissibility and merits of a complaint 
through written and oral proceedings), their monitoring procedures mostly take place 
in a quasi-judicial setting. This can be asserted by examining: their composition (i.e. 
experts, rather than trained judges); and their key role (interpreting and monitoring 
the implementation of the treaty they are mandated to supervise through, mostly, 
non-legally binding means). However, SNHRBs must (collegially) decide whether 
states comply with their obligations and justify why, when evaluating the 
implementation of the right to health. As a result, they effectively delineate its legal 
content or at least, have the potential to do so. However, this is not a one-way 
relationship: supranational monitoring and legal content feed into each other. Not 
only do SNHRBs contribute to delineating the legal content of the right to health, the 
latter adapts itself to the procedures reviewing it, in order to fit practical 
considerations. Analysing such contributions is thus important. So far, various 
 
6 
authors have used findings from supranational monitoring on an ad hoc basis to 
discuss the right to health.19 Nevertheless, few authors explore how such findings can 
and should contribute to clarifying the legal content of this right, and none has done 
so systemically and comprehensively.20 This thesis, therefore, will explore how 
SNHRBs contribute to clarifying the right to health in the course of quasi-judicial 
monitoring procedures, and how to optimise their interpretation for that purpose.  
Identifying the research question  
In this thesis, I aim to assist in remedying the vagueness that presently affects the 
substance of the right to health. I will do so by asking two intertwined questions: (i) 
how do SNHRBs contribute to clarifying the legal content of the right to health in the 
course of their quasi-judicial monitoring procedures, and (ii) how can their 
interpretation be optimised for that purpose? I, thus, explore how SNHRBs 
contribute to clarifying the legal content of this right when interpreting it through 
their reporting and complaint procedures. Such analysis enables me to then study 
how SNHRBs’ contributions can be optimised, by developing a theoretical 
framework enabling them to interpret adequately the right to health when monitoring 
it. As a result, this thesis lies primarily in international human rights law but will also 
involve elements of public international law, as well as (modestly) public health and 
health ethics. 
The scope of the thesis 
Focus 
This thesis will attempt to answer those questions by focusing on two SNHRBs in 
particular, building upon the comparative analysis that arises from Part I, to develop 
the theoretical framework laid out in Part II. It is worth noting that ‘SNHRBs’ will be 
understood as collegial human rights bodies, which have (quasi-judicial) competence 
                                                
19 E.g. Toebes 1999a (n 1); John Tobin, The Right to Health in International Law (Oxford 
University Press 2012). 
20 E.g. Evelyne Schmid, ‘Socio-Economic and Cultural Rights and Wrongs after Armed 
Conflicts: Using the State Reporting Procedure before the United Nations Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights More Effectively’ (2013) 31 Netherlands Quarterly of 
Human Rights 241. (However, this article is limited to situations of conflicts). 
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to reach decisions on states’ compliance with the right to health; that competence 
being established in legally binding treaties. 
This thesis will focus on how the right to health is interpreted at the international 
level in the UN, as this project primarily lies in international human rights law. 
Therefore, it will examine how the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (UN Committee) interprets Article 12 ICESCR. Furthermore, with a total of 
164 states parties, the ICESCR represents the widest forum through which the right 
to health can be interpreted and its subsequent legal content, implemented, amongst 
treaties of general application.  
This thesis will also study how the right to health is interpreted at the regional level, 
in order to put the UN interpretation into perspective. This will enable me to 
highlight best practice and to discuss compatibility between international and 
regional levels of monitoring. I have chosen to focus on Europe and will therefore 
examine how the European Committee of Social Rights (European Committee) 
interprets Article 11 of the European Social Charter (ESC). Focusing on the Council 
of Europe (CoE) offers several advantages. First, the CoE represents a powerful 
system of human rights protection, increasing the likelihood for the right to health to 
be strictly monitored and thus, clarified through this process. Second, it will provide 
a different perspective on resource availability, since Europe is the wealthiest 
regional system of human rights protection but is also suffering from the remnants of 
the economic crisis. Third, the European Committee remains relatively unknown and 
few researchers have analysed its jurisprudence. Fourth, Europe is where I am based 
and received my legal education, which gives me a better insight into the norms this 
region has set and the legal challenges it faces. Fifth, the findings of the African and 
the Inter-American frameworks do not contribute to clarifying precisely what the 
right to health means. This is due to the fact that the right to health cannot be 
adjudicated through a complaint procedure in the Inter-American system, and that 
the interpretation of its content in the African system is unclear. Furthermore, space 
limitations do not allow an in-depth analysis of each system. 
It is also worth noting that key instruments and key publications on the right to 
health often define the content of the right by distinguishing its scope from the nature 
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of states’ obligations to realise it.21 While both notions are clearly intertwined, such 
distinction remains a common and useful way to break down complexity in legal 
scholarship. As such, it will be used throughout the thesis, to enhance the clarity and, 
thus, quality of the arguments developed in later chapters. 
Finally, I will often use examples in the area of sexual and reproductive health 
(SRH) as a comparative framework to assess the different approaches of the 
Committees. These examples encapsulate particularly well the need for states to 
guarantee adequate health care and policies, sometimes in opposition with religious 
or cultural beliefs, as well as to address health discrimination against vulnerable 
groups. I will use arguments primarily based on health considerations (although 
influenced by a feminist approach to bodily integrity), since health is the focus of my 
project. 
Setting limits 
For the purpose of clarity, it is worth noting that the right to health studied in this 
thesis is neither to be defined through the angle of the interdependence of rights, nor 
to be confused with health rights. 
Health issues and human rights law have an intricate relationship, as outlined by 
Mann.22 Firstly, certain health policies can result in human rights abuses (which must 
be born in mind by decision-makers in the field of healthcare). This can often be 
observed, for instance, in internment cases of mental health patients that breach their 
right to liberty. Secondly, certain human rights abuses can be associated with 
detrimental effects on the health of victims. Abuses of civil and political rights 
(CPR) such as the right to life or the freedom from torture can have an adverse 
impact on victims’ health. For example, the overuse of solitary confinement in 
prisons is considered as torture because of its adverse consequences on prisoners’ 
                                                
21 UNCESCR, ‘General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of 
Health (Art 12)’ (2000), Parts I and II; Toebes 1999a (n 1), Part C; Tobin (n 19), Chap 4 to 
9. 
22 Jonathan M Mann and others, ‘Health and Human Rights’ 1 Health and Human Rights 6. 
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mental health.23 Similarly, abuses of ESCR, such as the right to food, the rights to 
water and sanitation, the right to housing, the right to work in healthy conditions, and 
the right to a healthy environment can have adverse implications for victims’ health. 
For instance, the failure to secure adequate sanitation facilities can contribute to the 
spread of diseases among a community. Such interactions, however, do not 
necessarily define the content of the right to health with precision. Instead, they 
reflect the interdependence of rights in human rights law. 
Furthermore, the right to health should not be confused with health rights. Health 
rights correspond to individuals’ rights to health protection in their relations with 
state or non-state actors as consumers, employees, patients, social security 
beneficiaries etc. Such relations do not automatically give rise to fundamental 
inalienable rights protecting the dignity of every human being and are thus not 
always regulated by international human rights law. For instance, the obligation for 
food companies to label information likely to affect the health of their consumers and 
the entitlement it creates do not necessarily fall under human rights law. As argued in 
this thesis, the right to health obliges states to provide everyone with access to a 
health system ensuring the highest standard of health attainable, necessary to 
preserve their fundamental dignity as human beings. Therefore, while certain authors 
argue that the right to the highest standard of health attainable should be described as 
a ‘right to healthcare’,24 this thesis will use the formulation ‘right to health’ for the 
sake of clarity and to reflect its most contemporary understanding. 
Finally, due to space constraints inherent to any research project, I have eliminated 
three elements from the scope of my thesis. Firstly, my thesis will not cover non-
state actors’ obligations to realise the right to health. The role of non-state actors as 
                                                
23 Babar Ahmad and Others v United Kingdom [2012] Fourth Section, Applications No. 
24027/07, 11949/08, 36742/08, 66911/09 and 67354/09, Judgment of 10 April 2012 [205–
212] (European Court of Human Rights). 
24 E.g. Allen Buchanan, ‘The Right to a Decent Minimum of Health Care’ (1984) 13 
Philosophy & Public Affairs 55; Hessler and Buchanan ‘Specifying the content of the human 
right to health care’ in Allen Buchanan, Justice and Health Care: Selected Essays (Oxford 
University Press 2009); Tom L Beauchamp and Ruth R Faden, ‘The Right to Health and the 
Right to Health Care’ (1979) 4 Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 118; Norman Daniels, 
Just Health Care (Cambridge University Press 1985) (although his position has changed 
since).  
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duty-bearers remains contested and uncertain in international human rights law. 
While this thesis acknowledges their importance, it focuses on state actors instead, as 
they are the primary duty-bearers in this discipline. For instance, it is up to states to 
regulate the activities of pharmaceutical companies, private clinics and physicians, or 
to impose taxes on individuals and companies to fund a health system, essential to 
the realisation of the right to health. Secondly, my thesis will not cover extra-
territorial obligations to realise the right to health. The legal aspect of extra-territorial 
obligations (i.e. states’ obligations to realise rights outside their borders) is heavily 
disputed and remains unclear in international human rights law. Whilst I recognise 
the principle of international assistance and cooperation, as enshrined in the Charter 
of the United Nations (UN Charter) or the ICESCR,25 I limit my discussion to the 
protection of individuals within states’ borders. Thirdly, since my thesis explores the 
legal content of the right to health, I will focus on quasi-judicial collegial SNHRBs. 
Therefore, I will not examine in depth the comments of non-judicial human rights 
institutions (e.g. UN Special Rapporteurs, CoE Commissioner for Human Rights 
etc.), as these do not contribute as precisely to delineating the right to health in a 
(quasi) judicial setting. More precisely, I will not study in detail the contributions of 
the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to health within the UN or within legal 
scholarship (at the exception of few reports), for this would represent another project. 
The methodology of the thesis 
The interpretative approach 
In order to explore how SNHRBs contribute to clarifying the legal content of the 
right to health (and later, how their interpretation can be optimised for that purpose), 
I will observe both the texts on which they base their interpretation, and the 
substance they have given or should give to this right though monitoring. This is 
particularly relevant to Part I. 
While this thesis does not entirely rely on an intentionalist approach to interpretation, 
since it also advocates for a dynamic approach at times, parties’ intentions remain 
crucial and can assist SNHRBs in clarifying the legal content of the right to health. 
                                                
25 Charter of the United Nations 1945, Art 1(3); ICESCR (n 4), Art 1(2) and 2(1). 
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Therefore, I will study how this right is formulated in international and regional 
human rights instruments, and will study the Travaux Préparatoires of the relevant 
provisions. Since this thesis focuses on the UN and the CoE, this will involve an in-
depth analysis of Article 12 ICESCR and Article 11 ESC.  
I will also examine thoroughly how this right is interpreted in the reporting and 
complaint procedures of SNHRBs. This exercise will rely on grounded theory, since 
it aims at deriving a theory (here, an account of how SNHRBs can and should clarify 
the legal content of the right to health) from systematically collected and analysed 
data.26 On that basis, I have used a coding method when examining the comments of 
both Committees (i.e. categorisation of unstructured data). I have also had the 
opportunity to verify my hypotheses through semi-structured interviews with four 
members of the UN Committee; and through semi-structured discussions with my 
supervisor Mr Colm O’Cinneide, who sits in this institution and served as an internal 
rapporteur on Article 11 ESC. 
Finally, in Part II, I will build upon the analysis of relevant treaties and their 
interpretations, to develop a theoretical framework enabling SNHRBs to optimise 
their contributions to clarifying the legal content of the right to health. Such 
framework will take a doctrinal approach, using relevant literature. This thesis, 
however, must identify the principles that will guide recommendations made in later 
chapters and justify why, to demonstrate the merits of the said recommendations. 
Setting principles of interpretation 
The doctrinal and empirical aspects of my research rely on four normative principles 
of interpretation, designed to fit both the purposes and the needs of SNHRBs’ 
monitoring procedures. Their application is particularly relevant to Part II. When 
giving life to the right to health through their monitoring procedures, SNHRBs 
should thus: first, seek an effective enjoyment of the right to health; second, set 
reasonable expectations on how it is to be realised; and third, encourage an 
implementation that is context-sensitive (when this does not contradict the latter two 
                                                
26 Juliet Corbin ‘Grounded Theory’ (Chap 13) in Bridget Somekh and Cathy Lewin (eds), 
Theory and Methods in Social Research (Second edition, SAGE Publications Ltd 2011). 
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principles). Furthermore, SNHRBs must, overall, develop principled consistency in 
their interpretation, partly deriving from Dworkin’s vision of law as integrity.27  
A similar approach was developed by Tobin in The Right to Health in International 
Law, although not tailored to SNHRBs.28 Tobin argues that the interpretation of the 
right to health (which he considers being subject to a process of constructive 
engagement with key actors) should be driven by four principles. It should be: 
principled; clear and practical; coherent; as well as context-sensitive.29 As argued in 
this thesis, Tobin’s approach is rich in relevance and originality. However, since he 
aims at convincing the interpretative community, his principles skew the 
(hierarchical) relationship between the necessity to comply with human rights law 
and that to incorporate views from key actors. Furthermore, his principles do not 
follow any chronology or order of importance. As a result, Tobin does not offer any 
solution in the event these principles generate incompatible interpretations of the 
right to health.30 Finally, while Tobin’s approach is sophisticated, it fails to address 
the need to ensure a relatively consistent interpretation of this right and that to take 
into consideration resource availability. The principles of interpretation I suggest 
build upon a similar idea: setting fundamental principles driving the interpretative 
process to facilitate the development of a satisfactory legal content of the right to 
health. However, they differ from Tobin’s in purpose (i.e. clarifying what this right 
means to improve its realisation, rather than to convince the interpretative 
community); and in content (except regarding context-sensitivity). 
Those four principles will be used in Chapters 1, 2 and 3, when contextualising the 
right to health in human rights law and discussing the adequacy of the UN and the 
European Committees’ interpretation. They will then be used in Chapters 4, 5, and 6, 
when drawing the theoretical framework SNHRBs should use to clarify what the 
right to health entail and assessing how this can be coherently applied across 
SNHRBs. 
                                                
27 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Hart Publishing 1986). 
28 Tobin (n 19). 
29 ibid 88–118. 
30 Claire Lougarre, ‘(Book Review) John Tobin, The Right to Health in International Law, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012’ (2014) 77 The Modern Law Review 336. 
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An effective enjoyment of the right to health 
First and foremost, SNHRBs’ interpretation should be driven by the need to ensure 
an effective enjoyment of the right to health. This principle derives from the very 
purpose of the right, i.e. the enjoyment of the highest standard of health by every 
individual; and from the mandate of SNHRBs, i.e. supervising its implementation. It 
thus embraces an interpretation reproducing a degree of fidelity to the text. Since 
individuals are subjects to human rights law protection, they should be put at the 
centre of the interpretative process. In order for the enjoyment of the right to health 
to be effective, it must guarantee adequate health care and policies, responsive to 
individuals’ and populations’ needs. As a result, SNHRBs should interpret the right 
to health by relying (directly or indirectly) on established research in medicine, 
public health, health ethics, health economics, and health law. This principle, thus, 
builds upon Tobin’s idea of constructive engagement but primarily aims at ensuring 
the highest standard of health attainable, not convincing the interpretative 
community. 
Reasonable expectations to realise the right to health  
Secondly, SNHRBs’ interpretation of the right to health should set reasonable and 
realistic expectations upon states. This principle stems from states’ obligation to 
progressively realise this right and its contingence on resource availability. 
Furthermore, as argued by Quinot and Liebenberg (referring to Sadurski), 31  a 
reasonableness test improves the transparency of the legal reasoning, and avoids 
unfair or irrational decisions.32 Absolutist interpretations of ESCR can also be 
detrimental to their credibility among states and, thus, impede their implementation. 
Therefore, this principle of interpretation goes beyond Tobin’s principle of 
‘practicality and clarity’, since it involves a more robust legal analysis relying on 
requirements of progressive realisation and fairness. SNHRBs, however, should 
                                                
31  Sadurski ‘Reasonableness and Value Pluralism in Law and Politics’ in Giorgio 
Bongiovanni, Giovanni Sartor and Chiara Valentini, Reasonableness and Law (Springer 
Science & Business Media 2009). 
32 Geo Quinot and Sandra Liebenberg, ‘Narrowing the Band: Reasonableness Review in 
Administrative Justice and Socio-Economic Rights Jurisprudence in South Africa’ (2011) 22 
Stellenbosch Law Review 639. 
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strictly scrutinise reasonableness, as the effective enjoyment of the right to health is 
of crucial importance. 
Context sensitivity 
Thirdly, SNHRBs’ interpretation of the right to health should incorporate 
considerations relevant to the environment in which it is to be implemented, but only 
to the extent that it does not contravene the two principles above. Since states are 
under the obligation to implement the right to health through measures they deem 
appropriate, SNHRBs should give some flexibility to the implementation process. 
Furthermore, using the specificities of the environment in which the right is to be 
implemented is more likely to improve its realisation. As outlined by Tobin, this 
principle originates from the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights 
on states’ margin of appreciation, and aims at gaining states’ trust. This principle 
mostly matches Tobin’s concept of context sensitivity and imposes the same limits: it 
must be used towards the object and purpose of the right.  
Principled consistency 
Fourthly, when following all three principles mentioned above, SNHRBs’ 
interpretation of the right to health should be driven by the overall need to ensure 
principled consistency. This umbrella requirement derives from Dworkin’s vision of 
law as ‘integrity’, in which judges seek to fit and justify their decisions through the 
existing framework in which such decisions are to be understood, i.e. a legal 
framework prioritising equal treatment for all individuals.33 The requirement of 
principled consistency, therefore, serves two purposes in this thesis. The first is to 
ensure that SNHRBs’ interpretation of the right to health is justified by reference to 
an existing legal framework, i.e. human rights law. Not only does this framework 
reflect states’ consent, crucial to the creation of rules under public international law, 
it also encapsulates moral considerations driving legal activity worldwide: dignity 
and equality. The second purpose of the requirement of principled consistency is to 
ensure a certain degree of legal certainty. Since the right to health is to be monitored 
                                                
33 Dworkin 1986 (n 27), Chap 6. 
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and adjudicated, both duty-bearers and right-holders are entitled to know what it 
consists of. This represents a basic component of the rule of law.34 Legal certainty 
benefits duty-bearers, when trying to implement the right to health and when facing 
allegations or findings of non-compliance. It also benefits right-holders (individuals 
and NGOs representing their interests), when facing potential violations of the right 
to health, and when bringing a complaint on that basis. As a result, SNHRBs must 
interpret the right to health in a way that is as clear, consistent and transparent as 
possible. 
Underlying conceptual foundations 
Since this thesis explores how SNHRBs contribute to clarifying the legal content of 
the right to health, and how their interpretation can be optimised for that purpose, 
outlining the principles that should guide their interpretation is insufficient. It is 
fundamental that this thesis also outlines the philosophical premises in which it 
considers the right to health is grounded. Such premises are clearly inherent to the 
nature and, thus, the content of the right to health.35 Furthermore, this will enable me 
to meet the criterion of transparency, justify arguments made in later chapters, and 
advocate for a principled (and thus, consistent) interpretation of this right.  
Cosmopolitanism 
The atrocities committed by the Nazi regime in World War II targeted individuals 
because of their affiliation to a specific group. Individuals were imprisoned, beaten 
or killed on the basis of their religion, health status, sexual preference, ethnicity, 
nationality or political opinion. It is precisely to fight against the belief that such 
‘groups’ entitles individuals with different rights, that human rights law was created 
                                                
34 UNGA, ‘The Rule of Law at the National and International Levels' (2014) UN Doc. 
A/RES/69/123.’ 
35 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press 1978); Dworkin 1986 
(n 27). A parallel can be drawn between what this thesis describes as principles of 
interpretation and underlying conceptual foundations of the right to health, and what 
Dworkin describes as the fit and the justification tests. In the fit test, judges must identify 
principles of justice and fairness that best ‘fit’ the existing legal framework in which they 
operate; and in the justification test, judges must identify which interpretation is the most 
‘justifiable’ on grounds of morality. However, both tests are inherently intertwined, similarly 
to the principles of interpretation and the underlying conceptual foundations I advocate. 
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in the 1950s, and why it continues to exist. As a result, I argue that SNHRBs should 
understand the right to health through a cosmopolitan approach. According to such 
an approach, considerations of justice and universal values of human dignity, non-
discrimination and assistance to the vulnerable, do not stop at national boundaries.36 
Individuals, therefore, are entitled to benefit from equal standards of rights, 
regardless of any characteristic, including their nationality or the jurisdiction they 
live in. The contrary would defeat the purpose of human rights law. 37  The 
cosmopolitan approach has received considerable support among human rights 
lawyers, including in the context of the right to health.38 This approach will also be 
used in my analysis, when arguing that SNHRBs should interpret the right to health 
as entitling everyone, regardless of their migrant status or the cultural beliefs 
endorsed by the state they live in.  
Egalitarianism  
This thesis also asserts that the right to health is better defended by an egalitarian 
ideology than through libertarianism. This is clearly demonstrated on two accounts: 
progressive realisation and concentration of powers. Firstly, it could be argued that 
the notion of resource constraints, present in right to health provisions, implies that 
states cannot access certain resources because they are the property of individuals or 
legal entities. However, such hypothesis conflicts with states’ obligation to take steps 
in order to progressively achieve the highest standard of health attainable for 
everyone. Progress necessarily means that states will have to obtain further 
resources, presumably held by others, to realise better health standards. It would thus 
be inadequate to use a libertarian approach in the context of the right to health, as the 
latter prioritises the right to self-ownership and limits states’ interferences in that 
                                                
36 Charles R Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Revised edition, Princeton 
University Press 1999); See also Immanuel Kant, ‘Toward Perpetual Peace’ and Other 
Writings on Politics, Peace, and History (Reprinted in Yale University Press 2006). 
37 Kok-Chor Tan, Justice without Borders: Cosmopolitanism, Nationalism, and Patriotism 
(Cambridge University Press 2004) 198. 
38 Hammonds and Ooms ‘Realising the Right to Health: Moving from a Nationalist to a 
Cosmopolitan Approach’ in Gunilla Backman, The Right to Health: Theory and Practice 
(Studentlitteratur 2012) 73–92. 
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respect.39 Secondly, whether a right to property includes natural resources or is 
limited to financial resources,40 it can allow a concentration of economic power. It is 
no revelation that concentration of power is a short step from abuse. Nevertheless, in 
the libertarian framework, states are encouraged to not interfere with the resources 
detained by individuals or legal entities (without consent). This contrasts with right 
to health requirements obliging states to fund basic universal healthcare, to regulate 
medical fees in the private sector, or to limit the length of patents registered by 
pharmaceutical companies. The effects of the libertarian ideology have long been 
recognised and proved to be detrimental on access to non-profitable services such as 
healthcare.41 For the purposes of the right to health, it is therefore fundamental that 
SNHRBs give priority to guaranteeing everyone access to a health system that is 
affordable, of good quality as well as culturally and ethically acceptable. As a 
consequence, my thesis will rely on an egalitarian doctrine, involving inevitably 
principles of distributive justice, which I will nonetheless not discuss in depth due to 
space constraints.  
A (restricted) capabilities approach 
Whilst the egalitarian doctrine has received considerable support as a philosophical 
premise to human rights law, it has also been criticised for not challenging 
inequalities occurring prior to accessing such rights. For instance, it is one thing to 
provide everyone with an entitlement to affordable contraception, but it is another to 
ensure everyone has similar opportunities to use this service. Various psychosocial 
factors can affect the decision of using contraceptives (e.g. age, gender, level of 
income, education background etc.). For example, young women may renounce 
using contraception as a result of gender identity, by conceding to pressure from 
young men to not use condoms, by identifying themselves through traditional gender 
                                                
39 See John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (printed for Awnsham Churchill, at the 
Black Swan in Ave-Mary-Lane, by Amen-Corner 1689): Locke argues that the right to 
property is a natural right.  
40 For a differentiation between right and left libertarianism, see Hillel Steiner, An Essay on 
Rights (Wiley-Blackwell 1994). In this book the author defends a left-libertarian approach, 
by advocating that natural resources cannot be owned. 
41 Allyson M Pollock, NHS Plc: The Privatisation of Our Health Care (Verso Books 2005). 
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roles involving maternity etc.42 Therefore, the capabilities approach which promotes 
individuals’ opportunities to be and do what they consciously value, is fundamental 
in health. Authors such as Sen, Nussbaum and Ruger have discussed these issues 
thoroughly.43 This thesis contends that the right to health requires that states design 
their policies according to what they have identified as factors refraining 
considerably specific groups from using specific services.44 Such an assertion is 
echoed through the concept of vulnerability, protected by human rights law. 
However, Venkatapuram argues that a capabilities approach applied to health does 
not solely involve adequate health policies. It also involves social arrangements to 
guarantee that everyone is truly being given equal opportunities to become healthy.45 
This thesis agrees it is fundamental that societies address the psychosocial 
determinants of health inequalities to improve access for all to the highest standard 
of health. Nevertheless, considering this as a normative requirement under the right 
to health would inflate and blur its legal content significantly. Since this thesis aims, 
on the contrary, at assessing how SNHRBs contribute to clarifying the legal content 
of the right to health, and exploring how their interpretation can be optimised for that 
purpose, I will not endorse an inflated capabilities approach.  
The narrative of the thesis 
This thesis, aimed at exploring how SNHRBs contribute to clarifying the legal 
content of the right to health, and how their interpretation can be optimised for that 
purpose, is divided in two parts. 
                                                
42 Sally Brown and Kate Guthrie, ‘Why Don’t Teenagers Use Contraception? A Qualitative 
Interview Study’ (2010) 15 The European Journal of Contraception and Reproductive Health 
Care 197; Teresa Yago Simón and Concepción Tomás Aznar, ‘Condicionantes de género en 
anticoncepción: diseño y validación de un cuestionario [Gender-determinant factors in 
contraception: design and validation of a questionnaire]’ (2013) 45 Atencion Primaria / 
Sociedad Española De Medicina De Familia Y Comunitaria 418. 
43 Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen, The Quality of Life (Clarendon Press 1993); Ruger 
2006 (n 13) 283–287: Ruger criticises the egalitarian rights-based theory developed by 
Daniels, by pointing at the fact that such theory focuses on the inputs given to healthcare 
(resources) rather than its outputs (the realisation of health or health capability). 
44 Jennifer Prah Ruger, Health and Social Justice (OUP Oxford 2010). 
45 Sridhar Venkatapuram, Health Justice: An Argument from the Capabilities Approach 
(Polity Press 2011) 27–30. 
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Part I provides a critical overview of how the right to health is currently recognised 
and interpreted in international human rights law, seeking potential conceptual 
clarity of its legal content amongst SNHRBs, through their monitoring of this right. 
Chapter 1 starts by contextualising the recognition of the right to health in 
international human rights law, and argues that neither human rights law nor 
academics have sufficiently clarified its legal content, leaving SNHRBs’ potential 
underexplored. As a result, Chapters 2 and 3 explore SNHRBs’ contributions to 
clarifying the right to health in their monitoring procedures, through a comparative 
study between the UN and the European Committees. When these bodies evaluate 
the implementation of the right to health through their monitoring procedures, they 
delineate its legal content differently, with distinct benefits and shortcomings. 
Therefore, a number of fundamental questions regarding the normative scope of the 
right to health and states’ obligations to realise it, remain unclear or ignored. 
Part II builds upon the shortcomings identified in Part I, to produce a theoretical 
framework bringing further conceptual clarity on how the legal content of the right to 
health should be read in monitoring procedures, in order to optimise SNHRBs’ 
interpretation. Based on the methodology used in Part I, this thesis advocates for the 
legal content of the right to health to be understood through first, its normative scope 
and second, the nature of the obligations it creates. Therefore, Chapter 4 studies the 
scope of the right to health, by suggesting what SNHRBs should consider as 
appropriate healthcare and whom they should consider as right-holders. Chapter 5 
then demonstrates that SNHRBs should understand states’ obligations through a 
timeframe, by arguing how they should monitor progressive realisation, and why 
they should rely on reasonableness rather than minimum core. Finally, Chapter 6 
verifies that the theoretical framework developed in Chapters 4 and 5 can operate at 
all supranational levels of monitoring, contending that SNHRBs should seek 
harmony and flexibility in their mutual interpretations, to ensure both coherence and 
fairness. 
 
20 
PART I:  
THE RIGHT TO HEALTH IN SEARCH OF CONCEPTUAL 
CLARITY 
In Part I, I will provide a critical overview of how the right to health is currently 
recognised and interpreted in international human rights law, by seeking potential 
conceptual clarity amongst SNHRBs and through their monitoring of this right. 
Chapter 1 will thus study the recognition of the right to health in international human 
rights law. Chapter 2 will examine the interpretation given to this right by the UN 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights when monitoring Article 12 
ICESCR, and will identify its shortcomings. Finally, Chapter 3 will analyse that of 
the European Committee of Social Rights, when monitoring Article 11 ESC, and will 
also identify the shortcomings of its interpretation. 
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Chapter 1 Introductory remarks: the relevance and vagueness of 
the right to health in international human rights law  
Introduction 
Since this thesis aims at exploring how SNHRBs contribute to clarifying the right to 
health in the course of their quasi-judicial monitoring procedures (Part I), and, later, 
how their interpretation can be optimised for that purpose (Part II), it is essential to 
understand first where this right comes from and what challenges it currently faces. 
This will facilitate the development of an adequate overview of how this right is 
recognised and interpreted within international human rights law, and what questions 
remain unanswered. Is the right to health solely the product of the post-WWII era or 
is it still relevant nowadays? Are the criticisms targeting its vagueness justified; and 
have human rights lawyers addressed these criticisms in order to improve its 
implementation? 
By contextualising the right to health in international law, this chapter achieves two 
goals. Firstly, it asserts the relevance of the right to health by highlighting the firm 
historical roots on which its legal recognition sits, prior to the WHO Constitution, 
and ever since. Secondly, it nonetheless stresses the current vagueness surrounding 
the legal content of the right to health, the threat this represents for its 
implementation, and scholars’ failure to clarify it adequately or to study SNHRBs’ 
potential in doing so.  
For the past two decades, human rights scholarship has focused on developing a 
human rights-approach to health but has failed to engage meaningfully with the 
substance of the right to health, as few authors attempted to clarify its legal content.46 
This, however, is problematic. How can we expect states to realise a right they do not 
know the meaning of, and how can we expect SNHRBs to monitor it adequately 
without deciding what a sound interpretation of this right entails? In order to explore 
SNHRBs’ (potential) contributions to defining the legal content of the right to health, 
it is thus essential to understand its background first: how far we have come and how 
far we still have to go.  
                                                
46 At the exception, for instance, of Tobin (n 19); or Toebes 1999a (n 1). 
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Therefore, this chapter is structured as follows. First (1.1), I will outline the historical 
origins of the right to health prior to its recognition in the WHO Constitution 1946, 
and its widespread recognition in international human rights law ever since. Second 
(1.2), I will highlight the excessive vagueness of what this right entails at present, 
and the subsequent need for legal scholars to clarify its legal content, especially by 
exploring how SNHRBs might contribute to such clarification. 
 
1.1 The right to health, a right historically relevant for human rights law  
Before attempting to clarify what the right to health means by analysing SNHRBs’ 
interpretation, it is crucial to understand where it comes from, in order to 
contextualise its recognition in human rights law and give a meaning to its content.47 
This section will thus demonstrate the timeless involvement of states in public 
health, and the shift from utilitarian motives to legal duties in that respect. It will 
focus in particular on the European region, for it provides various insightful 
examples of how states progressively intervened in matters related to populations’ 
health, and represent a strong focus in this thesis. Subsection 1.1.1 will start by 
giving a brief historical background on the role of states in protecting the health of 
their populations from early civilisations to early 20th century. Subsection 1.1.2 will 
then examine the drafting of the Preamble of the WHO Constitution in 1946, a 
turning point in the recognition of the right to health. Finally, subsection 1.1.3 will 
study the widespread recognition of the right to health in human rights law since 
1946. 
1.1.1 From early civilisations to early 20th century: the role of the state in health 
protection 
This section will only focus on wide-scale public health movements and in particular 
within the European region, as my thesis studies the supranational protection of the 
right to health by taking Europe as a point of comparison. The history of public 
                                                
47 Tobin (n 19) 14–43: Tobin analysed the historical roots of the right to health in depth to 
demonstrate that it is not the product of a communist ideology. 
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health having been thoroughly reported by authors such as Rosen or Porter,48 this 
section will only examine key measures taken in decisive periods of time. First 
(1.1.1.1), I will show that states have been involved in health matters affecting their 
populations since the earliest times. I will then study (1.1.1.2) how the 
Enlightenment period and the Industrial revolution contributed to the recognition of 
states’ duty to protect the health of their populations. Finally (1.1.1.3), I will examine 
the emergence of states’ desire to cooperate and secure public health at an 
international level in the 20th century.  
1.1.1.1 Early involvement of the state to preserve the health of the community  
This subsection will demonstrate the early involvement of states in health matters 
affecting their populations. In ancient civilisations, by building drainage or water 
supply systems; in the Greco-Roman world, by institutionalising the function of 
physician; or in the Middle Ages, by establishing quarantine measures to avoid the 
spread of communicable diseases. 
Drainage and water supply systems in early civilisations 
In early civilisations, when medical means were lacking, the function of water was 
essential to human health. Used for drinking and food purposes, water was relied on 
for survival. The existence of irrigation techniques in 3,500 B.C to increase crops 
yields,49 and the existence of water supply or drainage systems to ensure drinkable 
water and personal hygiene in 2,000 B.C., 50  both outline the use of systems 
facilitating access to water. Many authors have argued that the construction of such 
systems required organised and forced labour, as well as a complex bureaucracy, 
                                                
48 George Rosen, A History of Public Health (Expanded edition, Johns Hopkins University 
Press 1993) [original edition: G Rosen, A History of Public Health (MD Publications 1958)]; 
Dorothy Porter, Health, Civilization and the State: A History of Public Health from Ancient 
to Modern Times (Routledge 1998). 
49 Steven Mithen, ‘The Domestication of Water: Water Management in the Ancient World 
and Its Prehistoric Origins in the Jordan Valley’ (2010) 368 Philosophical Transactions: 
Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences 5249, 5268–5269. 
50 Rosen 1993 (n 48) 1–3. 
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suggesting the existence of a state.51 Therefore, one could conclude that states’ 
involvement in protecting individuals’ health (interpreted as survival in such era) is 
present since the mists of time.  
The function of physician in the Greco-Roman world 
States’ interest in medical practice, however, seems to have appeared in Ancient 
Egyptian society and through its organisation of healthcare. Public medical services 
such as court physicians, dentists, physicians to the military, and physicians to 
pyramid builders emerged in 2,600 B.C.52 Nevertheless, it is the appearance of public 
physicians in Classical Greece (600-400 B.C) that revolutionised public health. 
Firstly, Greek physicians disseminated the belief that the cause of diseases was 
natural, and not divine.53 Action could thus be taken more easily to prevent their 
occurrence (i.e. through sleep, food and exercise) than previously, when diseases 
were associated with gods’ anger. Secondly, while Greek physicians were itinerant, 
cities could encourage them to stay within the community, by offering them an 
annual salary paid through a tax raised for that purpose.54 Municipal doctors were 
mostly recruited to serve the needy and research suggests that those residing in 
Athens were perhaps providing free services to the poor.55 Therefore, the provision 
of public medical assistance to the community and to the poor in particular, seems to 
have appeared in early democratic elements of the Greco-Roman world. 
                                                
51 Mithen (n 49) 5250–5251: the author argues that what academics disagree on is whether 
irrigation systems catalysed the formation of states or whether bureaucracies existed before 
such systems were created. 
52 Porter (n 48) 17. 
53 Hippocrates, The Law, Oath of Hippocrates, on the Surgery, and on the Sacred Disease 
(Translation by Francis Adams, Dodo Press 2009), ‘On the Sacred Disease’. In this piece on 
epilepsy, written in 400 B.C., the author declares: ‘It is thus with regard to the disease called 
Sacred: it appears to me to be nowise more divine nor more sacred than other diseases, but 
has a natural cause from the originates like other affections.’ 
54 Rosen 1993 (n 48) 6–13. 
55 Porter (n 48) 18. See also Louis Cohn-Haft, The Public Physicians of Ancient Greece 
(Department of History of Smith College 1956). 
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Quarantine measures in the Middle Ages 
Moving forward in time, states’ involvement in public health matters emerged even 
more clearly through the management of epidemics, in the Middle Ages. The growth 
of cities led to various outbreaks of epidemics between 500 and 1,500 A.D.56 The 
key response of the authorities at the time was to isolate the persons contaminated, in 
order to protect the rest of the population (often at dreadful costs for those excluded 
from society). The Church Council of Lyons (583) started by prohibiting the 
association of lepers with persons considered as healthy, which influenced various 
edicts across Europe to order the construction of leper houses detached from the rest 
of the city.57 Such experience shaped the institutionalisation of quarantines during 
the Black Death pandemic. When the pandemic hit Europe in the 14th century, 
Councils of Mediterranean cities adopted laws requiring that persons coming from 
endemic areas be isolated for 30 to 40 days, to avoid risks of contagion.58 Whilst 
such measures mainly served utilitarian purposes (i.e. public order), they certainly 
reflected the role of medieval authorities in the preservation of populations’ health. 
Furthermore, individuals affected by contagious diseases were not always left 
without medical care. In Europe, monastic infirmaries played an important role in 
assisting victims of contagious diseases; and in the late Middle Ages, city authorities 
started to fund public hospitals for that purpose. 59  Therefore, the concept of 
assistance to the sick was developing in the Middle Ages. However, such assistance 
remained voluntary and, thus, ad hoc.  
                                                
56 Rosen 1993 (n 48) 35–47. 
57 Porter (n 48) 27–31; Third Lateran Council 1179 (eleventh Ecumenical Council). Text 
available at <http://www.papalencyclicals.net/Councils/ecum11.htm> [accessed 8 September 
2015]. 
58 Philip A Mackowiak and Paul S Sehdev, ‘The Origin of Quarantine’ (2002) 35 Clinical 
Infectious Diseases 1071. 
59 L Cilliers and FP Retief, ‘The Evolution of the Hospital from Antiquity to the End of the 
Middle Ages’ (2002) 25 Curationis 60: the authors argue that the Muslim world was 
characterised by more developed hospitals; Rosen 1993 (n 48) 50–53: the author contends 
that the number of lepers’ hospitals in England or France represented a third or a half of all 
hospitals. 
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1.1.1.2 The emergence of states’ duty to protect the health of their citizens 
Up to the 17th century, public health measures did not clearly reflect a sense of duty. 
However, as acknowledged by Rosen, ‘[t]he 80 years from 1750 to 1830 form a 
pivotal period in the evolution of public health.’60 By laying down the foundations of 
the welfare state, the 18th and 19th centuries witnessed the emergence of states’ duty 
to protect the health of their citizens. This was particularly facilitated by the natural 
rights doctrine developed during the Enlightenment, and by the organisation of 
national sanitary movements to combat epidemics in the Industrial Revolution.  
Natural rights and health in the Enlightenment period  
Motivated by humanitarian ideals and the belief states should improve individuals’ 
conditions, the contribution of the philosophers of the French and American 
revolutions regarding health matters should not be ignored. Jefferson argued that sick 
populations were the product of sick political systems and that liberty and pursuit of 
happiness led to a healthy life.61 This influenced the draft of the United States 
Declaration of Independence in 1776, which recognises liberty and pursuit of 
happiness as inalienable rights.62 In his Encyclopédie (1751-1772), Diderot explicitly 
advocated for the creation of a public assistance scheme in France, involving medical 
care to the poor. He also stressed that hospitals should be available everywhere, and 
belong to the same network for efficiency purposes.63 While the French Declaration 
of the Rights of the Man and of the Citizen, signed a few decades later, does not 
recognise a right to health, it recognises natural rights similar to those recognised by 
                                                
60 Rosen 1993 (n 48) 107. 
61 Porter (n 48) 57. 
62 Declaration of Independence 1776 (United States). 
63  Denis Diderot and Jean Le Rond d’Alembert (eds), Encyclopédie, ou, Dictionnaire 
raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers (Third edition, Geneve: Chez Pellet; 
Neufchatel: Chez la Société typographique 1751) vol 8, Article ‘Hôpital’. Text available at 
<https://archive.org/details/encyclopdieoud01soci>, and at 
<http://artflsrv02.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/philologic/getobject.pl?c.7:1096.encyclopedie0513> 
[accessed 8 September 2015]. Translation from the author of this thesis: ‘The sovereign is 
father of his subjects ; why should he not be the general clerk of his poor subjects ?’ […] 
‘There is certainly a need for hospitals everywhere, but should they not be connected by a 
general service of correspondence ?’. 
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the American Declaration of Independence.64 Moreover, in the years following the 
adoption of the French Declaration, French authorities created various bodies and 
systems to monitor and provide medical assistance to the population, especially those 
in need. The Enlightenment thus gave rise to a new concept: state’s moral duty to 
ensure the health of individuals, in the name of fundamental rights to which all 
human beings are entitled at birth.  
Utilitarianism and public health in the Industrial Revolution 
The Industrial Revolution, which started in Great Britain in the late 18th century, and 
spread across Europe and the United States in the 19th century, also contributed to 
shaping states’ duty to protect individuals’ health, but through the creation of 
sanitary movements. The sudden increase of populations’ sizes, the wave of Irish 
emigration, and the growth of workforce needs in cities did not necessarily lead to 
the construction of more housing facilities. As a result, the working class often lived 
in overcrowded buildings and insalubrious sanitary conditions, as described by 
Engels.65 In the 19th century, an unprecedented sanitary movement emerged in the 
United Kingdom, driven by the utilitarian doctrine developed by the Philosophical 
Radicals, led by Bentham. It started by the drafting of the Chadwick report in 1834, 
highlighting the connection between diseases and poverty.66 The latter argued, on 
one hand, that workers’ deaths caused great economic costs by leaving widows and 
orphans behind; and on the other hand, that the spread of diseases was particularly 
fierce in the damp, overcrowded and insanitary conditions in which working classes 
lived. Chadwick, a British lawyer, suggested the UK could thus make an important 
economy by creating a diseases prevention programme.67 His report led to the Poor 
                                                
64 Declaration of the Rights of the Man and of the Citizen 1789 (France). 
65 Friedrich Engels, The Condition of the Working Class in England (David McLellan ed., 
Reissued edition, First published in Germany in 1845, Oxford University Press 2009). 
66 Poor Law Commissioners, UK Home Department ‘Report on the Sanitary Condition of the 
Labouring Population of Great Britain, Presented to Both Houses of Parliament by 
Command of Her Majesty’ (1842), digitized on 
<http://ocp.hul.harvard.edu/dl/contagion/005087620> [accessed 8 September 2015]. Such 
connection is outlined in the first part of the report, published in 1842. 
67 Rosen 1993 (n 48) 175–187. 
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Law Amendment Act in 1834,68 and to the establishment of municipal bodies 
monitoring public health matters, centralised under the Central Board of Health in 
1848,69 following a cholera epidemic.70 It is worth noting that similar sanitary 
movements occurred in Europe and in the United States. In 1830, French physician 
Villermé wrote a report on mortality rates in Paris (which influenced the Chadwick 
report). He, too, concluded that the spread of diseases was clearly connected to the 
insalubrious conditions in which poor persons lived, i.e. inadequate water supply or 
drainage systems.71 Another report was also drawn with regard to the conditions of 
the working class in New York by Griscom, in 1845.72 It led to comparable findings, 
and suggested the creation of hygiene education programmes among the poor. Whilst 
the reformers of the Industrial Revolution used utilitarian and economic 
considerations, foreign to the foundations of what later became human rights law, 
their demands also shaped states’ duty to provide medical assistance for everyone.  
1.1.1.3 The rise of international cooperation in health  
Up to the 19th century, the history of public health mostly recounts national 
initiatives, partly due to the fact that most health risks came from the inside. Such 
initiatives were examined through the European lens to provide concise examples 
that are coherent with the object of this thesis, but that is not to say national public 
health measures failed to occur elsewhere. Furthermore, the industrial revolution 
opened the world to international trade and transports, bringing a supranational 
dimension to public health protection. This subsection will examine the emergence 
of states’ desire to cooperate through two angles. First (1.1.3.1), it will study states’ 
                                                
68 Act for the Amendment and better Administration of the Laws relating to the Poor in 
England and Wales 1834 (UK).  
69 Public Health Act 1848 (UK). 
70 See also Rosen 1993 (n 48) 192–197; and Porter (n 48) 118–121. 
71 Louis René Villermé, ‘De la mortalité dans les divers quartiers de la ville de Paris’ (1830) 
3 Annales d’hygiène publique et de médecine légale 294.  
72 John Hoskins Griscom, ‘The Sanitary Condition of the Laboring Population of New York: 
With Suggestions for Its Improvement’ (Harper and Brothers 1845), digitized on 
<http://archive.org/details/sanitaryconditi00grisgoog> [accessed 8 September 2015]; see also 
Porter (n 48) 151–152. 
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cooperation to combat epidemics at a regional level. Second, (1.1.3.2), it will explore 
states’ desire to collaborate at an international level and on broader health issues. 
Controlling epidemics at a regional level 
Following a global wave of epidemics in the 19th century, countries decided to 
cooperate at a supranational level by initiating regional sanitary movements. From 
1851 to 1938, European states organised fourteen International Sanitary 
Conferences, in an attempt to understand and design supranational quarantine 
regulations against the spread of cholera, plague, and yellow fever.73 In 1902, 
American nations decided, in turn, to collaborate against the proliferation of cholera 
and yellow fever by starting to hold International Sanitary Conferences in parallel 
with those organised by European states.74 Furthermore, they established the Pan 
American Sanitary Bureau that same year, the first supranational health organisation 
ever created. The Pan American Sanitary Bureau (now known as the Pan American 
Health Organisation) was in charge of receiving states’ reports regarding the sanitary 
conditions in their ports and territories at the time.75 Such practice could thus be seen 
as partly reflecting what later became states’ obligation to report on the health of 
their populations under human rights law (and more precisely, the right to health). It 
is worth noting, however, that no regional sanitary movement was initiated by 
African or Asian countries, presumably because most of them were under the 
colonial rule of Western Empires at the time. As a result, the premise of international 
health cooperation seem to originate mainly from Europe and the Americas. It is 
interesting to note the influence of the Latin American socialist tradition in this 
concern, which Tobin argues is built upon Catholic values of justice.76 Nevertheless, 
                                                
73  See the reports of the International Sanitary Conferences (first to eleventh) at 
<http://ocp.hul.harvard.edu/contagion/sanitaryconferences.html> [accessed 8 September 
2015]. 
74 Norman Howard-Jones and WHO, ‘The Pan American Health Organization : Origins and 
Evolution / Norman Howard-Jones’ (WHO 1981) 
<http://apps.who.int//iris/handle/10665/39250> [accessed 8 September 2015]. Such 
conferences are now called ‘Pan American Sanitary Conferences’ and continue to exist 
under the WHO affiliation. 
75 ibid: the creation of this procedure follows recommendations formulated during the 
Second International Conference of the American States. 
76 Tobin (n 19) 19–23. 
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research on the history of public health tends to focus on the Western world (e.g. 
Rosen 1958, Porter 1993); and until recently, neglected African and Asian medical 
history. 77 
Protecting health at an international level 
Regional sanitary movements quickly gave rise to an international cooperation in 
health protection. In 1907, 12 states signed the Rome Agreement to create the first 
worldwide health organisation: the Office International d'Hygiène Publique 
(International Office of Public Health), mandated to prevent the spread of 
epidemics.78 By 1933, the Rome Agreement had 51 states parties, among which 
some representing regions that were previously left aside: e.g. Africa, Arab states 
and South-East Asia.79 At first, the Office International d’Hygiène Publique focused 
on disseminating information and designing measures to control epidemics. 
However, it slowly expanded its interests to hygiene issues and the construction of 
health facilities.80 In 1920, shortly after the creation of the League of Nations, the 
international community decided to set up another health body, working in parallel 
                                                
77 Africa: K David Patterson, ‘Disease and Medicine in African History: A Bibliographical 
Essay’ (1974) 1 History in Africa 141, 148: ‘African medical history is a virtually untouched 
field’. It is worth noting that a few books have been published since but they remain scarce, 
e.g. Steven Feierman, The Social Basis of Health and Healing in Africa (University of 
California Press 1992). Asia: Milton J Lewis and Kerrie L MacPherson, Public Health in 
Asia and the Pacific: Historical and Comparative Perspectives (Routledge 2008). The 
following two reviewers consider that this book is the first to finally address 
comprehensively the history of modern public health in this region: Shi-Yung Liu, ‘Review, 
Public Health in Asia and the Pacific: Historical and Comparative Perspectives’ (2008) 193 
The China Quarterly 189; and Alison Bashford, ‘Review, Public Health in Asia and the 
Pacific: Historical and Comparative Perspectives’ (2009) 83 Bulletin of the History of 
Medicine 790. 
78 Arrangement for the creation at Paris of an Office International d’Hygiène Publique 1907 
(states parties: Belgium, Brazil, Egypt, Spain, United States, France, Great Britain, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Russia, Swtizerland). 
79  Office International d’Hygiène Publique, ‘Vingt-Cinq Ans D’acitivité de l’Office 
International d’Hygiène Publique: 1909-1933’ (WHO archives, 1933) 5–6, digitized on 
<http://www.who.int/library/collections/historical/fr/index2.html> [accessed 8 September 
2015]. 
80 John Charles, ‘Origins, History, And Achievements Of The World Health Organization’ 
(1968) 2 The British Medical Journal 293. 
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with the Office International d'Hygiène Publique.81 The Health Organisation was 
therefore created in 1923, in accordance with Articles 23(f) and 25 of the Covenant 
of the League of Nations.82 Whilst this organisation was, again, created in the midst 
of an epidemic (typhoid), the provisions on which it relies clearly reflect states’ 
desire to improve individuals’ health, rather than simply prevent communicable 
diseases. Article 23 required that states take steps in international prevention and 
control of diseases; and Article 25, that states promote national Red Cross 
organisations to improve health, prevent diseases and mitigate suffering.83 Moreover, 
the work of the Health Organisation rapidly extended beyond the realm of 
epidemics’ prevention. It conducted various studies on rural hygiene, housing, school 
health, health facilities and health insurance. These studies assisted the signature of 
international agreements and enabled the Health Organisation to develop the concept 
of health promotion.84  
1.1.2 1946: the recognition of the right to health in the Constitution of the World 
Health Organisation 
In 1945, 49 states gathered to create a successor to the League of Nations, after it had 
failed to prevent the atrocities of World War II, and signed the Charter of the United 
Nations.85 Its Article 55 is of the utmost significance in the history of the right to 
health. Not only does it mark the birth of human rights law, it also shows the 
importance given to international health cooperation in the aftermath of a World War 
and at the earliest stages of the UN. It reads:  
                                                
81 ‘Conference on International Health’ (1920) 1 League of Nations Official Journal 88 
(Report to the Council of the League of Nations on the Measures to be taken against the 
further spread of Typhus in Poland). 
82 LON ‘Covenant of the League of Nations’ (1920) 1 League of Nations Official Journal 3, 
Art 23(f) and 25. 
83 ibid, Art 23(f) and 25. Art 24 also recognises the possibility for the League to create 
international bureaux for matters of international interest. 
84 Rosen 1993 (n 48) 482–484. 
85 UN Charter (n 25) ; UN Treaty Collection, ‘Status of the Charter of the United Nations’ 
<https://treaties.un.org/pages/ShowMTDSGDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=2&mtd
sg_no=I-1&chapter=1&lang=en#Participants> [accessed 8 September 2015]. 
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With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being 
which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations 
based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination 
of peoples, the United Nations shall promote: 
    a) higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of 
economic and social progress and development; 
    b) solutions of international economic, social, health, and related 
problems; and international cultural and educational cooperation; and 
   c) universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, 
language, or religion.86 
Following this statement, states created the World Health Organisation (WHO) a 
month later,87 before dissolving the Health Organisation and the Office International 
d’Hygiène Publique that same year.88 As outlined by Bok, all the delegates who 
came together to create the WHO knew too well the disastrous impact World War II 
had had on public health. Therefore, they all agreed from the outset that access to 
higher standards of living, better nutrition, medical care, and health insurance, should 
be guaranteed as a right for everyone.89 When drafting the Preamble of the WHO 
Constitution, the five appointed physicians and the Technical Preparatory Committee 
thus reflected this desire,90 as it now reads:  
                                                
86 UN Charter (n 25), Chapter IX Art 55.  
87 WHO Constitution (n 2). 
88 ‘Resolution for the Dissolution of the League of Nations, Adopted by the Assembly on 
April 18, 1946’ (1947) 1 International Organization 246; Protocol concerning the Office 
International d’Hygiène Publique 1946. 
89 Bok, ‘Rethinking the WHO Definition of Health’ in Kristian Heggenhougen and Stella R 
Quah (eds), International Encyclopedia of Public Health (Academic Press 2008) 590–591. 
90 WHO, Interim Commission, ‘Official Records of the World Health Organisation No. 1, 
Minutes of the Technical Preparatory Committee for the International Health Conference 
Held in Paris from 18 March to 5 April 1946’ 
<http://www.who.int/library/collections/historical/en/index3.html> [accessed 8 September 
2015]. 
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The enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the 
fundamental rights of every human being without distinction of race, 
religion, political belief, economic or social condition.91 
The creation of the WHO does not only represent a major landmark in the history of 
public health, it also recognises for the first time the existence of a right to health.  
1.1.3 From 1946 to 2015: the recognition of the right to health in human rights 
law  
Whilst the right to health was first recognised by the WHO Constitution in 1946, it 
legally came to light through the development of human rights law and is still 
relevant today. Therefore, Section 1.1.3 will discuss, firstly (1.1.3.1), the widespread 
recognition of the right to health in human rights instruments; secondly (1.1.3.2), its 
monitoring in human rights mechanisms; and thirdly (1.1.3.3), its relevance 
nowadays. 
1.1.3.1 The widespread recognition of the right to health in human rights 
instruments 
After the WHO Constitution recognised a right to health in its Preamble, many 
human rights treaties and documents embraced its legal existence. For the ease of the 
reader, this subsection provides a timeline of the most influential human rights 
treaties that have a right to health provision. Those include regional, 92  and 
international conventions. 93  By ‘influential’, this subsection understands legally 
                                                
91 WHO Constitution (n 2), Preamble. 
92 Regional human rights treaties: Europe: European Social Charter 1961 (ESC 1961), Art 
11; European Social Charter (as amended) 1996 (ESC 1996), Art 11. Africa: African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights 1981 (African Charter), Art 16. Americas: Additional 
Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights 1988 (Protocol of San Salvador), Art 10. This timeline does not include any 
instrument from the Arab world, Asia, or Oceania for they are either inadequate or 
inexistent; see the Arab Charter on Human Rights 2004 (Arab Charter), Art 39. 
93 International (human rights) treaties: WHO Constitution (n 2), Preamble (this is an 
international treaty but not of human rights nature); International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 1966 (CERD), Art 5(e)(iv); ICESCR (n 
4), Art 12.; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
1979 (CEDAW), Art 12.; Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 (CRC), Art 24; 
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of Their Families 1990 (ICMW), Art 28; Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities 2006 (CRPD), Art 25. 
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binding agreements to which a particularly high number of States are parties, and 
that represent a landmark in human rights law. The ‘landmark’ status of these 
instruments can be measured by a relatively frequent use in litigation or in advocacy. 
This timeline also includes two instruments that are not legally binding, due to their 
importance in human rights law. Those include: the UDHR, the first international 
human rights instrument; and General Comment 14 (GC14), guidelines drafted by 
the UN Committee on the implementation of the right to health.94  
                                                
94 Non-binding human rights instruments: UDHR (n 3), Art 25; UNCESCR, ‘GC14’ (n 21). 
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Figure 1 Timeline of major supranational human rights instruments recognising a 
right to health 
 
WHO	Constitution	1946	(Preamble)	
Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights	1948		
(Art	25)	
European	Social	Charter	1961	(Art	11)	
International	Convention	on	the	Elimination	of	All	Forms	of	Racial	Discrimination	1965	(Art	5(e)(iv)	)	
International	Covenant	on	Economic,	Social	and	Cultural	Rights	1966	(Art	12)	
Convention	on	the	Elimination	of	Discrimination	Against	Women	1979	(Art	12)		
African	Charter	on	Human	and	Peoples'	Rights	1981	(Art	16)	
Additional	Protocol	to	the	American	Convention	on	Human	Rights	in	the	area	of	Economic,	Social	and	Cultural	Rights	1988	(Art	10)	
Convention	on	the	Rights	of	the	Child	1989	(Art	24)	
General	Comment	14	from	the	UN	Committee	on	Economic,	Social	
and	Cultural	Rights	2000	
International	Convention	on	the	Protection	of	the	Rights	of	All	Migrant	Workers	and	Members	of	Their	Families	2003	(Art	28)	
Convention	on	the	Rights	of	Persons	with	Disabilities	2006	(Art	25)	
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1.1.3.2 The monitoring of the right to health in human rights mechanisms 
The implementation of the right to health can be subject to various monitoring 
procedures in the UN, the CoE and the African Union. Such procedures include: 
periodic states reports; ad hoc complaints; and ad hoc inquiries in presence of gross 
human rights violations (except in the CoE framework). Several SNHRBs conduct 
these procedures: the UN Committee; the European Committee; and the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Commission). Regrettably, the 
range of monitoring procedures available in other regions with regard to the right to 
health is limited. In the Inter-American system of human rights protection, the 
implementation of this right is exclusively reviewed through a reporting procedure.95 
ESCR complaints can only be brought under provisions specific to trade union rights 
and the right to education in this framework.96 Furthermore, the ‘human rights 
framework’ of the League of Arab States is heavily criticised and does not offer 
better alternatives. The Arab Human Rights Committee only supervises the 
application of the right to health through a reporting procedure, which, so far, merely 
4 states out of the 14 who ratified the Charter, have respected.97 Finally, such 
procedures do not exist in the rest of Asia. Table 1 below provides an overview of 
the monitoring procedures existing at present in SNHB. 
                                                
95 Protocol of San Salvador (n 92), Art 19(1) to (5): such reports are examined by what is 
now the Inter-American Council for Integral Development. 
96 ibid, Art 19(6): complaints are brought before the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights. 
97 The Arab Human Rights Committee was created in 2009. See Mohamed Y Mattar, 
‘Article 43 of the Arab Charter on Human Rights: Reconciling National, Regional, and 
International Standards’ (2013) 26 Harvard Human Rights Journal 91, 94; or Mervat 
Rishmawi, ‘The Arab Charter on Human Rights and the League of Arab States: An Update’ 
(2010) 10 Human Rights Law Review 169.  
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Table 1 Monitoring and enforcement mechanisms on the right to health in SNHRBs98 
Procedures United 
Nations 
Council of 
Europe 
African 
Union 
Organisation 
of American 
States 
League 
of Arab 
States 
ASEAN 
Reporting ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✖ 
Complaints 
from 
individuals 
✔ 
(individual) 
✔ 
(collective) 
✔ 
(individual 
and 
collective) 
✖ ✖ ✖ 
Complaints 
from states 
✔ ✖ ✔ ✖ ✖ ✖ 
Inquiry 
procedures 
✔ ✖ ✔ ✖ ✖ ✖ 
Special 
Rapporteur 
✔ ✖ ✖ ✖ ✖ ✖ 
Enforcement 
mechanism 
✖ ✖ ✖ ✖ ✖ ✖ 
                                                
98 This table is based on various documents. In the UN: UNCESCR, ‘Rules of Procedure of 
the Committee’ (1993) UN Doc E/C.12/1990/4/Rev.1; UNCESCR, ‘Provisional Rules of 
Procedure under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights’ (2013) UN Doc E/C.12/49/3. In the CoE: ESC 1961 (n 92), Art 21 to 
24; Additional Protocol of 1995 providing for a system of collective complaints 1995 
(Additional Protocol ESC). In the African Union: African Charter (n 92), Art 45 to 59. In the 
Organisation of American States: Protocol of San Salvador (n 92), Art 19. In the League of 
Arab States: Arab Charter (n 92), Art 48. 
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It is worth noting that supranational systems provide different monitoring 
opportunities for the right to health. However, the human rights treaties that 
recognise a legally-binding right to health  (which excludes the WHO Constitution, 
the UDHR and GC14) are all monitored through a reporting procedure, based on 
provisions recognising such mechanism. These procedures oblige states to 
periodically report on the implementation of the right to health provisions they are 
bound to. In each system, the civil society is also invited to submit parallel reports. 
This prevents SNHRBs from reviewing the implementation of the right to health by 
relying solely on governmental sources. SNHRBs then assess the content of all 
reports on an impartial basis. Once this task is completed, they reach conclusions on 
the adequacy of the realisation of the right to health in each country, and make their 
comments public. This thesis argues that reporting procedures represent the 
jurisprudence of SNHRBs to a certain extent. Firstly, reporting procedures ultimately 
aim at verifying whether states comply with their obligation to fulfil the right to 
health of their populations. Therefore, if they do not comply, this represents a 
violation of the right (whether explicitly recognised by the human rights body or 
not). Secondly, the standards developed through the reporting procedures are often 
used later, in cases opposing a more identifiable plaintiff (individuals) and defendant 
(states). Obviously, reporting procedures involve no complaint, no (real) plaintiff or 
defendant, no legal representative, no remedies, or no enforcement measures. These 
are incorporated within another type of monitoring: complaint procedures. 
Contrarily to reporting procedures, complaints mechanisms are often created by 
independent Protocols, which attract less states parties. At the regional level, both the 
African and the European systems of human rights protection have complaints 
mechanisms with regard to the right to health. Individuals living in states that 
consented to be bound by such mechanisms (or NGOs, on their behalf) can thus 
bring a complaint alleging a violation of their right to health. Such complaints can be 
brought before two quasi-judicial regional human rights bodies. The African 
Commission, which has jurisdiction over 53 states in the complaint procedure,99 and 
                                                
99 African Charter (n 92), Art 55-59; African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
‘Ratification Table: African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ 
<http://www.achpr.org/instruments/achpr/ratification/> [accessed 8 September 2015]. 
 
39 
the European Committee, restricted to 15 states in that regard.100 At the international 
level, most UN human rights treaties that have a right to health provision also have 
complaints mechanisms, except the International Convention on the Rights of 
Migrant Workers. Therefore, individual communications based on an alleged 
violation of the right to health can be brought before several quasi-judicial 
committees. The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights can 
receive individual complaints from 15 different jurisdictions (since 2013);101 and the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, from 55.102 The Committee 
on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women can review communications 
from 104 jurisdictions; 103  and the Committee on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, from 83.104 Finally, the Committee on the Rights of the Child can review 
communications from 11 different jurisdictions.105 
                                                
100 Additional Protocol ESC 1995 (n 98); CoE, ‘Signatures and Ratifications of the European 
Social Charter, Its Protocols and the European Social Charter (revised), Situation at 26 
March 2013’ 
<http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/socialcharter/Presentation/SignatureRatificationIndex
_en.asp> [accessed 8 September 2015]. 
101 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
2008 (OP to ICESCR) (entered into force 2013) ; UN Treaty Collection, ‘Status of the 
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ 
<https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-3-
a&chapter=4&lang=en> [accessed 8 September 2015]. 
102 CERD (n 93), Art 14; UN Treaty Collection, ‘Status of the International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination’ 
<https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
2&chapter=4&lang=en> [accessed 8 September 2015]. In order for complaints to be 
reviewed, states must submit a declaration under this provision, which only 56 states have 
done as of 16 April 2015. 
103 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women 1999; UN Treaty Collection, ‘Status of the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women’ 
<https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-8-
b&chapter=4&lang=en> [accessed 8 September 2015].   
104 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2006; UN 
Treaty Collection, ‘Status of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities’ 
<https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-15-
a&chapter=4&lang=en> [accessed 8 September 2015].  
105 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a communications 
procedure 2011; UN Treaty Collection, ‘Status of the Optional Protocol to the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child on a Communications Procedure’ 
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It is thus clear that the supranational forums in which the right to health can be 
adjudicated or at least, monitored are numerous, as Table 1 above demonstrated. 
Moreover, as states are increasingly constitutionalising the right to health,106 the 
possibility for adjudicating this right at a domestic level is also on the rise. This 
thesis, however, does not focus on national initiatives to protect the right to health 
but on supranational frameworks instead. In view of these observations, the existence 
of the right to health as a legal right capable of being monitored at a supranational 
level is indisputable. However, is this right created more than sixty years ago still 
relevant?   
1.1.3.3 The relevance of the right to health today 
As argued by Tobin, the historical origins of the right to health demonstrate that it is 
neither the product of a communist ideology, nor the result of utopian beliefs.107 
Instead, the right to health is firmly rooted in pragmatic and instrumentalist 
considerations at the core of states’ interests, i.e. preventing the spread of diseases. It 
also emerges from the longstanding primacy given to human life, whether in 
religious or secular systems, and the subsequent duty for states to protect the 
vulnerable. Therefore, states consented to be bound by the obligation to protect the 
health of their population not only implicitly, through a historical account of public 
health, but also explicitly, through the recognition of the right to health in human 
rights law. However, these concerns are still relevant today and so is the need for a 
right to health to exist.  
Such relevance is clearly reflected by states’ failure to meet the health-related 
Millennium Development Goals. In 2000, the UN General Assembly adopted the 
historic United Nations Millennium Declaration in a plenary meeting, establishing 
Millennium Development Goals to be achieved by 2015.108 According to Millennium 
                                                                                                                                     
<https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-11-
d&chapter=4&lang=en> [accessed 8 September 2015]. 
106 Gunilla Backman and others, ‘Health Systems and the Right to Health: An Assessment of 
194 Countries’ (2008) 372 The Lancet 2047. 
107 Tobin (n 19) 41–43. 
108 UNGA, ‘United Nations Millennium Declaration’ (2000) UN Doc A/RES/55/2.  
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Development Goals 4, 5 and 6, states had to endeavour to reduce by two-thirds the 
under-five mortality rate, and by three quarters the maternal mortality ratio. They 
also had to halt the spread of HIV, as well as the incidence of malaria and other 
major diseases. Furthermore, they had to achieve universal access to reproductive 
healthcare as well as to HIV/AIDS treatment. Fifteen years later, most of these 
targets have not been achieved. For instance, according to the WHO Statistics Report 
2014, only 33% of states had achieved or were on track to meet the targets set for 
infant mortality; and the decline of maternal mortality rate was still far below the 
target.109 We are clearly very far from a situation where individuals enjoy a right to 
health, let alone the ‘highest standard of health attainable’. Whilst this is particularly 
true for low-income and middle-income countries, European and Northern American 
countries are also facing difficulties in ensuring access to healthcare. For instance, 
the share of the population considering their need for medical examination or 
treatment is unmet, in the European Union, still varies considerably depending on 
individuals’ income.110 In the United States, 14.7% of the population (i.e. 45.5 
million persons) cannot afford any health insurance.111 Furthermore, while consensus 
on the need to implement this right is growing in the international community, the 
absence of research clarifying what it entails undermines its reality. How can states 
realise a right of which they do not understand the meaning? It is therefore 
fundamental that human rights lawyers clarify the legal content of the right to health 
to encourage the development of coherent strategies towards a better realisation of 
this right. 
                                                
109 WHO, ‘World Health Organisation Statistics 2013’ (2013) 13 and 15 (as well as 20–34) 
<http://www.who.int/gho/publications/world_health_statistics/EN_WHS2013_Full.pdf> 
[accessed 8 September 2015]. 
110 Eurostat, ‘Self Reported Unmet Need for Medical Examination or Treatment, by Income 
Quintile’ 
<http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/refreshTableAction.do?tab=table&plugin=1&pcode=tsdph
270&language=en> [accessed 8 September 2015]. 
111 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Health Statistics, 
‘Health Insurance Coverage: Early Release of Estimates From the National Health Interview 
Survey, 2012’ (2013) <http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nhis/released201306.htm> [accessed 8 
September 2015]. 
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1.2 The right to health, a right vaguely defined in human rights law 
Whilst it is crucial to understand where the right to health comes from to 
contextualise its recognition in human rights law, it is equally important to 
understand the challenges it faces today, to identify the issues it must overcome. 
Section 1.1 demonstrated that states have shown their perpetual involvement in 
public health throughout history, and have clearly expressed their desire to be bound 
to this right by ratifying human rights instruments. Therefore, this thesis does not 
attempt to justify the relevance, existence, or justiciability of the right to health. 
What it does instead, is asking where we are now and what needs to be done. Section 
1.2 will thus point at the need for the right to health to be more clearly defined in 
international human rights law. First (1.2.1), I will assert that the content of the right 
to health remains excessively vague, whether in human rights instruments or 
jurisprudence, which impedes its implementation. Second (1.2.2), I will highlight the 
failure of legal scholarship to clarify sufficiently and coherently what this right 
entails in practice, and the (underexplored) potential of SNHRBs in this respect. 
1.2.1 Excessive vagueness in human rights law 
As discussed in the introduction of this thesis, the right to health has been attacked 
on various fronts: for its weak conceptual foundations; its excessively vague, 
programmatic and unrealistic formulation; as well as its inadequate adjudication. It is 
worth noting, nonetheless, that all criticisms point towards the same problem: the 
legal content of the right to health (i.e. a normative content fit to practical 
considerations) is not clearly defined. Are those criticisms justified? In subsections 
1.2.1.1 and 1.2.1.2, I will highlight that at first glance, human rights instruments and 
jurisprudence do not clarify what this right means in practice. In subsection 1.2.1.3, I 
will then discuss the negative impact that such excessive vagueness can subsequently 
have on the implementation of this right. 
1.2.1.1 Vagueness in human rights instruments 
Human rights instruments define the right to health as ‘the right of everyone to the 
highest standard of health attainable’, which states must realise ‘progressively’.  
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At the international level, for instance, the ICESCR declares that:  
‘The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of 
everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical 
and mental health. […] Each State Party to the present Covenant 
undertakes to take steps, individually and through international assistance 
and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of 
its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full 
realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all 
appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative 
measures.’112 
Comparable statements can be found at the regional level. The ESC recognises that:  
‘Everyone has the right to benefit from any measures enabling him to 
enjoy the highest possible standard of health attainable.’113 
Similarly, the African Charter, recognises that: 
‘Every individual shall have the right to enjoy the best attainable state of 
physical and mental health’.114  
However, neither of those two instruments explicitly refers to the progressive 
realisation of the right to health, contrarily to the Protocol of San Salvador, which 
declares that:  
‘Everyone shall have the right to health, understood to mean the 
enjoyment of the highest level of physical, mental and social well-being 
[…] The States Parties to this Additional Protocol to the American 
Convention on Human Rights undertake to adopt the necessary measures, 
both domestically and through international cooperation, especially 
economic and technical, to the extent allowed by their available 
resources, and taking into account their degree of development, for the 
purpose of achieving progressively and pursuant to their internal 
                                                
112 ICESCR (n 4), Art 12 and 2(1). 
113 ESC 1996 (n 92), Part I (11). 
114 African Charter (n 92), Art 16. 
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legislations, the full observance of the rights recognized in this 
Protocol.’115 
Such formulations, however, fail to clearly indicate how this right should be 
interpreted in practice, i.e. in adjudicatory or monitoring procedures. Does the 
highest standard of health attainable mean that individuals have the right to be 
healthy, or the right to obtain expensive treatments for free? Does the obligation to 
progressively realise the right to health mean that as long as any progress is made, in 
an indefinite length of time, states comply with it?  
The UN Committee tried to clarify its interpretation of Article 12 ICESCR in 2000, 
by drafting GC14 on the right to health.116 This document provides a wide range of 
conceptual frameworks, through which states’ obligations and, thus, the scope of this 
right, are to be understood. It outlines an obligation to respect, protect, and fulfil the 
right to health (including to facilitate, provide, and promote it). It also describes: the 
obligation to progressively realise this right; minimum core obligations; the 
obligation of international assistance and cooperation; as well as obligations of non-
state actors. Finally, it declares that states must provide healthcare that is available, 
accessible, acceptable, and of good quality.  
Nevertheless, GC 14 remains highly theoretical. As argued in more depth in Chapter 
2 (subsection 2.2.2), the requirements of availability, accessibility, acceptability and 
quality of healthcare could potentially enable the UN Committee to clarify the 
normative scope of the right to health. However, the UN Committee rarely refers to 
these requirements in its reporting procedure, and the framework itself presents 
limits impeding its implementation to practical situations (e.g. crystallising the scope 
of the right through a narrow definition). Furthermore, and as argued in Chapter 2 
(subsections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2), while GC14 recognises states’ obligation to 
progressively realise the right to health and minimum core obligations, it does not 
specify how these may be monitored, and the UN Committee rarely refers explicitly 
to such obligations in its reporting procedure. Therefore, it is unclear how GC14 
                                                
115 Protocol of San Salvador (n 92), Art 10 and 1. 
116 UNCESCR, ‘GC14’ (n 21). 
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effectively clarifies how ‘the highest standard of health attainable’, or states’ 
obligations to realise it, may be materialised in adjudicatory or monitoring 
procedures. Furthermore, while GC 14 may have authoritative force, it is not legally 
binding. Human rights instruments, therefore, do not particularly clarify what the 
right to health entails when applied or interpreted in practice. 
1.2.1.2 Vagueness in human rights jurisprudence 
Although this thesis does not examine the domestic interpretation of the right to 
health, it is worth noting that national courts rarely adjudicate health issues under the 
label ‘human right to health’. The few jurisdictions that do so (i.e. South Africa, 
India, Colombia, Brazil, Argentina) have generated a highly contested case law, with 
different models of review that are far from being followed worldwide. As argued by 
O’Cinneide, this does not mean that domestic courts fail to protect social rights 
standards,117 or that a generic framework of social rights review is desirable at a 
national level.118 However, these elements highlight the impossibility of clarifying 
what the right to health means through domestic litigation and hence, the need to 
explore how SNHRBs contribute to clarifying its legal content in the course of their 
quasi-judicial monitoring procedures. 
In 1999, Toebes declared nonetheless: 
The problem with the right to health is [...] the absence of a consistent 
implementation practice through reporting procedures and before judicial 
and quasi-judicial bodies as well as an ensuing lack of conceptual clarity. 
These problems are interrelated: a lack of understanding of the meaning 
and scope of a right makes it difficult to implement and the absence of a 
frequent practice of implementation in turn hampers the possibility of 
obtaining a greater understanding of its meaning and scope.119 
                                                
117 O’Cinneide ‘The constitutionalization of social and economic rights’, in Helena Alviar 
García, Karl Klare and Lucy A Williams (eds), Social and Economic Rights in Theory and 
Practice: Critical Inquiries (Routledge 2014): the author argues that a ‘socially engaged’ 
constitutionalism is on the rise. 
118  O’Cinneide ‘The Problematic of Social Rights – Uniformity and Diversity in the 
Development of Social Rights Review’, in Liora Lazarus, Christopher McCrudden and Nigel 
Bowles (eds), Reasoning Rights: Comparative Judicial Engagement (Hart Publishing 2014). 
119 Toebes 1999a (n 1) 346.  
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Unfortunately, in 2015 SNHRBs still do not benefit from a well established or at 
least, well-known jurisprudence with regard to the right to health for three main 
reasons. Firstly, the UN Committee has not reached any Merits Decisions yet 
through its complaint procedure, due to the recent entry into force of the Optional 
Protocol to the ICESCR.120 Furthermore, its Concluding Observations are often 
vaguely formulated and are not legally binding. Secondly, at the regional level, while 
the African Commission can review the right to health through a complaint 
procedure, it only started to effectively delineate its normative content in 2001 and 
has reached very few decisions since.121 Moreover, the reporting procedure of the 
African Commission tends to copy the UN model and is characterised by the same 
vagueness (without mentioning the little online availability of its Concluding 
Observations).122 Thirdly, the Inter-American system does not allow for ESCR to be 
reviewed through its complaint procedure. Furthermore, its ‘ad hoc’ reporting 
procedure offers little to study from, whether in quantity or substance, regarding the 
right to health.123 Therefore, at first glance, these three SNHRBs do not seem to be 
able to contribute positively to clarifying the legal content of the right to health 
through their monitoring procedures. However, the interpretation of the UN 
Committee is still worth studying as it has an authoritative status internationally, and 
that of the European Committee of Social Rights brings hope. The complaint 
procedure of the European Committee has produced few but rich Merits Decisions 
on the right to health. Moreover, its reporting procedure has produced numerous and 
clear recommendations. However, no research has summarised the jurisprudence of 
the European Committee or that of the UN Committee in this respect. As a result, it 
is still uncertain whether and how they have contributed to clarifying the legal 
                                                
120 OP to ICESCR (n 101). 
121 Christopher Mbazira, ‘Enforcing the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the African 
Charter on Human and People’s Rights: Twenty Years of Redundancy, Progression and 
Significant Strides’ (2006) 6 African Human Rights Law Journal 333, 342–357; Manisuli 
Ssenyonjo, ‘Analysing the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Jurisprudence of the 
African Commission: 30 Years since the Adoption of the African Charter’ (2011) 29 
Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 358, 367–370 and 375–377.  
122 All the Concluding Observations of the African Commission can be found online at 
<http://www.achpr.org/states/reports-and-concluding-observations/> [accessed 8 September 
2015]. 
123 All the Concluding Observations of the Inter-American Commission can be found online 
at <http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/country.asp> [accessed 8 September 2015]. 
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content of the right to health in the course of their quasi-judicial monitoring 
procedures. 
1.2.1.3 The negative impact of (excessive) vagueness 
Law, and more particularly in this thesis, human rights law, does not aim at defining 
concepts with as much precision as possible. As rightly noted by Waldron:  
Perhaps, then, we sometimes try too hard to determine a precise 
prescriptive meaning for legal [and constitutional] provisions. Our urge is 
to get into a position where we can always answer the question, "Well, is 
this prohibited or is it not?" However, sometimes the point of a legal 
provision may be to start a discussion rather than settle it […].124  
Therefore, it is necessary that the legal interpretative process ensure a certain degree 
of flexibility, to avoid crystallising definitions or concepts into rigid frameworks. 
Such crystallisation can fail to reflect their complexity or can impede their evolution, 
thus impeding principles of justice and fairness to flow adequately. It is worth noting 
that the need for a flexible interpretative process is particularly relevant to SNHRBs, 
as legal pluralism and states’ margin of appreciation are crucial in international 
human rights law. However, the need for flexibility does not justify the excessive 
vagueness that currently plagues the content of the right to health, and a better 
balance must be struck between clarity and flexibility to guarantee legal certainty.  
As mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, the lack of conceptual clarity 
surrounding the legal content of the right to health can affect various actors in the 
realisation of this right and can, as a result, hinder its implementation. It is thus 
fundamental to clarify what the right to health means. First, states can be confused on 
the standards they must meet, and what they must report on. Therefore, an unclear 
legal content of the right to health represents either an opportunity for states to 
formulate excuses for non-compliance, or a risk for them to breach human rights law 
unnecessarily (on substantial or procedural grounds). Such lack of clarity also 
increases the likelihood for violations of the right to health to be ignored by states 
                                                
124 Jeremy Waldron, ‘Vagueness in Law and Language: Some Philosophical Issues’ (1994) 
82 California Law Review 509, 539. 
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not knowing or not willing to know what to do to remedy them. Finally, it can be 
interpreted as setting unrealistic expectations, which may discourage states. Second, 
NGOs can be at a loss for strategies when facing rights for which content is unclear. 
As a result, they tend to focus on rights which they believe are more accepted, 
‘enforceable’, and ‘immediate’, to carry on with their primary work of ‘naming and 
shaming’.125 This, however, contributes to a lack of visibility when it comes to right 
to health violations and makes little progress towards finding solutions. Third, the 
insufficient conceptual clarity surrounding the legal content of the right to health is 
both reflected by, and feeds on, its inadequate adjudication by domestic courts. 
Courts often avoid holding a claim admissible and reviewing its merits on the basis 
of a violation of the right to health, potentially denying protection and remedies to 
victims. Some courts (e.g. Brazil) may do so but ignore issues of resources 
constraints and health prioritisation, thus, inadequately inflating the content of this 
right. Fourth, this lack of conceptual clarity can also affect SNHRBs, when 
monitoring the implementation of the right to health. It leaves them uncertain of what 
to monitor, what to follow up, and when to reach a finding of conformity or non-
conformity. Furthermore, SNHRBs may waste time asking states to provide data and 
waiting for the latter to be sent, if states are not aware of what to report on. As a 
result, individuals are the main victims of such uncertainty. A lack of understanding 
of what the right to health entails jeopardises its realisation by states, its protection 
by NGOs, its adjudication by national courts, and its monitoring by SNHRBs.  
1.2.2 Absence of clarification in the literature and SNHRBs’ (underexplored) 
potential 
The excessive vagueness surrounding the legal content of the right to health, whether 
in human rights instruments or jurisprudence, is highly problematic. Whilst such 
vagueness manifests itself through different aspects, the failure of legal scholars to 
sufficiently clarify the legal content of the right to health clearly represents both a 
cause and a symptom of underlying problems. I will thus discuss, first (1.2.2.1), the 
increasing focus on the right to health in the literature, contrasted with, second 
                                                
125  Eitan Felner, ‘Closing the “Escape Hatch”: A Toolkit to Monitor the Progressive 
Realization of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights’ (2009) 1 Journal of Human Rights 
Practice 402, 405–408. 
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(1.2.2.2), the fact that few academics have (successfully) attempted to clarify the 
content of this right. Therefore (1.2.2.3), I will highlight SNHRBs’ potential 
contributions to clarifying such content and legal scholarship’s failure to analyse it in 
more depth. This will enable me, finally (1.2.2.4), to identify the gap in the literature 
that this thesis aims to fill. 
1.2.2.1 Increasing focus on the right to health in the literature  
The right to health is part of the economic, social and cultural rights’ family (ESCR). 
Albeit they were explicitly recognised in 1966 by the ICESCR, ESCR only started to 
receive thorough academic attention since the late 1980s.126 This is not the case for 
civil and political rights (CPR), which became the subject of considerable research as 
early as the late 1960s.127 As a result, human rights law has often been divided into 
two sets of rights: the ‘first generation’ of rights, i.e. CPR; and the ‘second 
generation’, i.e. ESCR. Such categorisation is detrimental to ESCR, including the 
right to health, as those rights have often been interpreted as being less important 
than CPR. This situation is aggravated by the belief that CPR are easier and cheaper 
to enforce, while ESCR are too complex, expensive and vague to be adjudicated or 
monitored. Whilst it is true that enforcing ESCR represents considerable challenges 
compared to CPR litigation, the vagueness calling into question their existence or 
justiciability could be potentially remedied, if attempts were made to clarify their 
legal content. Such clarification could assist the main actors involved in the 
implementation of ESCR (namely: judges, human rights bodies, individuals, NGOs, 
and of course, states), and could thus contribute in improving their realisation. 
However, the 20-year gap of research, jurisprudence and advocacy leaves ESCR 
inevitably behind in that respect, including the right to health. It is therefore 
fundamental that this gap is filled by clarifying what ESCR entails one by one, for 
clarity purposes. This is all the more fundamental regarding the right to health, as it 
                                                
126 E.g. see the seminal article in early literature on international ESCR, dated 1987: Philip 
Alston and Gerard Quinn, ‘The Nature and Scope of States Parties’ Obligations under the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1987) 9 Human Rights 
Quarterly 156. 
127 E.g. see the seminal article in early literature on international CPR, dated 1968: Egon 
Schwelb, ‘Civil and Political Rights: The International Measures of Implementation’ (1968) 
62 American Journal of International Law 827.  
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is closely related to the keystone right to life, and embraces particularly intricate 
medical, economic, ethical and legal issues.  
Literature, case law and advocacy on the right to health have nonetheless increased 
considerably over the last fifteen years. A new journal called ‘Health and Human 
Rights’ started to publish online and open-access articles in 1994, under Mann’s 
editorship.128 Furthermore, respectable human rights and medical journals regularly 
publish articles concerning the right to health.129 Nevertheless, few researchers have 
attempted to clarify the ‘legal content’ of the right to health, i.e. a normative content 
fit to adjudicatory or monitoring procedures.  
Firstly, most publications focus on the practical applications of a human rights-based 
approach to health issues, rather than on the right to health itself. For instance, 
Backman examines specific themes such as maternal mortality, HIV, mental 
disability, essential medicines, undocumented migrants and palliative care in The 
Right to Health: Theory and Practice.130  
Secondly, few publications provide an overarching theoretical framework clarifying 
the content of the right to health, perhaps due to a superior number of edited 
collections focusing on a range of thematic or geographic issues.131 For example, the 
authors who contributed to the edited collection Realising the Right to Health offer 
enlightening findings in respect of specific aspects of the right to health (e.g. 
                                                
128  The journal Health and Human Rights is available at <http://www.hhrjournal.org/> 
[accessed 8 September 2015]. 
129 E.g. Toebes 1999b (n 12); Mary Robinson, ‘Realising the Human Right to Health’ (2009) 
374 Lancet 1121. 
130 Backman (n 38). 
131 E.g. Jose M Zuniga, Stephen P Marks and Lawrence O Gostin, Advancing the Human 
Right to Health (Oxford University Press 2013); Brigit Toebes, Milan M Markovic and 
Rhonda Ferguson (eds), The Right to Health: A Multi-Country Study of Law, Policy and 
Practice (TMC Asser Press 2014); Colleen M Flood and Aeyal Gross (eds), The Right to 
Health at the Public/Private Divide: A Global Comparative Study (Cambridge University 
Press 2014). 
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vulnerable groups, the role of healthcare practitioners, etc.), but do not discuss its 
overall content.132  
Thirdly, recent publications tend to assess the adjudication of the right to health in 
national courts, but not in supranational bodies governed by international human 
rights law. Yamin and Gloppen, for instance, have exposed fascinating case studies 
on health litigation in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, India, and South 
Africa in Litigating Health Rights: Can Courts bring More Justice to Health?133 
However, none accounts for the adjudication or monitoring of the right to health in 
supranational procedures.  
Finally, authors such as Wolff or Ruger, who defend the philosophical premises of 
the right to health, do not study the practical relevance of its content in litigation, as 
the nature of their projects does not allow it.134 As a result, few researchers have 
attempted to explore how the normative content of the right to health should be 
interpreted in the light of international human rights law and in a manner fitted to 
practical considerations. It is nonetheless fundamental that such ‘legal content’ be 
clarified, in order to facilitate the development, monitoring, and enforcement of 
adequate standards at the international level. 
1.2.2.2 Few attempts to clarify the content of the right to health 
Prior to undertaking such task, one must be aware that the right to health is often 
criticised for not relying on solid conceptual foundations and that paradoxically, this 
has led academics to develop a multiplicity of justifications in response, increasing 
the likelihood for different interpretations to be developed as a result. Wolff rightly 
describes the situation as the following:  
                                                
132 Andrew Clapham and Mary Robinson (eds), Realizing the Right to Health (Rüffer & Rub 
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Our problem is not that there are no foundations for human rights, but 
that there are too many.135  
It is true, as argued by Beitz, that human rights values – such as those embodied 
within the right to health – can be endorsed without us having to agree on the origins 
of their foundations.136 Without such ‘agreement to disagree’, human rights law and 
more particularly here, the right to health, would never be able to possess any 
substantive content, or be capable of meaningful enforcement.137 However, it is 
unclear how the right to health should be interpreted when theories that agree on its 
existence clash with one another;138 or how its interpretation should respond to 
conflicts between minimalist and maximalist theories of rights.139 Such lack of 
consensus highlights the need for the right to health to fit in a theoretical framework 
that is clear, convincing, and coherent with human rights law, in order to promote the 
effective enjoyment of the highest standard of health attainable by all individuals. 
Two scholars in particular have attempted to clarify the legal content of the right to 
health in international human rights law, by drawing comprehensive theoretical 
frameworks. This work was undertaken by Toebes, in The Right to Health as a 
Human Right in International Law;140 and by Tobin, in The Right to Health in 
International Law.141 Toebes’ research, while highly informative, is restricted to 
describing how the right to health is understood in the UN system and does not 
include recent and crucial developments, since it was published in 1999. Her findings 
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thus need to be updated and compared with other frameworks, to produce a more 
comprehensive analysis of what the right to health entails at the supranational level.  
In his more recent book, Tobin uses the comments of the UN Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as well as the UN Committee on the Rights of 
the Child, to shed light on the legal content of the right to health. Nevertheless, he 
argues that the right to health is bound to be indeterminate and to thus bear an: 
‘accepted meaning […] at a particular point in time […] which attracts and achieves 
dominance over all other alternative understandings within the interpretative 
community’.142 He, therefore, suggests that the right to health be defined in a way 
aimed at convincing the ‘interpretative community’, which he understands as the 
actors involved in its realisation. Such approach represents an invaluable 
contribution to the ESCR literature, for that it attempts to draw principled and 
realistic human rights standards. However, it is also problematic for moral, practical 
and legal reasons, which I have discussed in detail in an earlier publication.143 Firstly 
(the moral argument), human rights law cannot always be built upon consensuses 
among key actors: what if the consensus points at a solution incompatible with right 
to health standards? Secondly (the practical argument), in the event key actors in the 
realisation of the right to health cannot reach a consensus, who should have the last 
word? Thirdly (the legal argument), what legal certainty can be offered with such 
evolutionary interpretative process? Although Tobin’s framework outlines how the 
legal content of the right to health should be construed, it leaves important questions 
unanswered and, thus, is not entirely fit for monitoring procedures, as these require 
further legal certainty.  
As a result, another theoretical framework, expanding on Toebes’ and Tobin’s 
findings, should be developed to clarify what the normative content of the right to 
health entails in light of practical considerations. Nevertheless, such an enterprise has 
never been carried out in depth, and the legal content of the right to health remains 
unclear.  
                                                
142 ibid 80. 
143 Lougarre (n 30). 
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1.2.2.3 The underexplored role of SNHRBs in clarifying content  
Such lack of conceptual clarity, whether found in human rights law, or reflected and 
perpetuated by legal scholarship, affects key actors in the realisation of this right and 
can thus hinder its implementation. How can states contribute towards realising the 
right to health if they do not know what it means? Therefore, and as outlined in the 
introduction of this thesis, the role of (quasi-judicial) SNHRBs is undeniably crucial 
as they can contribute to clarifying its content. Since SNHRBs are mandated to 
supervise the implementation of the right to health at the international and regional 
levels, their interpretation of what this right entails has a high degree of authority in 
human rights law, and has the potential to assist states in realising it. Furthermore, 
SNHRBs effectively delineate the content of the right to health in the course of their 
quasi-judicial monitoring procedures, when deciding whether or not it has been 
respected, and justifying why.  
Numerous scholars have studied the role and importance of human rights bodies in 
supranational monitoring.144 Nevertheless, few authors have explored how SNHRBs 
contribute to clarifying the legal content of the right to health in the course of their 
quasi-judicial monitoring procedures, or how their interpretation can be optimised 
for that purpose. Tobin, who has developed the most up-to-date and comprehensive 
theoretical framework to clarify the right to health,145 uses findings from SNHRBs 
but only on an ad hoc basis, to exemplify or assert arguments already developed. 
This is not surprising given that his framework aims at building content through 
constructive engagement with the interpretative community, in order for such content 
to be convincing. Therefore, any actor with an interest in the realisation of the right 
to health becomes a subject of research, as a member of the interpretative community 
(e.g. health professionals, NGOs, multinational corporations, etc.).146 Furthermore, 
Tobin considers that SNHRBs have not developed a clear methodology to interpret 
the right to health and that they subsequently tend to produce a results-driven 
                                                
144 For instance in the UN: Philip Alston and James Crawford, The Future of UN Human 
Rights Treaty Monitoring (Cambridge University Press 2000); Helen Keller and Geir 
Ulfstein (eds), UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies: Law and Legitimacy (Cambridge 
University Press 2015). 
145 Tobin (n 19). 
146 ibid 81–85.  
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jurisprudence. He argues that their case law may thus persuade those who approach 
the law similarly, but not those who wish to know what the law should be.147 As a 
result, of the few scholars who have analysed SNHRBs’ interpretation of the right to 
health, none have carried out a systemic and comprehensive analysis that can be used 
as a starting point for study and recommendations.148 This thesis, therefore, will 
explore the legal content of the right to health in the light of and for the purposes of 
supranational monitoring.  
1.2.2.4 Conclusion: the gap in the literature 
To conclude, the literature on the right to health highlights four features. First, the 
right to health is often integrated and dissolved in discussions on health and human 
rights law, i.e. application of a human right-based approach to health issues. Second, 
attempts to understand what the right to health means often focus either on its 
adjudication or on its normative content, but rarely merge both aspects through one 
framework. Third, the rare projects endeavouring to clarify the content of this right 
are either out-dated or do not provide a framework that guarantees sufficient legal 
certainty, which is necessary in adjudicatory or monitoring procedures. Fourth, no 
research has thoroughly studied how SNHRBs can contribute towards clarifying 
what the right to health entails, or how to optimise their interpretation. 
Therefore, existing research has not adequately addressed criticisms raised against 
the complexity, vagueness and costs of the right to health, leading to scepticism on 
its implementation. Such a situation leaves key actors unaware of how to interpret 
the legal content of this right, which contributes to poor realisation. As a result, it is 
clear that SNHRBs must contribute to remedying the excessive vagueness 
surrounding the legal content of the right to health by giving it more teeth, while 
keeping a certain degree of flexibility to adequately monitor unique situations. This 
thesis will thus assess how SNHRBs contribute to clarifying the legal content of the 
right to health in the course of their quasi-judicial monitoring procedures (in Part I), 
and how their interpretation can be optimised for that purpose (in Part II). 
                                                
147 ibid 76.  
148 E.g. Schmid (n 20). However, her analysis is limited to situations of conflicts. 
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Conclusion 
Chapter 1 contextualised the recognition of the right to health in international human 
rights law and highlighted the vagueness surrounding its legal content, in order for 
subsequent chapters to develop an informed analysis of how it is and should be 
interpreted. Firstly, Section 1.1 discussed the context in which the right to health 
came to life. It demonstrated states’ timeless involvement in public health matters 
and the slow shift from utilitarian motives to legal duties, before the WHO 
Constitution officially recognised this right in 1946. It then discussed the legal 
recognition of the right to health in international human rights law ever since: its 
worldwide recognition in human rights instruments, the existence of monitoring 
procedures supervising its implementation, and its relevance today. Secondly, 
Section 1.2 pointed at the need for greater clarity on what this right entails. While 
acknowledging the need for some flexibility in the interpretative process, it outlined 
the excessive vagueness of the right to health in human rights law and the negative 
impact this had on its realisation. It then highlighted the lack of research clarifying 
the normative content of this right in light of practical considerations such as 
monitoring or adjudicatory procedures; and SNHRBs’ (underexplored) potential in 
doing so. 
After having contextualised the right to health in international human rights law and 
pointed at the vagueness surrounding its meaning, Part I will analyse in greater 
details whether SNHRBs contribute to clarifying its legal content, and how. For this 
purpose, I will study how (collegial) SNHRBs interpret this right in the course of 
their quasi-judicial monitoring procedures. Chapters 2 and 3 will thus examine how 
the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the European 
Committee of Social Rights have interpreted the right to health, since their 
interpretations are respectively the most authoritative and precise of all SNHRBs. 
The findings derived from this critical analysis will enable me to develop, in Part II, 
a theoretical account bringing further conceptual clarity to optimise SNHRBs’ 
interpretation. Therefore, Chapter 4 will focus on the normative scope of the right to 
health, and Chapter 5 will focus on states’ obligations. Finally, Chapter 6 will discuss 
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whether international and regional interpretations are compatible and how they can 
coexist coherently.  
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Chapter 2 The interpretation of Article 12 ICESCR by the UN 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: 
conceptual clarity, a long way to go 
Introduction 
As outlined by Chapter 1, the right to health sits on firm historical roots and is 
widely recognised in human rights law, but paradoxically, its legal content remains 
excessively vague. Since Part I of this thesis aims at exploring how SNHRBs 
contribute to clarifying the legal content of the right to health in the course of their 
quasi-judicial monitoring procedures, it is logical to first seek clarification from its 
most authoritative interpretation. Therefore, Chapter 2 will examine how the UN 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (UN Committee) interprets 
Article 12 ICESCR,149 the leading right to health provision at the international level. 
Certain questions arise as a result. How does the UN Committee interpret the right to 
health when monitoring its implementation worldwide? Has it developed an 
insightful framework dealing adequately with the diversity of states parties’ cultures 
and resources? What can we learn from it, based on the principles of interpretation 
this thesis advocates? 
First recognised by the WHO Constitution in 1946 and two years later by the 
UDHR,150 the right to health is now enshrined in most UN core human rights 
instruments, including the ICESCR, adopted in 1966. Its sixty years of legal 
existence, worldwide acceptance and decades of monitoring would lead lawyers to 
believe that this right now benefits from a clear normative scope and imposes precise 
obligations upon states. However, Chapter 2 highlights that the contribution of the 
UN Committee towards clarifying the right to health is limited. Although it drafted 
the highly influential GC14 in 2000,151 the UN Committee has since failed to 
delineate clearly what this right means through its monitoring procedures. 
                                                
149 ICESCR (n 4), Art 12. 
150 WHO Constitution (n 2), Preamble; UDHR (n 3), Art 25. 
151 UNCESCR, ‘GC14’ (n 21). 
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There is significant research highlighting the pitfalls of the ICESCR and the 
challenges faced by the UN Committee when supervising its application. Over the 
last thirty years, authors such as Alston, Craven, Sepúlveda or Quinn have 
thoroughly discussed these issues.152 However, few researchers have attempted to 
evaluate the contributions of the UN Committee in clarifying the legal content of a 
right enshrined in the ICESCR, by methodically reviewing its monitoring 
procedures. In particular, no author has so far carried out an in-depth analysis of 
what such contributions might be regarding Article 12 ICESCR. For instance, 
Toebes and Tobin, who wrote influential books on the right to health in the UN, 
conducted a more ad hoc analysis in this concern 153 It is thus essential that such 
research be conducted, to address both the excessive vagueness surrounding this 
right and the gap left by legal scholars on the potential of SNHRBs such as the UN 
Committee to clarify it. When evaluating whether or not states have implemented 
Article 12 ICESCR and when justifying why, the UN Committee effectively 
delineates its legal content. This Chapter will thus analyse the comments expressed 
by the UN Committee when evaluating the implementation of Article 12 ICESCR in 
its reporting procedure.154 This research will involve a systemic analysis of the sixty 
Concluding Observations drafted between 2008 and 2012, and an ad hoc analysis of 
more recent Concluding Observations.  
Chapter 2 is structured as follows. First (2.1), Chapter 2 will present Article 12 
ICESCR, the monitoring procedures specific to this provision, and the methodology 
used for this research. Second (2.2), it will demonstrate that the UN Committee has 
not sufficiently clarified the normative scope of the right to health, as it failed to 
develop precise universal standards defining the ‘highest standard of health 
attainable’. Third (2.3), Chapter 2 will highlight that the UN Committee has not 
clarified states’ obligations to implement this right either, as it does not seem to use 
                                                
152 Phillip Alston, ‘Out of the Abyss: The Challenges Confronting the New U.N. Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly 332; Matthew 
CR Craven, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A 
Perspective on Its Development (Clarendon Press 1995); Magdalena Sepúlveda, The Nature 
of the Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights (Intersentia 2003).  
153 Toebes 1999a (n 1); Tobin (n 19). 
154 ICESCR (n 4), Art 12. 
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any tangible framework in its monitoring procedures. Finally (2.4), I will discuss the 
impact of such an absence of methodology on the legal content of the right to health, 
through a critical overview of the UN Committee’s interpretation. While normative 
scope and states’ obligations are issues inherently intertwined, distinguishing them is 
a useful way to break down complexity, often applied in legal scholarship.  
 
2.1 The right to health in the International Covenant on Economic, Social, 
and Cultural Rights 
In order to discuss how the UN Committee interprets the right to health and whether 
this clarifies its content, it is necessary to introduce Article 12 ICESCR (2.1.1), the 
procedures that can be used to monitor it (2.1.2), and to outline the methodology of 
my analysis (2.1.3). 
2.1.1 The provision: Article 12 ICESCR (and General Comment 14) 
Several provisions in the ICESCR deal with health. Articles 7(b) and 10(b) 
respectively recognise adults’ right to work in healthy conditions; and children’ right 
to protection from labour harmful to their health. Article 12, however, recognises the 
right to health as enshrined in the WHO Constitution 1946.155 This Chapter will 
focus on this provision as it is the most detailed provision on health and has received 
the most attention in this respect. Article 12 ICESCR reads: 
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of 
everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical 
and mental health. 
2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to 
achieve the full realization of this right shall include those necessary for: 
a) The provision for the reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of infant 
mortality and for the healthy development of the child; 
                                                
155 WHO Constitution (n 2), Preamble. 
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b) The improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial 
hygiene; 
c) The prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, 
occupational and other diseases; 
d) The creation of conditions which would assure to all medical service 
and medical attention in the event of sickness.156 
What makes the study of Article 12 ICESCR worthwhile is not only the inspiration it 
draws from the WHO Constitution, but also the legal force and scope of the 
Covenant itself. Since the UN opened the ICESCR for signature in 1966, more than 
160 states have ratified it.157 The binding nature of this Covenant and its worldwide 
ratification by states from every global region highlight its importance in human 
rights law with regard to ESCR, including the right to health.  
Furthermore, Article 12 ICESCR is subject to a General Comment drafted by the UN 
Committee in 2000: GC14.158 In GC14, the UN Committee outlines what the right to 
health entails by building upon experience gained through its reporting procedure, in 
order to assist states parties in fulfilling their obligations.159 These ‘guidelines’ 
explore the normative content, states’ obligations, violations, domestic 
implementation, and non-state actors relevant to Article 12 ICESCR. Although GC14 
is not legally binding, it encapsulates the authoritative interpretation of the UN 
Committee on the right to health. Therefore, this document has not only considerably 
contributed to clarifying the right to health amongst the human rights community, it 
has also been used in litigation by other SNHRBs and by national judges.  
                                                
156 ICESCR (n 4), Art 12. 
157 ibid; UN Treaty Collection, ‘Status of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights’ 
<https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
3&chapter=4&lang=en> [accessed 8 September 2015]. 
158 UNCESCR, ‘GC14’ (n 21), para 14. 
159 ECOSOC, ‘Report on the Forty-Fourth and Forty-Fifth Sessions of the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2010) UN Doc. E/2011/22 E/C.12/2010/3, paras 55 
to 58. 
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However, GC14 partially fails to respond to the demands of clarity expressed in this 
thesis, and this for two reasons. Firstly, it causes confusion by setting an excessive 
number of theoretical frameworks in which the right to health should be understood. 
Numerous frameworks are used to define the normative scope of the right to health, 
including: AAAQ requirements (i.e. availability, accessibility, acceptability and 
quality of healthcare); Article 12(2) requirements; and non-discrimination 
requirements. Numerous frameworks are also used to define states’ obligations, 
including: progressive realisation requirements; minimum core obligations; as well 
as the tripartite typology (i.e. obligations to respect, protect and fulfil). It is however 
unclear how these should interact with each other; or which one should be applied 
and why. Secondly, GC14 can also be criticised for failing to explain what the 
normative scope of the right to health or states’ obligations to realise it, mean in 
practice (and more specifically, in the monitoring procedures of the UN Committee). 
What entitlements derive from the ‘highest standard of health attainable’, and what 
does the ‘obligation to progressively realise the right to health’ entail? It is worth 
noting that GC14 is inherently limited by the need to be ‘reader- friendly, of 
reasonable length and readily understandable to a broad range of readers, primarily 
States parties to the Covenant’. 160  Nevertheless, these shortcomings should be 
addressed. 
2.1.2 The monitoring procedures 
Similarly to systems in place for other UN human rights treaties, a supervisory body 
monitors the implementation of the rights enshrined in the ICESCR. It is the UN 
Committee, who oversees the realisation of the right to health through various 
monitoring procedures.  
Firstly, it assesses states’ compliance with Article 12 by drafting Concluding 
Observations on periodic states reports. Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant oblige 
states parties to report on the observance of the rights enshrined in the ICESCR, 
including the right to health. 161  Furthermore, the Rules of Procedure of the 
                                                
160 ibid 58. 
161 ICESCR (n 4), Art 16 and 17. 
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Committee specify that these reports must be submitted before the UN Committee 
every five years and that in return, it will provide states with suggestions and 
recommendations. 162  Such comments are called ‘Concluding Observations’. 
Consensuses point to the recommendatory nature of Concluding Observations, 
highlighting their interpretative role with regard to the ICESCR. However, it can also 
be legitimately argued that these documents are legally binding, since they are based 
on Articles 16 and 17 the ICESCR, which have a binding status upon states.163 While 
the reporting procedure of the UN Committee has often been criticised for being too 
weak,164 it remains informative of what the right to health means in practice and is 
worth examining. 
Secondly, the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR establishes three other monitoring 
procedures through which the UN Committee can assess states’ conformity to Article 
12.165 The individual communications procedure is initiated by an individual alleging 
that her right to health has been violated.166 The inquiry procedure is initiated by the 
UN Committee, when receiving allegations of serious, grave or systematic violations 
of the right to health by reliable sources.167 Finally, the inter-state communications 
procedure is initiated by a state alleging that another state fails to fulfil its obligations 
with regard to the right to health.168 However, the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR 
                                                
162 UNCESCR, ‘Rules of Procedure 1993’ (n 98), see section XV ‘Reports from States 
Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant’. 
163 University of Bristol and Arts and Humanities Research Council, ‘Implementation of UN 
Treaty Body Concluding Observations: The Role of National and Regional Mechanisms in 
Europe Summary and Recommendations from the High Level Seminar Held on 19 - 20 
September 2011’, pp. 1–2 
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164 Leckie ‘The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Catalyst for change in 
a system needing reform’ in Alston and Crawford (n 144) 130–133: Leckie highlights that 
compliance with reporting obligations and recommendations issued in Concluding 
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constructive dialogue often leads to; and the insufficiency of resources. 
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166 OP to ICESCR (n 101), Art 1 to 9. 
167 ibid, Art 11 to 13. 
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entered into force in May 2013 and no decision has been reached yet under these 
three procedures.169 
It is worth noting that other institutions in the UN can monitor the realisation of the 
right to health, most notably the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health (UN 
Special Rapporteur on the right to health). The Special Rapporteur, whose mandate 
was created in 2002 (and extended in 2007),170 carries out various activities relevant 
to the interpretation of Article 12 ICESCR. She/he can: gather, request, receive and 
exchange information from all relevant sources; develop a dialogue with all relevant 
actors; report on the realisation of the right to health; make recommendations for 
improvement; and submit an annual report on her/his activities.171 Furthermore, this 
mandate has been interpreted as enabling the Special Rapporteur to conduct country 
visits, release various reports or statements, and most interestingly for this thesis, 
receive individual complaints alleging a violation of the right to health. However, my 
research focuses on the interpretation that SNHRBs develop in the course of quasi-
judicial monitoring procedures (understood as collegial human rights bodies, which 
competence to reach a decision on the compliance of the right to health is established 
in legally binding treaties). Therefore, whilst the procedures used by the Special 
Rapporteur are essential to the realisation of the right to health, they will not be 
examined in this research, nor their contributions to legal scholarship (at the 
exception of few reports). 
2.1.3 Methodology of my analysis  
As the purpose of this thesis is to explore how SNHRBs can and should contribute to 
clarifying what the right to health means, studying how the UN Committee interprets 
                                                
169 UN Treaty Collection, ‘Status of OP to ICESCR’ (n 101).  
170 Commission on Human Rights, ‘The Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest 
Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health (mandate of the Special Rapporteur)' 
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Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health (mandate of 
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171 Commission on Human Rights, ‘Resolution 2002/31’ (n 170), para 5; Human Rights 
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this right through its monitoring procedures is crucial. By evaluating whether Article 
12 ICESCR is realised or not when monitoring its implementation, the UN 
Committee effectively defines the legal content of the right to health. However, the 
procedures established by the Optional Protocol have not led to any finding yet. As a 
result, this chapter will focus on the Concluding Observations of the UN Committee, 
drafted during its reporting procedure on Article 12 ICESCR.  
Considering this procedure has existed since the ICESCR entered into force in 1976, 
it has generated a large volume of comments on Article 12. In fact, these are so 
numerous that I chose to use a sample of sixty Concluding Observations (those 
drafted from 2008 to 2012), to draw a systemic analysis of the interpretation of the 
right to health by the UN Committee. 172  It is worth noting that this sample 
corresponds to comments expressed on 23 European states, 14 African, 11 American, 
8 Asian, 3 Middle Eastern, and 2 Oceanian states. My analysis will also include more 
recent Concluding Observations but on a more ad hoc basis, since no major 
development has occurred in the manner the UN Committee interprets Article 12, 
since 2012.  
Furthermore, I conducted interviews with four members of the UN Committee from 
26 to 28 May 2014 in Geneva, to verify or reject hypotheses raised after analysing 
this sample. These questions were asked at the 53rd Pre-Sessional Working Group 
(during breaks), and were thus inherently limited to five members of the UN 
Committee, although one member was not available for interview. The reasons for 
choosing to interview the Pre-Sessional Working Group were both practical and 
strategic.  Timing and funding only enabled me to be in Geneva by the end of the 
52nd session and very few members were available then, due to heavy workloads and 
strict timetables. I thus chose to interview members of the Pre-Sessional Working 
Group instead. Being under less pressure, due to reduced workloads and fewer 
members present (i.e. 5 instead of 18), interviewees were more likely to give time 
and depth to their answers. Since my goal was to analyse qualitative data verifying or 
rejecting hypotheses made when studying these Concluding Observations, such 
                                                
172 Except UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations on Congo Made in the Absence of an 
Initial Report’ (2012) UN Doc E/C12/COG/CO/1. The latter was drafted in 2013 (although 
part of the 2012 reporting cycle). 
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characteristics were more essential than a high number of interviewees. To meet this 
goal, the interviews I conducted were semi-structured, open-ended, in person, and 
anonymous. 
Two observations can be drawn from the analysis of those sixty Concluding 
Observations and the Geneva interviews. First, the UN Committee has not clarified 
successfully what the right to health means in its reporting procedure. When it 
reviews the implementation of Article 12 ICESCR, the UN Committee does not use 
clear indicators or legal standards. Instead, it seems to use the information provided 
by states and by NGOs reports, to highlight the health issues that arise from their 
reading. Second, when the UN Committee reviews states’ realisation of the right to 
health in its Concluding Observations, it does not reach any findings of conformity 
or non-conformity to Article 12. Instead, it expresses its concern or satisfaction on 
how the State party has implemented the right to health. This lack of methodology in 
the reporting procedure restricts my analysis of the UN Committee’s interpretation of 
Article 12, to what repeatedly represents a source of concern or satisfaction. This 
also means that very few obligations are explicit (as it is case in the jurisprudence of 
the European Committee for instance), most of them being ‘implied’ instead. The 
analysis of this sample led me to the conclusions developed in the next three 
subsections, confirmed by my interviews with four members of the UN Committee. 
 
2.2 The normative scope of the right to health: unclear standards 
In order to assess how the UN Committee interprets the right to health and whether it 
clarifies its legal content in its monitoring procedures, I will first focus on how it 
regards the normative scope of this right. The UN Committee does not use clear 
indicators or legal standards in its reporting procedure, and does not reach findings of 
non-conformity. Therefore, it is difficult to define with certainty what standards it 
expects states to achieve. In this subsection, I explore how the UN Committee 
interprets what the ‘highest standard of health attainable’ entails, by analysing 
systemically the sixty Concluding Observations drafted from 2008 to 2012, focusing 
on Article 12 ICESCR. I will first (2.2.1) focus on health issues that repeatedly 
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represent a source of concern in the reporting procedure, and argue how these 
implicitly point at unmet standards. However, no obvious (or legitimate) reason 
explains why certain health issues are mentioned more often than others. Following 
this (2.2.2), I will argue that the AAAQ framework set by GC14 could clarify the 
standards states must achieve to realise the highest standard of health attainable in 
the reporting procedure. Unfortunately, the UN Committee rarely refers to this 
framework and inherent problems arise with its application. To conclude, the 
Concluding Observations of the UN Committee do not assist in clarifying the 
normative scope of Article 12 ICESCR.  
2.2.1 Topics reviewed by the UN Committee 
Analysing systemically the 2008-2012 Concluding Observations drafted by the UN 
Committee has enabled me to identify which health issues it tends to review and how 
often. This is outlined in Figure 2 below. 
Figure 2 Health issues raised in the reporting procedure 
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The UN Committee does not explicitly use any thematic indicators prompting its 
Concluding Observations to systematically address the same health topics. 
Therefore, it is difficult to delineate the legal content of the highest standard of 
health attainable by studying how it is interpreted in the reporting procedure. 
However, the UN Committee clearly emphasises certain health issues more than 
others, e.g. universal healthcare, sexual and reproductive health (SRH), and mental 
health. Those issues, surprisingly, do not explicitly correspond to the themes listed in 
Article 12(2): infant mortality; environmental and industrial hygiene, prevention, 
treatment and control of diseases; and medical assistance.173 Since the reasons behind 
such ‘prioritisation’ are entirely unknown, three hypotheses can be reasonably 
formulated, and will be developed in subsections 2.2.1.1, 2.2.1.2, and 2.2.1.3.  
2.2.1.1 Frequent failures to realise Article 12? 
The first hypothesis as to why the UN Committee reviews certain topics more than 
others in its Conclusions on Article 12 ICESCR, presumes that the themes often 
raised reflect the most common failures to realise the right to health amongst States 
parties. While an in-depth analysis of the sixty states at stake cannot be realistically 
carried out in this chapter, several examples suffice to discredit this hypothesis. The 
data of the WHO and the World Bank clearly stress that life expectancy and health 
expenditure, which are rarely mentioned by the UN Committee, are often inadequate 
among the states examined.174 For instance, the life expectancy in Tanzania amounts 
to 59 years old and is among the 40 lowest in the world.175 This issue, nonetheless, 
did not appear in the Concluding Observations of the UN Committee.176 The same 
can be said for the (low) health expenditure in Peru, which fell from 5.7% in 2008, to 
                                                
173 ICESCR (n 4), Art 12(2). 
174 WHO, ‘Interactive Chart on the Life Expectancy at Birth: Both Sexes’ 
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176 UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations on the United Republic of Tanzania’s Initial to 
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4.8% in 2011,177 but was ignored in the comments of the UN Committee.178 
Therefore, the topics that are most often reviewed by the UN Committee under 
Article 12 do not automatically reflect the most common failures to realise the right 
to health amongst States parties. 
2.2.1.2 Urgent issues within the country under review? 
The second hypothesis as to why the UN Committee reviews certain topics more 
than others in its Conclusions on Article 12 ICESCR, supposes that the topics often 
raised coincidently correspond to issues categorised as urgent by states or NGOs. 
Such urgency could potentially emerge from the reading of states’ or NGOs’ reports; 
or from oral discussions between the UN Committee, states, and NGOs (known as 
‘constructive engagement’). This could explain why, for instance, life expectancy is 
rarely mentioned. It cannot be improved on a short period of time and thus does not 
bear the same ‘compelling’ aspect as the necessity to provide primary healthcare or 
SRH services to vulnerable populations. This chapter cannot carry out an in-depth 
analysis of the sixty states studied in the 2008-2012 sample. However, the analysis of 
various exchanges between the UN Committee, states’ representatives and NGOs, 
suffice to discredit this hypothesis. This will be argued through the examples of 
Tanzania, Yemen and Sri Lanka, states with different incomes and from different 
regions.179  
In the case of the 2012 review of Tanzania, the UN Committee highlights urgent 
issues previously mentioned in reports drafted by the state (e.g. maternal and infant 
mortality, access to medical facilities),180 or by NGOs (e.g. SRH).181 However, it 
                                                
177 World Bank, ‘Health Expenditure’ (n 174).  
178 UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations on Peru’s Combined Second to Fourth Periodic 
Reports’ (2012) UN Doc E/C12/PER/CO/2-4. 
179 Michael O’Flaherty, ‘The Concluding Observations of United Nations Human Rights 
Treaty Bodies’ (2006) 6 Human Rights Law Review 27, 38–41. O’Flaherty concludes that a 
‘highly inconsistent pattern of correlation can be detected’ when comparing the topics 
mentioned in the List of Issues and the Concluding Observations of various UN treaty 
bodies, including the UN Committee. 
180 United Republic of Tanzania, ‘Combined Initial, Second and Third Periodic Reports on 
Implementation of the ICESCR’ (2011) UN Doc E/C12/TZA/CO/1-3, paras 113, 114, 121 
and 131. 
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ignores issues such as malaria or tuberculosis, representing yet important health 
crises which the government itself acknowledges.182 Such omission may be due to 
the state’s efforts to remedy this situation, but no declaration explicitly supports this 
assertion. When reviewing Yemen in 2011, the UN Committee raised three issues 
under Article 12, partly reflecting what the state and NGOs stressed in their reports 
(i.e. limited access to healthcare, high maternal and infant mortality;183 Al-Akhdam 
people’s health).184 However, its Concluding Observations fail to mention crucial 
issues repeatedly raised by both sides, such as Yemen’s inability to match its 
healthcare budget with population growth.185 Once again, such omission is not 
justified in the procedure. Finally, the example of Sri Lanka highlights similar issues. 
The Concluding Observations of the UN Committee fail to comment on the shortage 
of medical staff plaguing almost every hospital, yet repeatedly reported by NGOs.186 
Again, no explicit reason explains why this issue was ignored. Instead, the UN 
Committee mentions problems such as the adverse effects of civil war on 
                                                                                                                                     
181 Center for reproductive rights, ‘Supplementary Information on the United Republic of 
Tanzania’ (2011), available on the 49th session of the UNCESCR (12 Nov 2012 - 30 Nov 
2012) 
<http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/SessionDetails1.aspx?SessionID=44
1&Lang=en> [accessed 8 September 2015]. 
182 United Republic of Tanzania (n 180), paras 115, 118, 124, and 126: the Tanzanian 
government deplored the number of deaths caused by HIV/AIDS and declared that Malaria 
was the ‘number one killer’ in its report. It also admitted that tuberculosis was ‘on the rise’. 
183 Yemen, ‘Second Periodic Report on Implementation of the ICESCR’ (2009) UN Doc 
E/C12/YEM/2, para 153. 
184 The All Youth Network for Society Development in association with the International 
Dalit Solidarity Network, ‘Alternative Report on Human Rights of the Al-Akhdam in 
Yemen’ (2011), available on the 46th session of the UNCESCR (2 May 2011 - 20 May 
2011) 
<http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/SessionDetails1.aspx?SessionID=44
7&Lang=en> [accessed 8 September 2015]. 
185  Yemen report (n 183), para 156; National Organization for Defending Rights and 
Freedoms, ‘Alternative Report to the CESCR on Yemen’ (2011), 14, available on the 46th 
session of the UNCESCR (2 May 2011 - 20 May 2011) 
<http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/SessionDetails1.aspx?SessionID=44
7&Lang=en> [accessed 8 September 2015]. 
186 Collective for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Sri Lanka, ‘Civil Society Report 
on the Implementation of the ICESCR’ (2010), paras 117, 124, 129, 130, available on the 
45th Session of the UNCESCR (1 Nov 2010 - 19 Nov 2010) 
<http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/SessionDetails1.aspx?SessionID=44
9&Lang=en> [accessed 8 September 2015]. 
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individuals’ health or the general lack of SRH across the country.187 Whilst such 
issues are crucial, it is unsure which sources the UN Committee used to formulate 
such comments. 
To conclude, the topics often raised in the Concluding Observations of the UN 
Committee on Article 12 ICESCR do not particularly follow from the information 
submitted by states’ and NGOs’ reports. It is not desirable that the UN Committee 
fully relies on such documents as they can be inaccurate, vague or biased. For 
instance, Tanzania’s report declared that its health spending amounted to 11% of its 
GDP in 2009, while the World Bank reported 5.6% that same year.188 As for Sri 
Lanka’s report, the government announced that health targets were met, without 
giving any figures; and it did not provide any negative information about its health 
system.189 Such conflicts of interest can also arise for NGOs, such as whether 
religious NGOs working on health issues should be expected to report on the number 
of deaths due to clandestine abortions. The interviews conducted with members of 
the UN Committee in May 2014, stress their willingness to not rely entirely on such 
documents in order to remain impartial.190 They are above all independent experts. 
However, when states’ or NGOs’ reports highlight health issues of crucial 
importance, it seems illogical that the UN Committee does not mention them in its 
Concluding Observations. Such omissions defy the purpose of the ‘constructive 
engagement’ the UN Committee wishes to establish with governments and civil 
society. 
2.2.1.3 The existence of an agenda? 
The third hypothesis that could explain the emphasis of the UN Committee on 
certain health topics over others, is the existence of an agenda prioritising efforts in 
specific areas. This agenda could be potentially set by the UN Committee or by 
                                                
187  UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations on Sri Lanka’s Combined Second to Fourth 
Periodic Reports’ (2010) UN Doc E/C12/LKA/CO/2-4, paras 28–30 and 32–35. 
188  Tanzania report (n 180), para 10; World Bank, ‘Health Expenditure’ (n 174). 
189 Sri Lanka, ‘Combined Second, Third and Fourth Periodic Reports on the Implementation 
of the ICESCR’ (2010) UN Doc E/C12/LKA/2-4, paras 30, 31, 49, and 118. 
190 Interviews with four members of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, 26-28 May 2014, Geneva (see Appendix).  
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influential participants to the reporting procedure, such as UN specialised agencies 
and NGOs.  
Firstly, no document drafted by the UN Committee explicitly supports the possibility 
of an agenda pushing for certain issues more than others. Its reporting guidelines 
highlight, on the contrary, that states must account for a wide range of issues when 
describing the implementation of Article 12. These include: universal access to 
primary healthcare; physical and economic access to health; appropriateness of drugs 
and medical personnel; and availability of SRH services. States must also report on: 
diseases caused by water contamination; immunisation and infectious diseases; 
substance abuse; HIV/AIDS; affordability of essential drugs; and mental 
healthcare.191  
Secondly, since no agenda seems to have been set by the UN Committee, one may 
question what influence UN specialised agencies have on its reporting procedure. 
The Rules of Procedure of the UN Committee acknowledge the possibility for UN 
specialised agencies to submit reports together with States parties to the ICESCR.192 
However, such reports cannot be found on the online archives of the United Nations. 
One of the Committee members I interviewed explained that the UN Committee was 
often in contact with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, but 
that their exchanges were confidential.193 This Chapter will not study the position of 
each UN specialised agency on the right to health as a result. However, it can be 
observed that universal health coverage, the only issue that the UN Committee 
reviews almost systematically, is the focus of several WHO Annual Reports since 
2008.194 Moreover, SRH (the second issue most often raised by the UN Committee) 
is at the heart of two particularly influential documents. These are: the Millennium 
                                                
191 UN Secretary-General, ‘Compilation of Guidelines on the Form and Content of Reports 
to Be Submitted by States Parties to the International Human Rights Treaties’ (2009) UN 
Doc. HRI/GEN/2/Rev.6, paras 55–57. 
192 UNCESCR, ‘Rules of Procedure 1993’ (n 98), rule 64. 
193 Interviews UN Committee members (n 190). 
194 WHO, ‘The World Health Report: Research for Universal Health Coverage (Annual 
Report)’ (2013); WHO, ‘The World Health Report: Health Systems Financing: The Path to 
Universal Coverage (Annual Report)’ (2010).  
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Development Goals,195 regularly mentioned by the UN Committee; and its recent 
General Discussions on the right to health.196 Their influence, nevertheless, remain 
highly hypothetical. 
Finally, it is necessary to examine whether the types of NGOs who submit shadow 
reports have an impact on the topics arising from the Concluding Observations 
regarding the right to health. Figure 3 below summarises the types of NGOs that 
have submitted shadow reports from 2008 to 2012 (very few reports from the year 
2008 were available).  
Figure 3 Types of NGOs shadow reports 
 
* Older persons, Roma people, persons living with HIV, LGBT, indigenous people 
                                                
195 UNGA, ‘Millennium Declaration’ (n 108), para 19. 
196 UNCESCR, ‘Day of General Discussion on the Right to Sexual and Reproductive Health 
(1)' (2010) UN Doc E/C.12/2010/SR.49; UNCESCR, ‘Day of General Discussion on the 
Right to Sexual and Reproductive Health (2)' (2011) UN Doc E/C.12/2010/SR.50.  
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This pie chart, when read with Figure 2 (‘Health issues raised in the reporting 
procedure’), shows that there is no clear correlation between the issues raised in 
shadow reports, and those raised in the Concluding Observations of the UN 
Committee. The issues that are most often reviewed by the UN Committee (SRH, 
mental health, HIV) do not reflect a particularly high number of shadow reports from 
relevant NGOs. Furthermore, the NGOs submitting the most shadow reports, namely 
those working on children’s rights and persons with disabilities’ rights, do not trigger 
a prevalence of comments on such issues in the Concluding Observations of the UN 
Committee on Article 12. Interestingly, these two themes are over-represented by 
two international NGOs reporting for almost every state: Global Initiative to End All 
Corporal Punishment of Children; and International Disability Alliance. The 
interviews carried out with UN Committee members highlighted that certain NGOs 
were particularly present in reporting procedures, partly due to having their 
headquarters in Geneva. However, neither the prevalence of certain NGOs nor their 
number in a specific field seem to detract the UN Committee members from their 
independent status, which they all reaffirmed when talking about shadow reports in 
interviews.197 As a result, it cannot be said that the agenda of the UN Committee is 
particularly connected to the types of NGOs involved in the reporting procedure. 
To conclude, there is no apparent reason as to why the UN Committee reviews 
certain health topics more often than others, in its Concluding Observations. It might 
be due to a combination of the three hypotheses developed above, and to the 
background expertise of the Committee’s members, but this remains uncertain. More 
research needs to be done to understand the reasons motivating the review of the UN 
Committee in this concern. These findings also highlight the lack of transparency of 
the reporting procedure, and the lack of methodology of the UN Committee. 
Therefore, the UN Committee does not contribute successfully to clarifying what the 
highest standard of health attainable means, when monitoring Article 12 ICESCR 
through its reporting procedure.  
                                                
197 Interviews UN Committee members (n 190). 
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2.2.2 The AAAQ framework and the highest standard of health attainable 
It is thus worth studying GC14, as it provides guidelines on the ‘normative content’ 
of the right to health, building upon the experience gained by the UN Committee in 
its reporting procedure.198 In this document, the UN Committee recognises four 
requirements particularly crucial to achieving the highest standard of health 
attainable: availability, accessibility, acceptability and quality of healthcare (i.e. the 
AAAQ framework).199 I will demonstrate in subsection 2.2.2.1 that the AAAQ 
framework could potentially enable the UN Committee to clarify the normative 
scope of the right to health. However, I will argue in subsection 2.2.2.2 that the 
potential of the AAAQ framework to assist the UN Committee to successfully do so 
is limited. 
2.2.2.1 Potential to improve conceptual clarity  
GC14 clarifies the normative scope of the right to health by materialising the highest 
standard of health attainable into four requirements. According to this document, 
health facilities, goods, services, personnel and information are elements that must 
be: available; accessible; acceptable; and of good quality. 200  These four 
requirements, constituting the AAAQ framework, are then further divided into more 
detailed ‘sub-requirements’. Health facilities, goods, services and personnel must 
thus be:  
• Functioning and available in sufficient quantity (availability);  
• Physically and financially accessible to everyone, without discrimination 
(accessibility);  
• Respectful of medical ethics, and culturally appropriate (acceptability); 
• Scientifically or medically appropriate, and of good quality (quality).201  
                                                
198 UNCESCR, ‘GC14’ (n 21), part I; ECOSOC, Report of 44th and 45th sessions UNCESCR 
(n 159), paras 55 to 58. 
199 UNCESCR, ‘GC14’ (n 21), para 12.   
200 ibid. 
201 ibid. 
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In order to test the potential of the AAAQ framework to clarify what the highest 
standard of health attainable entails, I will use the example of childbirth care. In this 
instance, health facilities, goods, services, personnel, and information to which the 
AAAQ requirements apply, are the following. They include maternity wings, 
whether in public hospital or private clinics (the facilities); as well as obstetric 
equipment and medicines such as forceps, pain relieving drugs etc. (the goods). They 
also include procedures such as epidural anaesthesia or caesarean section (the 
services); obstetricians and midwives (the personnel); as well as medical advice 
provided in case of complications (the information). Furthermore, according to the 
AAAQ framework, all these elements must be functioning and in sufficient numbers, 
compared to the needs of the population (availability). They must also be spread 
adequately throughout the country in order to be geographically accessible to 
everyone, including to persons living in rural areas. Their costs must be affordable to 
everyone, including for persons living in poverty. Medical advice in case of obstetric 
complications must be given to all future parents (accessibility). Furthermore, 
obstetric care must respect medical ethics (e.g. physicians must obtain informed 
consent of the patient before administrating epidural anaesthesia). It must also be 
culturally appropriate (e.g. possibility for the patient to choose the position during 
delivery if it does not involve any medical risks)202 (acceptability). Finally, obstetric 
care must be scientifically and medically appropriate (e.g. evidence-based 
procedures with best outcome for the patient and the foetus, such as caesarean 
section when the foetus is in transverse position). It must also be of good quality (e.g. 
trained midwives) (quality).  
At first glance, the AAAQ framework seems to successfully clarify what the highest 
standard of childbirth care attainable entails. It applies fundamental requirements of 
healthcare delivery to key elements of childbirth in a coherent, comprehensive and 
transparent manner. As a result, it represents an improvement from the erratic review 
operated by the UN Committee in its Concluding Observations on Article 12 
ICESCR. It is also worth noting that the AAAQ framework is sometimes used by 
                                                
202  Sabine Gabrysch and others, ‘Cultural Adaptation of Birthing Services in Rural 
Ayacucho, Peru’ (2009) 87 Bulletin of the World Health Organization 724, 726.  
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NGOs,203 and by academics,204 when seeking conceptual clarity in human right law. 
Finally, the UN Committee indirectly endorses the relevance of the AAAQ 
framework in its reporting procedure, by regularly expressing dissatisfaction 
regarding situations in which such requirements are unmet. For instance, concerns 
expressed against insufficient medical staff in geriatrics, indirectly relate to the 
requirement ‘availability’, and to the sub-requirement ‘availability of health 
professionals’.205 Such practice is reflected in Figure 4. 
                                                
203  E.g. Physicians for Human Rights, ‘Tools & Resources: AAAQ Framework.’ 
<http://phrtoolkits.org/toolkits/medical-professionalism/the-human-rights-basis-for-
professionalism-in-health-care/aaaq-framework/> [accessed 8 September 2015]; 
International Federation of Health and Human Rights Organisations, ‘Site Visits - Applying 
the AAAQ Framework in Health Institutions.’ <http://www.ifhhro-training-
manual.org/index.php?r=training/view&id=14&sid=7> [accessed 8 September 2015]; 
Kenyan ESCR Coalition, International Network for Economic Social & Cultural Rights, 
‘Challenging Poverty and Inequality through Human Rights’ (2008) at International Strategy 
Meeting on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and ESCR-NET General Assembly 
<http://www.escr-net.org/docs/i/836924> [accessed 8 September 2015]. 
204 E.g. Judith V Welling, ‘International Indicators and Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights’ (2008) 30 Human Rights Quarterly 933, 951–952: Welling argues that ‘The 
significance and value of the newly delineated norms [AAAQ framework] is clear, and 
should inform the creation of indicator sets linking closely with the Covenant [ICESCR]’; 
Sital Kalantry, Jocelyn E Getgen and Steven Arrigg Koh, ‘Enhancing Enforcement of 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights Using Indicators: A Focus on the Right to Education 
in the ICESCR’ (2010) 32 Human Rights Quarterly 253, 273–279: the authors use this 
framework to suggest a set of indicators enabling the UN Committee to monitor the right to 
education (although for the right to education, the element ‘quality’ has become 
‘adaptability’). 
205 E.g. see concerns expressed in: UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations on Germany’s 
Fifth Periodic Report’ (2011) UN Doc E/C12/DEU/CO/5, para 27; UNCESCR, ‘Concluding 
Observations on The Kingdom of the Netherlands’ Combined Fourth and Fifth Periodic 
Report’ (2010) UN Doc E/C12/NDL/CO/4-5, para 29. 
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Figure 4 Indirect review of AAAQ requirements in Concluding Observations (based on 
the 2008-2012 sample)  
 
However, the UN Committee does not explicitly acknowledge the relevance of the 
AAAQ framework in its Concluding Observations on Article 12 ICESCR. These 
connections result from my own analysis of the issues addressed in the 2008-2012 
sample of Concluding Observations. 
2.2.2.2 Limited capacity to improve conceptual clarity  
Whilst the AAAQ framework could improve the ability of the UN Committee to 
clarify the normative scope of the right to health in its reporting procedure, three 
limits arise. 
Firstly, the failure of the UN Committee to use the AAAQ framework in its 
Concluding Observations on Article 12 ICESCR reflects a discrepancy between the 
standards drawn in abstracto in GC14, and those effectively applied in monitoring. 
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Therefore, its interpretation could be criticised for being insufficiently coherent and 
principled. This was confirmed through the interviews conducted in Geneva in May 
2014: none of the four UN Committee members declared using the AAAQ 
framework, and some were unaware of its meaning.206  
Secondly, the focus of the UN Committee on accessibility issues in its Concluding 
Observations, as showed by Figure 4, reflects the key role that the accessibility 
requirement plays in the AAAQ framework, but can be problematic on two aspects. 
The accessibility requirement plays a key role in monitoring healthcare delivery. 
Logically, individuals cannot benefit from a health service that is available, 
acceptable and of good quality, if they cannot access it in the first place.207 For 
instance, healthcare that is unaffordable for the poor in the United States; or 
healthcare that is not within safe physical reach for Palestinians in Israel. 
Furthermore, the accessibility requirement plays a key role in monitoring the non-
discrimination principle, a cornerstone of human rights law. In its Concluding 
Observations, the UN Committee often expresses concern regarding health 
discrimination with regard to Article 2(2) ICESCR (and not necessarily Article 
12).208  
However, such focus on accessibility issues in Concluding Observations can impede 
the capacity of the UN Committee to successfully clarify the normative scope of the 
right to health for two reasons. First, whilst AAAQ requirements are bound to be 
intertwined, an all-inclusive umbrella requirement (i.e. accessibility) might cause 
repetition and confusion in monitoring procedures. For instance, does a service have 
to be available to be accessible, or does it have to be accessible to be available? 
Second, focusing on accessibility issues should not result in an insufficient review of 
the availability, acceptability, and quality of healthcare, as showed by Figure 4, since 
these remain crucial. For instance, a health service that is not acceptable or not of 
                                                
206 Interviews UN Committee members (n 190), Question 3. 
207 It is worth noting that medical experts also defend the centrality of accessibility: Jean-
Frederic Levesque, Mark F Harris and Grant Russell, ‘Patient-Centred Access to Health 
Care: Conceptualising Access at the Interface of Health Systems and Populations’ (2013) 12 
International Journal for Equity in Health 18. 
208 ICESCR (n 4), Art 2(2). 
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good quality may discourage patients from using it, regardless of the fact that it is 
accessible and available in sufficient numbers. In Ecuador, maternal care that did not 
offer women the choice of a delivery position adapted to their cultural background 
(although safe for women’s and foetus’ health), was reported as deterring them from 
having an institutional delivery. 209  This thesis acknowledges, nonetheless, that 
evaluating the acceptability and quality of healthcare requires greater medical 
expertise than assessing its availability or accessibility, and does not always bear the 
same urgency. 
Finally, the third limit to the potential of the AAAQ framework in clarifying the right 
to health, is that it may crystallise and, thus, restrict its normative scope as a result. It 
is worth noting that Levesque, Harris and Russell, who synthesised how access to 
health was conceptualised in the literature, suggested five dimensions to healthcare. 
They advise that healthcare be understood through the dimensions of 
approachability; acceptability; availability and accommodation; affordability; and 
appropriateness. Interestingly, this framework partially covers the AAAQ 
requirements but adds two supplementary requirements: i.e. providing healthcare in a 
timely manner; and according to patients’ needs.210 These two requirements cannot 
be found within the AAAQ framework although they are essential to achieving the 
highest standard of health attainable. 
To conclude, whilst the AAAQ framework could potentially contribute to clarifying 
the normative scope of the right to health, it remains unused by the UN Committee, 
and when (indirectly) applied in its reporting procedure, is inherently limited. As a 
result, the AAAQ framework does not contribute entirely adequately to defining 
what the highest standard of health attainable means in the reporting procedure of the 
UN Committee. 
 
                                                
209 La revolución Ciudadana Avanza, Care and Ministerio de Salud Pública, ‘Culturally 
Appropriate Delivery Care: A Right of Women and Newborns (Área de Salud N°12 Hospital 
Raúl Maldonado Mejía Cantón-Cayambe, Ecuador)’ (2010) 
<http://www.care.org/sites/default/files/documents/MH-PCA_ingles.pdf> [accessed 8 
September 2015]. 
210 Levesque, Harris and Russell (n 207) 22–23. 
 
81 
2.3 States’ obligations to realise the right to health: unclear framework 
After having assessed the (unsuccessful) contributions of the UN Committee to the 
clarification of the normative scope of the right to health, I will examine whether it 
has interpreted more precisely states’ obligations to realise this right, when 
monitoring it. Section 2.3 will thus study how the UN Committee expects states to 
implement the right to health, mainly based on a systemic analysis of sixty 
Concluding Observations, drafted from 2008 to 2012. Three findings can thus be 
highlighted when examining the ‘concerns’ and ‘recommendations’ it formulates 
against states in difficulty under Article 12 ICESCR. Firstly (2.3.1), I will 
demonstrate that the UN Committee explicitly requires that states progress in the 
field of healthcare, and that it follows up such evolution. Secondly (2.3.2), I will 
highlight that the UN Committee rarely refers to the notion of minimum core, but 
often expects states to immediately realise certain aspects of health. Lastly (2.3.3), I 
will discuss the substantive obligations arising from that to report under Article 12, 
i.e. collect and submit data. It is worth noting that this section will not study states’ 
obligations in the light of the dichotomic obligations of result and conduct; or the 
tripartite typology obligation to respect, protect and fulfil, yet recognised in GC14.211 
This thesis refutes their relevance since those categories frequently overlap,212 are 
not used in the monitoring procedures of the UN Committee; and more importantly, 
listing the measures required by Article 12 is pointless, as these are too diverse to be 
crystallised into a framework. Instead, I will focus on progressive realisation and 
minimum core, more established concepts. 
2.3.1 Obligation of progressive realisation under Article 12 ICESCR 
Article 12 ICESCR imposes a central obligation upon States parties: achieving the 
highest standard of health attainable for their populations. However, it does not 
specify how, and more particularly, in what timeframe it expects them to do so (since 
                                                
211 UNCESCR, ‘GC14’ (n 21), paras 30, 31, 33–37, 43 and 44. See also UNCESCR, 
‘General Comment No. 3: The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations (Art 2, Para. 1)’ (1990), 
para 1.  
212  Such criticisms also appear in: Scott Leckie, ‘Another Step towards Indivisibility: 
Identifying the Key Features of Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1998) 
20 Human Rights Quarterly 81, 92; and will be discussed in Chapter 5. For a detailed 
account on the debate on obligations of result and conduct, see Sepúlveda (n 152) 184–196. 
 
82 
this section does not study obligations of conduct). Such details, however, can be 
found in Article 2(1) ICESCR, key provision of the Covenant. This provision reads: 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, 
individually and through international assistance and co-operation, 
especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available 
resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of 
the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, 
including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.213 
When applied to the right to health, the obligation of progressive realisation appears 
in GC14,214 but not explicitly in the Concluding Observations of the UN Committee. 
This section will nonetheless argue that the UN Committee implicitly recognises this 
concept in its reporting procedure on Article 12 ICESCR, (2.3.1.1) by expecting 
states to ‘progress’; (2.3.1.2) and by carrying out a follow-up. Such means, although 
insufficiently explicit, enable the UN Committee to delineate the nature of this 
obligation under the right to health.  
2.3.1.1 States under an obligation of ‘progress’ 
Craven, Alston, and Quinn have examined in great depth the meaning of each term in 
Article 2(1), by studying the Travaux Préparatoires of the ICESCR. 215  What 
transpires from their analysis is that while states must progressively realise the rights 
enshrined in the ICESCR, they must fulfil three requirements. First, states must 
adopt appropriate and comprehensive means to realise the right to health, including 
but not exclusively legislative measures. Second, states’ actions must be directed 
towards one goal: the full realisation of the right, i.e. the highest standard of health 
attainable. Third, states must use the maximum resources available to realise the 
right to health, which should not be restricted to budgetary considerations. 
Therefore, when asking for information on a particular health issue, the UN 
Committee often specifies that data must demonstrate the ‘progress’ made by the 
                                                
213 ICESCR (n 4), Art 2(1). 
214 UNCESCR, ‘GC14’ (n 21), paras 30 and 31. 
215 Craven (n 152) 106–152; Alston and Quinn (n 126) 164–191. 
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state in this field.216 Likewise, when the information provided by the state shows that 
its performance in healthcare has improved, the UN Committee expresses 
satisfaction. For instance, it recently commended Sri Lanka for ‘its significant 
progress towards the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, especially 
in the field of health’.217 However, if such information does not show sufficient 
progress (or if there is no information at all), the UN Committee can require that the 
state take further measures. For instance, it asked Kenya to progressively extend the 
scope of its health insurance in order to reimburse hospitalisation fees and to cover 
the entirety of workers and unemployed persons.218 Finally, the UN Committee has 
explicitly referred to the obligation of progressive realisation and to Article 2(1) a 
few times, when urging states to increase their spending on health services.219 For 
instance, it requested the Philippines to expand its health expenditure because this 
figure was low, had decreased, and did not follow the overall GDP growth.220  
The UN Committee also encourages states to develop health indicators and 
benchmarks,221 stating that these enable states to monitor their own performance in 
healthcare.222 Subsection 2.2.1, nevertheless, shows that states’ reports could be 
                                                
216 E.g. UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations on Ecuador’s Third Periodic Report’ (2012) 
UN Doc E/C12/ECU/CO/3, para 30: ‘The Committee requests the State party to provide 
information on the progress made in the field of mental and psychosocial health in its next 
periodic report’. 
217 E.g. UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations Sri Lanka 2010’ (n 187), para 5. 
218 UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations on Kenya’s First Periodic Report’ (2008) UN Doc 
E/C12/KEN/CO/1, para 20. 
219 E.g. UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations DRC 2009’ (n 61), para 16; UNCESCR, 
‘Concluding Observations on Cambodia’s Combined Initial and Second to Fourth Periodic 
Reports’ (2009) UN Doc E/C12/KHM/CO/1, para 27; ICESCR (n 4), Art 2(1). 
220  UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations on Philippines’ Combined Second to Fourth 
Periodic Reports’ (2008) UN Doc E/C12/PHL/CO/4, para 17. 
221  E.g. UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations on Russian Federation’s Fifth Periodic 
Report’ (2011) UN Doc E/C12/RUS/CO/5, para 37; UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations 
on Australia‘s Fourth Periodic Report’ (2009) UN Doc E/C12/AUS/CO/4, para 28: ‘the 
Committee invites the State party to identify disaggregated health indicators and appropriate 
national benchmarks in relation to the right to health, in line with the Committee’s General 
Comment No.14 (2000)’. 
222 E.g. UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations Sri Lanka 2010’ (n 187), para 30: ‘The 
Committee encourages the State party to further develop indicators and benchmarks, 
disaggregated by sex, age, urban/rural population and social and ethnic group, for monitoring 
progress achieved in combating poverty’. 
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inaccurate (e.g. Tanzania) or biased (e.g. Sri Lanka).223 Therefore, how can states be 
trusted with developing their own indicators, or monitoring themselves? How can 
such indicators guarantee a comprehensive and expert review of the right to health? 
Moreover, how can the realisation of this right be assessed methodically if each state 
has a different set of indicators? In order to ensure impartiality, expertise, and 
methodology in the evaluation of states’ progress in healthcare, it is essential the UN 
Committee design its own indicators. This would enable it to review the performance 
of each state in each reporting cycle, with regard to the same issues (SRH, 
communicable diseases, etc.). The UN Committee sometimes uses the targets set by 
the Millennium Development Goals in the field of health, in order to assess whether 
a state is on track (e.g. regarding maternal mortality).224 However, this is insufficient. 
Indicators are fundamental to monitor the obligation to progressively realise the right 
to health, since they are the only means through which compliance can be measured. 
This argument is supported by Hunt, in his capacity as former UN Special 
Rapporteur on the right to health,225 and scholar.226 He stated that ‘there is no 
alternative but to use indicators to measure and monitor the progressive realization 
of the right to the highest attainable standard of health’.227 All four UN Committee 
members whom I interviewed declared they used what some called ‘indicators’ and 
others called ‘statistics’, in the reporting procedure.228 However, it is unclear what 
indicators the UN Committee uses, since it seems to operate on an ad hoc basis and 
does not mention the sources used to reach its conclusions. As a result, there is no 
guarantee states’ progress is reviewed comprehensively (i.e. review of all relevant 
                                                
223  Tanzania report (n 180), para 110; World Bank, ‘Health Expenditure’ (n 174); Sri Lanka 
report (n 189), paras 30, 31, 49, and 118. 
224 These were used, for instance, in UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations Cambodia 2009’ 
(n 219), para 32. 
225 Special Rapporteur on the right to health, Paul Hunt, ‘Annual Report to the General 
Assembly (Main Focus: Right to Health Indicators)’ (2003) UN Doc A/58/427. 
226 Hunt and McNaughton, ‘A Human Rights-Based Approach to Health Indicators’, in 
Mashood Baderin (ed) Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in Action (Oxford University 
Press 2007). 
227 Special Rapporteur on the right to health, Paul Hunt, ‘Annual Report to the Commission 
on Human Rights (Main Focus: A Human Rights-Based Approach to Health Indicators)’ 
(2006) UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/48, para 29. 
228 Interviews UN Committee members (n 190). 
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health issues) or coherently (i.e. similar review across reporting cycles and across 
states, to enable or compare progress). It is nonetheless essential that the UN 
Committee materialise the obligation to progress in a comprehensive and coherent 
manner, in order to define the substance of the right to health adequately. 
2.3.1.2 The existence of a rudimentary follow-up 
The UN Committee clearly expects states’ performance to progress in the field of 
healthcare, but how does it monitor such evolution without indicators in order to give 
life to this obligation? I will demonstrate that the UN Committee frequently follows 
up on issues raised in previous Concluding Observations. Such review, nonetheless, 
is neither systematic nor comprehensive. This will be illustrated through the 
examples of the United Kingdom, Bolivia, Cameroon and South Korea, in Table 2 
below. These countries were selected on the basis of their geographical and 
economic representation, as well as for having been subject to the reporting 
procedure more than once in the last 15 years. It is worth mentioning that the latter 
element severely restricted the number of countries available for this analysis. Most 
countries have either never reported on the implementation of the Covenant, or 
reported only once, or submitted reports with considerable delays in between.  
This case study stresses that while the UN Committee attempts to follow up states’ 
progress under Article 12 ICESCR, it fails to do so consistently. The example of the 
United Kingdom points at the absence of follow up on the implementation of Article 
12 ICESCR. The examples of Bolivia and Cameroon demonstrate that the UN 
Committee (explicitly) follows up states progress under Article 12 in its reporting 
procedure, but that it forgets to review certain peripheral issues. Finally, the example 
of South Korea highlights that the UN Committee follows up on the implementation 
of Article 12, but that it does not monitor comprehensively the evolution of states’ 
performance in healthcare. As a result, not only does its monitoring deprive the 
obligation of progressive realisation from a coherent substance, potential violations 
can easily go unnoticed. The adoption of indicators and benchmarks in the 
Concluding Observations of the UN Committee could nonetheless potentially 
overcome the inconsistency of its monitoring and materialise the requirement to 
progressively realise the right to health into a legal obligation.
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Table 2 Follow up on health issues raised under Article 12 ICESCR from one reporting 
cycle to the next  
Country under 
review 
Health issues raised in previous 
Concluding Observations 
Health issues followed up 
in next Concluding 
Observations 
United 
Kingdom 229 
Prevalence of mental health issues 
among homeless persons 
NO 
High prevalence of HIV/AIDS in the 
Caribbean territories 
NO 
Bolivia230 Inadequate access to healthcare for the 
poorest 
PARTIALLY (and not 
explicitly) 
Health discrimination against 
indigenous persons 
YES 
High maternal mortality YES (but not explicitly) 
Cameroon231 Female genital mutilation (FGM) PARTIALLY 
High maternal mortality YES 
Inadequate medical facilities PARTIALLY (and not 
explicitly) 
South Korea232 Marginalisation of certain groups in 
healthcare 
YES (but not explicitly) 
Priority to urban areas in health 
programmes 
NO 
Low budget allocated to health YES (but not explicitly) 
2.3.2 Minimum core obligations under Article 12 
The UN Committee clearly recognises the existence of minimum core obligations to 
realise the right to health in GC14. GC14 dedicates an entire section to this topic in 
paragraphs 43, 44, and 45, and provides a non-exhaustive list of what such 
                                                
229 UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations on the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, the Crown Dependencies and the Overseas Dependent Territories' Fourth 
Periodic Report’ (2002) UN Doc E/C12/1/Add79, paras 19, 21, 38, 40; UNCESCR, 
‘Concluding Observations on the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the 
Crown Dependencies and the Overseas Dependent Territories’ (2009) UN Doc 
E/C12/GBR/CO/5, paras 7 and 29. 
230 UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations on Bolivia’s First Periodic Report’ (2001) UN 
Doc E/C12/1/Add60, paras 13, 14, 23, 30, 43; UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations on 
Bolivia’s Second Periodic Report’ (2008) UN Doc E/C12/BOL/CO/2, paras 6, 15, 22, 27(f), 
28, 34, 35.  
231 UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations on Cameroon’s First Periodic Report’ (1999) UN 
Doc E/C12/1/Add40, paras 15, 25, 26, 33, 42, 45; UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations on 
Cameroon’s Second and Third Periodic Reports’ (2012) UN Doc E/C12/CMR/CO/2-3*, 
paras 5(d) to (e), 20, 27, 28. 
232 UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations on Republic of Korea’s Second Periodic Report’ 
(2001) UN Doc E/C12/1/Add59, paras 11, 22, 26, 34; UNCESCR, ‘Concluding 
Observations on Republic of Korea’s Third Periodic Report’ (2009) UN Doc 
E/C12/KOR/CO/3, paras 22 and 30. 
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obligations include. 233  After analysing the sample of 2008-2012 Concluding 
Observations, two conclusions can be drawn in that respect. First, (2.3.2.1) the UN 
Committee rarely refers to the concept of minimum core obligations in the context of 
Article 12; and second, (2.3.2.2), it however recognises states’ obligation to take 
‘immediate steps’. Such means, although implicit, seem to point towards the 
recognition of a core obligation to prioritise (at least, in time) certain areas of health.  
2.3.2.1 The rare recognition of minimum core obligations 
The concept of minimum core obligations did not appear in the text of the ICESCR. 
It emerged instead in the 1980s, in the literature on ESCR.234 In 1990, however, this 
concept received a more authoritative recognition through General Comment 3 on 
the nature of States’ obligations under Article 2(1) of the ICESCR. In this document, 
the UN Committee describes minimum core obligations as ensuring the realisation of 
‘at the very least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights’ (of the 
Covenant).235 It specifies that in the context of health, these represent ‘essential 
primary health care’, and that without such minima the ICESCR would lose its 
‘raison d’être’. 236 The UN Committee confirmed the existence of core obligations to 
realise the right to health in GC14. Not only does GC14 set a long list of core 
obligations under Article 12, it also declares that they are non-derogable and that 
retrogressive measures in that respect would, therefore, violate automatically the 
right to health.237 
While the UN Committee emphasises the importance of minimum core obligations 
in its General Comments, it very rarely refers to them in its Concluding Observations 
(at least under Article 12 ICESCR). The only occasion for which this expression was 
recently used concerned irregular migrants’ health. In 2010, the UN Committee 
expressed its concern over the fact that irregular migrants had difficulty in accessing 
                                                
233 UNCESCR, ‘GC14’ (n 21), paras 19, 43–45, 47, 48, and 60. 
234 As outlined by Audrey Chapman and Sage Russell (eds), Core Obligations: Building a 
Framework for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Intersentia 2002) 8. 
235 UNCESCR, ‘General Comment 3’ (n 211), para 10. 
236 ibid. 
237 UNCESCR, ‘GC14’ (n 21), paras 43, 44, 47, and 48. 
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healthcare in Netherlands, although they were legally entitled to it. As a result, it 
urged the Netherlands to ‘meet its core obligations’ by providing undocumented 
migrants with minimum essential levels of healthcare.238 More implicitly, the UN 
Committee referred to what seemed to be a ‘minimum standard’ in the case of the 
Dominican Republic. It observed with dissatisfaction that the public health system of 
this state was ‘seriously underfunded’. It thus urged the Dominican Republic to 
increase its healthcare expenditure in order to ‘at least’ align with the international 
standard amounting to 3% of its GDP.239 It is worth noting that during the interviews 
carried out in Geneva, 3 members out of 4 declared being sceptical about core 
obligations and thus favouring a more flexible approach, based on resource 
availability.240 
As a result, the UN Committee has not developed any clear ‘minimum’ standards 
when monitoring Article 12 ICESCR. Moreover, it does not reach any findings of 
non-conformity in its Concluding Observations, contrarily to what the non-
derogability approach in GC14 would suggest.241 It is thus difficult to clearly 
delineate what minimum standards states are required to fulfil under the right to 
health, based on the reporting procedure of the UN Committee. The UN Committee, 
nonetheless, implicitly recognises the notion of minimum core by regularly 
requesting that States parties take ‘immediate steps’ to redress certain situations.  
2.3.2.2 States under the obligation to take ‘immediate’ steps 
In General Comment 3, the UN Committee declares that fulfilling minimum core 
obligations must be considered ‘as a matter of priority’, as they guarantee minimum 
levels of rights. 242  In their book Core Obligations: Building a framework for 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Chapman and Russell also translate the notion 
of priority into a timing perspective, to differentiate core and progressive 
                                                
238 UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations Netherlands 2010’ (n 205), para 25(b). 
239 UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations on Dominican Republic’s Third Periodic Report’ 
(2010) UN Doc E/C12/DOM/CO/3, para 30. 
240 Interviews UN Committee members (n 190). 
241 UNCESCR, ‘GC14’ (n 21), para 48. 
242 UNCESCR, ‘General Comment 3’ (n 211), para 10. 
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obligations.243 They argue that States parties to the ICESCR must immediately 
address the minimum levels required by the Covenant, while progressively realising 
other standards. While they declare that such distinction does not result in a 
hierarchy benefiting to minimum core obligations, 244 two observations should be 
made. First, this assertion is overly optimistic. For many states, realising all the core 
obligations listed by GC14 may mean having no resources left to realise the 
progressive aspects of the right to health; especially if the obligation of progressive 
obligation is derogable and core obligations are not. This would thus result in a de 
facto and a de jure hierarchy of obligations, benefiting to the minimum core. Second, 
how can minimum core obligations be realistically defined, what with the diversity 
of resources (and willingness) to realise the right to health amongst States parties to 
the ICESCR? 
The 2008-2012 sample of Concluding Observations examined highlight that the UN 
Committee implicitly recognises the existence of core obligations, by using a 
terminology that reflects the priority and urgency of certain situations.  After having 
expressed its concern over a specific health issue, the UN Committee occasionally 
urges states to take ‘immediate steps’ or to take measure ‘without delay’ to redress 
the situation. It has done so for ten states, out of the sixty studied in the sample. 
Furthermore, all instances seem to correspond to what GC14 lists as ‘core 
obligations’.245 
• Provision of healthcare on a non-discriminatory basis (5 states urged to take 
urgent measures)246 
                                                
243 Chapman and Russell (n 234) 9. 
244 ibid. 
245 UNCESCR, ‘GC14’ (n 21), paras 43 and 44. 
246  ibid, para 43(a); UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations on The Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia’s First Periodic Report’ (2008) UN Doc E/C12/MKD/CO/1, paras 
12, 21, 26 (on health discrimination) and para 32 (on immediate steps); UNCESCR, 
‘Concluding Observations on Ukraine’s Fifth Periodic Report’ (2008) UN Doc 
E/C12/UKR/CO/5, paras 11 and 34; UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations Kenya 2008’ (n 
218), para 20; UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations United Kingdom 2009’ (n 229), para 
33; UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations Australia 2009’ (n 221), para 28. 
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• Provision of essential food and water, as well as basic shelter, housing, and 
sanitation (4 states urged to take urgent measures)247 
• Provision of reproductive, maternal and child healthcare (2 states urged to 
take urgent measures)248 
• Guarantee of an equitable distribution of health services (2 states urged to 
take urgent measures)249  
• Provision of health education and information on the main health problems in 
the community (2 states urged to take urgent measures)250 
• Prevention, treatment and control of epidemic and endemic diseases (1 state 
urged to take urgent measures)251  
• Provision of immunisation against major diseases (1 state urged to take 
urgent measures)252  
• Development of a national health strategy (1 state urged to take urgent 
measures)253  
• Provision of essential medicines (3 states urged to take urgent measures)254  
                                                
247 UNCESCR, ‘GC14’ (n 21), para 43(b) and (c); UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations 
Australia 2009’ (n 221), para 28; UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations Ukraine 2008’ (n 
246), paras 26 and 49; UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations on Madagascar’s Second 
Periodic Report’ (2009) UN Doc E/C12/MDG/CO/2, para 25; UNCESCR, ‘Concluding 
Observations on Kazakhstan’s First Periodic Report’ (2010) UN Doc E/C12/KAZ/CO/1, 
para 35. 
248 UNCESCR, ‘GC14’ (n 21), para 44(a); UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations Kenya 
2008’ (n 218), para 32; UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations on Serbia’s Document 
Submitted by the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo Following 
Initial Periodic Report’ (2008) UN Doc E/C12/UNK/CO/1, para 30. 
249 UNCESCR, ‘GC14’ (n 21), para 43(e); UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations Kenya 
2008’ (n 218), para 32(a) and (c); UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations Serbia 2008’ (n 
248), para 30. 
250 UNCESCR, ‘GC14’ (n 21), para 44(d); UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations Kenya 
2008’ (n 218), para 32(d); UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations Serbia 2008’ (n 248), para 
30. 
251 UNCESCR, ‘GC14’ (n 21), para 44(c); UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations Kenya 
2008’ (n 218), para 32(c), (d), and (e) (however, the connection with a core obligation here is 
less evident). 
252 UNCESCR, ‘GC14’ (n 21), para 44(b); UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations Kenya 
2008’ (n 218), para 32(c), (d), and (e) (again, the connection with a core obligation here is 
less evident). 
253 UNCESCR, ‘GC14’ (n 21), para 43(f); UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations Kenya 
2008’ (n 218), para 32(c), (d), and (e) (the connection with a core obligation is, again, less 
evident). 
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• Provision of an appropriate training of health personnel (1 state urged to take 
urgent measures)255  
However, no standard emerges from the analysis of the (limited) requests of the UN 
Committee to take ‘immediate steps’ in the reporting procedure. It may use this 
formulation for one state and not another, although they encounter similarly urgent 
issues. For instance, Germany was the only state that was asked to immediately 
redress the insufficient number of health personnel (in geriatrics). However, 
Germany is certainly not the only state that presents inadequate numbers of health 
professionals, among the sixty states studied in this sample. For instance, Benin had 
0.1 physicians per 1,000 persons in 2008 (while Germany had 3.5) but this was not 
mentioned in the Concluding Observations on Benin.256 This highlights, once again, 
how the absence of indicators in the reporting procedure impairs the possibility for 
the UN Committee to develop a coherent legal content of the right to health, which 
application effectively guarantees everyone’s highest standard of health attainable. 
Moreover, the Committee considers on one hand that core obligations are ‘non-
derogable’,257 but on the other it does not reach any findings of non-conformity in its 
reporting procedure. If infringements are not sanctioned, the point of having non-
derogable obligations is unclear and such practice deprives them of their substance. 
                                                                                                                                     
254 UNCESCR, ‘GC14’ (n 21), para 43(d); UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations Kenya 
2008’ (n 218), para 32(d); UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations Ukraine 2008’ (n 246), 
paras 26, 29 and 49; UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations on Democratic Republic of the 
Congo’s Combined Second to Fourth Periodic Reports’ (2009) UN Doc E/C12/COD/CO/4, 
para 25. 
255 UNCESCR, ‘GC14’ (n 21), para 44(e); UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations Germany 
2011’ (n 205), para 27. It is worth noting that this obligation should be reworded as that to 
provide health personnel appropriately trained and in sufficient number. The number of 
medical personnel is as important as their training and represents a basic primary healthcare 
requirement; see Declaration of Alma-Ata 1978, para VII(7): ‘Primary health relies […] on 
health workers […] to respond to the expressed health needs of the community’. 
256  World Bank, ‘Physicians (per 1,000 People) 2005-2014’ 
<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.MED.PHYS.ZS> [accessed 8 September 2015]; 
UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations on Benin’s Second Periodic Report’ (2008) UN Doc 
E/C12/BEN/CO/2. 
257 UNCESCR, ‘GC14’ (n 21), para 47. 
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2.3.3 Substantive obligations arising from that to report under Article 12 
States’ obligation to report on the implementation of the rights enshrined in the 
ICESCR is procedural in nature, and is recognised in Articles 16 and 17 of the 
Covenant.258 However, substantive obligations arise from the obligation to report, as 
witnessed in the documents and practice of the UN Committee. Since these 
contribute to clarifying the legal content of the right to health, and more particularly 
the nature of states’ obligations to realise it, it is worth studying them. One 
substantive requirement in particular emerges from the UN Committee’s 1993 Rules 
of Procedure,259 GC14,260 and its 2009 reporting guidelines:261 i.e. states’ obligation 
to collect (specific) data. Similar observations can be drawn from the reporting 
procedure on Article 12 ICESCR, in which the UN Committee often expresses its 
concern over the absence of information on certain health issues, and asks states to 
provide data in the next reporting cycle. When discussing how the UN Committee 
substantively interpreted the obligation to report under Article 12, I will thus, first 
(2.3.3.1), demonstrate the existence of an obligation to collect data; and second 
(2.3.3.2), explore the specificity of the data that states must submit and, thus, collect.  
2.3.3.1 The obligation to collect data 
The obligation upon States parties to the ICESCR to submit data on their 
performance in the field of healthcare clearly aims at achieving two goals. The first 
goal is the most explicit: the submission of data enables the UN Committee to 
monitor how states implement the right to health. The UN Committee can then 
evaluate states’ efforts to fulfil the highest standard of health attainable, and the 
timeframe in which such progress is achieved (progressively, immediately). 
However, the focus remains on the monitoring role of the UN Committee. 
                                                
258 ICESCR (n 4), Art 16 and 17.  
259 UNCESCR, ‘Rules of Procedure’ (n 98), rules 58 to 64. 
260 UNCESCR, ‘GC14’ (n 21). 
261 UNCESCR, ‘Guidelines on Treaty-Specific Documents to Be Submitted by States Parties 
under Articles 16 and 17 of the ICESCR’ (2009) UN Doc. E/C.12/2008/2, paras 55–57 on 
Article 12. 
 
93 
The second goal is more implicit and yet crucial: the obligation to submit data forces 
States parties to collect it in the first place. Such a goal gives a substantive meaning 
to the obligation, as it focuses on what states ought to do at the domestic level to 
realise the right to health. It suggests, as argued by Alston, that states are primarily 
accountable for devising adequate means to implement the right to health.262  This 
has been implicitly recognised by the UN Committee. In its Concluding 
Observations on Moldova, for instance, it expressed concern over the absence of 
disaggregated data regarding certain vulnerable groups, urging the state to establish 
an appropriate system of data collection.263  
Data collection is essential to build and maintain appropriate health systems, as it is 
the only way for states to detect inadequacies and to thus address them. This is 
especially relevant in the context of disaggregated data, as it facilitates the 
identification of health discrimination perpetuated against disadvantaged groups. The 
obligation to collect data – rather than to submit data – therefore contributes 
significantly in defining the legal content of the right to health in that respect. A state 
cannot be complying with Article 12 without knowing whether the number and 
repartition of hospitals across its territory is sufficient, for example. Finally, while it 
is fundamental that states carry out data collection, it is equally fundamental that this 
process leads to accurate and reliable results. The UN Committee has expressed its 
dissatisfaction when this was not the case.264 
2.3.3.2 The obligation to collect specific data 
Analysing the 2008-2012 sample of Concluding Observations enabled me to observe 
that the UN Committee clearly expects states to submit and, thus, collect specific 
                                                
262 Alston 1987 (n 152) 357. 
263  UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations on Republic of Moldova’s Second Periodic 
Report’ (2011) UN Doc E/C12/MDA/CO/2, para 6: ‘The Committee recommends that the 
State party take urgent measures to establish a system for the collection and monitoring of 
annual data on Covenant rights, disaggregated by disadvantaged and marginalized 
individuals and groups, including (although not exclusively) Roma, persons with disabilities, 
persons living with HIV/AIDS and non-citizens’. 
264 E.g. UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations on Turkmenistan’s First Periodic Report’ 
(2011) UN Doc E/C12/TKM/CO/1, para 23: ‘The Committee urges the State party to review 
the collection of statistical information with regard to health issues’. 
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information when reporting on the implementation of Article 12. It repeatedly 
expresses its concern over lack of qualitative, quantitative, and disaggregated data. 
Such data is informative of how the UN Committee expects states to perform and 
thus, the nature of their obligations under the right to health.  
Firstly, the UN Committee requires that states provide both qualitative and 
quantitative data to demonstrate their efforts in the field of healthcare.  
The UN Committee often requests that states provide and thus collect quantitative 
information. It regularly requires ‘statistical’ and ‘comparative’ data, in order to 
evaluate states’ performance in healthcare through figures and over periods of 
time.265 Finally, it may ask states to use indicators and benchmarks,266 or to report on 
the percentage of their gross domestic product allocated for healthcare.267  
The UN Committee also frequently requires that states provide qualitative data, and 
thus collect it in the first place. It may request that they submit ‘updated and detailed 
information’268 describing measures taken in the field of healthcare. It often asks 
states to provide information on measures such as strategies,269 programmes,270 or 
legislation.271  
                                                
265 E.g. UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations on New Zealand’s Third Periodic Report’ 
(2012) UN Doc E/C12/NZL/CO/3, para 28; UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations on 
Brazil’s Second Periodic Report’ (2009) UN Doc E/C12/BRA/CO/2, para 29. 
266 E.g. UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations Sri Lanka 2010’ (n 187), para 30. 
267 E.g. UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations on India‘s Second to Fifth Periodic Reports’ 
(2008) UN Doc E/C12/IND/CO/5, paras 33 and 73 (however, such requests are rare). 
268 E.g. UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations on Turkey’s First Periodic Report’ (2011) 
UN Doc E/C12/TUR/CO/1, para 33. 
269 E.g. UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations on Mauritius’ Combined Second to Fourth 
Periodic Reports’ (2010) UN Doc E/C12/MUS/CO/4, para 29: request for further 
information on strategies implemented to combat chronic diseases, especially diabetes, 
tobacco use, and obesity. 
270  E.g. UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations on Angola’s Combined First to Third 
Periodic Report’ (2008) UN Doc E/C12/AGO/CO/3, para 36: request for further information 
on programmes implemented to provide universal access to healthcare. 
271 E.g. UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations on Poland’s Fifth Periodic Report’ (2009) 
UN Doc E/C12/POL/CO/5, para 28: request for further information on legislation 
implemented to address unsafe abortions. 
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This approach is implicitly recognised by the reporting guidelines of the UN 
Committee, when reading the list of data that it requests states to provide.272 Using 
both qualitative and quantitative data enables the UN Committee to carry out an in-
depth analysis, by evaluating the implementation of the right to health in figures, and 
understand failures or successes in words. However, requests to provide quantitative 
and qualitative data are irregularly formulated in the reporting procedure. 
Secondly, the UN Committee often asks for disaggregated data in order to identify 
potential health discrimination.  
The UN Committee evaluates data on a wide range of disaggregated grounds in its 
Concluding Observations. It often requests data disaggregated by geographic area 
(per regions or per urban/rural areas),273 by sex,274 age,275 ethnicity,276 religion,277 or 
‘any prohibited ground of non-discrimination’.278 It has also requested that states 
provide disaggregated data regarding Roma people, persons living with HIV/AIDS, 
persons with disabilities, and non-nationals.279  
The necessity to provide disaggregated data is required by the UN Committee in both 
GC14, 280  and its reporting guidelines. 281  This approach also enables the UN 
Committee to identify potential health discrimination, prohibited by the principle of 
non-discrimination enshrined in Article 2(2) ICESCR.282 Nevertheless, requests to 
provide disaggregated data are irregularly formulated in the reporting procedure of 
the UN Committee. 
                                                
272 UNCESCR, ‘ICESCR Reporting Guidelines 2009’ (n 261), para 3. 
273 E.g. UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations Peru 2012’ (n 178), para 20. 
274 E.g. UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations Kazakhstan 2010’ (n 247), para 32. 
275 E.g. UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations Turkmenistan 2011’ (n 264), para 22. 
276 E.g. UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations Brazil 2009’ (n 265), para 11. 
277 E.g. UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations India 2008’ (n 267), para 58(e). 
278 E.g. UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations Russia 2011’ (n 221), para 37. 
279 E.g. UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations Moldova 2011’ (n 263), para 6. 
280 UNCESCR, ‘GC14’ (n 21), paras 16, 20, 57, and 63. 
281 UNCESCR, ‘ICESCR Reporting Guidelines 2009’ (n 261), para 3(g). 
282 ICESCR (n 4), Art 2(2). 
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Thirdly, the UN Committee asks states to provide data on a wide range of health 
issues.  
GC14 specifies that it aims at assisting states in fulfilling their reporting obligations 
under Article 12, but does not mention what information states must collect before 
submitting their reports.283 The 2009 reporting guidelines of the UN Committee, 
however, are quite specific and list twelve health issues that states must report 
against.284 These issues, nonetheless, are not consistently monitored for each country, 
which emphasises the need for the UN Committee to adopt a set of thematic 
indicators.  
In practice, the UN Committee often requires that states provide information on 
broad health issues. These can include: life expectancy of the population;285 mental 
health286 (e.g. suicide,287 conditions of mental health patients);288 or SRH289 (e.g. 
abortion services).290 Information can also be frequently requested on issues such as: 
substance abuse (e.g. drug consumption and availability of dependence therapy);291 
accessibility and affordability of water and sanitation;292 prevalence of HIV/AIDS;293 
or occupational health.294  
                                                
283 UNCESCR, ‘GC14’ (n 21), para 6. 
284 UNCESCR, ‘ICESCR Reporting Guidelines 2009’ (n 261), paras 55–57 (on Article 12). 
285 E.g. UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations Brazil 2009’ (n 265), para 11. 
286 E.g. UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations Kazakhstan 2010’ (n 247), para 32. 
287 E.g. UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations on France’s Third Periodic Report’ (2008) 
UN Doc E/C12/FRA/CO/3, para 48. 
288 E.g. UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations on Uruguay’s Combined Third and Fourth 
Periodic Report’ (2010) UN Doc E/C12/URY/CO/3-4, para 26. 
289 E.g. UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations New Zealand 2012’ (n 265), para 28(d). 
290 E.g. UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations Poland 2009’ (n 271), para 28. 
291 E.g. UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations on Hungary’s Third Periodic Report’ (2008) 
UN Doc E/C12/HUN/CO/3, para 49. 
292 E.g. UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations Turkey 2011’ (n 268), para 33(b). 
293 E.g. UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations on Chad’s Combined First to Third Periodic 
Report’ (2009) UN Doc E/C12/TCD/CO/3, para 29. 
294 E.g. UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations Turkey 2011’ (n 268), para 33(a). 
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The UN Committee also regularly requires that states provide, and thus collect, 
information on health issues specific to vulnerable groups. These can include: access 
to health for vulnerable groups in general,295 or more particularly, for persons with 
disabilities,296 persons living with HIV/AIDS,297 and for the poorest sectors of the 
populations (e.g. poverty-related diseases).298 
 
2.4 Critical overview 
By failing to apply any clear framework and failing to reach any finding of non-
conformity, the UN Committee does not delineate precisely the legal content of 
Article 12 ICESCR when monitoring it. A critical overview of its interpretation must 
thus be drawn, based on the principles of interpretation advocated in the introduction 
of this thesis. This fourth section will demonstrate that the interpretation of the UN 
Committee (and more particularly, its lack of methodology) does not only affect the 
definition of the right to health, it also affects its very substance. Firstly (2.4.1), I will 
discuss the negative impact that such lack of methodology has on the substance and 
conceptual clarity of the right to health. Second (2.4.2), I will however acknowledge 
the positive effect this may represent for the UN Committee, when building a 
constructive dialogue with States parties and NGOs. 
2.4.1 The absence of methodology: a weak interpretation 
First, the absence of indicators and decisions of non-conformity weakens the 
substance of Article 12 ICESCR.  
Without indicators or benchmarks in its reporting procedure, the UN Committee does 
not always review States parties to the ICESCR on the same basis. This absence of 
transparency contributes to a lack of procedural certainty for states and right-holders, 
                                                
295 E.g. UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations United Kingdom 2009’ (n 229), para 32. 
296 E.g. UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations Uruguay 2010’ (n 288), para 25. 
297 E.g. UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations Moldova 2011’ (n 263), para 23. 
298 E.g. UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations on Latvia’s First Periodic Report’ (2008) UN 
Doc E/C12/LVA/CO/1, para 51. 
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but more importantly, fails to guarantee principled consistency or protect an effective 
enjoyment of the right to health. For instance, in 2012 the UN Committee requested 
New Zealand to provide information on measures taken in the field of mental 
health,299 but did not ask any other state to submit similar information that same year. 
It is however unlikely that mental health issues were not worth reporting on, that 
year. For instance, the European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies had 
reached alarming findings regarding Spain in 2010. It stated that the provision of 
mental healthcare was uneven among autonomous communities; that services were 
not appropriately or systematically assessed; and that information systems were ‘very 
deficient and uncoordinated’.300 However, the UN Committee expressed no concern 
regarding Spanish mental health services in its 2012 Concluding Observations, 
ignoring what could constitute violations of individuals’ right to health.301 This 
example thus highlights how the lack of indicators can leave certain countries or 
certain aspects of the right to health unmonitored. It is therefore necessary that the 
UN Committee develop thematic indicators and benchmarks in its reporting 
procedure on Article 12. This would strengthen the coherence of the normative scope 
of the right to health, and would enable the UN Committee to review adequately 
states’ obligations to realise it, enabling its interpretation to achieve principled 
consistency and protect an effective enjoyment of this right. As argued by Griffey: 
‘In the contexts of monitoring and implementation, statistical human 
rights indicators and benchmarks are necessary to facilitate progressive 
realisation, as well as to satisfy immediate obligations of core content 
and non- discrimination.’302  
                                                
299 UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations New Zealand 2012’ (n 265), para 28(c). 
300 European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, ‘Spain: Health System Review’ 
(2010), 226-227 available at 
<http://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/128830/e94549.pdf> [accessed 8 
September 2015]. 
301 UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations on Spain’s Fifth Periodic Report’ (2012) UN Doc 
E/C12/ESP/CO/5. 
302 Brian Griffey, ‘The “Reasonableness” Test: Assessing Violations of State Obligations 
under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights’ (2011) 11 Human Rights Law Review 275, 290. 
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The use of indicators, however, requires the adoption of a violations approach in 
order for the UN Committee to clarify what conforms to or violates the right to 
health through its reporting procedure. The UN Committee has not endorsed such an 
approach as it favours a constructive dialogue with states. How can a state feel 
committed to collect and submit data if it already knows that no public declaration 
will be made on its compliance (or lack of) with the right to health? This is 
confirmed through the poor reporting practices of States parties. The 1993 Rules of 
Procedure of the UN Committee specify that states must report on the 
implementation of the rights enshrined in the ICESCR one year after having ratified 
it and once every five years.303 Therefore, States parties to the ICESCR since its 
entry into force (i.e. the majority of those reviewed in the 2008-2012 sample)304 
should have submitted eight reports by now, or at least four since the drafting of the 
initial Rules of Procedure in 1993. However, among the sixty states examined in this 
chapter, only a third had submitted four to five reports. Ten had submitted only one 
report and many states had never reported yet. 
Second, the absence of indicators and decisions of non-conformity deprives the right 
to health from its conceptual clarity.  
The example above, in which the UN Committee only asked New Zealand to report 
on mental health in 2012, highlights this point. How can states understand that 
Article 12 ICESCR obliges them to provide mental health services, personnel, 
screening, and treatment, if they are not asked, or not systematically asked, to report 
on those issues? A few years after its creation, Alston declared that one of the 
greatest challenges the UN Committee had to overcome was to clarify the norms set 
by the ICESCR. He argued that the only way to achieve this was to review states’ 
reports through a systematic methodology, in order for its interpretation to be 
coherent and provide guidance to States parties.305 25 years later, this argument 
                                                
303 UNCESCR, ‘Rules of Procedure 1993’ (n 98), rule 58(2). 
304  All states parties’ reports can be found at 
<http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/TBSearch.aspx?Lang=en&TreatyID
=9&DocTypeID=29> [accessed 8 September 2015]. 
305 Alston 1987 (n 152) 351–355. 
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remains valid and such developments, necessary to meet the principles of 
interpretation suggested by this thesis.  
Finally, by ‘refusing’ to hold violations of Article 12, the UN Committee fails to 
delineate what is acceptable or not and therefore, to specify what realising the right 
to health entails. When analysing the 2008-2012 sample of Concluding Observations, 
it is clear that the UN Committee recognises situations raising issues of non-
compliance with the ICESCR. For instance, it declared that the assimilation of 
transsexual and inter-sexed persons to persons with mental illness ‘violated’ their 
sexual and reproductive rights.306 It also recommended that Switzerland ‘complied’ 
with its ‘Covenant obligations’ because its intellectual property protection was going 
beyond the standards set by the World Trade Organisation and could adversely affect 
access to medicines.307 Such instances, nevertheless, are rare and the terms used by 
the UN Committee are usually vague. For example, it qualifies discrimination in 
access to healthcare as ‘human rights violations’308 and declares that FGM ‘violate 
the physical integrity and human dignity of women’,309 rather than finding a breach 
of Article 12. How can the right to health be understood in legal terms if it never 
amounts to findings of conformity or non-conformity, and how can an effective 
enjoyment of this right be protected? Soon, the UN Committee will have to reach 
findings of compliance through its communications procedure. It will be interesting 
to observe whether it will export this approach to its reporting procedure, in order to 
avoid contradictions between both procedures. In the meanwhile, Leckie’s 
suggestion that Concluding Observations include an additional category entitled 
‘Violations of the Treaty’ is worth considering.310 
                                                
306 UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations Germany 2011’ (n 205), para 26. 
307  UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations on Switzerland‘s Second and Third Periodic 
Reports’ (2010) UN Doc E/C12/CHE/CO/2-3, para 24. 
308 UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations DRC 2009’ (n 254), para 17. 
309 UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations Chad 2009’ (n 293), para 19. 
310 Leckie ‘The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Catalyst for change in 
a system needing reform’ in Alston and Crawford (n 144) 143–144. 
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2.4.2 The absence of methodology: a flexible interpretation? 
The absence of indicators from the reporting procedure of the UN Committee 
presents one advantage that is worth mentioning. Without any ‘check list’ in mind, 
the UN Committee can interpret the substance of the right to health with more 
flexibility and be more open to new information brought from external actors. This 
can potentially increase dialogue with NGOs in the reporting procedure, whose 
expertise and insight can be highly valuable to the UN Committee’s review. The 
importance of civil society is recognised in various documents. According to the 
1993 Rules of Procedure, NGOs who have consultative status with the Economic and 
Social Council are entitled to submit written and oral information to the UN 
Committee.311 The list of such organisations is relatively extensive.312 GC14 even 
declares that NGOs and associations of health professionals facilitate the 
implementation of the right to health, and that their assistance should thus be 
evaluated when reviewing states’ compliance with Article 12 ICESCR.313 It can 
however be dangerous for the UN Committee to rely too heavily on NGOs’ reports. 
Depending on their expertise and on the quality of their research, NGOs shadow 
reports may be targeting certain issues only, or may simply be unreliable. For 
instance, in its 2012 shadow report, the Icelandic Human Rights Centre declared that 
‘Icelanders are the 5th most obese nation in the world’. Whilst the number of obese 
adults is high in Iceland (more than 20%), according to WHO it is the 81st country 
with the highest prevalence, not the 5th.314 
Finally, the absence of findings of non-conformity represents two benefits. First, it 
reflects the non-adversarial aspect of the reporting procedure, which aims to generate 
                                                
311 UNCESCR, ‘Rules of Procedure 1993’ (n 98), rule 69. 
312 ECOSOC, ‘List of Non-Governmental Organizations in Consultative Status with the 
Economic and Social Council as of 1 September 2010' UN Doc E/2010/INF/4.  
313 UNCESCR, ‘GC14’ (n 21), para 64. 
314 The Icelandic Human Rights Centre, ‘Supplementary Report on the Implementation of 
CESCR (Prior to the List of Issues)’ (2012), para 73, available from the 49th Session of the 
UNCESCR (12 Nov 2012 - 30 Nov 2012) 
<http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/SessionDetails1.aspx?SessionID=44
1&Lang=en> [accessed 8 September 2015]; WHO, ‘Interactive Chart on the Prevalence of 
Obesity, Ages 18+, Both Sexes’ 
<http://gamapserver.who.int/gho/interactive_charts/ncd/risk_factors/obesity/atlas.html> 
[accessed 8 September 2015]. 
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a constructive dialogue between the UN Committee and States parties to the 
ICESCR.315 This is confirmed by the Travaux Préparatoires of the ICESCR, where 
the approach of a ‘cooperative’ implementation was unanimously adopted over a 
‘censorial’ one.316 Second, since the role of the UN Committee is limited to assisting 
states in implementing the rights enshrined in the ICESCR, and not sanctioning 
them, it can address controversial issues more easily. It has, for instance, reviewed 
topics such as abortion, irregular migrants’ health, and mental health services 
comprehensively. This argument plays in favour of the UN Committee, as this thesis 
outlines that SNHRBs’ interpretation of the right to health must be fit to their 
monitoring procedures to be effective. 
 
Conclusion 
In this Chapter, I examined how the UN Committee interpreted the right to health 
and whether this contributed adequately to clarifying its legal content, by analysing 
its monitoring procedures on Article 12 ICESCR. Therefore, I studied the comments 
formulated in its reporting procedure, by analysing systemically all Concluding 
Observations drafted from 2008 to 2012, and by examining several Concluding 
Observations drafted more recently (no major developments can be noted). The 
interpretation of the right to health by the UN Committee, however, does not 
delineate the legal content of this right with much precision. In Section 2.1, I 
introduced Article 12 ICESCR and the procedures that can be used to monitor it, 
before outlining the methodology of my analysis in this regard. In Section 2.2, I 
argued that the UN Committee implicitly recognised standards delineating what the 
highest standard of health attainable meant, but that the normative scope of the right 
to health remained unclear. While it is clear that the UN Committee refers to certain 
health issues more than others in its Concluding Observations, no apparent or 
legitimate reason justifies such prioritisation. The AAAQ framework set by GC14 
could potentially clarify the normative scope of the right to health but since it is not 
                                                
315 Alston 1987 (n 152) 358. 
316 ECOSOC, Commission on Human Rights, ‘Summary Record of the 238th Meeting' 
(1951) UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR.238, p 18 (Mr Whitlam, Australia). 
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used in the reporting procedure, it remains abstract. In Section 2.3, I studied how the 
UN Committee expected states to achieve such standards, and concluded that it 
recognised three types of obligations under Article 12 ICESCR. Firstly, I 
demonstrated that the UN Committee explicitly expected states to progress in the 
field of healthcare and attempted to follow up their performance. Secondly, I 
highlighted that it rarely referred to the notion of minimum core but sometimes 
expected states to immediately address certain health crises, seemingly pointing 
towards an implicit recognition of this concept. Thirdly, I discussed the substantive 
obligations arising from that to report on the implementation of the right to health, by 
exploring the recognition of requirements to collect specific data. Finally, I used 
these findings to draw a critical overview in Section 2.4, using the principles of 
interpretation this thesis advocates. I argued, first, that the UN Committee failed to 
adopt clear indicators or reach decisions of non-conformity in its Concluding 
Observations, which adversely affected its ability to clarify what the right to health 
meant in practice. I also acknowledged the positive aspect of its approach, since it 
allowed a flexible understanding of what Article 12 ICESCR entails. However, I 
concluded that the absence of indicators or findings of non-conformity eventually 
eroded the possibility for the UN Committee to define the legal content of the right 
to health, contrary to the aim and principles of interpretation set by this thesis. 
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Chapter 3 The interpretation of Article 11 ESC by the European 
Committee of Social Rights: attempts of clarification  
Introduction 
While it is fundamental to study the universal standards set by the UN interpretation 
of the right to health, outlined in Chapter 2, it is essential to also seek clarification at a 
regional level. Since Part I of this thesis aims at analysing how SNHRBs contribute to 
clarifying the legal content of the right to health in the course of their quasi-judicial 
monitoring procedures, the interpretation of both international and regional bodies 
should be examined (and, later in this thesis, compared). Furthermore, regional 
systems group states with more similar features and thus represent a better chance for 
mutual standards to be easily defined and enforced in human rights law. Certain 
questions arise as a result. How is the right to health interpreted at a regional level? 
Does regional monitoring offer a more insightful framework than the UN? What can 
we learn from it, based on the principles of interpretation advocated by this thesis? 
Human rights literature has paid considerable attention to the protection of ESCR in 
the African and Inter-American systems. Few authors, however, have explored the 
European Social Charter (ESC),317 its mechanisms,318 and even less, the legal content 
of the rights it enshrines319 (including the right to health).320 Such dearth of literature 
is regrettable for two main reasons. Firstly, the European region is particularly 
affected by the adoption of austerity policies that threaten to narrow the fulfilment of 
                                                
317 See David J Harris, ‘A Fresh Impetus for the European Social Charter’ (1992) 41 The 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 659. 
318 See Robin R Churchill and Urfan Khaliq, ‘The Collective Complaints System of the 
European Social Charter: An Effective Mechanism for Ensuring Compliance with Economic 
and Social Rights?’ (2004) 15 European Journal of International Law 417; Alston, ‘Assessing 
the Strengths and Weaknesses of the European Social Charter’s Supervisory System’, and 
Jean-François Akandji-Kombé, ‘The Material Impact of the Jurisprudence of the European 
Committee of Social Rights’, in Grainne De Burca and Bruno de Witte (eds) Social Rights In 
Europe (Oxford University Press 2005).  
319 See Matti Mikkola, ‘Social Human Rights of Migrants under the European Social Charter’ 
(2008) 10 European Journal of Social Security 25. 
320 The only paper available on the right to health in the ESC to date is Henriette Roscam 
Abbing, ‘The Right to Care for Health: The Contribution of the European Social Charter’ 
(2005) 12 European Journal of Health Law 183. This short article provides an overview of 
how the ESC deals with health, but not an in-depth analysis of how it defines the legal content 
of the right to health. 
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the right to health to limited healthcare. It is therefore fundamental for the CoE to 
clarify what this right means in order to assist the main actors involved in its 
implementation and to improve its realisation in Europe. Secondly, the CoE offers 
better enforcement potential than other systems of human rights protection on three 
aspects. First, the overall high income of European states (especially when compared 
to the rest of the world) is essential to realise rights such as health. Second, the weight 
given to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights can promote that 
of its sibling: the European Committee of Social Rights (the European Committee). 
Third, the European Committee has developed innovative methodologies to monitor 
the right to health such as indicators and averages, which no other human rights 
system seems to be using.  
When human rights bodies evaluate the implementation of the right to health through 
their monitoring procedures, they effectively delineate its legal content since they 
must declare whether or not it is realised, and justify why. In an attempt to assess 
whether the legal content of the right to health has been clarified in the CoE, this 
chapter will examine how the European Committee interprets Article 11 ESC.321 
More particularly, it will study the comments formulated by the European Committee 
when evaluating the implementation of Article 11 in its reporting and complaint 
procedures. This research will thus involve an assessment of all the Conclusions and 
Merits Decisions drafted and reached from 1969 to April 2015.322  
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.1 will present Article 11 ESC, the 
monitoring procedures specific to this provision, and the methodology used for this 
research. Sections 3.2 and 3.3 will then demonstrate that the European Committee 
defines the legal content of the right to health in two ways. First, the European 
Committee defines the legal content of the right to health directly, through clear 
jurisprudential standards on Article 11 ESC, which delineate the normative scope of 
this right. Second, it defines the legal content of the right to health indirectly, through 
the methodology used to evaluate states’ compliance with Article 11 ESC, which 
delineate states’ obligations to realise this right. Finally, Section 3.4 will draw a 
                                                
321 ESC 1961 (n 92), Art 11; ESC 1996 (n 92), Art 11. 
322 As of April 2015, the Merits Decisions from Complaint No. 91/2013 onwards had not been 
published or reached yet.  
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critical overview of the European Committee’s interpretation by discussing the impact 
of its jurisprudence and methodology on the legal content of the right to health. Issues 
specific to the normative scope of a right and states’ obligations to realise it, are 
inherently intertwined. However, distinguishing them is a useful way to break down 
complexity, and is often applied by legal scholars. 
 
3.1 The right to health in the European Social Charter 
In order to discuss how the European Committee interprets the right to health and 
whether this clarifies its content, it is necessary to introduce Article 11 ESC (3.1.1), 
the procedures that can be used to monitor it (3.1.2), and to outline the methodology 
of my analysis (3.1.3). 
3.1.1 The provisions 
Several provisions of the ESC deal with health.323 Articles 3, 7 and 8 recognise the 
right to healthy working conditions for adults in general, with particular protection 
provided to young persons and pregnant women. Articles 13 and 19 guarantee the 
right to medical assistance for persons without adequate resources, legal migrants, and 
irregular migrants during their journey back to their home countries.324 Finally, 
Articles 23 and 30 ensure the right to healthcare for elderly persons and persons 
socially excluded or poor.325 It is worth noting that Articles 23 and 30 were added by 
the revised version of the ESC and are thus not applicable to States who are solely 
parties to its initial version.326  
This chapter, however, focuses on Article 11, for it is the most detailed provision of 
the Charter on health, and the one that has received the most consideration in the 
                                                
323  ESC Secretariat, ‘The Right to Health and the European Social Charter (2009)’ 
<http://www.coe.int/t/dGHl/monitoring/Socialcharter/Theme%20factsheets/FactsheetHealth_
en.pdf> [accessed 8 September 2015]. 
324 ESC 1961 (n 92), Art 3, 7, 8, 11, 13, and 19; ESC 1996 (n 92), Art 3, 7, 8, 11, 13, and 19. 
325 ESC 1996 (n 92), Art 23 and 30. 
326 CoE, ‘Signatures and Ratifications of the ESC and Its Protocols’ (n 100). 
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literature in this respect. Contrarily to the other health provisions of this instrument, 
which are limited to particular groups of individuals or to specific aspects of health, 
Article 11 embraces the right of the population as a whole to benefit from an 
appropriate health system.  
Article 11 reads: 
With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right to protection of 
health, the Parties undertake, either directly or in cooperation with public 
or private organisations, to take appropriate measures designed inter alia: 
1. to remove as far as possible the causes of ill-health; 
2. to provide advisory and educational facilities for the promotion of 
health and the encouragement of individual responsibility in matters of 
health; 
3. to prevent as far as possible epidemic, endemic and other diseases, as 
well as accidents.327 
How did this provision come to life? It is worth noting that states’ officials recognised 
the need for the ESC to ensure ‘general health protection’ at the earliest stages of its 
drafting.328 Furthermore, when the ‘Committee of Experts on Public Health’ drafted 
the text of rights relating to health, it clearly drew inspiration from international 
standards. The Travaux Préparatoires of the ESC expressly refer to the Preamble of 
the WHO Constitution, to the draft provision on health in the ICESCR;329 and 
recognised a right to ‘the highest attainable standard of health’.330 However, states’ 
officials expressed the desire to avoid duplicating standards set by other organisations, 
including the United Nations, by taking a ‘more radical approach to social matters’, 
                                                
327 ESC 1961 (n 92), Art 11; ESC 1996 (n 92), Art 11. The sole difference between the 
formulation of Article 11 in the 1961 and the 1996 versions of the ESC, is the addition of the 
wording ‘as well as accidents’ in paragraph 3. 
328 CoE, ‘Collected Travaux Préparatoires of the European Social Charter, Volume I' (1953-
1954), p 6: 'Memorandum by the Secretariat–General' (16 April 1953), para 16. 
329 CoE, ‘Collected Travaux Préparatoires of the European Social Charter, Volume IV' (1957), 
p 121: ‘Report prepared by the Social Division on Rights relating to health, a proper standard 
of living etc.’ (20 June 1957) CE/Soc (57) 12 Or. Fr. p 121. 
330 WHO Constitution (n 2), Preamble; see the current text of ICESCR (n 4), Art 12. 
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through a better protection and harmonisation of social standards across Members 
States.331 As a result, the Committee of Experts on Public Health drafted Article 11 in 
‘more precise terms’, in order to bind states with realistic obligations.332 The drafters, 
nonetheless, added the formulation ‘inter alia’ to ensure that the measures listed in 
paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 were not interpreted exhaustively; and referred to the additional 
protection (i.e. medical assistance) provided by what is now Article 13.333 Lastly, 
Article 11 now recognises a ‘right to protection of health’ but the preamble of the 
ESC mentions a ‘right to benefit from any measures enabling him to enjoy the highest 
possible standard of health attainable’.334 Such formulation testifies the drafters’ 
ambition: approaching health (and other social matters) comprehensively, while 
creating specific legal obligations. For clarity purposes, however, this chapter will 
refer to a ‘right to health’. 
What makes the study of Article 11 ESC worthwhile is that the ESC is the only 
legally binding treaty that recognises explicitly a right to health in Europe. The ESC 
was developed in parallel with the European Convention on Human Rights,335 but 
focuses on ESCR rather than on CPR. However, it is unconventional in that its States 
parties can select the provisions they wish to be bound to, on condition that they 
accept a minimum of six ‘core’ articles and a total of sixteen articles.336 While Article 
11 on the right to the protection of health is not a ‘core’ article, its three paragraphs 
have been accepted by all States parties except Armenia.337 The Charter entered into 
force in 1961 and was ratified by thirty-two states over the course of more than thirty 
years. In 1996, an amended version entered into force, recognising twelve additional 
rights. These new provisions mainly protect workers’ rights but also include a right to 
                                                
331 CoE, ‘Collected Travaux Préparatoires ESC, Volume I' (n 328), p 16: ‘Report presented by 
Mr Heyman on behalf of the Committee on Social Questions’ (18 September 1953) Doc. 188. 
332 CoE, ‘Collected Travaux Préparatoires ESC, Volume IV’ (n 329), pp. 122–124. 
333 ibid. 
334 ESC 1996 (n 92), Art 11 and Preamble. 
335 (European) Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (as 
amended) 1950 (ECHR). 
336 ESC 1996 (n 92), Art A(1); ESC 1961 (n 92), Art 20(1): minimum of fifteen provisions in 
the initial version. 
337  CoE, ‘Table of Accepted Provisions (as of March 2015)’ 
<http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/socialcharter/Presentation/ProvisionsIndex_en.asp> 
[accessed 8 September 2015]. 
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housing, as well as a right to social protection for elderly persons and persons socially 
excluded or poor. Thirty-three states have ratified the revised version but ten States 
parties to the 1961 Charter still refuse to do the transfer and two versions of the 
Charter co-exist as a result.338 This, nevertheless, does not particularly affect the 
recognition of the right to health since its formulation is relatively similar in both 
versions. I will thus study Article 11 ESC by reference to both versions of Charter, 
unless stated otherwise. 
3.1.2 The monitoring procedures  
The European Committee monitors the implementation of Article 11 ESC through 
two procedures: the procedures of collective complaints and that of state reports. 
However, such monitoring procedures only apply to states that have ratified the ESC 
and have accepted this provision,339 which excludes a total of five states within the 
CoE. These are: Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino, Switzerland, and Armenia.340 
The procedure of collective complaints, unlike that of state reports, was created 
recently: by the Additional Protocol of 1995 providing for a system of collective 
complaints.341 According to its Article 1, complaints may only be submitted by trade 
unions, and by international NGOs that have consultative status within the CoE and 
that are on a list established by the Governmental Committee.342 National NGOs may 
lodge complaints, but only if the State party in which they reside has formally 
consented to it, which at present solely concerns Finland.343 Therefore, not only is this 
                                                
338 CoE, ‘Signatures and Ratifications of the ESC and Its Protocols’ (n 100): the states parties 
to the 1961 Charter but not to its revised version include: Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Luxembourg, Poland, Spain, and the United Kingdom 
(Liechtenstein and Switzerland have signed but not ratified the 1961 Charter). 
339 ESC 1961 (n 92), Art 21 and 22; ESC 1996 (n 92), Art C: in theory, states that have not 
accepted Article 11 must also report to the Committee “when requested, at regular intervals”, 
but this is not applied in practice. 
340 CoE, ‘Signatures and Ratifications of the ESC and Its Protocols’ (n 100): Liechtenstein, 
Monaco, San Marino, and Switzerland are the four states that have not ratified any version of 
the ESC; CoE, ‘Table of Accepted Provisions of the ESC’ (n 337): Armenia is the only state 
that has not accepted Article 11. 
341 Additional Protocol ESC 1995 (n 98). 
342 ibid, Art 1. 
343 ibid Art 2; CoE, ‘List of Declarations Made with Respect to Treaty No. 158 (Additional 
Protocol to the European Social Charter Providing for a System of Collective Complaints)’ 
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procedure restrictive in access, it is also restrictive in outcome, since it tends to be 
used for violations of the right to health that have a collective dimension, i.e. affecting 
a group of individuals rather than one person in particular.344 As a result, the 
complaint procedure has provided few findings useful for this research: there have 
only been seven Merits Decisions involving alleged violations of Article 11 so far.345  
By contrast, the reporting procedure is more established since it has been in existence 
since 1961, through Articles 21 to 24 of the first version of the Charter.346 This 
procedure obliges States parties to the Charter to regularly report on the 
implementation of each provision, and enables the European Committee to assess 
whether such implementation is appropriate, in documents called ‘Conclusions’.347 
Before 2006, States had to report every two years on the provisions that they were 
bound to.348 Since then, the provisions of the Charter have been divided into four 
thematic groups (including ‘Health, social security and social protection’) and states 
must report on one thematic group per year, which means every four years for Article 
11.349 From 1969 to 2000, the European Committee had no substantive methods to 
assess the realisation of the right to health in its reporting procedure. However, in 
2001, it started to use a wide range of health indicators, a tool that enabled the 
development of clear and precise legal standards under Article 11. Whilst elements of 
                                                                                                                                       
<http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeDeclarations.asp?NT=158&CM=8&DF=&
CL=ENG&VL=1> [accessed 8 September 2015]. 
344 Additional Protocol ESC 1995 (n 98), Art 1(b): NGOs must have a consultative status 
within the Council of Europe and be on a list established by the Governmental Committee.  
345  The Merits Decisions of the European Committee are available at 
<http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/socialcharter/Complaints/Complaints_en.asp> 
[accessed 8 September 2015]. 
346 ESC 1961 (n 92), Art 21 to 24. 
347  The Conclusions of the European Committee are available at 
<http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/socialcharter/Conclusions/ConclusionsYear_en.asp> 
[accessed 8 September 2015] 
348 ESC 1961 (n 92), Art 21. 
349 European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR) ‘New system for the presentation of reports 
on the application of the European Social Charter’ (2006) CM(2006)53, item 4.2.  
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the reporting procedure have been criticised on several grounds,350 it remains very 
informative of what the right to health means in practice. 
3.1.3 Methodology of my analysis 
As the purpose of this thesis is to explore how SNHRBs can and should contribute to 
clarifying what the right to health means, studying how the European Committee 
interprets this right through its monitoring procedures is crucial. When evaluating 
whether the right to health is realised or not in its monitoring procedures on Article 11 
ESC, the European Committee effectively defines its legal content. The complaint 
procedure has produced several findings, which will be analysed in this chapter. 
However, these are relatively limited since to date, the European Committee has only 
reached 6 Merits Decisions. Therefore, this chapter will focus on the reporting 
procedure. In this procedure, the implementation of the right to health has been 
examined in all States parties to the ESC (i.e. 43) across a period of time (1969-2013) 
covering twenty reporting cycles.  
The analysis of the Conclusions and Merits Decisions of the European Committee on 
Article 11 ESC from 1969 to 2013 stresses three findings. First, the European 
Committee systematically reviews the implementation of Article 11 by evaluating 
states’ performance against each paragraph of Article 11, rather than against the 
provision as a whole.351 Second and as a result, it has developed various health 
indicators under each paragraph, which it consistently uses in its Conclusions since 
2001.352 Third, the structure and constancy of this review have enabled the European 
Committee to derive legal standards from the indicators developed under Article 
11(1), (2), and (3). 
                                                
350 Alston 2005 (n 318): The author criticises the procedure for being slow, failing to provide 
a clear channel for the participation of civil society, for being dependant on the Committee of 
Ministers’ decision to take further action, and for not involving any political sanction.  
351 Except in ECSR, ‘Conclusions I (1969)'.  
352 Since ECSR, ‘Conclusions XV-2 (2001)'. In its last reporting cycle on Article 11 ESC (i.e. 
in 2013), the European Committee exceptionally merged several indicators, thus reducing 
their number. However, since it is unsure whether this method will be kept in the next 
reporting cycle on Article 11 (2017), I will focus on the indicators created in 2001. 
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Chapter 3, therefore, will demonstrate that the findings of the monitoring procedures 
have greatly contributed to clarifying the legal content of the right to health. Firstly, 
the European Committee delineates the normative scope of the right to health by 
deriving express standards from the text of the ESC. Secondly, it also delineates the 
content of states’ obligations through implied standards derived from the 
methodology used in its review. 
 
3.2 The normative scope of the right to health: the recognition of express 
obligations in the jurisprudence of the committee 
When the European Committee reviews the implementation of Article 11 ESC in its 
monitoring procedures, it systematically refers to states’ obligations to provide 
curative, promotional, and preventive health (as enshrined in the three paragraphs of 
this provision). These duties, deriving from the wording of Article 11, will thus be 
called express obligations. It is nonetheless essential to examine how the European 
Committee interprets the legal content of each express obligation, as this contributes 
directly to defining the legal content of the right to health. I will thus reach two 
conclusions, based on a systemic analysis of all the European Committee’s 
Conclusions and Merits Decisions up to 2015. Firstly (3.2.1), I will demonstrate that 
the standards developed under each express obligation delineate precisely the 
normative scope of Article 11. Secondly (3.2.2), I will analyse what threshold must be 
reached for such standards to be considered violated in order to appreciate their 
substance. 
3.2.1 The standards developed under Article 11 
The European Committee has laid down various legal standards while monitoring the 
implementation of Article 11, which now form part of its jurisprudence on the right to 
health. The legal aspect of these standards can be easily demonstrated by the 
association of three features observed throughout the Conclusions and Merits 
Decisions on Article 11. First, the European Committee addresses states with words 
such as: ‘must’, ‘should’, ‘require’ and ‘request’, pointing towards a normative 
terminology. Second, the European Committee interprets these standards as ruling 
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principles applicable to all States parties to the Charter and refers to them as such, 
whether in its reporting procedure, its collective complaint procedure, or its reporting 
guidelines. Finally, the European Committee holds findings of conformity to Article 
11 when it considers that these standards are respected; and findings of non-
conformity when it considers they are not respected..  
It is worth noting that most standards have been developed in the reporting procedure, 
since this procedure enables the European Committee to review the realisation of 
Article 11 in each state every four years. As a result, standards often correspond to the 
themes raised by the indicators used in this procedure. Few standards, however, have 
been clarified, expanded or created through the complaint procedure. Table 3 below 
summarises the standards developed under Article 11 in both procedures. This 
jurisprudence can be found partially on the Case law Digest of the European 
Committee (2008) but this table presents more updated (and accurate) data.353 
 
                                                
353  ECSR, ‘Case Law Digest of the European Committee' (as of September 2008) 
<http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/socialcharter/Digest/DigestIndex_en.asp> [accessed 8 
September 2015]. 
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Table 3 Standards developed by the European Committee under Article 11 ESC 
 
Article 11 (1) – OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE CURATIVE HEALTH 
Health indicator Standards developed by the European Committee 
None in particular 
(mostly applied to the 
two indicators below) 
States’ performance must improve, 354  must not be 
significantly below the European average, and must not 
reflect strong disparities between urban and rural areas or 
between regions’.355 
Life expectancy and 
main causes of death of 
the population 
Health systems must respond appropriately to avoidable 
health risks, and states must reach the best results 
possible, according to the knowledge available.356   
Infant and maternal 
mortality  
States must undertake measures to bring maternal and 
infant deaths down to zero risk,357 especially countries 
with highly developed healthcare systems.358 
                                                
354 First established in ECSR, ‘Conclusions 2005’, Lithuania p 336; ECSR, ‘Conclusions XVII-2 
(2005)’, Latvia p 497.  
355 First established in ECSR, ‘Conclusions 2005’, Lithuania p 336.  
356 First established in ECSR, ‘Conclusions XV-2 (2001)’, Denmark pp. 126–127. 
357 First established in ECSR, ‘Conclusions XV-2 (2001)’, Belgium p 94. 
358 Fist established in ECSR, ‘Conclusions 2003’, France p 147 (this standard was formulated in more 
‘formal’ terms in cycles XIX-2 (2009) and 2009). 
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Access to healthcare Healthcare systems must be accessible to everyone,359 
and potential restrictions on the application of Article 11 
must not impede access to healthcare for disadvantaged 
groups.360 
Costs of healthcare must be borne, at least in part, by the 
community.361 States must take steps to reduce healthcare 
costs for patients, especially the most disadvantaged 
ones, and guarantee that they do not become an excessive 
burden.362 
Health services must be provided without unnecessary 
delays.363 
Healthcare professional, 
facilities 
The numbers of health staff and facilities must be 
sufficient;364 the living conditions in psychiatric hospitals 
must be adequate and preserve human dignity.365  
                                                
359 First established in ECSR, ‘Conclusions XV-2 (2001)’, Cyprus p 25. 
360 First established in ECSR, ‘Conclusions XVII-2 (2005)’, Statement of interpretation on Article 11, 
para 5; and ECSR, ‘Conclusions 2005’, Statement of interpretation on Article 11, para 5; ESC 1996 (n 
92), Art E (non-discrimination clause). 
361 First established in ECSR, ‘Conclusions I (1969)’, Statement of Interpretation of Article 11, p 59 
[this document cannot be accessed online].  
362 First established in ECSR, ‘Conclusions XVII-2 (2005)’, Netherlands p 595. 
363 First established in ECSR, ‘Conclusions 2007’, Albania p 53; CoE, ‘Recommendation Rec(99)21 
of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on Criteria for the Management of Waiting Lists and 
Waiting Times in Health Care’ (1999). 
364 First established in ECSR, ‘Conclusions 2007’, Albania p 53. 
365 First established in ECSR, ‘Conclusions XVII-2 (2005)’, Statement of interpretation of Article 11, 
para 5; ECSR, ‘Conclusions 2005’, Statement of interpretation of Article 11, para 5.  
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Article 11 (2) – OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE PROMOTIONAL HEALTH 
Health indicator Standards developed by the European Committee 
Health education in 
schools 
Health education must be included in school curricula 
and provided during the entire period of schooling. It 
must cover: smoking and alcohol abuse; sexual and 
reproductive education (prevention of sexually 
transmitted diseases and AIDS in particular); road safety; 
and promotion of healthy eating habits.366 These topics 
can vary depending on the main public health problems 
affecting the country.367  
Sex education in schools must be relevant, culturally 
appropriate, of sufficient quality, objective, and based on 
contemporary scientific evidence. It should not involve 
censoring, withholding or intentionally misrepresenting 
information. Finally, it must be adequate in terms of time 
and resources.368 
Public information and 
awareness-raising 
Public information and awareness-raising campaigns 
must represent a public health priority.369 States must 
take measures to prevent activities damaging to health 
and to promote a sense of individual responsibility. 
These campaigns must deal with healthy eating, sex 
                                                
366 First established in ECSR, ‘Conclusions XV-2 (2001)’, Belgium p 97. 
367 First established in ibid, Belgium pp. 96–99.   
368 First established in International Centre for the Legal Protection of Human Rights (INTERIGHTS) 
v Croatia [2009] Complaint No. 45/2007, Decision on the Merits [47] (ECSR) (no decision has 
referred to these standards yet). 
369 First established in ECSR, ‘Conclusions 2005’, Moldova pp. 450–452.  
 
117 
education, environmental issues,370 and health problems 
that are predominant in the country.371 
States must also demonstrate through concrete measures 
that they implement public health education policies in 
favour of groups affected by specific problems.372  
Counselling and screening 
for pregnant women, 
children and adolescents 
Counselling and screening services must be provided free 
of charge, regularly and throughout the country.373 Free 
medical checks must be provided during the period of 
schooling and with adequate: frequency, objectives, 
coverage, and staff.374 
Counselling and screening 
for the rest of the 
population 
Prevention through screening has a considerable impact 
on improving a populations’ health and must therefore be 
fully used when it is proved to be efficient.375 Screening 
must be systematic for diseases that represent the main 
causes of death of a population.376 
 
                                                
370 First established in ibid.  
371 First established in ECSR, ‘Conclusions XV-2 (2001)’, Belgium pp. 97–98. 
372  First established in Marangopoulos Foundation for Human Rights (MFHR) v Greece [2006] 
Complaint No. 30/2005, Decision on the Merits [203 to 221] (ECSR). 
373 First established in ECSR, ‘Conclusions 2005’, Moldova pp. 450–452.  
374 First established in ECSR, ‘Conclusions XV-2 (2001)’, France pp. 208–211.  
375 First established in ibid, Belgium pp. 96–99.  
376 First established in ECSR, ‘Conclusions 2005’, Moldova pp. 450–452.  
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Article 11 (3) – OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE PREVENTIVE HEALTH 
Health indicator Standards developed by the European Committee 
Air, water, and noise 
pollution, as well as 
ionising radiation 
 
States must devote a reasonable portion of their budget to 
environmental protection and enact legislation 
‘sufficiently advanced and detailed’ in this concern.377 
They must guarantee a right to a healthy environment by 
ensuring that environmental standards and rules are 
properly applied through appropriate supervisory 
machinery.378 As a result, states must take specific steps, 
such as introducing threshold values for emissions.379 
Asbestos States must prohibit the use, production, and marketing 
of asbestos.380 States must take measures in order to 
monitor its presence in dwellings, and set up an 
obligation on companies regarding the elimination of 
waste that contains asbestos.381 
Food safety States must develop national standards taking into 
account scientific data, and create a system monitoring 
these norms throughout the food chain. States must also 
establish preventive measures (especially through the 
labelling process), and monitor food-borne diseases.382 
                                                
377 Fist established in ECSR, ‘Conclusions XV-2 (2001)’, Slovak Republic pp. 201–205.  
378 First established in Marangopoulos Foundation for Human Rights v Greece (n 372) [195 and 203].  
379 ECSR, ‘Conclusions 2005’, Moldova pp. 453–454.  
380 First established in ECSR, ‘Conclusions XV-2 (2001)’, Austria p 59.  
381 First established in ibid.  
382 First established in ECSR, ‘Conclusions XV-2 (2001), Addendum 1’ Cyprus, pp. 31–35. 
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Measures to combat 
smoking and alcoholism 
States must adopt prevention policies that restrict the 
supply of tobacco, alcohol and drug through controls on 
their production, distribution, advertising and pricing. 
States must provide statistics on their consumption trends 
to assess the effectiveness of these policies.383  
Prophylactic measures States must have high immunisation levels through 
widely accessible immunisation programmes. States 
must reduce the incidence of certain diseases (diphtheria, 
measles, meningitis Hib, poliomyelitis, tetanus, 
whooping cough) and neutralise the virus reservoir 
according to the objectives set by the World Health 
Organisation.384 
States must demonstrate their ability to cope with 
infections diseases (for example, measures to report and 
notify diseases, special treatment for AIDS patients, and 
emergency measures in case of epidemics).385 
Accidents prevention 
(since Conclusions 2003) 
States must take preventive measures against road 
accidents, domestic accidents, accidents at school, 
accidents during leisure time, including those caused by 
animals.386 
                                                
383 First established in ECSR, ‘Conclusions XVII-2 (2005)’, Malta pp. 560–561.  
384 First established in ECSR, ‘Conclusions XV-2 (2001)’, Belgium p 103.  
385 First established in ECSR, ‘Conclusions XVII-2 (2005)’, Latvia p 504.  
386 First established in ECSR, ‘Conclusions 2005’, Romania p 608.  
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3.2.2 Boundaries and non-compliance under Article 11 
When it assesses the implementation of Article 11 in its monitoring procedures, the 
European Committee reaches decisions of conformity or non-conformity, depending 
on whether states are considered as having realised the right to health or not. While 
the standards developed under Article 11 are relatively specific, their practical 
meaning is inevitably refined in the course of monitoring procedures and more 
precisely, when analysing what constitutes a breach of these requirements. Such 
exercise may enable lawyers to further delineate the legal content of each standard, 
but two observations are worth making. Firstly, most decisions of non-conformity to 
Article 11 result from a lack of information provided by states in their reports, which 
does not particularly clarify the signification of these standards. Clarification should 
thus be sought instead in decisions of non-conformity that are based on an 
inadequate performance in the field of healthcare (see more details in figure 6, 
subsection 3.3.1.2). Secondly, certain standards have led to more breaches of Article 
11 than others, and their practical meaning may have been more refined in 
consequence. It is nonetheless worth noting that certain standards encompass a larger 
number of issues than others (e.g. standards developed under the indicator ‘access to 
healthcare’) and may thus lead to more findings of non-conformity. Figure 5 below 
illustrates how many Article 11 violations have been found under each standard. 
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Figure 5 Number of findings of non-conformity held by the European Committee 
under each indicator since 1969387  
  
                                                
387 From ‘Life expectancy’ to ‘Health staff and facilities’: Article 11(1); From ‘Public 
information’ to ‘Counselling and screening’: Article 11(2); From ‘Asbestos’ to ‘Accidents’: 
Article 11(3).  
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Section 3.2 outlined how the European Committee interpreted the obligations 
expressly set by Article 11 ESC. It concluded that by laying down legal standards 
through thematic indicators, and (potentially) clarifying what they mean in practice 
through findings of non-conformity, the European Committee’s interpretation 
directly contributed to delineating the legal content of the right to health. The 
European Committee, however, does not limit its understanding of Article 11 to the 
obligations to provide curative, promotional and preventive health. By choosing 
certain methods over others to measure states’ conformity to these express 
obligations, it indirectly defines what the right to health entails.  
 
3.3 States’ obligations to realise the right to health: recognition of implied 
obligations in the methodology of the committee 
When the European Committee evaluates whether or not states have realised the 
obligations expressly set by Article 11, it uses certain methods more than others. 
These reveal how states are expected to perform under the obligations to provide 
curative, promotional and preventive health. Section 3.3 will thus explore how such 
methods indirectly define the right to health, since they point towards ‘implied 
obligations’. The analysis of the European Committee’s Conclusions from the 1969 
to the 2013 reporting cycles and its Merits Decisions from 1998 to April 2015, 
identifies repetitive techniques used to review the implementation of Article 11. 
These include, for instance: disaggregated data (to identify discrimination); European 
averages (to compare); timelines (to assess progress); and requests to submit data (to 
review standards, monitoring systems, and effectiveness of measures). This section, 
nevertheless, will focus on the two implied obligations the European Committee uses 
the most to assess states’ compliance and occasionally, to hold them in breach of this 
provision. These include: (3.3.1) the obligation to submit specific data on health; and 
(3.3.2) the obligation to perform comparably with European averages in the field of 
healthcare. 
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3.3.1 The states’ obligation to submit data on health: a necessary standard 
It is clear from the methodology and the jurisprudence of the European Committee 
that states are most often asked to submit relevant data on health. Such observation, 
although more relevant to the reporting procedure, suggests the existence of an 
implied obligation. While this implied obligation is procedural by nature, it 
contributes to defining the legal content of the right to health in practice. First 
(3.3.1.1), it directly enables the European Committee to carry out an in-depth 
evaluation of states’ performance in healthcare. Second (3.3.1.2), the violations of 
Article 11 based on a failure to submit data, indirectly measure the realisation of the 
right to health. 
3.3.1.1 The use of specific data to evaluate states’ performance in healthcare  
The European Committee uses a wide range of data when assessing states’ 
performance against the health indicators developed in its reporting procedure. The 
information it requests includes: qualitative and quantitative data, which facilitate an 
in-depth evaluation of states’ performance in healthcare; as well as disaggregated 
data, which enable the identification of health discrimination.  
Qualitative and quantitative data: an in-depth analysis 
The type of data examined by the European Committee generally depends on the 
health indicator under review.  
Certain health indicators require that states mainly submit quantitative data. This is 
the case for the majority of indicators relevant to Article 11 (1), on curative health. 
Parameters such as ‘life expectancy’, ‘main causes of death’, ‘infant and maternal 
mortality’, or ‘healthcare professionals and facilities’, prioritise figures, mortality 
rates and statistics. Nonetheless, qualitative data is incorporated to explain 
inadequate performances in that regard. 
Other health indicators require that states submit more qualitative data. This can be 
said for most indicators developed under Article 11 (2), on health promotion. 
Parameters such as ‘health education in school’, ‘public information and awareness-
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raising’, or ‘counselling and screening services’, prioritise a description of the 
content and operation of these services. Quantitative data is also needed to measure 
the availability of such services but it is not systematically incorporated. 
Finally, health indicators can sometimes rely equally on both qualitative and 
quantitative information. This is especially relevant to indicators specific to Article 
11 (3) on preventive health. Parameters such as ‘prevention of risks’ and 
‘prophylactic measures’ usually entail a description of the existing legislation, 
measures and supervisory mechanisms, as well as an evaluation of threshold levels, 
rates, trends, and statistics.  
The attempt of the European Committee to combine a results-based approach with a 
qualitative analysis provides a fascinating insight into the monitoring of social rights, 
as no other human rights body goes into such depth. However, certain questions 
arise.  
First, it is important to question how the balance between the use of quantitative and 
qualitative data should be determined. This Chapter does not pretend to address the 
complexity of this issue, as it primarily aims at discussing how the evaluation of 
Article 11 by the European Committee contributes to defining the legal content of 
the right to health. However, further research is needed on that aspect.388 
Second, a question arises regarding the quality of the data. In its Conclusions, the 
European Committee observes that the data submitted by states can sometimes be 
inaccurate,389 or unreliable.390 As a result, most of the data that it reviews emanates 
from more ‘trustworthy’ sources. The European Committee often uses data published 
                                                
388 A very interesting discussion on the interactions between quantitative and qualitative data 
can be found in Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods (Fourth edition, Oxford University 
Press 2012), Chap 26 ‘Breaking down the quantitative/qualitative divide’. 
389 ECSR, ‘Conclusions XV-2 (2001), Addendum 1’, Cyprus p 24: the Committee notes an 
imperfect registration system when assessing the life expectancy of the population (only 
45% of deaths are recorded). 
390 ECSR, ‘Conclusions 2003’, Slovenia p 491 (on air pollution): ‘Noting that pollution data 
are collected by the polluters themselves, the Committee would like to be informed whether 
the mechanism of pollution control is subject to a supervisory system, which would assure 
reliability of collected data’. 
 
125 
by European governmental agencies (OECD; Eurostat; European Observatory on 
Health Care Systems). Sometimes, it also uses data published by the United Nations 
(WHO; Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; UNICEF). Many of 
these organisations, however, rely on data initially provided by states. 391  The 
European Committee should therefore incorporate data emanating from NGOs’ 
shadow reports more often, in order to balance the potential subjectivity of 
governmental sources. Since it does not receive NGOs reports in great quantity for 
each country, it is crucial that the European Committee engages more substantially 
with civil society to raise awareness of its procedures.392 It is worth noting, however, 
that the number of NGOs reports submitted is increasing and that the European 
Committee started incorporating their findings in its 2013 reporting cycle, with 
regard to Article 11. This allowed the European Committee to review a topic it had 
never monitored before: transgender persons’ health.393 
Disaggregated data: identifying health discrimination 
The European Committee uses different types of disaggregated data in order to 
identify potential health discrimination. 
It often uses gender-disaggregated data when measuring the life expectancy, main 
causes of death, and issues of substance abuse within the population. It has also 
emphasised the protection of women’s (reproductive) health by creating the 
indicators ‘maternal mortality rate’, and ‘counselling and screening services for 
pregnant women’. However, women’s health is evaluated through the restricted 
                                                
391 See for instance OECD, ‘OECD Health Data 2013 Electronic Questionnaire: Guidelines 
for Updating OECD Health Data’ <http://www.oecd.org/statistics/data-
collection/health.htm> [accessed 8 September 2015], p 3: ‘These Guidelines aim to assist the 
national correspondents’. 
392 CoE, ‘Comments from INGOs / Trade Unions under the Reporting Procedure of the 
European Social Charter’ 
<http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/socialcharter/Reporting/StateReports/CommentsING
O_en.asp> [accessed 8 September 2015]: participation seems to be increasing. 
393 ECSR, ‘Conclusions 2013’, Georgia p 6: ‘As regards the right to protection of health of 
transgender persons the Committee received submissions from the International Lesbian and 
Gay Association (European Region) (ILGA) stating that in Georgia there is a requirement 
that transgender people undergo medical treatment, including sterilisation, as a condition of 
legal gender recognition’. 
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prism of maternal healthcare, rather than through that of sexual and reproductive 
freedom (as required by the CoE).394 Issues such as access to contraception or access 
to safe abortion procedures remain largely unmonitored, including in states such as 
Poland, Ireland or Slovakia, yet often sanctioned by the European Court of Human 
Rights in that regard.395 The European Committee should thus systematically review 
SRH issues in its reporting procedure, in order to monitor more adequately the right 
to health.  
The European Committee sometimes uses age-disaggregated data when assessing the 
main causes of death, the prevalence of substance abuse, or the availability of 
counselling and screening services within the population. It has also emphasised the 
protection of children and young people’s health by creating the indicators ‘health 
education in school’, ‘counselling and screening for children and adolescents’, and 
‘infant mortality’. Nonetheless, it does not review elderly people’s health under 
Article 11. Only states bound to Article 23(2)(b) of the 1996 Charter, which 
recognises the right to healthcare for older persons, must report on this issue.396 
These states, however, are fewer than those bound to Article 11, and many of them 
correspond to the ‘bad performers’ under Article 11 (Belgium, Romania, Moldova, 
Bulgaria, Georgia and Azerbaijan). Such lack of protection is problematic. 
Finally, the European Committee often uses geographically disaggregated data when 
reviewing the number of healthcare professionals and facilities, or the availability of 
counselling and screening services. Through this, it asserts the importance of equal 
access to healthcare between urban and rural areas and between different regions. It 
is regrettable, however, that the European Committee does not systematically apply 
                                                
394 CoE Parliamentary Assembly, ‘Resolution 1607 Access to Safe and Legal Abortion in 
Europe’ (2008) <http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-
en.asp?fileid=17638&lang=en> [accessed 8 September 2015]. 
395 See the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights: On access to lawful 
abortion: A, B and C v Ireland [2010] Grand Chamber, Application No. 25579/05, Judgment 
of 16 December 2010; Tysiac v Poland [2007] Fourth section, Application No. 5410/03, 
Judgment of 20 March 2007; On forced sterilisation: KH and Others v Slovakia [2009] 
Fourth section, Application No. 32881/04, Judgement of 28 April 2009; On access to 
contraceptives: Pichon and Sajous v France [2001] Third Section, Application No. 
49853/99, Admissibility decision of 2 October 2001.  
396 ESC 1996 (n 92), Art 23 § 2 (b); CoE, ‘Table of Accepted Provisions of the ESC’ (n 337). 
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this review. This would highlight incongruous public policies between federated 
provinces, or regional differences such as the desertion of certain areas by medical 
staff. For instance, the number of health personnel per 100,000 inhabitants in the 
province of Flevoland (Netherlands) amounted to 127 in 2009, one the lowest in 
Europe.397 Nevertheless, the European Committee did not mention any regional 
disparities in that regard, in its 2009 Conclusions.398 
To conclude, the European Committee uses disaggregated data to identify health 
discrimination perpetuated against three vulnerable groups in particular: women, 
children, and persons living in rural areas. It sometimes also holds states responsible 
for breaching Article 11 due to health discrimination based on ethnic origins (Roma 
people)399 or based on economic status (the poor or persons socially excluded).400 
The use of disaggregated data to identify health discrimination is an irregular 
practice; it highlights a superficial understanding of what constitutes vulnerability in 
health. (For instance, it is clear that women represent a group especially vulnerable 
SRH issues, but maybe less so to other health issues since their life expectancy is 
generally higher than that of men). The European Committee could thus remedy this 
inconsistency by combining two types of reviews. One that systematically evaluates 
the accessibility of healthcare for vulnerable groups common to all States parties; 
and another that evaluates access to health for groups particularly vulnerable within 
the state under review. This would ensure a more thorough monitoring of health 
discrimination, and materialise the obligation to submit data more coherently as a 
result. It is worth noting that the former UN Special Rapporteur on the right to health 
supports such alternative. Hunt declared that vulnerability in health was contextual 
                                                
397  Eurostat, ‘Health Personnel by NUTS 2 Regions’ 
<http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=hlth_rs_prsrg&lang=en> [accessed 
8 September 2015].  
398 ECSR, ‘Conclusions 2009’, Netherlands p 568–569.  
399 For instance, this occurred several times in the 2009 cycle: ECSR, ‘Conclusions XIX-2 
(2009)’, Croatia pp. 58–59, Czech Republic p 91–92, Greece p 210, Hungary pp. 248 and 
251; ECSR, ‘Conclusions 2009’, Bulgaria pp. 160–162, Italy p 407, Slovenia p 723. It also 
occurred several times in Merits Decisions: Médecins du Monde – International v France 
[2012] Complaint No. 67/2011, Decision on the Merits (ECSR); European Roma Rights 
Centre (ERRC) v Bulgaria [2008] Complaint No. 46/2007, Decision on the Merits (ECSR). 
400 ECSR, ‘Conclusions 2009’, Bulgaria.  
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but that data should be disaggregated ‘at least [by] sex, race, ethnicity, rural/urban 
and socio-economic status.’401 
3.3.1.2 The use of an absence of data to find a breach of the right to health 
Not only does the European Committee use extensive data when evaluating states’ 
performance in healthcare, it also bases most of its findings of non-conformity to 
Article 11 on states’ failure to provide such information. Figure 6 below illustrates 
clearly this assertion.402 However, do these decisions contribute in defining the legal 
content of the right to health? 
Figure 6 Rationales of Article 11 violations in the Conclusions of the European 
Committee 
 
First, it can be argued that violations of Article 11 based on a failure to submit data 
do not delineate directly the content of the right to health. Such findings highlight 
                                                
401 Special Rapporteur on the right to health, 'Annual Report 2006' (n 227), para 49(b). 
402 This chart is based on reporting cycles from 1969 to 2013 (inclusive). The European 
Committee reaches findings of non-conformity to Article 11 paragraph per paragraph. It may 
thus find a state up to three times in breach of Article 11 ESC in the same cycle. 
Furthermore, it usually bases violations of Article 11(1), (2), or (3) on either a failure to 
submit data or a poor performance in healthcare (the latter being sometimes associated with 
a performance significantly below the European average). As a result, it is possible to find 
several rationales in the same finding of non-conformity. 
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states’ non-compliance with a procedural requirement, not necessarily a poor 
performance in healthcare. A state may fail to provide the information requested by 
the European Committee but still be providing appropriate curative, promotional and 
preventive health. Such violations, numerous in the jurisprudence of the European 
Committee, can thus give the distorted impression that States parties to the Charter 
often under-perform under the obligations expressly set by Article 11. 
Second, it can be demonstrated, however, that violations of Article 11 based on a 
failure to submit data delineate indirectly the content of the right to health. The 
analysis of the reporting procedure on Article 11 stresses that the European 
Committee does not simply expect states to provide data. It expects them to use this 
information in order to show they adequately implemented the right to health. This is 
especially true when the European Committee must decide whether states have 
repaired violations of the right to health found in previous reporting cycles. For 
instance, Poland was found in breach of Article 11 in 2003 because of its excessive 
waiting times. In 2005, it had implemented a new system but was still found in 
violation of Article 11 for not having provided enough information. In 2009, the 
European Committee received a considerable amount of qualitative data but reserved 
its position until reception of quantitative data.403 The submission of information thus 
serves a purpose closely related to the realisation of the right to health: 
demonstrating compliance with the express obligations this right imposes upon 
states. 
Third, violations of Article 11 based on a failure to submit data can delineate directly 
the content of the right to health. Hypothetically, the reason why states do not 
provide the information requested by the European Committee is likely to be their 
reluctance to display poor health records. Such instances can potentially correspond 
to a breach of the obligations expressly set by Article 11. This hypothesis is 
especially relevant after having observed that states held in breach of Article 11 for 
not having submitted data, had usually also failed to provide it in previous reporting 
                                                
403  Non-conformity in ECSR, ‘Conclusions XVI-2 (2003)’, Poland; and in ECSR, 
‘Conclusions XVII-2 (2005)’, Poland. Deferral in ECSR, ‘Conclusions XIX-2 (2009)’, 
Poland.  
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cycles.404 Moreover, holding states in breach of the right to health for not complying 
with their obligation to submit data highlights their obligation to collect it in the first 
place. Data collection is essential to build and maintain appropriate health systems, 
as it enables states to detect inadequacies and address them. How can a state be 
complying with its obligation to provide targeted health education if it does not know 
about the main diseases affecting its population? In this context, the obligation to 
collect data – rather than to submit it – contributes significantly in defining the legal 
content of the right to health. 
3.3.2 The states’ obligation to perform comparably with the European average: 
an illegitimate standard? 
Following the obligation to submit data on health under Article 11 ESC, what clearly 
transpires from the methodology and jurisprudence of the European Committee is an 
obligation to perform ‘comparably’ with European averages, in the field of 
healthcare. This obligation, which arises in both the reporting and the complaint 
procedures, yet contributes to delineating the legal content of the right to health. First 
(3.3.2.1), I will analyse how, in theory, this implied obligation inadequately 
contributes towards defining the legal content of the right to health. Second (3.3.2.2), 
I will discuss how, in practice, European averages may be a heuristic method to 
assess the realisation of the right to health.  
3.3.2.1 The legitimacy of European averages  
The European Committee repeatedly uses European averages when it assesses states’ 
performance against the health indicators developed under Article 11. It also bases 
many of its findings of non-conformity on states’ failures to meet such figures (see 
Figure 6 above). The use of European averages as a method to evaluate the 
realisation of the right to health should therefore be questioned for several reasons. 
First, the European Committee should not rely on the average states’ practice to set 
human rights objectives regarding the right to health. This argument echoes the 
criticisms formulated against the ‘European consensus’, a method of interpretation 
                                                
404 See for instance ECSR, ‘Conclusions XVII-2 (2005)’, Greece p 315 (regarding the 
submission of statistics on tobacco consumption). 
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sometimes used by the European Court of Human Rights.405 With the European 
consensus, the Court interprets the rights enshrined in the European Convention in 
the light of how they are applied in the majority of the States parties. This, however, 
has occasionally played against the recognition or protection of human rights,406 
impeding the dynamism of the Court’s jurisprudence. As a result, certain authors 
advocate for an autonomous interpretation,407 which this paper supports in the case 
of the European Committee. Interpreting what the right to health requires should not 
rely on the average states’ practice but on human rights law, itself inspired from the 
expertise of health professionals, economists, NGOs, and other key actors.408  
Second, the European averages used by the European Committee are not always 
accurate. These figures, calculated by the OECD or Eurostat, do not always reflect 
the entire European region since states sometimes fail to submit data to these 
agencies.409 Furthermore, Eurostat is an agency from the European Union. Therefore, 
its averages are based on the data of 27 countries (not 47), incidentally also the 
wealthiest of the CoE.  
                                                
405 This method emerged in Tyrer v United Kingdom [1978] Chamber, 2 EHRR 1, Judgment 
of 25 April 1978 (ECtHR) [31]: ‘The Court must also recall that the Convention is a living 
instrument which, as the Commission rightly stressed, must be interpreted in the light of 
present-day conditions. In the case now before it the Court cannot but be influenced by the 
developments and commonly accepted standards in the penal policy of the member States of 
the Council of Europe in this field’ [i.e. regarding judicial corporal punishment]. 
406 Rees v United Kingdom [1987] Plenary, 9 EHRR 56, Judgment of 17 October 1986 
(ECtHR) [37]: the right of transsexuals to have their acquired gender recognised on formal 
documentation is not recognised because there is ‘little common ground’ between states in 
this area. 
407 Daniel Regan, ‘European Consensus: A Worthy Endeavour for the European Court of 
Human Rights’ (2011) 14 Trinity College Law Review 51; George Letsas, A Theory of 
Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford University Press 
2009), see Chapter 3 on Intentionalism, Textualism and Evolutive Interpretation. 
408 Tobin (n 19). See Tobin’s notion of constructive engagement and its shortcomings in 
Lougarre (n 30). 
409 Eurostat, ‘Healthy Life Years and Life Expectancy at Age 65, by Sex’ 
<http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/refreshTableAction.do;jsessionid=9ea7d07e30e649f36
a96b2024db9a48ac7acf09c8ed9.e34OaN8Pc3mMc40Lc3aMaNyTaxyMe0?tab=table&plugi
n=1&pcode=tsdph220&language=en> [accessed 8 September 2015]: Turkey never 
submitted its figures. 
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Third, even if European averages were entirely accurate, it is legitimate to question 
the adequacy of the standards they set for each State party to the Charter. Using an 
average to assess the performance of European states with the most satisfactory 
health figures and the highest income is incoherent. In this case, not only does an 
average fail to set increasing objectives with regard to the right to health, it also 
lowers relevant standards. This is incompatible with the principle of progressive 
realisation, implicitly enshrined in the ESC.410 Moreover, using an average to 
evaluate the performance of European states with the worst health figures and the 
lowest income is also inadequate. In this case, it may set standards that are 
impossible to achieve. The Charter, nevertheless, expects states to realise Article 11 
‘as far as possible’, which means that the objectives set by the European Committee 
must be reasonable.411 
Finally, European averages are only used to assess states’ performance under health 
indicators that mainly require quantitative data. This creates an imbalanced 
monitoring of Article 11 in favour of curative healthcare, since ‘quantitative’ 
indicators correspond mostly to Article 11(1). Such indicators include: ‘life 
expectancy’; ‘main causes of death’; ‘infant and maternal mortality’; ‘access to 
healthcare’ (when reviewing healthcare budget or rates of reimbursement); and 
‘health staff and facilities’. Fewer ‘quantitative’ indicators are found under Article 
11(3), on preventive health: ‘substance abuse’ (when assessing consumption trends); 
and ‘immunisation’ (when evaluating coverage rates). None appears under Article 
11(2), on promotional health. For obvious reasons, comparing performances in 
healthcare is easier with quantitative data, as poor results can be more quickly 
highlighted. As a result, this may lead the European Committee to evaluate certain 
standards more strictly than others. Health promotion and preventive health, 
                                                
410 ESC 1961 (n 92), Preamble; ESC 1996 (n 92), Preamble: ‘Considering that the aim of the 
Council of Europe is […] facilitating their [states parties] economic and social progress 
[and…] ‘to improve their [populations’] standard of living and their social well-being’.  
411 ESC 1961 (n 92), Part I (11); ESC 1996 (n 92), Part I(11): ‘Everyone has the right to 
benefit from any measures enabling him to enjoy the highest possible standard of health 
attainable’. Furthermore, Art 11 (1) and (3) in both versions of the Charter mention the need 
to remove causes of ill-health or prevent diseases ‘as far as possible’. 
 
133 
however, are as fundamental as curative health, since they involve policies with 
long-term effects and can be less costly.412  
3.3.2.2 The European average: a heuristic method to measure the realisation of the 
right to health? 
It has been demonstrated that the use of European averages to evaluate states’ 
performance inadequately contributes in defining the right to health. After having 
observed how such averages are applied in practice however, this argument can be 
nuanced on four grounds. 
First, the number of times that a failure to perform comparably with the European 
average is invoked by the European Committee to hold a breach of Article 11 ESC, 
is proportionately low compared to the number of times it uses absence of data or 
poor performance as rationale. This can be observed in Figure 6. Moreover, the issue 
of European averages is always associated with either an absence of data or, more 
often, an inadequate performance under Article 11. Therefore, while the European 
Committee relies on European averages to assert what breaches Article 11, such 
figures do not have an overwhelming impact on its findings of non-conformity. 
Second, the findings of non-conformity based on a failure to perform comparably 
with the European average only target performances that are considerably below 
such figure. The European Committee never uses European averages to find 
violations of Article 11 when states’ performances fall short of the average. Instead, 
it uses European averages as a comparative means to hold states with the worst 
results in the region, in breach of the right to health. The European Committee 
draws, therefore, a legal threshold where significantly poor results in healthcare are 
unacceptable, regardless of external factors such as the availability of resources 
within the state. While such an observation does not entirely justify the use of 
averages, it is in line with the minimum core approach developed by the United 
Nations and casts an interesting light onto the monitoring of the right to health in 
                                                
412 WHO, ‘Annual Report 2010’ (n 194), 90. 
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Europe, and social rights more generally.413 Later in this thesis, I will challenge the 
notion of minimum core by demonstrating the impossibility to determine what it 
means and by thus suggesting the adoption of a test of reasonableness instead. 
However, the levels of resources of the States parties to the ESC and their proximity 
in other areas, including healthcare, seems to allow a requirement that ‘core’ 
common standards are fulfilled under Article 11.  
Third, violations based on a failure to perform comparably with the European 
average are often found in relation to an unsatisfactory evolution of states’ 
performance. For instance, the European Committee found Latvia and Lithuania in 
breach of Article 11(1) on the basis that their life expectancies were considerably 
below the European average, but also because they were stagnant or in decline.414 
This seems to echo the principle of progressive realisation implicitly recognised by 
the Charter. The European Committee, nevertheless, does not systematically use this 
rationale as it may hold a state in violation of Article 11, regardless of its efforts to 
improve. For example, it found Turkey in breach of Article 11(1) due to its high 
infant and maternal mortality rates, but without giving any weight to the considerable 
decrease of these figures since the last reporting cycle. It focused, instead, on the fact 
that these rates were still significantly above the European average.415 This may, 
again, reflect the adoption of a minimum core approach and its prevalence over the 
principle of progressive realisation in certain instances.  
Finally, the use of European averages has enabled the European Committee to 
integrate the issue of resource availability in its review, as it tends to evaluate states’ 
performance in healthcare depending on their level of income. As a result, the 
European Committee sometimes assesses the performance of a state with low 
income, by comparing it with the overall performance of states with similarly low 
incomes. This technique highlights the worst results among that group. For instance, 
it declares in 2001 that ‘the results achieved by Turkey in the field of health are 
                                                
413 The UN Committee first adopted the minimum core approach in UNCESCR, ‘General 
Comment 3’ (n 211), para 10. 
414 Non-conformity in ECSR, ‘Conclusions XIX-2 (2009)’, Latvia; ECSR, ‘Conclusions 
2009’, Lithuania. 
415 Non-conformity in ECSR, ‘Conclusions 2009’, Turkey. 
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significantly worse than in many other countries with a comparable income level’.416 
Moreover, the European Committee occasionally sets stricter standards for states 
with the best health systems. For example, it requires that states maintain infant and 
maternal mortality rates as close as possible to zero, ‘especially for states with highly 
developed healthcare systems’.417  
This Chapter outlined that the legal content of the right to health is defined by 
obligations expressly set by Article 11. It is also defined by obligations implied in 
the reporting procedure: submitting data on health and performing comparably to the 
European average. Whilst the latter is controversial, it enables the European 
Committee to lay down thresholds under which states are regarded as breaching the 
right to health. Considering the level of revenue available in Europe, this approach is 
defensible. However, it is desirable that the European Committee combines 
European averages more often with sub-averages in relation with states’ income, in 
order to promote unity and fairness in its review. 
 
3.4 Critical overview 
By translating Article 11 ESC into clear express and implied obligations, the 
European Committee delineates precisely the legal content of Article 11 ESC. A 
critical overview of its interpretation must nonetheless be drawn, based on the 
principles of interpretation the introduction of this thesis advocates. This fourth 
section will demonstrate that the interpretation of the European Committee does not 
only define the right to health, it also affects its very substance. First (3.4.1), I will 
examine how the ambitious interpretation of the right to health, developed through 
the monitoring procedures of the European Committee, can be challenging for the 
coherence of its legal content. Second (3.4.2), I will argue that the evaluation of the 
right to health can sometimes be defective and, as a result, can weaken its substance.  
                                                
416 ECSR, ‘Conclusions XV-2 (2001), Addendum 1’, Turkey p 255 (regarding Turkey’s 
performance under the indicators ‘life expectancy’ and ‘main causes of mortality’). 
417 See the standard established in ECSR, ‘Conclusions 2003’, France.  
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3.4.1 The challenges set by an ambitious interpretation of the right to health 
Because it relies on a comprehensive but precise range of indicators and standards, 
the interpretation of the right to health by the European Committee represents a 
unique and ambitious development in human rights law. Nevertheless, it is 
fundamental to assess how the European Committee’s interpretation affects the 
substance of the right to health and whether it clarifies it adequately. I will do so by 
challenging:  (3.4.1.1) the adequacy of its thematic indicators; and (3.4.1.2) that of its 
legal standards. 
3.4.1.1 The indicators used by the European Committee 
Assessing the realisation of ESCR against indicators raises several issues as outlined 
by Green.418 This subsection does not intend to address the breadth of such issues. 
Instead, it will explore the questions specifically raised by the thematic health 
indicators used in the reporting procedure of the European Committee on Article 11 
ESC, in order to assess their appropriateness. 
First, are indicators restricted to quantitative data? I have demonstrated in subsection 
3.3.1.1 that the European Committee developed indicators embracing both 
quantitative and qualitative data, which enabled a comprehensive understanding of 
what realising the right to health meant. For instance, the indicator ‘measures to 
combat smoking and alcoholism’ requires both qualitative data (such as legislative 
framework) and quantitative data (such as consumption trends). Therefore, indicators 
are not restricted to quantitative data in that instance. 
Second, are indicators designed to measure states’ compliance with their obligations, 
or to measure individuals’ effective enjoyment of their right? In the context of 
Article 11, most indicators measure the accessibility and availability of health 
services. This clearly evaluates both states’ compliance with their obligations to 
realise the right to health, and individuals’ enjoyment of this right. For instance, the 
European Committee uses the indicator ‘environmental pollution’ to hold states 
                                                
418  Maria Green, ‘What We Talk About When We Talk About Indicators: Current 
Approaches to Human Rights Measurement’ (2001) 23 Human Rights Quarterly 1062. 
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responsible for breaching their obligation to prevent environmental pollution under 
Article 11(3); 419  and to find a violation of individuals’ right to a healthy 
environment.420 However, certain indicators used to assess the general state of health 
of the population seem to only measure states’ compliance with their Article 11 
obligations. The connection between one’s enjoyment of her or his right to health 
and indicators such as ‘life expectancy’, ‘main causes of death’, or ‘infant and 
maternal mortality rates’, for instance, is far from obvious. This does not mean that 
such indicators are pointless. On the contrary, they allow for gross malfunctions of a 
health system to be identified. However, these indicators focus on duty-bearers and 
since Article 11 recognises a human right to protection of health, it is important to 
define who the right-holders are. The reporting procedure primarily aims at 
monitoring states’ compliance with the Charter and does not offer any remedies. 
Therefore, it does not represent the most adequate forum to recognise victims of 
Article 11 violations (in contrast to the complaint procedure). Health indicators, 
nonetheless, also embrace right-holders: i.e. the population as a whole and several 
vulnerable groups recognised through the reporting procedure. It is thus crucial that 
the European Committee widens its understanding of vulnerability, as recommended 
in subsection 3.3.1.1, in order to measure individuals’ effective enjoyment of their 
right to health more adequately. 
Third, where should the boundary be drawn between human rights indicators and 
general development indicators? This question is closely related to the issue 
discussed above, that is, do indicators measure the enjoyment of a human right? I 
have demonstrated that the indicators used by the European Committee to review the 
accessibility and availability of health services, are not solely restricted to measuring 
states’ compliance with Article 11. They also measure individuals’ enjoyment of 
their right to health, which is reflected by the possibility for the standards developed 
under these indicators to be used in the complaint procedure. For instance, in 
Marangopoulos Foundation for Human Rights (MFHR) v. Greece, the European 
Committee used the standards developed under the indicator ‘environmental 
                                                
419  ECSR, ‘Conclusions XIX-2 (2009)’, Greece; ECSR, ‘Conclusions 2009’, Cyprus, 
Georgia, Moldova. 
420 Marangopoulos Foundation for Human Rights v Greece (n 372) [195 and 203].  
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pollution’ to find a violation of individuals’ right to a healthy environment.421 This 
highlights that indicators reviewing the availability and accessibility of health 
services are clearly human rights indicators. Certain indicators, nevertheless, cannot 
directly measure individuals’ enjoyment of the right to health, as they focus on the 
general state of health of the population (e.g. life expectancy and main causes of 
death). As a result, they have never been used to assert a breach of Article 11 in the 
complaint procedure and resemble at first glance general development indicators. 
That said, these ambiguous indicators can indirectly measure the individual 
dimension of the right to health when used in parallel with other indicators. For 
instance, the standards on ‘public information and awareness-raising’ and on ‘health 
education’ oblige states to design health promotion campaigns according to what has 
been identified under the indicator ‘main causes of death of the population’. Such 
indicators are therefore necessary for a comprehensive review of the right to health 
by the European Committee, including both its individual and its collective 
dimension. 
Finally, how many indicators are necessary to define adequately the content of a 
right and thus, to measure appropriately its implementation in the context of Article 
11? On one hand, the high number of current indicators (i.e. 18 up to 2009) could be 
criticised for inflating the legal content of the right to health in theory, and for 
committing states to submit a considerable amount of data in practice. When 
discussing the obligation to submit data, I demonstrated that the indicators developed 
under Article 11 enabled a comprehensive understanding of what the right to health 
meant, and an in-depth evaluation of how it was realised. Whilst it is true that most 
violations of Article 11 are due to a failure to submit data, these indicators do not 
necessarily require states to produce new data. In fact, the European Committee 
frequently uses data emanating from European agencies, to whom states have already 
had to submit this information. On the other hand, these same indicators could also 
be criticised for failing to embrace fundamental issues such as ethnicity, socio-
economic status, and elderly persons’ health. These issues sometimes appear in the 
findings of the European Committee but they should be reviewed systematically, in 
order to ensure a uniform monitoring of such essential aspects of Article 11. 
                                                
421 ibid. 
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To conclude, albeit thematic health indicators can be criticised, they have enabled the 
development of a more comprehensive and transparent interpretation of the right to 
health than that developed by the UN Committee. The use of indicators is also 
especially relevant to monitoring the obligation to progressively realise the right to 
health, as they facilitate a follow-up of states’ performance. Finally, it is worth 
nothing that indicators are recommended by various international human rights 
institutions: e.g. the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights;422 and 
the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to health. 423  The recommendations 
formulated in that respect correspond relatively well to the practice of the European 
Committee. For instance, the Special Rapporteur specifies that indicators must be 
connected to established norms, must be disaggregated, and must evaluate national 
strategies as well as access to information, which the Article 11 indicators do. 
Therefore, indicators contribute to fulfilling the principles suggested by my thesis, 
i.e. SNHRBs’ interpretation should (1) protect an effective enjoyment of the right to 
health; (2) set reasonable expectations upon states; (3) be sensitive to the context in 
which this right is implemented; (4) apply principled consistency (and be fit to 
supranational monitoring). However, certain improvements remain to be seen: 
according to these guidelines, no indicator evaluates the participation of the 
population or the existence of accountability mechanisms in healthcare.424  
3.4.1.2 The standards developed by the European Committee   
The right to health is explicitly recognised in Article 11 ESC, which has been 
translated by the European Committee into various legal standards through its 
reporting and complaint procedures. However, it is also enshrined (more implicitly) 
in other provisions of the Charter. The coherence of how these standards interact 
with one another should therefore be discussed, as this can affect the principled 
consistency of its interpretation and thus, the substance of the right to health. 
First, the legal force of the standards that have been developed by the European 
Committee under Article 11 is not homogeneous. Certain standards have been given 
                                                
422 UNCESCR, ‘GC14’ (n 21), paras 57 and 58. 
423 Special Rapporteur on the right to health, 'Annual Report 2006' (n 227), para 49. 
424 ibid. 
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more importance than others under this provision. This can be identified either in the 
preciseness of their formulation, or in the strictness of their monitoring, as these 
differ considerably. As a result, such differences can either facilitate or impede 
findings of non-conformity. For instance, the legal standards developed under Article 
11 (1), on curative health, seem more precise and have led to more findings of non-
conformity than those developed under Article 11 (2), on preventive health. This 
‘differentiation’ is particularly relevant to the standards developed under the 
indicator ‘infant and maternal mortality’. The European Committee declares that 
conformity to these standards is ‘decisive’ in its overall finding of compliance 
regarding the implementation of Article 11,425 which it does not assert for any other 
standards. Moreover, high maternal and infant mortality rates are the most common 
reason why the European Committee finds states in breach of Article 11 (whether 
basing its findings on states’ performance, or data submission, see Figure 6). The 
emphasis put on complying with these standards seems to reflect the adoption of a 
minimum core obligations approach by the European Committee. This chapter does 
not pretend to address the complex issues raised by a minimum core approach (these 
will be examined in more depth in chapter 5). Instead, it recommends caution. It is 
legitimate that the European Committee considers minimum levels of healthcare as 
being a priority in the realisation of the right to health. It is nevertheless extremely 
difficult to determine what services are essential and must subsequently be 
prioritised in healthcare. The European Committee alone does not have the expertise 
to carry this task, and maternal healthcare does certainly not represent the only 
service that should be considered as such. Finally, whilst it is important to prioritise 
certain aspects of Article 11, it is crucial to not under-recognise others (such as 
health promotion), as they define, too, the legal content of the right to health. 
Second, the legal force of the provisions that protect the right to health in the Charter 
is not homogeneous either. As mentioned in subsection 3.1, Article 11 is not the only 
provision that embraces the right to health. Articles 3 and 7 deal with occupational 
health. Articles 13 and 19 provide for medical assistance to persons without adequate 
resources and to migrant workers. Finally, Articles 23 and 30 recognise the right to 
                                                
425 Such requirement was first established in ECSR, ‘Conclusions XV-2 (2001)’, Belgium p 
94. 
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healthcare for elderly persons and persons socially excluded or poor.426 These 
provisions all contribute towards delineating the legal content of the right to health 
but their scattering throughout the ESC risks blurring the normative scope of this 
right. Moreover, the interpretation of these provisions by the European Committee 
does not benefit from the same preciseness when compared to Article 11 (except, 
possibly, Article 3 and 7).427 Articles 23 and 30 were created in 1996 with the 
Revised Charter, thus leaving less time for an established jurisprudence to be 
developed than under Article 11, enshrined in the 1961 Charter.428 As for Articles 13 
and 19, they are part of the 1961 Charter but do not benefit from standards as clear as 
those found under Article 11. Due to their controversial nature (health protection to 
non-nationals), these provisions are not as widely ratified as Article 11,429 and the 
European Committee may therefore be unable and unwilling to set regional 
standards. As a result, the content and protection of the right to health may appear 
unbalanced, according to what aspects of health, or whose health are at stake.  
The uneven legal force of the standards defining the right to health in the ESC 
partially reflects the European Committee’s attempt to strictly monitor certain 
aspects of the right to health, and to leave a wider margin of appreciation for others. 
However, the reasons behind such approach are unclear, and the approach itself 
seems unjustifiable since certain aspects of health are unregulated as a result (e.g. 
older persons’ health). Therefore, such interpretation threatens the coherence given 
to the substance of the right to health and its implementation, going against the 
principle of principled consistency advocated by this thesis. 
3.4.2 The issues arising from a defective evaluation of the right to health  
While the interpretation of the right to health by the European Committee is unique 
and ambitious, the manner through which it monitors this right presents various 
shortcomings. It is nonetheless important to assess these shortcomings, as they may 
affect how the European Committee interprets the legal content of Article 11 ESC, 
                                                
426 ESC 1961 (n 92), Art 3, 7, 13 and 19; ESC 1996 (n 92), Art 3, 7, 13, 19, 23 and 30. 
427 ESC Secretariat, 'The right to health and the ESC' (n 323). 
428 ESC 1961 (n 92), Art 11; ESC 1996 (n 92), Art 11, 23 and 30. 
429 CoE, ‘Signatures and Ratifications of the ESC and Its Protocols’ (n 100). 
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(3.4.2.1) whether through its monitoring procedures, (3.4.2.2) or through the findings 
of non-conformity held under that provision. 
3.4.2.1 The monitoring procedures on Article 11 ESC 
The monitoring procedures of the European Committee regarding Article 11 are not 
fully adequate for several reasons, which affect how the right to health is interpreted. 
First, albeit the same health indicators are systematically used for every state and in 
every reporting cycle, the European Committee does not always evaluate them with 
the same tools. Considering the commonality of issues these tools attempt to assess, 
there is no apparent or justifiable reason why they should not be applied to all states. 
For instance, the European Committee consistently reviews states’ performance 
against the indicator ‘healthcare professionals and facilities’ in its Conclusions, but 
does not always verify that these figures are fairly distributed between rural and 
urban areas.430 The danger of ‘medical deserts’ in rural areas, however, is a common 
issue. As a result, the implementation of Article 11 is not entirely monitored on the 
same grounds for each State party to the Charter. Whilst the right to health should be 
interpreted in a manner that sets reasonable expectations of review upon SNHRBs, 
such practice threatens the coherence of its normative scope and the procedural 
certainty of its review. The European Committee should, thus, not only evaluate 
states’ performance with the same health indicators, it should also use the same 
‘tools’ when these enable the identification of common violations of Article 11. 
Second, both the reporting and the complaint procedures focus on the collective 
dimension of the right to health, but fail to translate what entitlements it grants to 
each individual. The indicators developed in the reporting procedure measure the 
implementation of Article 11 among the population as a whole and among certain 
vulnerable groups (children, women, persons living in rural areas, and, sometimes, 
Roma). By contrast, the collective complaint procedure enables the European 
Committee to review alleged violations of the right to health against any group of 
individuals (vulnerable or not). Nevertheless, the complaints can only be brought by 
                                                
430 E.g. in ECSR, ‘Conclusions 2005’, France pp. 230–231; or in ECSR, ‘Conclusions 2009’, 
Bulgaria p 161. 
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a restricted number of NGOs, not by the victims themselves,431 and must concern 
‘general’ situations.432  By establishing limited monitoring procedures, the ESC 
deprives the right to health from its individual scope and prevents its content from 
recognising adequately all right-holders. Therefore, any potential attempt from the 
European Committee to develop an interpretation that protects an effective 
enjoyment of individuals’ right to health is limited. 
3.4.2.2 The findings of non-conformity under Article 11 ESC 
While the monitoring procedures on Article 11 present a few shortcomings, the 
findings of non-conformity that emerge from them weaken the legal content of the 
right to health on one hand, and strengthen it on the other. 
First, the European Committee rarely reaches findings of non-conformity to Article 
11, and even less so on the basis of states’ direct failure to comply with their express 
obligations. Instead, most violations of Article 11 are based on a failure to fulfil the 
implied obligations to submit data (a requirement mainly procedural); or, sometimes, 
on a failure to perform comparably with European averages (a controversial 
requirement). Out of the 870 findings reached by the European Committee in its 
Conclusions on Article 11,433 79 correspond to a violation, and only 37 of these 79 
violations are due to inadequate performances in the field of healthcare. This 
represents only 4.2% of the total number of findings. The rarity of these findings of 
non-conformity seems to point at the reluctance of the European Committee to hold 
states in breach of the right to health in its reporting procedure. Moreover, its 
tendency to hide behind violations of implied obligations instead of holding 
violations of express obligations shows an unwillingness to engage more firmly with 
the legal standards developed under Article 11. However, out of the seven Merits 
Decisions involving Article 11 (to date), all correspond to a violation of the right to 
health, and all are based on states’ direct failure to fulfil their express obligations. 
                                                
431 Additional Protocol ESC 1995 (n 98), Art 1(b). 
432 CoE, ‘European Social Charter Collected Texts 6th Edition' (2008) 
<http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/socialcharter/Presentation/ESCCollectedTexts_en.pdf
> [accessed 8 September 2015], see Explanatory report to the 1995 Protocol, para 31. 
433 Calculated according to each decision based on states’ compliance with each of their three 
express obligations, in each reporting cycle (from 1969 to 2013). 
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The standards drawn from Article 11 have thus been given more legal force through 
the complaint procedure. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the European 
Committee seems less and less reluctant to reach findings of non-conformity to 
Article 11 through the reporting procedure. Whilst it held, respectively, 4, 2, 8, and 5 
violations of Article 11 during the 2001, 2003, 2005 and 2007 reporting cycles, it 
found 30 violations in 2009, and 29 in 2013. Such developments reflect a positive 
trend but also show that the interpretation of the European Committee must protect 
more explicitly an effective enjoyment of the right to health through both procedures. 
Second, the findings of non-conformity based on states’ failure to perform 
comparably with the European average in healthcare, seem to reflect the adoption of 
two approaches: the progressive realisation and the minimum core approaches. Such 
assertion can be deduced from two observations mentioned in subsection 3.3.2 on 
European averages. The European Committee holds states responsible for breaching 
Article 11 when their performances fall considerably below the European average, 
not when they simply fall short of it (which would disregard differences between 
states’ capabilities). This seems to reflect a minimum core obligation to realise the 
right to health: that to not perform significantly below the European average, 
regardless of the level of resources available to the state. This thesis challenges the 
notion of minimum core obligations as understood in Chapter 5. However, the 
application of this notion may be acceptable in the context of the European 
framework, where the level of resources and states’ proximity in other areas 
(including healthcare) allow for common core obligations to be set under Article 11. 
Furthermore, the European Committee usually encourages states that perform below 
European averages but that demonstrate their efforts to improve the implementation 
of Article 11. This seems to reflect an obligation to progressively realise the right to 
health: that to constantly improve one’s performance, regardless of the European 
average. It is worth noting that these findings echo the human rights-based approach 
of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Such compatibility 
between the European and the international protection of the right to health can 
therefore strengthen the legal content of this right. Moreover, the progressive and 
core approaches as (heuristically for the latter) applied by the European Committee, 
seem to facilitate an interpretation of the right to health that fulfils relatively well the 
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principles of interpretation advocated in this thesis. According to these, SNHRBs’ 
interpretation of the right to health should protect an effective enjoyment of the right, 
set realistic expectations upon states, be context-sensitive, and guarantee principled 
consistency. 
 
Conclusion 
In this Chapter, I examined how the European Committee interpreted the right to 
health and discussed whether this contributed to clarifying its legal content 
adequately, by studying its monitoring procedures on Article 11 ESC. Therefore, I 
analysed the comments formulated by the European Committee when monitoring the 
implementation of this right: in its reporting procedure, up to the 2013 cycle; and in 
its complaint procedures, up to April 2015. This research led to the conclusion that 
the European Committee delineates the legal content of the right to health with 
precision. In Section 3.1, I introduced the provisions relevant to health in the ESC, 
justified my choice to focus on Article 11 ESC, and described the procedures through 
which the latter is monitored; before outlining the methodology of my analysis in 
this regard. In Section 3.2, I contended that the European Committee recognised 
three express obligations in its jurisprudence on Article 11, clarifying the normative 
scope of the right to health. These concern the provision of curative health, health 
promotion, and preventive health. The use of a normative terminology as well as the 
repetition and reference to certain standards clearly point at the existence of legal 
standards under the right to health. Furthermore, the use of findings of non-
conformity contributes to clarifying what thresholds must be reached for such 
standards to be considered violated. In Section 3.3, I then argued that the 
methodology used by the European Committee to monitor Article 11 ESC, stressed 
the recognition of implied obligations. Requests to submit specific data and 
violations held for failure to do so clearly highlight states’ obligation to not only 
report on the implementation of the right to health, but also to collect data in order to 
understand the health needs of their populations. Furthermore, the use of European 
averages, although illegitimate in theory, represents a heuristic tool enabling the 
European Committee to hold states in breach of Article 11 when they perform 
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comparably below the average. Finally, I used these findings to draw a critical 
overview of the European Committee’s interpretation in Section 3.4, using the 
principles of interpretation this thesis advocates. Firstly, I analysed the challenges 
and benefits of its ambitious interpretation, by discussing the use of thematic 
indicators and the (uneven) legal force of the various health standards developed 
under the ESC. Secondly, I pointed at the pitfalls of the monitoring procedures and 
the findings of non-conformity on Article 11, weakening the legal content of the 
right to health. However, due to its established jurisprudence and its unusual 
monitoring tools (i.e. health indicators and regional averages), the European 
Committee’s interpretation offers an unprecedented contribution to the clarification 
of the right to health through supranational monitoring. 
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PART I: 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This thesis seeks to clarify the legal content of the right to health through 
supranational monitoring, in an attempt to remedy its conceptual vagueness. As a 
result, Part I of this thesis explored how SNHRBs could effectively contribute to 
clarifying the legal content of the right to health in the course of their quasi-judicial 
monitoring procedures.  
Chapter 1 set the background. It contextualised the recognition of the right to health 
in international law and analysed the issues that this right currently faces, concluding 
that scholars failed to sufficiently clarify the excessive vagueness surrounding its 
legal content by examining the potential of SNHRBs in this respect. Chapters 2 and 
3, therefore, analysed thoroughly how the UN and the European Committees 
interpreted the right to health in their monitoring procedures, using a critical, 
interpretative, and empirical approach. By monitoring the right to health differently, 
they developed distinct, although not necessarily incompatible, understandings of 
what it meant in practice. The UN Committee interprets the normative scope of the 
right to health more comprehensively, and (implicitly) recognises states’ obligations 
to progressively or immediately realise this right. However, the lack of methodology 
and follow-up in its reporting procedure, impede its ability to develop a clear and 
consistent understanding of what Article 12 ICESCR entails. It is interesting to 
observe that the flexibility of this approach enables a constructive dialogue with 
States parties to the ICESCR, perhaps contributing towards the realisation of the 
right to health in practice. Contrarily to the UN Committee, the European Committee 
developed clear standards delineating the normative scope of the right to health, 
which now form its jurisprudence on Article 11 ESC. Such development has been 
assisted by the systematic use of indicators for each state and in each reporting cycle, 
and by the use of European averages. These tools enable the European Committee to 
identify inadequate performances in the health sector, and to reach findings of non-
conformity, thus clarifying states’ obligations under the right to health.  
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To conclude, analysing how the UN and the European Committees interpret the right 
to health in their quasi-judicial monitoring procedures can delineate its legal content 
with more precision. However, certain conceptual issues specific to the normative 
scope of the right to health, the nature of states’ obligations to realise it, and the 
coherence of its content across different SNHRBs, remain unclear. They must 
nonetheless be addressed for this right to be interpreted, monitored, and implemented 
adequately. What does ‘the highest standard of health attainable’ mean? Is such 
standard the same for every country, regardless of cultures? Is everyone entitled to 
it? What does the obligation to progressively realise the right to health entail in 
practice? Should minimum core obligations be non-derogable? How can those 
questions be interpreted consistently when various SNHRBs are at stake? What 
margin should SNHRBs retain if any, in this respect? 
Part II, therefore, will attempt to answer those questions in the light and for the 
purposes of supranational monitoring, in order to assist SNHRBs in optimising their 
interpretation of what the right to health entails in their procedures.  
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PART II: 
THE RIGHT TO HEALTH TOWARDS FURTHER 
CONCEPTUAL CLARITY 
In Part II, I will build upon the shortcomings identified in Part I, to produce a 
theoretical framework bringing further conceptual clarity on how the legal content of 
the right to health should be read in monitoring procedures, in order to optimise 
SNHRBs’ interpretation of this right. Chapter 4 will thus study how the normative 
scope of the right to health should be interpreted in supranational monitoring. 
Chapter 5 will examine how SNHRBs should understand what states’ obligations to 
realise this right entails. Finally, Chapter 6 will analyse how the legal content of the 
right to health should be interpreted across the various levels of supranational levels 
of human rights monitoring, to improve coherence. 
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Chapter 4 Clarifying the normative scope of the right to health in 
supranational monitoring 
Introduction 
As outlined by the introduction of my thesis, an adequate interpretation of the right 
to health must ensure an effective enjoyment of this right, set reasonable 
expectations upon states, be sensitive to the context in which it will be implemented 
and overall, it must guarantee principled consistency. However, how can SNHRBs 
make these principles coexist when defining the substance and scope of the right to 
health in practice, through their monitoring procedures? Whilst the monitoring 
procedures of the UN and the European Committees provide interesting findings in 
that regard, discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, they leave crucial conceptual issues 
unaddressed. What does the ‘highest standard of health attainable’ mean, is it the 
same everywhere, and who is entitled to such standard?  
It is essential that such questions be clarified, as excessive vagueness can threaten the 
realisation of the right to health. This chapter will thus offer a theoretical account 
assisting SNHRBs in interpreting the normative scope of the right to health 
adequately, drawing from a critical analysis of the UN and the European 
Committees’ interpretation, and from an analysis of the relevant doctrine.  
Unfortunately, legal scholarship has not yet managed to define comprehensively the 
substance and scope of the right to health.434 Most publications explore a human 
rights-based approach to health, thus failing to clarify the legal content of this right 
and more precisely, its normative scope. However, in The Right to Health in 
International Law, Tobin partially sheds light on what the ‘highest standard of health 
attainable’ entails, by clarifying its scope of interests, the freedoms associated with 
health, as well as the ‘availability’ and ‘accessibility’ requirements. 435  The 
shortcomings of his methodology will nonetheless lead this chapter to suggest an 
                                                
434  Marks ‘The emergence and scope of the right to health’ in Zuniga, Marks and Gostin (n 
131) 3–24: When attempting to define the normative content of the right to health, Marks 
tends to focus on obligations specific to its implementation and on the different human rights 
with which it interacts, rather than on its substance per se.  
435 Tobin (n 19) 4. 
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approach fitting the principles of interpretation set earlier, and drawing from the 
declaration of former UN Special Rapporteur on the right to health Professor Hunt in 
his 2006 Annual Report: 
The right to health can be understood as a right to an effective and 
integrated health system, encompassing health care and the underlying 
determinants of health, which is responsive to national and local 
priorities, and accessible to all.436 
Chapter 4 is thus structured as follows. First (4.1), Chapter 4 will suggest that 
SNHRBs translate the right to a ‘highest standard of health attainable’ into a right to 
an adequate health system, for monitoring purposes. Section 4.1 will highlight the 
difficulties emerging from an expansive definition of health, and the subsequent need 
to understand the right to health as a right to an adequate health system, before 
examining how this can be materialised and monitored by SNHRBs. Second (4.2), 
Chapter 4 will study the importance for such a right to be responsive to the cultural 
environment in which it is to be understood. Section 4.2 will discuss how culture can 
threaten the realisation of the right to health on one hand, and enhance its 
implementation on the other, and will suggest a monitoring framework for SNHRBs’ 
procedures. Finally (4.3), Chapter 4 will explore the requirement for the right to 
health to be accessible to all, by focusing on non-nationals. Section 4.3 will thus 
point at the inconsistent scope of the right to health and the disproportionate 
restrictions reflecting tensions between universalism and states’ sovereignty, before 
suggesting a monitoring framework for SNHRBs.  
 
4.1 The right to an adequate health system (the scope of interests) 
The requirement according to which states must guarantee the ‘highest standard of 
health attainable’ is enshrined in most human rights treaties recognising a right to 
health.437 However, it is unclear what such requirement entitles individuals to; and 
the latter is often criticised for setting unreasonable expectations upon states. It is 
                                                
436 Special Rapporteur on the right to health, 'Annual Report 2006' (n 227), para 4. 
437 Except in: CERD (n 93), Art 5(e)(iv); CEDAW (n 93), Art 12; ICMW (n 93), Art 28. 
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nonetheless crucial to explore what the scope of interests of the right to health should 
entail in supranational monitoring, in order to enable SNHRBs to optimise their 
interpretation accordingly. In an attempt to clarify such scope through relevant 
literature and through a comparative analysis of the UN and the CoE, this section 
will thus suggest that the right to the ‘highest standard of health attainable’ be 
translated into the right to an ‘adequate health system’ in supranational monitoring. 
Firstly (4.1.1), I will discuss the issues emerging from the expansive definition of 
health in human rights law, justifying the need for SNHRBs to understand the right 
to health as a right to an adequate health system. Secondly (4.1.2), I will discuss how 
the substance of the right to an adequate health system can be materialised into 
precise legal requirements in supranational monitoring. Thirdly (4.1.3), I will assess 
whether the methods developed by SNHRBs such as the UN and the European 
Committees to rationalise health when monitoring this right, can accommodate this 
framework.  
4.1.1 From the requirement to achieve the highest standard of health attainable 
to the requirement to set up an adequate health system 
The right to health entails a requirement according to which states must achieve the 
‘highest standard of health attainable’. Such requirement, however, is inadequately 
framed in human rights law and this subsection thus suggests that it is understood 
instead as a requirement to set up adequate health systems, at least for monitoring 
purposes. This will be demonstrated through: (4.1.1.1) the unrealistic expectations 
set by the WHO Constitution; (4.1.1.2) the incoherent standards set by human rights 
instruments; and (4.1.1.3) the recognition of states’ obligation to develop adequate 
health systems in human rights law. 
4.1.1.1 The definition of health in the WHO Constitution: unrealistic expectations 
The WHO Constitution 1946 is the first text that recognised the existence of a right 
to health in the history of international law and more precisely, a ‘right to the highest 
standard of health attainable’.438 The WHO Constitution is not a human rights treaty 
and thus does not intend to define the legal content of such right. However, since the 
                                                
438 WHO Constitution (n 2), Preamble. 
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definition of health enshrined in its Preamble is recognised worldwide and guides 
international health policies, it is worth studying it when attempting to clarify what 
the ‘highest standard of health attainable’ means. The latter reads:  
 ‘Health is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and 
not merely the absence of disease or infirmity.’439 
This definition, which associates health with a state of complete wellbeing, has 
generated heated debates amongst physicians, ethicists, and lawyers, as it 
automatically categorises persons with chronic diseases and with disabilities as being 
perpetually ill. Some experts argue that such formulation ignores the capacity of the 
human body to cope and function with chronic health challenges while reaching a 
feeling of wellbeing.440 Others, however, consider that health is not simply about 
survival and refuse to diminish the suffering experienced by these patients.441 This 
chapter has neither the medical expertise nor the philosophical insight required to 
answer such a question. Instead, its purpose is to examine whether the WHO 
definition of health can be translated into a legal right, which I will answer 
negatively. 
Firstly, associating health with a state of ‘complete’ physical and mental wellbeing 
expands the scope of the right to health unrealistically. States cannot necessarily be 
held responsible for health conditions genetically inherited (e.g. Down syndrome) or 
for common and benign viral infections (e.g. the common cold), as causation with 
their (in)actions cannot be established. This does not mean they should not assist 
individuals in accessing health services in that regard. This means that the right to 
health does not guarantee a right to be healthy, as recognised by the UN Committee 
                                                
439 ibid, Preamble. 
440  Machteld Huber and others, ‘How Should We Define Health?’ (2011) 343 British 
Medical Journal 235, 235–236. 
441 D. M. Lewis, ‘WHO definition of health remains fit for purpose (Letter)’ (2011) 343 
British Medical Journal 435; Angus Tallini, ‘Health Is State of Wellbeing (Letter)’ (2011) 
343 British Medical Journal 435. 
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in GC14.442 Furthermore, states are not bound to fund every single health service. 
According to Wang, referring to Daniels’ work: 
No health care system – no matter how rich the country or how high the 
health expenditure per person – is able to offer unrestricted access to all 
treatments that may improve citizens’ health.443 
Such limits can be found in human rights instruments, which often require that states 
achieve the highest standard of health attainable, and realise it progressively. As a 
result, individuals cannot claim compensation for suffering from a health condition 
that cannot be reasonably prevented; and cannot demand access to free treatments on 
the sole basis that it will improve their health. This would set unrealistic standards 
upon states. Instead, the right to health entitles individuals with the best care possible 
for their conditions (e.g. physiotherapy for new-borns with Down syndrome), in the 
limits of states’ resources. Therefore, the notion of ‘completion’ in the WHO 
definition should be understood as what is attainable. 
Secondly, describing health as a state of complete ‘wellbeing’ tends to blur the 
distinction between health and happiness, and between what is fundamental to 
human dignity, a pillar of human rights law, and what is not. The Travaux 
Préparatoires of the WHO Constitution highlight intentions to adopt a ‘positive 
health’ approach, going beyond the notion of illness and embracing that of wellbeing 
instead.444 Nevertheless, recognising a right to wellbeing is unrealistic. Whilst it is 
true that the right to health is a means to happiness in a liberal egalitarian model, it 
cannot guarantee happiness, for such notion is vague and infinite.445 Not only does 
the meaning of wellbeing depend on personal experiences, lifestyles or cultures; the 
resources it involves are unlimited. What if someone ‘needs’ regular and expensive 
spa treatments abroad to reach wellbeing? Moreover, the absence of diseases does 
                                                
442 UNCESCR, ‘GC14’ (n 21), para 8. 
443 Daniel WL Wang, ‘Courts and Health Care Rationing: The Case of the Brazilian Federal 
Supreme Court’ (2013) 8 Health Economics, Policy and Law 75, 78; see Daniels 2008 (n 
15).  
444 WHO Interim Commission, ‘Official Records No. 1 1946’ (n 90), Eight meeting (Friday 
22 March 1946), p 19 para 1(c).  
445 Joseph Raz, ‘Legal Principles and the Limits of Law’ (1971) 81 Yale Law Journal 823, 
836–839. 
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not necessarily amount to happiness: someone can be perfectly healthy but deeply 
sorrowful (e.g. grieving the loss of a loved one).446 It is worth noting that the 
Travaux Préparatoires of the WHO Constitution somehow distinguish both notions, 
by affirming that health is a ‘prerequisite’ to happiness.447 Therefore, it is important 
health remains distinct from wellbeing, at least in the context of this thesis as it aims 
at clarifying the legal content of the right to health for monitoring purposes. 
Thirdly, another problematic aspect of the WHO definition of health is the reference 
to ‘social’ wellbeing. Authors such as Nussbaum, Sen, and Venkatapuram have 
promoted such understanding of health through the capabilities approach, by arguing 
that individuals should be given equal opportunities to access health and well-
being.448 According to them, obstacles to this fulfilment (e.g. socio-economic factors, 
ethnicity, gender etc.) should be addressed in order for individuals to reach control 
over their health.449 It is of course desirable that all individuals access a state of 
social wellbeing, by benefiting from adequate opportunities to access a state of social 
wellbeing. However, it would be excessively difficult to translate this into a legal 
requirement and could set unreasonable expectations upon states. Such excessive 
inflation of the right to health would also discredit its legal existence. 
To conclude, in its attempt to transcend the biomedical aspect of health, the WHO 
definition of health has become all-inclusive but remain limited to its individual 
dimension. Translating it into a legal entitlement is thus impossible for that it would 
set unrealistic expectations upon states. It is thus important SNHRBs consider the 
                                                
446 See similar discussions in the medical community: Rodolfo Saracci, ‘The World Health 
Organisation Needs to Reconsider Its Definition of Health’ (1997) 314 British Medical 
Journal 1409. 
447 WHO Interim Commission, ‘Official Records No. 1 1946' (n 90), Annex 9 (Suggestions 
relating to the Constitution of an International Health Organisation), p 58 (Preamble). 
448 See the work of Nussbaum and Sen (n 43); Venkatapuram (n 45). 
449 See also Alicia Ely Yamin, ‘Defining Questions: Situating Issues of Power in the 
Formulation of a Right to Health under International Law’ (1996) 18 Human Rights 
Quarterly 398. 
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WHO definition as a historic reference,450 and turn towards human rights law 
instead. 
4.1.1.2 The highest standard of health attainable in human rights instruments: 
incoherent standards 
Most legally-binding human rights treaties that recognise a right to health embrace a 
right to ‘the highest standard of health attainable’, as mentioned in subsection 
1.2.1.1. Such formulation can be found at the international level: in Article 12 
ICESCR,451 Article 24 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child,452 and Article 
25 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.453 It can also be 
found at a regional level: in Article 11 ESC,454 Article 16 of the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples' Rights (African Charter), 455  Article 10 of the Additional 
Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (Protocol of San Salvador),456 and Article 39 of the Arab 
Charter of Human Rights (Arab Charter).457 However, it is unclear what the ‘highest 
standard of health attainable’ means, and relying on the WHO definition of health 
has proven to be unhelpful. 
In order to provide further guidance as to what this entails, right to health provisions 
often include paragraphs clarifying the types of care or services individuals are 
entitled to. However, the formulation found in these paragraphs can be inadequate to 
delineate the normative scope of the right to health. This will be illustrated through 
the examples of Article 12 ICESCR and Article 11 ESC.  
                                                
450  As argued by Bok (n 89). 
451 ICESCR (n 4), Art 12. 
452 CRC (n 93), Art 24. 
453 CRPD (n 93), Art 25. 
454 ESC 1961 (n 92), Art 11 (see formulation of Part I (11)); ESC 1996 (n 92), Art 11 (see 
formulation of Part I (11)). 
455 African Charter (n 92), Art 16. 
456 Protocol of San Salvador (n 92), Art 10. 
457 Arab Charter (n 92), Art 39. 
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Defining health by way of examples: Article 12 ICESCR 
To clarify what the right to health entails, human rights treaties sometimes list some 
of its components as examples. However, such lists do not enable SNHRBs to define 
what the highest standard of health attainable means, since they are intended to be 
non-exhaustive and are thus inevitably limited. This is the case for instance of Article 
12 ICESCR, which reads: 
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of 
everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical 
and mental health. 
2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to 
achieve the full realization of this right shall include those necessary for: 
(a) The provision for the reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of infant 
mortality and for the healthy development of the child; 
(b) The improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial 
hygiene; 
(c) The prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, 
occupational and other diseases; 
(d) The creation of conditions which would assure to all medical service 
and medical attention in the event of sickness.458 
Addressing infant, environmental and occupational health, as well as infectious 
diseases (listed in paragraph 2(a), (b) and (c)) is fundamental to the realisation of the 
right to health. Nevertheless, two issues arise.  
First, the decision to list certain topics over others is unprincipled. The Travaux 
Préparatoires of the ICESCR show that drafters considered these issues as 
representing ‘important problems’.459 However, no rationale appears as to why they 
                                                
458 ICESCR (n 4), Art 12. 
459 ECOSOC Commission on Human Rights, ‘Summary Record of the 223rd Meeting' 
(1951) UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR.223, p 12 (Mr Santa Cruz, Chile). 
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selected these topics in particular. Furthermore, documents drafted by the WHO in 
the early 1960s point at the existence of other priorities, not reflected in Article 
12(2). In its 1960 annual report, the WHO revealed an agenda focused on malaria, 
communicable diseases, environmental sanitation, public health services, health 
promotion, medical training, and medical research.460 Whilst this agenda targeted 
infectious diseases and environmental health, listed in Article 12(2) ICESCR, it also 
targeted elements not listed in this provision, such as health promotion or medical 
training. Shortly after, the WHO released a report on the world health situation. It 
specified that over the last decade (1950s), the main causes of mortality had been (in 
descending order): heart diseases, malignant neoplasms (cancers), vascular lesions 
affecting the central nervous system, and accidents.461 None of these conditions 
appear in the list established by Article 12(2) ICESCR. 
Second, it is undesirable to define this right by health topics. Causes of mortality 
evolve over time, due to medical progress and diseases’ outbreaks. The WHO 
declared recently that ischaemic heart disease, stroke, chronic obstructive pulmonary 
disease, and lower respiratory tract infections had been the ‘top major killers’ over 
the past decade’.462 Nevertheless, Article 12(2), which was drafted in the 1940s and 
the 1950s, does not account for any of these issues. And it should not. It is unsure 
whether these causes of mortality will be the same in fifty years time, due to the 
nature of medicine, a rapidly changing and evolving platform.  
To conclude, defining the scope of interests of the right to health through non-
exhaustive lists is not particularly helpful to clarifying its legal content. Not only do 
lists fail to grasp the ever-changing aspect of global health, they also prioritise 
                                                
460 WHO, ‘Official Records of the World Health Organisation No. 105, The Work of WHO 
1960: Annual Report to the Director-General to the World Health Assembly and to the UN’ 
<http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/85731/1/Official_record105_eng.pdf> [accessed 8 
September 2015]. 
461 WHO, ‘Official Records of the World Health Organisation No. 122, Second Report of the 
World Health Situation 1957-1960’ (1963), p 9 (on Mortality Statistics) 
<http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/85752/1/Official_record122_eng.pdf> [accessed 8 
September 2015]. However, the WHO acknowledges issues of data collection. 
462 WHO, ‘The Top 10 Causes of Death’ <http://who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs310/en/> 
[accessed 8 September 2015].  
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certain fields of health over others with no rationale. It is therefore undesirable 
SNHRBs define health solely by drawing a list of topics. 
Defining health by its aims: Article 11 ESC 
To clarify what the right to health entails, other human rights treaties may focus on 
its purposes. However, the drafting of human rights treaties does not necessarily 
involve experts in medicine, public health, ethics, or health economics. As a result, 
the conceptual framework on which the scope of the right to health relies may be 
inadequate. This is the case to a certain extent of Article 11 ESC, which reads:  
With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right to protection of 
health, the Parties undertake, either directly or in cooperation with public 
or private organisations, to take appropriate measures designed inter alia: 
(1) to remove as far as possible the causes of ill-health; 
(2) to provide advisory and educational facilities for the promotion of 
health and the encouragement of individual responsibility in matters of 
health; 
(3) to prevent as far as possible epidemic, endemic and other diseases, as 
well as accidents.463 
The framework preventive-curative care reflected by this provision (although less 
clearly so by the first paragraph) has the advantage of being less likely to change, 
since it builds upon the main two purposes of healthcare. Healthcare principally aims 
at avoiding the occurrence of diseases before the manifestation of signs of ill-health; 
or aims at treating diseases after the manifestation of such signs.  
Important criticisms can be raised against the dichotomy preventive-curative 
healthcare nonetheless. First, such distinction is not always clear. For instance, 
should surgeries performed to remove solitary malignant cancerous tumours prior to 
metastasising, be categorised as preventive or curative care? Second, this dichotomy 
                                                
463 ESC 1996 (n 92); ESC 1961 (n 92). The 1996 version of the ESC contains the wording 
‘as well as accidents’ in its Art 11(3), but not the 1961 version. 
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is not always comprehensive. For instance, it excludes palliative care, which does not 
aim at ‘curing’ existing conditions, but at managing patients’ suffering. This, 
however, certainly does not mean that individuals have no right to palliative care.464 
Third, a definition of health based on the purposes of healthcare does not clarify 
what preventive and curative health services states must guarantee. Should states 
fund mammograms for all girls and women to prevent the occurrence of breast 
cancer? Should states fund expensive cancer therapy when a cheaper but less 
effective treatment is available, and under what conditions?  
Such questions, related to healthcare prioritisation and the obligation to progressively 
realise the right to health, involve at least four types of expertise and six parameters. 
Those include: expertise in public health (to assess the health needs of the 
population); expertise in medicine (to evaluate the effectiveness, safety and necessity 
of a treatment); expertise in health economics (to assess its costs and affordability); 
and expertise in ethics (to determine who should benefit from it, in the event of 
rationing). Therefore, an effective enjoyment of the right to health means that 
individuals in need should be able to claim for treatments that are effective, safe, 
necessary to improve their health, affordable, and that do not clash with the 
possibility for other persons to receive treatment. However, Wang considers this 
impossible, as treating one person often implies not being able to treat others.465 
Furthermore, drawing a theoretical framework applicable to all states is also 
impossible, for health needs and resource availability may vary from one state to 
another. SNHRBs must thus delineate the scope of interests of the right to health in a 
manner that is comprehensive, realistic and coherent. 
4.1.1.3 The right to an adequate health system: a more adequate framework 
Interestingly, in GC14 the UN Committee declares that the right to health entitles 
individuals with a right to:  
                                                
464 Backman and Stjernswärd ‘Palliative Care’, in Clapham and Robinson (n 132) 311–350; 
UNCESCR, ‘GC14’ (n 21), para 34. 
465 Wang (n 443) 86. 
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‘a system of health protection which provides equality of opportunity for 
people to enjoy the highest attainable level of health.’466  
It then requires that such systems ensure healthcare that is available, accessible, 
acceptable and of good quality, as discussed in Chapter 2. A similar approach was 
advocated by the Special Rapporteur on the right to health, who affirms in his 2006 
Annual Report:  
The right to health can be understood as a right to an effective and 
integrated health system, encompassing health care and the underlying 
determinants of health, which is responsive to national and local 
priorities, and accessible to all.467 
Such formulation encapsulates the obligation for states to constantly strive to achieve 
high standards, since states must guarantee health systems responsive to the health 
needs of their population. However, it also allows the flexibility and reasonableness 
needed to determine what services are needed in each state, and whether states can 
afford these services.468 Finally, such formulation is not restricted to the individual 
dimension of health in the provision of healthcare, as this was the case with the 
WHO definition. It also embraces its collective dimension, by setting public health 
requirements such as campaigns promoting healthy behaviour or combatting 
unhealthy behaviour.  
To conclude, the WHO definition of health and that found in human rights 
instruments do not clarify adequately the scope of interests of the right to health. 
Therefore, this thesis suggests that SNHRBs understand the right to the ‘highest 
standard of health attainable’ as a right to benefit from an adequate health system. 
However, how can SNHRBs translate such requirement into specific legal 
obligations? 
                                                
466 UNCESCR, ‘GC14’ (n 21), para 8. 
467 Special Rapporteur on the right to health, 'Annual Report 2006' (n 227), para 4; see also 
Paul Hunt and Gunilla Backman, ‘Health Systems and the Right to the Highest Attainable 
Standard of Health’ (2008) 10 Health and Human Rights 81. 
468 See the benefits of a rights-based approach in health when focusing on local systems:  
Freedman ‘Drilling down: Strenghtening local health systems to address global health 
crises’, in Clapham and Robinson (n 132). 
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4.1.2 Materialising the right to an adequate health system 
Subsection 4.1.1 demonstrated that SNHRBs should not fully rely on the WHO 
definition of health or the wording found in right to health provisions, for these 
define health generically or restrict it to an individual dimension. Instead, they 
should understand the right to health as a right to an adequate health system. 
Subsection 4.1.2 will thus discuss how such right can be materialised into standards 
applicable to all states, in supranational monitoring. First (4.1.2.1), I suggest that 
SNHRBs interpret what constitute an adequate health system by relying 
appropriately on external expertise. Second (4.1.2.2), I recommend that SNHRBs 
recognise states’ obligation to identify the health needs of their populations (and 
address them), as a basis for findings of non-conformity. Third (4.1.2.3), I argue that 
they understand social determinants of health through the principle of the 
interdependence of rights, to avoid inflating the scope of the right to health. 
4.1.2.1 Defining adequate health systems: human rights law and external expertise 
Defining precisely what services states must guarantee through their health systems 
is an excessively challenging task for human rights lawyers alone, including 
SNHRBs. What is considered as harmful to health changes over time. Research 
frequently identifies new evidence of how certain substances, activities or behaviours 
can be harmful to human health (e.g. smoking tobacco).469  What if juicing diets (a 
recent trend) are proved to provoke serious digestive disorders in 10 years time; 
should states be held responsible for not having sufficiently investigated their risks; 
and if yes, to what extent? 
Moreover, diseases that are now particularly deadly, or disabilities that are 
particularly burdensome, may be better managed in the years to come thanks to 
medical and biomedical progress. For instance, HIV mortality is now relatively well 
controlled through anti-retroviral therapy; amputees’ quality of life can be greatly 
                                                
469 Richard Doll and A Bradford Hill, ‘The Mortality of Doctors in Relation to Their 
Smoking Habits’ (1954) 1 British Medical Journal 1451: the first time that research revealed 
smoking could cause lung cancer. 
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improved thanks to bionic prostheses; and smallpox has been eradicated.470 Such 
parameters modify the concept of health over time and as a result, change states’ 
duties towards their populations in right to health monitoring (and adjudication). 
However, further questions arise. Does the right to health imply that states must 
systematically provide access to new treatments improving patients’ conditions? If 
not, what factors should be considered, and how much importance should be given to 
treatments’ effectiveness or costs, and to patients’ quality of life? 
Finally, health often interacts with the notion of human responsibility. While the 
latter may determine civil litigation opposing patients with health insurance 
companies, how should it be approached in right to health monitoring (and 
adjudication)? Should a state provide expensive palliative care to a heavy smoker 
with lung cancer, although it deployed multiple awareness-raising campaigns against 
tobacco and provided free lung cancer screening to its population? Whilst this thesis 
does not suggest it should not, justifications are required. 
Human rights law cannot answer these questions alone and certainly not generically. 
Therefore, it is crucial that the definition of ‘adequate health systems’ is constantly 
guided by the expertise of medical and public health professionals, as well as 
healthcare lawyers, economists and ethicists. This is how Tobin suggests that the 
right to health is clarified, by advocating for an interpretative approach based on a 
constructive engagement with its key actors.471 Nonetheless, two shortcomings can 
be observed in this approach.472 They highlight both the limits of external expertise 
and the importance of a principled methodology.  
It is morally undesirable that the scope of interests of the right to health is defined 
entirely through consensuses between key actors. What if, hypothetically, the 
majority of the interpretative community contended that the highest standard of 
health attainable implied mandatory HIV screening on pregnant women, in breach of 
                                                
470  WHO, ‘Smallpox and Its Eradication’ (1988) 
<http://whqlibdoc.who.int/smallpox/9241561106.pdf> [accessed 8 September 2015], Chap 
24 to 27. 
471 Tobin (n 19). 
472 Lougarre (n 30). 
 
164 
human rights norms?473 Therefore, I suggest that SNHRBs determine the adequacy 
of health systems by relying primarily on the cornerstones principles of human 
dignity and non-discrimination, and then on external expertise. How should this be 
done?  
In order for the scope of interests of the right to health to be coherent, it is necessary 
that it is interpreted through a principled methodology. What if, hypothetically, half 
of the interpretative community argued that HIV testing on pregnant women should 
be mandatory, and the other half believed that it should simply be recommended? As 
a result, I suggest that SNHRBs interpret the highest standard of health attainable by 
respecting four principles. These are inspired from the principles developed by 
Tobin,474 but readjusted by order of importance to address his shortcomings and 
reach the aim of this thesis, i.e. clarifying the legal content of the right to health 
through and for supranational monitoring. Firstly, SNHRBs’ interpretation of the 
right to health must be coherent within its legal system to ensure principled 
consistency: it must respect established principles of international human rights law. 
Secondly, their interpretation must be expertise-based to ensure an effective 
enjoyment of the right to health and set reasonable expectations upon states. It must 
rely on established research in medicine, public health, healthcare ethics, health 
economics, and health law. Thirdly, SNHRBs’ interpretation of the right to health 
must be context-sensitive: it must be adapted to the environment in which the right is 
to be implemented to be more effective, as later discussed in subsections 4.1.2.2 and 
4.2. Finally, their interpretation must be clear and practical to be fit to supranational 
monitoring, as excessive vagueness threatens the realisation of the right to health.475  
It could be argued that such methodology is fastidious, and that expertise is not 
always necessary in right to health monitoring and adjudication, when health systems 
are obviously inadequate. In Sierra Leone, for example, the number of maternal 
mortality reached 1,100 deaths per 100,000 live births before the Ebola outbreak, by 
                                                
473 For instance, see the arguments put forward by Udo Schuklenk and Anita Kleinsmidt, 
‘Rethinking Mandatory HIV Testing During Pregnancy in Areas With High HIV Prevalence 
Rates: Ethical and Policy Issues’ (2007) 97 American Journal of Public Health 1179. 
474 Tobin (n 19) 88–118. 
475 Lougarre (n 30) 340–341. 
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far the highest figure worldwide.476 Should Sierra Leone be automatically held 
accountable for breaching the right to health, since it clearly failed to provide basic 
maternal care, ‘core’ component of this right?477 Whilst this figure clearly reflects an 
inadequate health system and potentially represents a violation of this right, Sierra 
Leone’s compliance with human rights law must be also examined in the light of its 
resources and efforts. As outlined by Article 2(1) ICESCR and by the word 
‘attainable’, states must progressively realise the right to health, according to the 
resources available to them. This will be discussed in depth in Chapter 5. Such 
requirements are time-consuming, but so is the rule of law. However, this does not 
mean that no generic obligation can be derived from the right to health. 
4.1.2.2 The obligation to identify (and address) health needs  
In order to set up any adequate health system, it is fundamental states first 
understand the particular health needs of their populations. As argued by Alston, 
states are primarily accountable for devising adequate means to implement ESCR.478 
Furthermore, this facilitates the principle of context-sensitivity advocated by this 
thesis, according to which SNHRBs interpret the right to health by considering the 
environment in which it is to be implemented. Whilst it is excessively challenging 
for human rights lawyers, including SNHRBs, to define what is an adequate health 
system, they should recognise states’ obligation to identify (and address) the health 
needs of their populations.  
Firstly, such obligation represents the essence of reporting procedures before 
SNHRBs. Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrate that these procedures do not simply require 
that states provide data on their health systems. They also require that states collect 
the data in the first place, which eventually forces them to observe the successes and 
failures of their health systems. Therefore, identifying populations’ needs is essential 
to the design of appropriate health policies, as highlighted by the UN and the 
                                                
476 WHO, ‘Trends in Maternal Mortality: 1990 to 2013. Estimates by WHO, UNICEF, 
UNFPA, The World Bank and the United Nations Population Division’ (2014), p 7 
<http://www.who.int/reproductivehealth/publications/monitoring/maternal-mortality-
2013/en/> [accessed 8 September 2015]. 
477 UNCESCR, ‘GC14’ (n 21), para 44(a). 
478 Alston 1987 (n 152) 357.  
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European Committees when commenting on states’ reports.479 Some may contend 
that this obligation is costly, as numerous administrative means must be established 
to collect data in the health sector. However, the analysis of the sources used by the 
European Committee and the interviews conducted with UN Committee members in 
May 2014, reveal that data is often available and that reporting procedures tend to 
require that states compile data rather than collect it. As for states in which the data 
is unavailable, the obligation to identify health needs represents a preliminary step to 
providing appropriate healthcare. Assistance by intergovernmental agencies and 
NGOs is thus crucial in this concern. 
Secondly, states’ obligation to identify the health needs of their populations is related 
to the principle of non-discrimination, a pillar of human rights law. According to this 
principle, states must refrain from committing de jure and de facto discrimination. 
States must ensure everyone can access their health systems on the same basis, in 
law and in practice.  Such requirement is clearly recognised through the monitoring 
procedures of the UN and the European Committees. For example, in its complaint 
procedure, the European Committee declared that: ‘[t]reating the migrant Roma in 
the same manner as the rest of the population when they are in a different situation 
constitutes discrimination’; and found a breach of Article 11 ESC.480 However, de 
facto discrimination can be difficult to detect. Avoiding them obliges states to collect 
disaggregated data in order to verify that groups vulnerable to health discrimination 
enjoy their right to health to the same extent than the rest of the population. Both the 
UN and the European Committees regularly request that states provide such 
disaggregated data in their monitoring procedures.481 As a result, the principle of 
non-discrimination implies positive actions from states towards vulnerable groups, 
                                                
479 For instance, in its Conclusions 2013, the European Committee finds Poland in breach of 
Article 11 for excessively long waiting lists, after having balanced it with the improvements 
brought by a legislation aimed at effective data collection. 
480 Médecins du Monde v France (ECSR) (n 399) [163]. 
481  E.g. UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations Congo 2012’ (n 172), para 20: ‘The 
Committee also requests the State party to furnish recent statistics, disaggregated by sex, 
urban/rural location and year, on the various indicators, such as morbidity and mortality 
rates, used to measure the enjoyment of the right to health.’ 
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which seems forgotten by the ‘negative’ dimension of the obligation to respect.482 
This is clearly established in the jurisprudence of the UN and the European 
Committees, when reviewing de facto health discrimination.483 In its last Concluding 
Observations on France, for instance, the UN Committee observed that despite the 
existence of a universal healthcare coverage, undocumented migrant workers and 
asylum-seekers had difficulty in accessing healthcare. It highlighted that the lack of 
awareness, the complexity of administrative procedures, and the language barriers 
impeded their access to the health system, and asked France to remedy the 
situation.484 
In order to prevent de facto health discrimination, it is nonetheless crucial to 
conceptualise what vulnerability represents in access to health. GC14, the UN 
Special Rapporteur on the right to health, the UN and the European Committees all 
identify the following groups as vulnerable to health discrimination: women; 
children and adolescents; old persons; persons with disabilities; lesbians, gays, 
bisexuals and transgender persons; ethnic or national minorities; indigenous 
populations; the poor; the homeless; migrants, refugees or stateless persons; 
prisoners; persons living in rural areas; persons living with HIV; and other persons 
with a particular religion, political opinion or birth status. However, few authors 
have written about what constitutes a vulnerable group in human rights law. 
Chapman and Carbonetti interestingly distinguish vulnerable groups with fixed status 
(e.g. women, persons with disabilities, etc.) from vulnerable groups with variable 
statuses (e.g. the poor, the homeless).485 Fixed vulnerable statuses would involve 
permanent protection against health discrimination, while variable vulnerable 
statuses would involve temporary protection. Nevertheless, further questions arise. 
What are the obligations binding states to guarantee vulnerable groups’ right to 
                                                
482 UNCESCR, ‘GC14’ (n 21), paras 33 and 34: states must ‘refrain from’ denying or 
limiting access to healthcare for vulnerable groups. 
483 E.g. UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations Netherlands 2010' (n 205), para 25(b): the 
UN Committee urged the state to ensure de facto minimum levels of health to undocumented 
migrants. 
484 UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations France 2008’ (n 287), paras 26 and 47. 
485 Audrey R Chapman and Benjamin Carbonetti, ‘Human Rights Protections for Vulnerable 
and Disadvantaged Groups: The Contributions of the UN Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights’ (2011) 33 Human Rights Quarterly 682, 706. 
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health? Since human rights law clearly recognises persons living with HIV as being a 
vulnerable group, does that mean any person with a particular health status can be 
considered as such? If not, why; and how can this work in the context of right to 
health monitoring? Further research is needed to answer these questions. 
Thirdly, states’ obligation to identify the health needs of their population derives 
from the obligation to deploy health promotion campaigns targeting the main health 
issues affecting the population. Such obligation, recognised by the UN and the 
European Committees, inevitably involves collecting data to detect what main health 
issues affect populations’ health. This includes, for instance, providing sufficient 
education in SRH, if teenage pregnancies rates are high;486 or providing preventive 
measures for diseases with a high morbidity or mortality.487 
Fourthly, identifying the health needs of the population is crucial to an adequate 
epidemiological monitoring of communicable diseases such as HIV. The evolution 
of the number of patients infected by a particular virus and the adequacy of measures 
to control it, are both regularly reviewed by the UN and the European Committees. 
This, again, requires that states collect a certain type of data to understand what are 
populations’ needs in this concern. 
Finally, fulfilling the obligation to identify the health needs of the population can 
also assist states in prioritising their resources within the health sector. If the data 
collected shows a particularly high suicide rate and a very low maternal mortality 
rate, evidently the state does not immediately need to increase the budget allocated to 
obstetric care but must urgently expand that allocated to mental health services. 
However, SNHRBs should not translate states’ obligation to identify the health needs 
of their populations into a requirement to constantly collect data for all health issues 
and for all vulnerable groups. This would set unrealistic expectations upon states. 
Instead, it requires that states develop an intelligent understanding of health needs. 
One issue remains, nonetheless: what types of health needs are SNHRBs ready to 
consider? Should they extend it to social determinants of health? 
                                                
486 As requested by UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations Ecuador 2012’ (n 216), para 28. 
487 As requested by ECSR, ‘Conclusions XIX-2 (2009)’, Greece pp. 213-214. 
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4.1.2.3 The inflation caused by social determinants of health 
In order to be in good health, it is crucial individuals access adequate food, water, 
housing, and live in a healthy environment. Such parameters, commonly called 
‘social determinants of health’, are clearly recognised by the WHO and by the UN 
Committee, in GC14.488 It is also worth noting that the Travaux Préparatoires of the 
WHO Constitution recognise that wellbeing results from ‘positive factors, such as 
adequate feeding, housing, and training.’489 Nevertheless, defining health needs 
through social determinants of health raises two issues in the context of right to 
health monitoring (and adjudication) by SNHRBs: they widen its scope of interests 
considerably and unduly.  
The right to health has often been criticised for being too vague and too complex to 
be adjudicated. Therefore, incorporating social determinants of health into its 
definition increases considerably its scope and thus, the complexity of its legal 
content as each determinant requires a different type of expertise. This decreases the 
likelihood of successful adjudication and, even, monitoring. Moreover, other 
parameters have a determining effect on individuals’ health. Work-life balance, 
social background, and education, for instance, have all been proven to affect 
individuals’ health. Why not considering them as social determinants of health? It is 
desirable to understand health needs through a capabilities approach in order to 
design better policies, as advocated by Venkatapuram.490 However, it is impractical 
to translate the overall picture in right to health monitoring. 
Furthermore, it is unnecessary to extend the scope of the right to health to social 
determinants such as food, water, sanitation, housing, and healthy environment. 
These elements have already been translated into rights of their own in human rights 
law. At the international level, the rights to food, water, sanitation and housing have 
emerged from Article 11 ICESCR on the right to an adequate standard of living,491 as 
                                                
488 UNCESCR, ‘GC14’ (n 21), para 4. 
489 WHO Interim Commission, 'Official Records No. 1 1946' (n 90), Annex 9 (Suggestions 
relating to the Constitution of an International Health Organisation), p 58 (Preamble). 
490 Venkatapuram (n 45). 
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attested by various General Comments drafted by the UN Committee. 492 
Furthermore, the UN shows willingness to recognise a right to a healthy 
environment, as suggested by UNGA resolutions and by the Independent Expert on 
the issue of human rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, 
healthy and sustainable environment.493 At a regional level, these rights are also 
protected but less homogenously. Article 21 of the African Charter, on the right to 
dispose of natural resources, tends to be interpreted as protecting the rights to food, 
water, and healthy environment.494 Articles 11 and 12 of the Protocol of San 
Salvador clearly recognise rights to food and to a healthy environment.495 Finally, 
Article 31 ESC explicitly protects a right to housing,496 and Article 11 is usually 
interpreted as protecting the right to a healthy environment.497  
Therefore, it is preferable that SNHRBs understand interactions between the right to 
health and social determinants through the principle of the interdependence of rights, 
as argued by Tobin. 498  This would avoid complexifying the monitoring and 
adjudication of the right to health. I thus recommend that social determinants of 
health only be monitored through the right to health under three non-cumulative 
conditions.  
                                                
492 UNCESCR, ‘General Comment No. 4: The Right to Adequate Housing (Art 11 (1))’ 
(1991); UNCESCR, ‘General Comment No. 12: The Right to Adequate Food (Art 11)’ 
(1999); UNCESCR, ‘General Comment No. 15: The Right to Water (Art 11)’ (2003). 
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12–17. 
494 African Charter (n 92), Art 21. 
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496 ESC 1996 (n 92), Art 31. 
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Firstly, SNHRBs may monitor social determinants of health through the right to 
health if they have an actual impact on individuals’ health. They should, thus, not be 
reviewed for the potential impact they may have. Such approach is adopted by the 
UN Committee, as it only refers to Article 12 ICESCR when food, water, 
environment or housing issues have an actual impact on individuals’ health. 
Malnutrition,499 water contamination,500 the absence of a sewage system,501 and air 
pollution502 are thus sometimes mentioned in its comments on Article 12. The UN 
Committee reviews their potential impact (i.e. national standards, monitoring 
systems, and budgets in place) under Article 11 ICESCR instead. As a result, this 
approach avoids inflating the scope of the right to health while enabling the 
development of a more comprehensive and, thus, protective jurisprudence under each 
right. 
Secondly, SNHRBs monitoring the right to health may exceptionally consider the 
potential impact of social determinants on individuals’ health, in the context of 
health promotion campaigns. This approach is adopted by the European Committee 
in its jurisprudence on Article 11(2), since it considers that states must take measures 
to warn their populations against risks factors impeding their health. It thus expects 
states to raise awareness in schools and among the overall population on healthy-
eating, environmental issues, and any health issues predominant in the country. 503 
That way, the relations between social determinants of health and the right to health 
are acknowledged but limited to a realistic monitoring or adjudicatory framework. 
Finally, whilst it is not desirable that SNHRBs monitor social determinants of health 
through the right to health for their potential impact on health (except for promotion 
                                                
499 UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations Sri Lanka 2010’ (n 187), para 33. This issue was 
reviewed under Articles 11 and 12. 
500 UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations Tanzania 2012’ (n 176), para 25. This issue was 
reviewed under Article 12. 
501 UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations Chad 2009’ (n 293), para 31. This issue was 
reviewed under Article 12. 
502 UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations Kazakhstan 2010’ (n 247), para 35. This issue was 
reviewed under Article 12. 
503 First established in ECSR, ‘Conclusions XV-2 (2001)’, Belgium pp. 96–99; and in ECSR, 
‘Conclusions 2005’, Moldova pp. 450–452. 
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purposes), it represents a heuristic tool to protect rights that do not benefit from 
sufficient recognition. For instance, when the European Committee evaluates the 
implementation of Article 11 ESC in its reporting procedure, it systematically 
reviews standards and measures taken on food safety; water, soil and air pollution; 
ionising radiation; and asbestos. As a result, it assesses the potential impact that such 
issues may have on individuals’ health (in the event such standards or measures are 
deemed inadequate). In theory, such monitoring is not desirable since food, water, 
environment and housing significantly inflate the scope of the right to health. 
However, the ESC does not explicitly recognise a right to food, water or sanitation. It 
recognises a right to housing in Article 31 of the revised ESC, but the latter is not 
ratified by all Member States.504 Therefore, if the European Committee did not 
incorporate these issues in its interpretation on Article 11 ESC, they would remain 
unmonitored, at the expense of individuals’ basic human rights. 
To conclude, the right to the highest standard of health attainable should be 
understood as the right to an adequate health system and its normative content should 
be materialised into clear legal requirements, to fit supranational monitoring. 
However, SNHRBs inevitably rationalise this concept by choosing certain methods 
over others to monitor it, as studied in Chapters 2 and 3. It is thus worth examining 
whether the methodology used in their monitoring procedures accommodates these 
suggestions. 
4.1.3 Monitoring the right to an adequate health system  
This thesis contends that in order for SNHRBs to optimise their interpretation of the 
scope of interests of the right to health, not only must they rely on a framework 
clarifying adequately its substance, they must also monitor the concept of health 
appropriately. Since this thesis focuses on the UN and the European Committees, I 
will assess whether the approach and methods adopted in their monitoring 
procedures accommodate the suggestions developed in subsections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. I 
will thus reflect on the adequacy of: (4.1.3.1) the use of indicators by the European 
Committee; (4.1.3.2) and the use of an ad hoc review by the UN Committee.  
                                                
504 ESC 1996 (n 92), Art 31; CoE, ‘Table of Accepted Provisions of the ESC’ (n 337). 
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4.1.3.1 Using health indicators for a clearer substance: the European interpretation 
Since 2001, the European Committee systematically uses the same eighteen thematic 
indicators for each State party and in each reporting cycle, to assess states' 
performance under Article 11 ESC. Each of these indicators measures compliance 
with one of the three express obligations set by this provision: obligation to provide 
curative healthcare, health promotion, or preventive healthcare. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, the structure and consistency of this method has enabled the development 
of a precise jurisprudence delineating what curative, promotional and preventive 
services states must guarantee in order to ensure an adequate health system and 
consequently, to realise the right to health. Therefore, the use of thematic health 
indicators presents several benefits. First, indicators enable SNHRBs to set common 
standards within their jurisdiction, and to justify why. Second, they guarantee 
transparency and legal certainty for both duty-bearers and right-holders. Third, 
thematic health indicators leave the flexibility needed for SNHRBs to take into 
consideration the health needs or resources constraints specific to each state. Finally, 
they can successfully channel the obligation I recommend SNHRBs to recognise: 
that for states to identify the health needs of their populations. 
Nevertheless, such approach tends to freeze the legal content of the right to health 
into a set list of issues, criticised in the context of Article 12(2) ICESCR. This can be 
observed through the reporting procedure of the European Committee, as the 
development of its jurisprudence under Article 11 ESC relies entirely on the themes 
embraced by these indicators. As a result, if indicators fail to cover a specific health 
issue, the European Committee is unlikely to monitor it or to develop norms in that 
regard. For instance, the European Committee has not created any indicator on 
individuals’ access to contraceptives and, consequently, has not developed any 
standard in this area. The importance for health systems to incorporate reproductive 
health services is yet clearly acknowledged by experts and human rights law has 
since recognised states’ obligation to provide access to such services.505 However, a 
state could potentially conform to Article 11 ESC without guaranteeing affordable 
                                                
505 UNCESCR, ‘GC14’ (n 21), para 34, CEDAW (n 93), Art 12. 
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contraception to its population.506 This highlights the importance for SNHRBs to not 
act alone and the failure of the European Committee to use external expertise to 
devise and update its indicators in order to grasp what adequate health systems 
individuals should be entitled to, as I suggested previously.  
Therefore, a static monitoring of the right to health by SNHRBs can lead to a static 
interpretation of what the highest standard of health attainable entails. Thematic 
indicators can help SNHRBs rationalising health for the purpose of right to health 
monitoring (or adjudication). However, they must be designed and updated through 
the guidance of medical and public health experts, to ensure they grasp adequately 
the scope of interests of this right. Would an ad hoc review be thus more beneficial?  
4.1.3.2 Using an ad hoc review for a more comprehensive substance: the UN 
interpretation 
Contrarily to the European Committee, the UN Committee uses no indicators and 
reaches no findings of non-conformity when assessing the realisation of the right to 
health. Moreover, it does not use the AAAQ framework created by GC14 in its 
Concluding Observations. 507  Therefore, delineating what the UN Committee 
interprets as being an adequate health system can only be deduced from what 
repeatedly represents a source of concern or satisfaction in its Concluding 
Observations. As outlined in Chapter 2, such absence of methodology leads to issues 
being reviewed for certain states and not others, or for the same state but not in all 
reporting cycles, without any clear and legitimate rationale to justify it. This clearly 
impedes the capacity of the UN Committee to develop a jurisprudence on the right to 
health that is as coherent and precise as the European Committee’s. For instance, in 
2012, it expressed concern over the high prevalence of HIV/AIDS in Ecuador and 
                                                
506 For instance, see the findings of conformity to Article 11(1) (or the findings of non-
conformity that are not based on unaffordable access to contraception), in ECSR, 
‘Conclusions XX-2 (2013)’ Czech Republic, Denmark, Latvia; and in ECSR, ‘Conclusions 
2013’, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Finland, Lithuania, Romania. However, the NGO IPPF recently 
found that those countries were not reimbursing contraceptive methods in IPPF (European 
Network), ‘Barometer on Women’s Access to Modern Contraceptive Choice’ (2015), pp. 
22–23 
<http://www.ippfen.org/sites/default/files/Barometer_final%20version%20for%20web%20
%282%29_0.pdf> [accessed 8 September 2015]. 
507 UNCESCR, ‘GC14’ (n 21), para 12. 
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not in Tanzania,508 while the prevalence of HIV among adults was 0.4% in Ecuador 
and 5% in Tanzania at the time.509 Therefore, not only does its ad hoc review fail to 
secure transparency or legal certainty for duty-bearers and right-holders, it also fails 
to interpret the scope of interests of the right to health through the standards I 
suggested. These include: developing an understanding of what constitutes an 
adequate health system, by using appropriately external expertise and by recognising 
states’ obligation to identify the health needs of their populations. 
Nevertheless, such lack of methodology does not prevent the UN Committee from 
examining in depth certain health issues. On the contrary, its ad hoc review enables 
crucial topics that remain unmonitored by the European Committee, to be explored. 
This is particularly true regarding mental health, and SRH. Two main hypotheses as 
to why the UN Committee reviews these topics and not the European Committee can 
be drawn. Contrarily to the ESC, the ICESCR recognises the right to physical and 
mental health, 510  which might motivate the UN Committee to review mental 
healthcare. Furthermore, the UN Committee receives more NGOs shadow reports 
than the European Committee in its reporting procedure, many of these concern SRH 
issues, as discussed in Chapter 2. 
To conclude, the UN and the European Committees’ interpretations of what 
constitutes an adequate health system tend to point towards a similar understanding 
overall. However, they fail to develop an understanding of health that is both 
comprehensive and coherent. This could be enhanced by using external expertise 
appropriately to define what constitutes an adequate health system, and by 
recognising states’ obligation to identify (and address) the health needs of their 
populations. 
 
                                                
508 UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations Ecuador 2012’ (n 216), para 30; UNCESCR, 
‘Concluding Observations Tanzania 2012’ (n 176). 
509 WHO, ‘Data on the Size of the HIV/AIDS Epidemic: Prevalence of HIV among Adults 
Aged 15 to 49 (Data by Country, Years 2012, 2006, and 2001)’ 
<http://apps.who.int/gho/data/node.main.622?lang=en> [accessed 8 September 2015]. 
510 ICESCR (n 4); ESC 1996 (n 92). 
 
176 
4.2 The right to a health system responsive to its cultural environment (the 
scope of application) 
Whilst it is clear that an adequate health system must respond to the health needs of 
the population and to ‘local priorities’, 511 it must also respond to its cultural 
environment. However, it is unclear how the scope of application of the right to 
health should be defined in the context of cultural diversity, yet omnipresent in 
supranational settings. This raises two crucial questions. Are individuals entitled to 
the same healthcare worldwide, irrespective of their cultures or traditions? How can 
human rights law avoid becoming a tool of legal exploitation and abuse over cultural 
diversity? It is thus fundamental this section clarifies what the scope of application of 
the right to health should entail in supranational monitoring, to enable SNHRBs to 
optimise their interpretation accordingly. Following the study of relevant literature 
and the analysis of the two frameworks studied in this thesis, i.e. the UN and the 
CoE, I offer two arguments. On one hand (4.2.1), cultural relativism can threaten the 
realisation of the right to health. SNHRBs should thus disregard cultural arguments 
attempting to justify a violation of this right. On the other hand (4.2.2), cultural 
considerations can enhance the implementation of the right to health. SNHRBs 
should thus adopt a context-sensitive approach in their interpretation. Lastly (4.2.3), I 
will assess whether the approach developed by SNHRBs such as the UN and the 
European Committees when monitoring the impact of cultural issues on health, can 
accommodate this framework. 
4.2.1 Cultural relativism and health 
Human rights law clearly recognises a universal right to health entitling every human 
being, in every state, to the highest standard of health attainable. However, the 
concept of universal human rights has been heavily criticised by cultural relativist 
scholars. In 1947, the American Anthropological Association released a statement 
warning against the dangers of a colonialist attitude in human rights law.512 It 
declared that respect for individuals entailed respect for their cultural differences, 
                                                
511 Special Rapporteur on the right to health, 'Annual Report 2006' (n 227), paras 4 and 7.  
512 American Anthropological Association, Executive Board, ‘Statement on Human Rights’ 
(1947) 49 American Anthropologist 539. :  
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that no qualitative technique could assess cultures, and that standards depended on 
the culture in which they were formed. Today, authors such as Renteln continue to 
argue that individual rights and the standards they set are irrelevant to non-Western 
cultures, where the notions of community and cultural heritages prevail.513  
Such arguments, nonetheless, can be primarily rejected on three grounds. First, 
globalisation can soften the sharpest edges of cultural boundaries. Second, the 
recognition of social rights was initially encouraged by Latin American and 
Communist states. Third, opposing Western to Asian, African, or South American 
values dismisses the diversity of cultures in each ‘bloc’.514 In the context of the right 
to health, the values of human dignity and equality in access to healthcare, as well as 
states’ duty to guarantee an adequate health system, are all subject to global 
consensus (e.g. 164 states are currently bound to Article 12 ICESCR).515 This was 
demonstrated in Chapter 1, through the long history of public health and the 
worldwide recognition of a human right to health. Moreover, it cannot be said that 
these values have been imposed on ‘non-Western states’, since the latter have 
adopted regional or national instruments across the globe recognising also a right to 
the highest standard of health attainable. Therefore, SNHRBs should not allow 
culture to justify a breach of the right to health. According to GC14, the only 
justifications SNHRBs may accept to review should be based on severe public health 
matters or resources’ constraints, and these should be limited in time.516  
However, rejecting cultural relativists’ arguments in theory neither prevents clashes 
between the right to health and cultural beliefs from occurring, nor does it solve them 
in practice. Two types of tensions usually arise between the implementation of the 
right to health and the cultural beliefs of a community, begging questions on how 
SNHRBs should monitor the right to health in such circumstances. 
                                                
513  Alison Dundes Renteln, ‘Relativism and the Search for Human Rights’ (1988) 90 
American Anthropologist 56. 
514  Amartya Sen, Human Rights and Asian Values (Carnegie Council on Ethics and 
International Affairs 1997). 
515 E.g. UN Treaty Collection, ‘Status of the ICESCR’ (n 157). 
516 ICESCR (n 4), Art 2(1) and 4; UNCESCR, ‘GC14’ (n 21), paras 28 and 29. 
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Firstly, when implementing the right to health involves eliminating traditional 
practices harmful to health.517 Practices such as binding of new-borns; blood letting; 
cosmetic mutilation (e.g. neck rings); withholding food; male circumcision; FGM; 
etc. have all been proved to be harmful to human health.518 As a result, they 
contravene the possibility for individuals to enjoy the highest standard of health 
attainable. SNHRBs should thus not allow such practices to persist in the name of 
cultural heritage. 519  However, should SNHRBs ask states to blindly impose 
prohibitions that communities disagree with, in the name of a right to health they do 
not wish to benefit from? Secondly, tensions between cultural beliefs and the right to 
health can also arise in situations where implementing this right involves creating 
services going against the religious beliefs present in the state. This is especially 
recurrent in the field of SRH. Public health experts clearly agree that access to 
abortion services, sexual health education, and affordable contraception to teenagers, 
are fundamental to populations’ health.520 As a result, not providing them would 
contravene the highest standard of health attainable of the population and SNHRBs 
                                                
517 UNCESCR, ‘GC14’ (n 21), paras 21, 22, 35, 36, 37 and 51. 
518 Council on Violence against Children, ‘Violating Children’s Rights: Harmful Practices 
Based on Tradition, Culture, Religion or Superstition’ (2012), pp. 19–39 
<http://srsg.violenceagainstchildren.org/sites/default/files/documents/docs/InCo_Report_15
Oct.pdf> [accessed 8 September 2015]. 
519 It is worth noting that such argument is also supported by the Independent expert in the 
field of cultural rights, Farida Shaheed, ‘Annual Report to the Human Rights Council (Main 
Focus: The Right of Access to and Enjoyment of Cultural Heritage)’ (2011) UN Doc A 
/HRC/17/38, para 74: ‘International instruments clearly state that practices contrary to 
human rights cannot be justified with a plea for the preservation/safeguard of cultural 
heritage, cultural diversity or cultural right’. She refers to (among others) the UNESCO 
Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage 2003, Art 2 (1): 
‘consideration will be given solely to such intangible cultural heritage as is compatible with 
existing international human rights instruments, as well as with the requirements of mutual 
respect among communities, groups and individuals, and of sustainable development’. 161 
states have ratified his Convention: 
<http://www.unesco.org/culture/ich/index.php?lg=en&pg=00024> [accessed 8 September 
2015]. The UN Committee goes even further in UNCESCR, ‘General Comment No. 21: 
Right of Everyone to Take Part in Cultural Life (Art 15 (1) (a))’ (2009), para 64: ‘A violation 
also occurs when a State party fails to take steps to combat practices harmful to the well-
being of a person or group of persons’. 
520 E.g. UNFPA and Guttmacher Institute, ‘Adding It Up 2014: The Costs and Benefits of 
Investing in Sexual and Reproductive Health’ (2014) 
<http://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/Adding%20It%20Up-Final-11.18.14.pdf> 
[accessed 8 September 2015]. 
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should thus urge states to fulfil their obligations.521 However, should SNHRBs 
encourage states to entirely ignore parents who have religious convictions against the 
use of such services, considering their (human) right to educate their children in 
conformity with their beliefs?522  
To conclude, SNHRBs should dismiss cultural relativists’ arguments attempting to 
justify (in)actions that constitute a breach of the right to health. This is fundamental 
to an adequate interpretation of the right to health, i.e. one that promotes everyone’s 
effective enjoyment of the highest standard of health attainable, and that meets the 
requirement of principled consistency. However, how can they address clashes 
between culture and human rights law? 
4.2.2 A context sensitive approach to the right to health  
While the scope of application of the right to health should not be restricted for 
cultural considerations, SNHRBs should incorporate such considerations (to a certain 
extent) in their procedures, for both normative and practical reasons.  
Normative reasons respond to the legitimate concerns raised by cultural relativists, 
i.e. the need to accommodate cultural diversity, and that to respect states’ 
sovereignty for democracy purposes. Such reasons are reflected in two aspects of 
human rights law, making the context sensitive approach meet the requirement of 
principled consistency. First, the context-sensitive approach translates the margin of 
appreciation doctrine initially developed by the European Court of Human Rights, to 
ESCR.523 According to this doctrine, states are allowed a certain degree of flexibility 
on how they wish to implement human rights standards, in order for SNHRBs to 
respect the sovereignty principle and in practice, to gain further trust from states. 
Second, the context sensitive approach reflects the acceptability requirement 
                                                
521 UNCESCR, ‘GC14’ (n 21), paras 11, 16, 21, 34 and 44(d). 
522 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, Art 18(4); ECHR (n 335), Art 
2. 
523  See early works of Thomas A O’Donnell, ‘The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine: 
Standards in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights’ (1982) 4 Human 
Rights Quarterly 474; Howard Charles Yourow, ‘The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in 
the Dynamics of European Human Rights Jurisprudence’ (1987) 3 Connecticut Journal of 
International Law 111. 
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developed by GC14.524 The latter requires that health facilities, goods and services 
are culturally appropriate, i.e. respectful of the culture of individuals, minorities, 
peoples and communities (and in line with medical ethics), while designed to 
improve their health.525  
Practical reasons also justify the need for SNHRBs to take cultural considerations 
into account in their interpretation. Much research shows the importance of involving 
key actors in the realisation of the right to health, especially with regard to harmful 
traditional practices. Their assistance in the promotion of safer practices is essential 
to a successful implementation of right to health standards among the community. In 
the context of FGM for instance, statutory bans and criminalisation that are not 
accompanied by a comprehensive eradication strategy can be detrimental. In certain 
African countries, this has led to either an absence of enforcement or to underground 
practice.526 As a result, various authors argue that the influence of FGM practitioners 
should be used to inform communities about the dangers of such procedures,527 and 
to design efficient counter-practices symbolising entry into womanhood to replace 
FGM.528  Therefore, SNHRBs should adopt a context sensitive approach when 
interpreting the scope of application of the right to health, since it contributes to an 
effective enjoyment of the latter.  
It is worth noting that this approach, also suggested by Tobin,529 focuses on the stage 
at which cultural considerations must be incorporated. Cultural beliefs can be taken 
into consideration during the design of measures aimed at implementing the highest 
standard of health attainable, but not when deciding what this standard should be. 
Therefore, SNHRBs may ask states to design context-sensitive measures, but only if 
those contribute to improving their health systems, which adequacy must be assessed 
                                                
524 UNCESCR, ‘GC14’ (n 21), para 12(c). 
525 ibid. 
526 Bonny Ibhawoh, ‘Between Culture and Constitution: Evaluating the Cultural Legitimacy 
of Human Rights in the African State’ (2000) 22 Human Rights Quarterly 838, 857–858. 
527 Vanja Berggren and others, ‘An Explorative Study of Sudanese Midwives’ Motives, 
Perceptions and Experiences of Re-Infibulation after Birth’ (2004) 20 Midwifery 299. 
528 Tobin (n 19) 314–324. 
529 ibid 110–118; see also Wolff (n 134) 27. 
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by relevant experts in health and determined by human rights law, as argued in 
subsection 4.1. However, the distinction between normative content and 
implementation is not always self-evident: are such considerations set in the 
substance of the right or contextual to its application? While there is no clear-cut 
answer to this question, the following framework enables SNHRBs to optimise their 
interpretation by clarifying how such issues may be monitored in practice. It is based 
on the need for the context sensitive approach to be principled when applied to 
supranational monitoring (for coherence and fairness purposes),530 and it considers 
two situations. 
Firstly, the realisation of the right to health can potentially conflict with the existence 
of a traditional practice. I will illustrate this through the example of obstetric and 
neonatal care, as many traditional practices involve the (intended) protection of 
pregnant women, mothers, and new-borns. In the first instance, medical research 
shows that traditional practice X has medical virtues and/or does not represent any 
risk for women’s or new-borns’ health (e.g. vertical crouching position in delivery in 
Peru).531 In this case, no conflict arises between the implementation of the highest 
standard of health attainable and traditional practice X. Therefore, practice X can 
presumably be respected, especially if it is not costly, and as long as it does not 
breach human rights law. It is worth noting that the absence of culturally appropriate 
healthcare, notably in the context of childbirth, can be detrimental as individuals may 
refuse to use institutional services and put their lives at risk.532 In the second 
instance, medical research shows that traditional practice Y represents a risk for the 
health of women or new-borns (e.g. tight swaddling of new-borns in Turkey).533 In 
this case, a conflict arises between the implementation of the highest standard of 
health attainable and traditional practice Y. Practice Y should, therefore, be 
eliminated. However, a dialogue with key actors in the community is essential. It 
                                                
530 O’Donnell (n 523): similar criticism was formulated in the early days of the margin of 
appreciation in the European Court of Human Rights. 
531 Gabrysch and others (n 202). 
532 ibid. 
533 Emine Geçkil, Türkan Şahin and Emel Ege, ‘Traditional Postpartum Practices of Women 
and Infants and the Factors Influencing Such Practices in South Eastern Turkey’ (2009) 25 
Midwifery 62, 66 and 70. 
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enables the design of measures adapted to the environment in which they are to be 
implemented to increase their efficiency (e.g. health promotion campaigns 
explaining the dangers of tight-swaddling).  
Secondly, the realisation of the right to health can automatically conflict with 
cultural or religious beliefs that are against a type of healthcare necessary to secure 
the highest standard of health attainable. In such instance, there should be little 
margin of appreciation. I will illustrate this through the example of abortion services, 
as SRH is a field encountering great cultural or religious oppositions. Research 
clearly highlights the importance of abortion services to achieve the highest standard 
of health attainable as they prevent the use of clandestine procedures, dangerous for 
women’s health.534 As a result, states must ensure the availability of such services, 
regardless of the fact they transgress religious values (e.g. legal ban in states where 
Catholicism is influent). A dialogue with key actors is essential to identify the 
measures such service should be accompanied by, in order to ensure its use in the 
community. In this case, it could include campaigns revealing the dangers of 
clandestine abortions, and discussions with religious leaders enabling them to 
understand that access to abortion does not increase promiscuity (although issues 
related to what some believe to be ‘foetus’ right to life’ remain unsolved).535 
To conclude, SNHRBs should reject cultural relativist argument attempting to justify 
the right to the highest standard of health attainable, but their interpretation should be 
sensitive to the context in which this right ought to be implemented. However, it is 
worth examining whether the approach adopted in their monitoring procedures 
accommodates these suggestions. 
                                                
534 WHO, ‘Unsafe Abortion: Global and Regional Estimates of the Incidence of Unsafe 
Abortion and Associated Mortality in 2008 (6th edition)’ (WHO 2011) 
<http://www.who.int/reproductivehealth/publications/unsafe_abortion/9789241501118/en/>. 
535  Nana Oye Lithur, ‘Destigmatising Abortion: Expanding Community Awareness of 
Abortion as a Reproductive Health Issue in Ghana’ (2004) 8 African Journal of Reproductive 
Health / La Revue Africaine de la Santé Reproductive 70. 
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4.2.3 Cultures and monitoring of the right to health by SNHRBs  
This thesis contends that in order for SNHRBs to optimise their interpretation of the 
scope of application of the right to health, not only must they rely on a framework 
clarifying its substance appropriately, they must also monitor the impact of cultural 
issues on health adequately. Since this thesis focuses on the UN and the European 
Committees, I will assess whether the approach adopted in their monitoring 
procedures accommodates the suggestions developed in subsections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2. 
The UN Committee 
Most of the comments expressed by the UN Committee during the reporting 
procedure regarding health and culture, concern traditional practices that are harmful 
to individuals’ health, and more particularly FGM. This issue is mentioned in 26% of 
the 2008-2012 Concluding Observations studied. The UN Committee clearly adopts 
a context sensitive approach in that regard, since it requires the ban of the practice, 
accompanied by a comprehensive strategy involving key actors. In its recent 
Concluding Observations on Benin, for instance, the UN Committee listed several 
context-specific measures that the state should implement to prevent FGM. It 
recommended that Benin prohibited FGM via legislation, while training judges and 
officers to enforce it. It also advised the creation of awareness-raising campaigns; 
adequate assistance to victims; and programmes to re-orientate and support 
practitioners who decide to stop practicing excision. Finally, it requested data 
regarding the number of reported FGM cases, as well as the number of convictions 
and penalties imposed on the persons responsible.536 Whilst such monitoring is 
satisfactory, the UN Committee must diversify its understanding of harmful 
traditional practices to adequately assess the realisation of the right to health (e.g. 
including male circumcision, as suggested by Tobin).537 This will enable it to 
develop a more comprehensive interpretation of Article 12 ICESCR. 
The UN Committee also formulates recommendations when religious or cultural 
beliefs prevent a health service necessary to achieve the highest standard of health 
                                                
536 UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations Benin 2008’ (n 256), para 47. 
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attainable from being created. This can be observed through frequent expressions of 
concern regarding absolute bans on abortion. In such instances, the UN Committee 
recommends the legalisation of abortion for, at least, cases of rape, incest, and 
pregnancies threatening women’s life. The UN Committee may wish to preserve a 
constructive dialogue with states and, thus, uses caution when dealing with strong 
cultural or religious oppositions to human rights standards. However, the availability 
of abortion services should not be limited to minimal conditions as a result. Let alone 
feminist arguments according to which women have the right to control their own 
bodies, unsafe abortions procedures have adverse effects on the health of women 
falling outside those three exceptions. Therefore, the UN Committee must ensure 
that its interpretation of Article 12 ICESCR promotes adequately an effective 
enjoyment of the right to health. 
Finally, the UN Committee rarely recommends that traditional practices involving 
the health of community members but that are, in fact, harmless to human health, be 
respected. The UN Committee highlighted, for instance, the necessity for Argentina 
to protect natural resources necessary for indigenous peoples’ ‘way of life and 
subsistence’ under Article 12 ICESCR. 538  It also recommended that Australia 
protected indigenous peoples’ traditional knowledge and medicine through the 
creation of a specific intellectual property regime. 539  However, these vague 
comments are the only examples in which the UN Committee recommended the state 
to make healthcare culturally acceptable, out of the sixty 2008-2012 Concluding 
Observations studied. Such lack of monitoring is problematic since the failure to 
meet the acceptability requirement can deter individuals from using institutional 
healthcare. This can be observed in the context of childbirth in Peru and Ecuador 
(both reviewed in the period studied but no issue was raised), as some patients refuse 
to use facility care culturally insensitive, resulting in maternal deaths.540 
                                                
538 UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations on Argentina’s Third Periodic Report’ (2011) UN 
Doc E/C12/ARG/CO/3, para 9. 
539 UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations Australia 2009’ (n 221), para 33. However, here 
the UN Committee refers to Article 15 on the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress 
and its applications, not Article 12 on the right to health. 
540 Gabrysch and others (n 202); La revolución Ciudadana Avanza, Care and Ministerio de 
Salud Pública, 'Culturally Appropriate Delivery Care' (n 209).  
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Considering the UN Committee monitors the implementation of the right to health in 
more than 160 states and in every region of the world, a context-sensitive approach 
to health is crucial. Not only to respect the diverse cultures of the States parties to the 
ICESCR, but also to increase the efficiency of health systems in states where cultural 
traditions have an important impact on individuals’ health. Nevertheless, its review 
in this subject is irregular, which could be addressed by the use of thematic 
indicators, as suggested in Chapter 2. 
The European Committee 
Cultural or religious beliefs in Europe do not have the same impact on healthcare 
than they do in other regions of the world. The occurrence of harmful traditional 
practices and the prohibition of health services based on these considerations are 
rarer in Europe than they might be in African or in Latin American states, for 
instance. This may be the reason why the European Committee fails to monitor two 
of the three tests advocated by this thesis. However, this does not mean that cultural 
considerations do not come into play regarding health issues in Europe. Cultural or 
religious beliefs involving individuals’ health are clearly present in European states, 
whether among nationals or among migrants. It is therefore important the European 
Committee remains aware of such issues when monitoring Article 11 ESC. 
First, the European Committee does not require that States parties to the ESC respect 
traditional practices that are harmless to human health but important for the 
community in question (and, indirectly, benefiting the health of its members). 
Nevertheless, requesting that health services are culturally appropriate would 
improve the use of facility care by members of certain communities. For instance, 
20% of childbirths still occur at home in Turkey, mainly to respect traditional 
practices which could easily be carried out by families in the hospital instead.541 
Therefore, such considerations should be incorporated in the European Committee’s 
interpretation of Article 11 ESC. 
                                                
541 Duygu Yılmaz and others, ‘Determination of the Use of Traditional Practices to Ease 
Labour among Turkish Women’ (2013) 19 International Journal of Nursing Practice 65, 66. 
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Second, the European Committee does not review the issue of traditional practices 
harmful to health under Article 11 ESC. This is worrying for states in which such 
practices exist (e.g. tight swaddling of new-borns in Turkey),542 but also for states in 
which traditional practices harmful to health have been imported by non-nationals. 
For instance, whilst FGM are illegal in Europe, hundreds of thousands women who 
have been subject to this procedure now live in European countries, or are at risk of 
being subject to such procedure during a trip to their parents’ country of origin.543 
The European Institute for Gender Equality deplores a lack of monitoring in that 
respect and suggests funding civil society organisations to organise awareness-
raising, exchange good practices and advocate for the eradication of this practice.544 
This could be easily encouraged through the reporting procedure of the European 
Committee and would enhance the quality of its interpretation of the right to health.  
Third, the European Committee sometimes reviews the availability of health services 
facing cultural or religious opposition. For instance, it constantly monitors the 
existence of SRH education in schools through its reporting procedure, and 
sometimes through its complaint procedure.545 However, the availability of abortion 
services remains entirely unmonitored until recently. In its Merits Decision IPPF v. 
Italy, it found Italy in violation of the right to health for:  
the failure of the competent authorities to adopt the necessary measures 
which are required to compensate for the deficiencies in service 
provision caused by health personnel choosing to exercise the right of 
conscientious objection, this constitutes a discrimination.546 
                                                
542 Geçkil, Şahin and Ege (n 533) 66 and 70. 
543 European Institute for Gender Equality, ‘Female Genital Mutilation in the European 
Union and Croatia’ (European Union Publications Office 2013), pp. 25–26 
<http://eige.europa.eu/rdc/eige-publications/female-genital-mutilation-european-union-and-
croatia-report> [accessed 8 September 2015]. 
544 ibid 67–70.  
545 E.g. International Centre for the Legal Protection of Human Rights v Croatia (ECSR) (n 
368). The European Committee found a breach of Article 11 ESC on the basis that SRH in 
schools was inadequate. 
546 International Planned Parenthood Federation European Network (IPPF EN) v Italy [2013] 
Complaint No. 87/2012, Decision on the Merits (ECSR) [189–194]. 
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Such development is satisfactory but limited. The problem was not legalising 
abortion but providing sufficient access in practice, which the European Committee 
asked the state to do. Therefore, the European Committee has still not clarified 
whether a legal ban on abortion would breach Article 11 ESC. Tragic cases such as 
the unreported ‘Miss Y’ decision in Ireland (2014) highlight the importance for the 
European Committee to review the availability of abortion (and any health service 
giving rise to cultural or religious oppositions), in every reporting cycle. This will 
facilitate an interpretation of Article 11 ESC ensuring an effective enjoyment of the 
right to health. 
To conclude, while the UN Committee seems willing to monitor the impact that 
cultural issues have on the realisation of the right to health (although not consistently 
enough), the European Committee has not integrated it yet in its interpretation. It is 
nonetheless essential that SNHRBs promote everyone’s effective enjoyment to the 
highest standard of health attainable when interpreting what the right to health entails 
in their monitoring procedures. This is true regardless of cultural differences between 
states, and regardless of individuals’ characteristics within the same state. 
 
4.3 The right to a health system accessible to all (the scope of protection) 
Whilst the scope of interests and, to a lesser extent, the scope of application of the 
right to health bear uncertainties, its scope of protection seems more definite at first 
glance. Human rights law being grounded in universalism and cosmopolitanism, all 
human rights instruments, whether international or regional, recognise that 
‘everyone’ is entitled to a right to health. However, this raises a controversial 
question, particularly in the context of the economic crisis: do non-nationals benefit 
from the same right to health than nationals? It is nonetheless crucial to clarify what 
the scope of protection of the right to health should entail in supranational 
monitoring, in order to enable SNHRBs to optimise their interpretation accordingly. 
After having studied relevant literature and compared the two frameworks examined 
in this thesis, i.e. the UN and the CoE, I make three observations. Firstly (4.3.1), 
human rights treaties tend to restrict non-nationals’ right to health to minimum 
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levels, impeding the ability of SNHRBs to interpret adequately its scope of 
protection. Secondly (4.3.2), such restrictions, however, constitute disproportionate 
differential treatments and should be considered as such by SNHRBs. Thirdly 
(4.3.3), to accommodate this framework, SNHRBs must thus dismiss political 
considerations when monitoring non-nationals access to health, which the UN and 
the European Committees seem to do. 
4.3.1 Restrictive right to health for non-nationals in human rights instruments 
States have witnessed a considerable rise of migration flux over the past decades, as 
the global migrant stock increased from 92 million to 165 million from 1960 to 
2000,547 and up to 232 million in 2013.548 However, the ‘receiving’ states often fear 
that the arrival of non-nationals jeopardise their cultural unity, economic markets, 
and environmental capacities. As a result, they have developed policies and 
legislations to control immigration, whether through international agreements or 
convergent domestic measures.549 More particularly, limiting migrants’ access to 
public services such as healthcare is one of the means often used to deter their 
intentions to stay or arrive.550 It is in this light that provisions restricting non-
nationals’ right to health came to existence in human rights law. 
At first glance, human rights treaties clearly reflect the universalist and cosmopolitan 
values in which human rights law is grounded.551 Article 12 ICESCR,552 Article 11 
                                                
547 Çağlar Özden and others, ‘Where on Earth Is Everybody? The Evolution of Global 
Bilateral Migration 1960–2000’ (2011) 25 The World Bank Economic Review 12, 15. 
548 UNPD, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, ‘International Migration Report 
2013’ (2013) UN Doc. ST/ESA/SER.A/346 1 
<http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/pdf/migration/migrationre
port2013/Full_Document_final.pdf#zoom=100> [accessed 8 September 2015]. 
549  Valsamis Mitsilegas, ‘Immigration Control in an Era of Globalization: Deflecting 
Foreigners, Weakening Citizens, Strengthening the State’ (2012) 19 Indiana Journal of 
Global Legal Studies 3. 
550 Anna Błuś, ‘Beyond the Walls of Paper. Undocumented Migrants, the Border and Human 
Rights’ (2013) 15 European Journal of Migration and Law 413, 422–423. 
551 In the universalist approach, individuals receive rights by virtue of being ‘human beings’; 
and in the cosmopolitan approach, individuals receive rights by virtue of being ‘citizens of 
the world’ (deriving from a Kantian concept, although such concept was developed in the 
context of international conflicts). See Kant (n 36). 
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ESC,553 Article 16 of the African Charter,554 Article 10 of the Protocol of San 
Salvador,555 and Article 39 of the Arab Charter,556 all declare that ‘everyone’ is 
entitled to the highest standard of health attainable. However, some treaties provide 
grounds for a restrictive interpretation of non-nationals’ right to health, creating 
confusion. At the international level, two legally binding provisions are problematic. 
Article 28 ICMW explicitly restricts the right to health of migrant workers’ to 
emergency care; 557  and Article 2(3) ICESCR allows developing countries to 
determine to what extent they wish to guarantee economic rights to non-nationals.558 
The latter provision, however, does not affect the application of the right to health, 
which is a social right. Nevertheless, it highlights that a distinction can be made 
between nationals and non-nationals in human rights law. At the regional level, all 
instruments but the Protocol of San Salvador can be read as restricting the scope of 
the right to health.559 The Appendix of the ESC explicitly excludes from its scope of 
protection nationals from State not parties to the Charter, as well as Europeans 
illegally working or residing within other States parties.560 The African Charter is 
more implicit. Article 16 declares that state must ensure the health of ‘their people’ 
and Article 13(2), that every ‘citizen’ has the right of equal access to the public 
services of the country.561 Finally, it is worth noting that Article 39 of the Arab 
Charter recognises that ‘citizens’ have a right to free basic healthcare and to access 
                                                                                                                                     
552 ICESCR (n 4), Art 12: ‘the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental health’. 
553 ESC 1961 (n 92), Part I (11); ESC 1996 (n 92), Part I (11): 'Everyone has the right to 
benefit from any measures enabling him to enjoy the highest possible standard of health 
attainable'. 
554 African Charter (n 92), Art 16: ‘Every individual shall have the right to enjoy the best 
attainable state of physical and mental health’. 
555 Protocol of San Salvador (n 92), Art 10: ‘Everyone shall have the right to health’. 
556 Arab Charter (n 92), Art 38: ‘Every person has the right to an adequate standard of living 
for himself and his family’. 
557 ICMW (n 93), Art 28. 
558 ICESCR (n 4), Art 2(3). 
559 Protocol of San Salvador (n 92), Preamble. 
560 ESC 1961 (n 92), Art 11 and Appendix; ESC 1996 (n 92), Art 11 and Appendix. 
561 African Charter (n 92), Art 13(2) and 16. 
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medical facilities without discrimination.562 I will thus examine the confusion such 
provisions create for SNHRBs, through the examples of the ICESCR and the ESC, 
reflecting the two frameworks examined in this thesis. 
International framework: conflict between the ICESCR and the ICMW 
The ICESCR declares that ‘everyone’ has a right to health, which it understands in 
its Preamble as ‘all members of the human family’.563 This universal approach to 
human rights law in general, and to the right to health more particularly, derives from 
the moral belief that dignity is inherent to every human being. It is recognised in all 
UN human rights treaties and in founding texts such as the UDHR or the UN 
Charter.564 Whilst the universal approach entitles all human beings to a right to 
health, it is unclear whether everyone has a right to similar type of healthcare in the 
UN framework.  
The UN recently adopted documents that differentiate the type of healthcare 
individuals are entitled to, according to their nationality and migration status. In 
1985, the UN adopted the Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who are 
not Nationals of the Country in which They Live.565 Its Article 8 recognises the 
existence of a right to health for non-nationals, but under strict conditions. It declares 
that non-nationals can only benefit from a right to health protection and medical care 
if they lawfully reside on the territory and respect participation regulations. 
Furthermore, it only grants non-nationals a right to health if states’ resources are not 
experiencing ‘undue strain’, which could be interpreted broadly.566 This instrument, 
however, is not legally binding. In 1990, the legally binding International 
                                                
562 Arab Charter (n 92), Art 39. 
563 ICESCR (n 4), Preamble and Art 12 
564 UDHR (n 3), Art 1: ‘All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights’; UN 
Charter (n 25), Art 1(3): ‘The purposes of the United Nations are […] promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion’. 
565 UNGA, ‘Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who Are Not Nationals of the 
Country in Which They Live' (1985) UN Doc. A/RES/40/144 
<http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/40/a40r144.htm> [accessed 8 September 2015]. 
566 ibid, Art 8(1)(c). 
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Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of 
Their Families (ICMW) was adopted nonetheless, and came into force in 2003. Its 
Article 28 declares that migrant workers and members of their families, whether in a 
regular or irregular situation, have a right to health. However, it restricts this right to 
emergency care. 567 Therefore, several issues arise when reading this provision 
altogether with Article 12 ICESCR. 
First, Article 28 ICMW and Article 12 ICESCR are contradictory. On one hand, both 
the ICESCR and the ICMW prohibit discrimination based on national origin or on 
‘any other status’, which could be understood as migration status.568 On the other 
hand, Article 12 ICESCR entitles everyone to the highest standard of health while 
Article 28 ICMW only guarantees emergency care to migrants. It is thus unclear how 
the conflict of norms between the ICESCR and the ICMW should be addressed. 
Second, according to the principles lex specialis derogat legi generali and lex 
posterior derogat priori, the ICMW should prevail over the ICESCR. The ICMW 
provides for the right to health of a particular group of individuals rather than for all 
human beings, and was adopted more recently than the ICESCR. Nevertheless, 
reducing the scope of protection of the right to health based on the nationality and 
migration status of individuals could go against the principle of non-discrimination, 
pillar of human rights law and core obligation in GC14.569 
Third, the ICMW only covers migrant workers. Therefore, unemployed migrants 
(whether in a regular or irregular situation) would benefit from the protection of the 
ICESCR instead. This means that states should guarantee the ‘highest standard of 
health attainable’ to unemployed migrants, but should limit access to emergency 
services for those who are working. Whilst working does not entitle to a human right 
to access better healthcare, it would be illogical if unemployment did, considering 
states’ efforts to deter migration.  
                                                
567 ICMW (n 93), Art 28. 
568 ICESCR (n 4), Art 2(2); ICMW (n 93), Preamble (reference to ICESCR). 
569 UNCESCR, ‘GC14’ (n 21), para 43(a). 
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Regional (CoE) framework: confusion in the ESC 
Contrarily to Article 12 ICESCR, Article 11 ESC bears restrictions as to who is 
entitled to benefit from healthcare. The Appendix of the Charter specifies that Article 
11 protects refugees, stateless persons, nationals and ‘foreigners only in so far as 
they are nationals of other Parties lawfully resident or working regularly within the 
territory of the Party concerned’.570 The scope of Article 11, therefore, does not 
apply to regular migrants from non-States parties who are neither refugees nor 
stateless, and does not apply to irregular migrants in general.  
However, the text of the Charter is confusing. Its Article E prohibits discrimination 
on the grounds of national extraction, national minority, birth or ‘other status’, which 
could be interpreted as migration status. Therefore, this provision should protect both 
regular migrants whose birth or national extraction is not located in Europe and 
individuals with irregular migration status, from health discrimination. Furthermore, 
Part I of the ESC describes Article 11 as the right of everyone to benefit from the 
highest standard of health attainable.571  
The Travaux Préparatoires of the ESC explicitly point at the drafters’ intention to 
assign the scope of this instrument to European nationals.572 Nevertheless, it is not 
clear whether drafters intended to exclude non-nationals from the scope of the 
Charter as a result.573 What is clear, however, is their desire to promote freedom of 
movement among Europeans, by protecting States parties’ nationals against 
discrimination based on nationality grounds.574 It is thus perhaps more appropriate to 
study the restricted scope of the ESC and its Appendix through an historical 
                                                
570 ESC 1961 (n 92), Appendix; ESC 1996 (n 92), Appendix. 
571  ESC 1961 (n 92), Part I (11). 
572 CoE, ‘Collected Travaux Préparatoires of the European Social Charter, Volume III' 
(1956); CoE, ‘Collected Travaux Préparatoires of the European Social Charter, Volume V' 
(1958).  
573 CoE, ‘Collected Travaux Préparatoires ESC, Volume I’ (n 328): ‘The aim of the social 
policy of the Member Governments should therefore be the continuous improvement of the 
standard of living of all members of society […]. 
574 Ibid, p 5 (Memorandum by the Secretariat-General, 16 April 1953), para 14: states parties 
are willing to ‘abolish discrimination on grounds of nationality between nationals of the 
Members of the Council in relation to social rights.' 
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perspective. The Charter was drafted in the 1950s, a period in which migration 
movements raised different challenges in Europe than they do today. The first 
common labour market areas were created, the new borders resulting from World 
War II led millions of individuals to resettle, and many left for the Americas.575 
Migration of non-European nationals towards Europe was not an important trend at 
the time, and the absence of protection provided by the ESC in that regard may thus 
result from an omission.576 However, migration trends have changed dramatically 
since. Mikkola, former Member and Chairman of the European Committee (1995-
2006), declared: ‘Europe used to be the point of departure, now it is both the point of 
departure and the point of arrival’.577 When the Charter was amended in 1996, 
States parties could have addressed the issue of migrants’ rights but decided to leave 
it untouched. This might reflect a more conscious desire to differentiate nationals 
from non-nationals, when providing for a right to health.  
As a result, it is unclear when reading the ESC whether ‘everyone’ is entitled to 
healthcare, as recognised by Article 11; or whether certain migrants are excluded 
from its scope of protection, as stated by the Appendix. Moreover, reducing the 
scope of protection of the right to health according to individuals’ nationality or 
migration status could constitute a discrimination, ‘core’ substance of this right.578  
To conclude, the uncertainty present in the UN and the CoE frameworks impede the 
ability of SNHRBs such as the UN and the European Committees to develop an 
adequate interpretation of the right to health. That is, one which promotes everyone’s 
effective enjoyment of the highest standard of health attainable, and that meets the 
requirement of principled consistency. Therefore, how should SNHRBs interpret 
such provisions? 
                                                
575 Mikkola (n 319) 32–34. 
576 Özden and others (n 547) 15: ‘In 1960, except for migration within the Soviet Union, the 
majority of migrants were born in Europe and South Asia’. 
577 Mikkola (n 319) 33. 
578 UNCESCR, ‘GC14’ (n 21), para 43(a). 
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4.3.2 Restrictions to healthcare: a disproportionate measure? 
Restricting the scope of protection of the right to health based on right-holders’ 
nationality goes against the very foundation of human rights law, i.e. equal dignity 
for all human beings (regardless of their nationality or status). As contended by 
Weiler, two main arguments should be made against the provision of human rights 
according to state affiliation.579 Firstly, it undervalues the common humanity of 
individuals and can thus feed xenophobia. Secondly, an approach based on economic 
considerations (i.e. the perceived costs of immigration) views aliens in utilitarian 
terms, which is undesirable in a human rights context. Furthermore, various authors 
have disputed the notion of citizenship as a simple legal status. Mantouvalou argues: 
In the heart of the role of rights for citizenship lies the belief that only 
when a person enjoys the full range of rights can she or he be full 
member of a community. A community is not a synonym to the state, 
though, and the importance of belonging is not limited to state 
nationals.580 
Human rights law, nevertheless, allows differential treatments based on citizenship if 
these pursue an objective and reasonable purpose, and if the measures taken are 
proportionate to that purpose.581 In theory, it is objective and reasonable for states to 
avoid ‘overspending’ in the health sector, if they wish to realise other rights and do 
not have sufficient resources to do so. However, no evidence shows that in practice, 
restricting non-nationals’ access to healthcare enables states to meet this objective.  
On the contrary, authors have argued that restricting non-nationals’ right to health is 
an inadequate immigration control strategy. Firstly, it is based on the false 
assumption that migrants will incur an economic loss to sovereign states. This does 
                                                
579 Joseph HH Weiler, ‘Thou Shalt Not Oppress a Stranger:* On the Judicial Protection of 
the Human Rights of Non-EC Nationals - A Critique’ (1992) 3 European Journal of 
International Law 65, 65–69. 
580 Virginia Mantouvalou, ‘Workers without Rights as Citizens at the Margins’ (2013) 16 
Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 366, 369. Further discussion 
on citizenship and (social) rights can be found on pp. 367-370, although focusing on labour 
rights. 
581 UNCESCR, ‘General Comment No. 20: Non-Discrimination in Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (Art 2, Para 2)’ (2009), paras 13 and 14. 
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not take into consideration the economic contributions made by migrant workers. 
Regular migrant workers pay taxes (some of which fund the health system), and 
some may create employment. Irregular migrant workers are often used as cheap 
labour,582 and are sometimes overqualified if they failed to obtain equivalence of 
diplomas. Moreover, this strategy does not acknowledge the low usage of health 
facilities by irregular migrants, who fear to be identified by state authorities and 
deported.583 Secondly, deterring migration by restricting non-nationals’ access to 
healthcare does not seem particularly efficient in the context of irregular migrants. 
Engbersen and Broeders argue that traditional border policies have been recently 
supplemented with internal migration control and expulsion measures to discourage 
individuals who managed to cross the borders.584 However, they contend that such 
measures are both costly (e.g. deportations, detention centres, enforcement 
personnel, etc.) and ineffective. Irregular migrants tend to develop inventive 
strategies and informal systems enabling them to stay within the borders (e.g. 
informal work, criminal activities, becoming unidentifiable). 585  As a result, 
restricting migrants’ access to healthcare seems to be disproportionate to the aim 
sought and therefore constitutive of de jure health discrimination. SNHRBs should 
thus abstain from interpreting the right to health in such manner. 
However, the international community (including SNHRBs) tends to allow certain 
differential treatments based on nationality grounds, likely for political reasons since 
treatment of aliens are traditionally attached to states’ sovereignty. It is nonetheless 
important that such leniency does not impede migrants’ inherent dignity as human 
beings, including their ability to access an adequate health system (e.g. emergency 
care, primary care). Furthermore, differential treatments based on nationality grounds 
fail to represent a sustainable solution to immigration, provided there should be one. 
                                                
582 Gregor Noll, ‘Why Human Rights Fail to Protect Undocumented Migrants’ (2010) 12 
European Journal of Migration and Law 241, 259; Sylvie Da Lomba, ‘Immigration Status 
and Basic Social Rights: A Comparative Study of Irregular Migrants’ Right to Health Care 
in France, the UK and Canada’ (2010) 28 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 6, 34–35. 
583 Da Lomba (n 582) 34–35. 
584 Godfried Engbersen and Dennis Broeders, ‘The State versus the Alien: Immigration 
Control and Strategies of Irregular Immigrants’ (2009) 32 West European Politics 867, 870–
874. 
585 ibid 874–881: it is worth noting that the article focuses on the Netherlands. 
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A question remains nonetheless: can the application of the right to health interrupt 
deportation procedures of irregular migrants in need of lifesaving treatments? Health 
rationing in lifesaving treatments is a particularly contentious issue in health 
economics, particularly in the context of non-nationals. International human rights 
law, nonetheless, widely and explicitly requires that minimum levels of health be 
guaranteed to all human beings.586 This thesis challenges the existence of minimum 
core obligations, but contends that lifesaving measures should be prioritised as much 
as possible, regardless of the nationality and migration status of individuals. 
Furthermore, human rights law prohibits the extradition of individuals at risk of cruel 
and inhuman treatment in their home countries (not solely torture), including an 
absence of lifesaving treatments.587 As a result, SNHRBs should explore at least four 
questions when deciding whether states should provide healthcare to irregular 
migrants about to be deported, given the treatment is lifesaving, safe and efficient. 
Any positive answer to the following generates an obligation to that effect. First, 
should the treatment be urgently administered? Second, is the treatment available in 
the receiving country but not the home country? Third, is the treatment short-term? 
Fourth, has the treatment begun? Such test points at the inaccurate rationale of 
decisions such as N v the United Kingdom.588 In this case, the European Court of 
Human Rights had rejected a claim brought by an irregular migrant who alleged that 
the state’s decision to expulse her and to subsequently interrupt her antiretroviral 
treatment, amounted to inhuman treatment. The Court, however, only based its 
decision on the 50% likelihood for the claimant to get lifesaving treatment in her 
home country, leaving the other 50% to fate.589  
To conclude, while SNHRBs have to deal with incoherent right to health provisions 
when it comes to non-nationals, they should consider immigration policies 
permanently restricting access to healthcare for non-nationals, disproportionate. It is 
                                                
586 Declaration of Alma-Ata (n 255); UNCESCR, ‘General Comment 3’ (n 211), para 10; 
UNCESCR, ‘GC14’ (n 21), paras 43 and 44; ICMW (n 93). 
587 D v United Kingdom [1997] Chamber, Application No. 30240/96, Judgment of 2 May 
1997 (ECtHR). 
588 N v United Kingdom [2008] Grand Chamber, Application No. 26565/05, Judgment of 27 
May 2008 (ECtHR). 
589 ibid [44 to 51]. 
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nonetheless worth examining whether the approach adopted in their monitoring 
procedures accommodates these suggestions. 
4.3.3 Comprehensive right to health for non-nationals in SNHRBs’ 
jurisprudence  
This thesis contends that in order for SNHRBs to optimise their interpretation of the 
scope of protection of the right to health, not only must they rely on a framework 
clarifying adequately its substance, they must also monitor non-nationals’ access to 
health appropriately. Since this thesis focuses on the UN and the European 
Committees, I will assess whether the approach adopted in their monitoring 
procedures accommodates the suggestions developed in subsections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2.  
Protection of migrants’ health at the UN level 
Article 28 ICMW on migrants’ health has a more restricted scope of protection than 
Article 12 ICESCR, and applies to fewer states. Only 47 states are parties to the 
ICMW and almost no European or Northern American states have ratified it (except 
Albania, Azerbaijan and Turkey). 590  This means that among the 10 countries 
receiving the largest number of international migrants (i.e. USA, Russia, Germany, 
Saudi Arabia, UAE, UK, France, Canada, Australia, Spain),591 none is bound by the 
Convention. As Noll declared: ‘the treaty clearly was and is the South's project.’592 
Furthermore, the ICMW does not protect refugees, stateless persons, and migrants 
who are not workers or members of the worker’s family. Therefore, non-nationals’ 
right to health is better protected by the UN Committee (on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights) than by the UN Committee on Migrant Workers. 
The UN Committee frequently highlights health discrimination committed against 
migrants (whether in regular situation or undocumented); asylum-seekers; refugees; 
                                                
590 UN Treaty Collection, ‘Status of the International Convention on the Protection of the 
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families’ 
<https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
13&chapter=4&lang=en> [accessed 8 September 2015]. 
591 UNPD, 'International Migration Report 2013' (n 548), p 5. 
592 Noll (n 582) 255. 
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or stateless persons. In the sixty Concluding Observations studied, it reviewed their 
situation fifteen times under Article 12 ICESCR, targeting both de jure and de facto 
discrimination.  
Firstly, the UN Committee sometimes points de jure discrimination. These can 
directly affect non-nationals, for instance when a new legislation curtailed the rights 
of irregular migrants to access public health services in Spain.593 However, de jure 
discrimination can also indirectly affect non-nationals, by imposing conditions they 
cannot reach. This was the case for instance of Israel, who required that individuals 
had a permanent residence permit to access healthcare, excluding in practice 
Palestinians with temporary residence permits, migrant workers, and refugees.594 
Furthermore, the UN Committee also expresses its concern when states’ legislations 
only provide migrants with access to emergency healthcare. This was the case of 
Belgium, with irregular migrants,595 and of Russia, with persons having a temporary 
asylum status.596  
Secondly, the UN Committee sometimes criticises states for allowing de facto 
discrimination. For example, it observed that poor awareness, complex 
administrative formalities and language barriers, impeded access to healthcare of 
asylum-seekers and undocumented migrant workers in France.597 Finally, the UN 
Committee often urges states to provide medical assistance to migrants who are 
victims of trafficking, exploitation, abuse and violence.598 
Such interpretation fits with the recommendations formulated in subsection 4.3.2. 
However, since the UN Committee does not use thematic indicators and has no 
                                                
593 UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations Spain 2012’ (n 301), para 19. 
594 UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations on Israel’s Third Periodic Report’ (2011) UN Doc 
E/C12/ISR/CO/3, para 31. 
595 UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations on Belgium’s Third Periodic Report’ (2008) UN 
Doc E/C12/BEL/CO/3, paras 21 and 35. 
596 UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations Russia 2011’ (n 221), para 21. 
597 UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations France 2008’ (n 287), para 26.  
598 UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations Philippines 2008’ (n 220), para 21. 
 
199 
methodology in its reporting procedure, it does not systematically review migrants’ 
access to health in its monitoring and interpretation of Article 12 ICESCR. 
The extensive interpretation of the European Committee   
The European Committee recently started to widen the scope of protection of the 
right to health in its monitoring procedures, despite the restrictions of the ESC 
regarding non- nationals.  
In its collective complaint procedure, the European Committee reached two 
decisions on migrants’ right to health. These led to different findings, whether 
Article 13 ESC on the right to medical assistance, or Article 11 on the right to health 
protection, was under review.599 First, in its Merits Decision FIDH v France, the 
European Committee recognised that Article 13 entitled irregular migrants to access 
emergency healthcare.600 It recognised that their children should access healthcare on 
the same basis as the rest of the population, but based its decision on Article 17 ESC 
on children's right to social protection.601 The European Committee then used the 
principle of good faith in the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties,602 to assert 
that the Charter was based on the values of dignity, autonomy, equality and 
solidarity.603 It declared that since healthcare was necessary to preserve human 
dignity, irregular migrants were entitled to a form of medical assistance, which 
entailed emergency care.604 However, emergency healthcare does not include basic 
aspects of primary care such as treatment for common diseases and injuries (e.g. GP 
consultations). 605  Such system, therefore, fails to meet requirements the UN 
                                                
599 ESC 1961 (n 92), Art 11 and 13; ESC 1996 (n 92), Art 11 and 13. 
600 International Federation of Human Rights Leagues (FIDH) v France [2004] Complaint 
No. 14/2003, Decision on the Merits (ECSR) [26 to 34]. 
601 ibid [35 to 37].  
602 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 (VCLT), Art 31(1). 
603 International Federation of Human Rights Leagues  v France (ECSR) (n 600) [26 to 32]. 
604 ibid [31 to 34]. 
605 Declaration of Alma-Ata (n 255). 
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framework considers to be ‘minimum’ (which this thesis interprets as ‘to be 
prioritised’).606  
Second, in its Merits Decision Médecins du Monde International v France, the 
European Committee recognised that Article 11 ESC entitled migrants to enjoy 
adequate access to health, beyond emergency care and regardless of their residence 
status.607 It considered that the unhealthy living conditions and the difficult access to 
healthcare experienced by Roma migrants breached their right to health. The 
European Committee declared, thus, that the emergency care fund for irregular 
migrants residing in France for less than three months was insufficient. 608  It 
requested that France took preventive measures such as free consultations and 
screening to pregnant women and children; measures preventing infectious diseases 
or domestic accidents; and immunisation. As a result, irregular migrants’ right to 
health is better protected when monitored under Article 11 ESC than under Article 
13. However, it is still unsure whether the European Committee will interpret them 
as requiring that non-nationals be guaranteed access to healthcare on the same basis 
as citizens.  
Similarly to its complaint procedure, the European Committee reviews migrants’ 
right to health expansively in its reporting procedure, whether regarding Article 13 
ESC (right to medical assistance) or Article 11 (right to health protection).609 Its 
Conclusions usually recognise a right to emergency healthcare for irregular migrants 
under Article 13 ESC, and it holds violations when such services are not provided. 
Until 2013, however, its Conclusions did not recognise irregular migrants’ right to 
access general healthcare under Article 11 ESC, and no violation had been found in 
that respect.610  This changed recently, as the European Committee applied the 
                                                
606 UNCESCR, ‘GC14’ (n 21), paras 43 and 44; UNCESCR, ‘General Comment 3’ (n 211), 
para 10. 
607 Médecins du Monde v France (ECSR) (n 399) [134–164]. 
608 ibid [163]. 
609 ESC 1961 (n 92), Art 11 and 13; ESC 1996 (n 92), Art 11 and 13. 
610 ECSR, ‘Conclusions 2009’, France pp. 299-300: The European Committee declared that 
‘The system makes it possible to cover the healthcare costs of illegal immigrants’, and asked 
France whether access to healthcare was equally guaranteed between French citizens and 
foreigners. 
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jurisprudence developed in Médecins du Monde International v France to its 2013 
Conclusions on Spain. In this document, it threatened to reach a finding of non-
conformity to Article 11 against Spain, on the basis it had amended its legislation to 
restrict irregular migrants’ access to healthcare to emergency services.611 It referred 
to Médecins du Monde International v France, declaring that States parties to the 
ESC had positive obligations towards irregular migrants’ health ‘whatever their 
status’. It also specified that the health system had to be accessible to the entire 
population (including migrants), and referred to the universality of Article 12 
ICESCR.612 This confirms the European Committee is starting to extend the scope of 
the right to health to every individual, regardless of her nationality or migration 
status, by recognising de jure and de facto health discrimination. Such interpretation 
is in line with the recommendations formulated in subsection 4.3.2. 
To conclude, the monitoring and adjudication of non-nationals’ right to health in 
SNHRBs such as the UN and the European Committees, reflect their attempts to 
accommodate an issue traditionally attached to states’ sovereignty, while promoting 
a universalist approach, a pillar of human rights law. It is thus essential that SNHRBs 
such as the UN and the European Committees review this issue more systematically, 
to verify that states do not restrict migrants’ access to healthcare disproportionately. 
Furthermore, since irregular migrants may avoid using complaint procedures by fear 
of being identified and consequently deported, such procedures should remain open 
to NGOs and allow anonymity. 
 
Conclusion 
In this Chapter, I clarified how the normative scope of the right to health should be 
interpreted in supranational monitoring by addressing three key questions left 
unanswered in Part I. What is the highest standard of health attainable; do cultural 
considerations affect its content; and can everyone benefit from it? I thus used the 
relevant doctrine and analysed comparatively the UN and the European Committees’ 
                                                
611 ECSR, ‘Conclusions XX-2 (2013)’, Spain pp. 12-14. 
612 ibid, Spain p 13. 
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interpretations, in order to develop a theoretical account based on the principles of 
interpretation advocated by this thesis, enabling SNHRBs to optimise their 
interpretation. In Section 4.1, I suggested that the scope of interests of the right to 
health should be understood as a right to an adequate health system. I highlighted the 
need for SNHRBs to interpret the requirement to achieve the highest standard of 
health attainable as a requirement to set up adequate health systems, due to the 
excessive vagueness of the WHO Constitution and human rights instruments. I also 
argued that such a requirement could be materialised into clear legal standards and 
obligations, and that SNHRBs had to monitor it comprehensively and methodically 
to rationalise its content coherently. In Section 4.2, I highlighted that the scope of 
application of the right to health meant that it had to be responsive to the cultural 
environment in which it was implemented. I thus discussed how, on one hand, 
cultural relativist arguments could threaten the implementation of the right to health 
and how, on the other hand, SNHRBs should take into consideration cultures to 
promote an effective enjoyment of this right. I then assessed whether the UN and the 
European Committee’s monitoring accommodated these suggestions. In Section 4.3, 
I analysed the scope of protection of the right to health by focusing on non-nationals. 
I outlined that human rights instruments tended to formulate migrants’ right to health 
in restrictive terms, including in the UN and the CoE. However, I argued that 
permanent restrictions on non-nationals’ right to health could represent 
disproportionate differential treatments; and that SNHRBs should monitor those 
accordingly. Such approach has been successfully adopted by SNHRBs such as the 
UN and the European Committees. 
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Chapter 5 Clarifying states’ obligations to realise the right to 
health in supranational monitoring 
Introduction 
As outlined in the introduction of my thesis, an adequate interpretation of the right to 
health should ensure an effective enjoyment of this right, set reasonable expectations 
upon states, offer context sensitivity through its implementation and overall, it 
should guarantee principled consistency. However, one can legitimately wonder how 
SNHRBs can make these principles coexist when defining states’ obligations to 
realise the right to health through their monitoring procedures. The monitoring 
procedures of the UN and the European Committees highlight interesting findings in 
this concern, but fundamental conceptual issues remain unaddressed. What does 
‘progressively’ realising the right to health entail; and are states obliged to fulfil 
certain minimum core obligations regardless of constraints weighing upon them? 
It is fundamental such questions be clarified, since excessive vagueness can threaten 
the realisation of the right to health. Chapter 5 will thus offer a theoretical account 
assisting SNHRBs in interpreting states’ obligations to realise the right to health 
adequately, based on a comparative analysis of the UN and the European 
Committees’ interpretation, and on a study of the relevant doctrine.  
Legal scholarship has written profusely about the obligation to progressively realise 
ESCR and about minimum core obligations.613 While arguments have slightly shifted 
from whether ESCR produce legal obligations to how these can be monitored, 
confusion remains on how duty-bearers must implement the right to health. As a 
result, it is fundamental to clarify the nature of states’ obligations in that respect. 
However, it is worth noting that this chapter will not rely on the tripartite typology of 
obligations to respect, protect and fulfil the right to health, yet widely used in human 
rights scholarship, for it does not contribute adequately to clarifying the legal content 
of the right to health. As argued by Koch, the tripartite typology is problematic in 
                                                
613 E.g. Felner (n 125); Gauthier De Beco, ‘The Interplay between Human Rights and 
Development the Other Way Round: The Emerging Use of Quantitative Tools for Measuring 
the Progressive Realisation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2010) 4 Human 
Rights and International Legal Discourse 265; Chapman and Russell (n 234). 
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practice (and in the context of this thesis, in supranational monitoring), as the 
categories it creates eventually merge between each other, and recent developments 
highlight the need to adopt additional categories.614 For instance, what differentiates 
the obligation to respect (usually described as an obligation to refrain from 
interfering with the enjoyment of rights) from the obligation to provide, when states 
are required to adopt measures combating de facto discrimination in access to 
healthcare? To avoid ‘interfering’ with the enjoyment of the right to health 
(obligation to respect), states must ensure that groups vulnerable to discrimination 
benefit from the same healthcare than the rest of the population, by providing 
measures adapted to their vulnerability (obligation to fulfil). Therefore, it is unclear 
what distinguishes one obligation from the other, and how such distinction may 
assist SHRB in interpreting states’ obligations through monitoring as it may 
crystallise the latters inadequately. 
This Chapter will thus explore the nature of states’ obligations to realise the right to 
health by focusing on the timeframe in which they have to be fulfilled, guided by the 
                                                
614 Ida Elisabeth Koch, ‘Dichotomies, Trichotomies or Waves of Duties’ (2005) 5 Human 
Rights Law Review 81. It is worth noting that the tripartite typology stems from Shue’s 
writings: Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy 
(Princeton University Press 1980). In this book, Shue specifically recognises the obligations 
to ‘avoid depriving’, to ‘protect from deprivation’, and to ‘aid the deprived’  (in the revised 
edition: Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy (2nd 
edition, Princeton University Press 1996), 52). In 1987, Eide proposed a typology deriving 
from Shue’s writings, but using the terminology now recognised as the obligations to 
respect, protect and fulfil (Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Mr. Asbjørn Eide, ‘Final 
Report on the Right to Adequate Food as a Human Right’ (1987) UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/23). However, scholars such as Van Hoof suggest that the obligation to 
fulfil includes an obligation to promote (Van Hoof ‘The Legal Nature of Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights: A Rebuttal of Some Traditional Views’, in Philip Alston and Katerina 
Tomaševski, The Right to Food (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1984), 106). Steiner and Alston 
even advocate for a quintuple typology, including obligations (1) to respect the rights of 
others; (2) to create institutional machinery essential to the realisation of rights; (3) to protect 
rights/prevent violations; (4) to provide goods and services to satisfy rights; and (5) to 
promote rights (Steiner and Alston, International Human Rights in Context (2nd edition, 
Oxford University Press 2000), 182). See further information on the evolution of the 
tripartite typology in Sepúlveda (n 152) 157-164. It is worth highlighting that in 2000, the 
UN Committee recognised that the obligation to fulfil the right to health encompassed 
obligations to facilitate, provide and promote (UNCESCR, ‘GC14’ (n 21), para 37). 
However, the negative wording used for the obligation to respect (see UNCESCR, ‘GC14’ (n 
21), paras 33 and 34) is particularly confusing, as ‘refrain[ing] from interfering directly or 
indirectly with the enjoyment of the right to health’ often requires that states ‘provide’ or 
‘facilitate’ access to such right, yet part of the obligation to fulfil. 
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established principle of progressive realisation in supranational monitoring. Section 
5.1 will examine how SNHRBs should interpret the obligation to progressively 
realise the right to health. It will analyse the requirement to progressively improve 
this right in human rights law; how such progress must be monitored by SNHRBs; 
and what they must prohibit to give meaning to its substance. Section 5.2 will then 
explore the notion of minimum core obligations in the context of healthcare. It will 
discuss how minimum core obligations are recognised in human rights law, and will 
challenge how their legal content is determined. Finally, it will conclude they cannot 
be clearly defined and SNHRBs must thus understand them through the test of 
reasonableness, as measures to be prioritised, although they may heuristically 
facilitate findings of non-conformity against particular states. 
 
5.1 The obligation to progressively realise the right to health 
The obligation to progressively realise ESCR is a cornerstone of human rights law 
and has received considerable attention in the literature. However, it is still unclear 
what such requirement precisely obliges or prohibits states to do; and it is often 
criticised for not guaranteeing an effective enjoyment of ESCR, including the right to 
health. In an attempt to clarify states’ obligation to progressively realise the right to 
health to enable SNHRBs to optimise their interpretation, this section will suggest 
that whilst the concern to set reasonable expectations upon states is legitimate, the 
importance of giving substance to this obligation must not be forgotten. Firstly 
(5.1.1), I will observe that progressive realisation requires that states improve 
individuals’ enjoyment of their right to health, but that this is contingent upon the 
availability of resources. Secondly (5.1.2), I will argue that in order to interpret this 
right adequately, SNHRBs must monitor it adequately, i.e. by evaluating resource 
availability and by using health indicators. Thirdly (5.1.3), I will contend that to 
materialise states’ obligation to progressively realise the right to health adequately, 
SNHRBs must review it through two findings of violations: insufficient progress, or 
retrogression of health standards.   
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5.1.1 Progress towards a better realisation of the right to health 
In order to comply with their obligations under human rights law, states must 
‘progressively realise’ the right to health. The nature of such progress, however, is 
insufficiently clarified in human rights law. This subsection thus suggests that two 
elements be taken into account. Firstly (5.1.1.1), states’ progress must attest an 
improvement in individuals’ enjoyment of their right to health. Secondly (5.1.1.2), 
whilst progress is understood through a long-term approach, being contingent upon 
resource availability, it requires that states take steps immediately. 
5.1.1.1 The requirement to improve individuals’ enjoyment of their right to health 
Both human rights instruments and SNHRBs, when interpreting them, clearly 
recognise the importance for states’ progressive realisation of the right to health to 
attest an improvement in individuals’ enjoyment of this right.  
Recognition by human rights instruments 
As mentioned in subsection 1.2.1.1, the legal requirement to progressively realise 
and improve the enjoyment of ESCR, including the right to health, is explicitly 
enshrined in Article 2(1) ICESCR, which reads: 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, 
individually and through international assistance and co-operation, 
especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available 
resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of 
the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, 
including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.615  
When drafting this provision in the early 1950s, states’ representatives disagreed on 
the necessity to take into consideration resource availability by including the word 
‘progressively’.616 Some advocated that this formulation clarified what was already 
                                                
615 ICESCR (n 4), Art 2(1). 
616 Alston and Quinn (n 126) 174–177. 
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implicit in the Covenant, 617  and that transforming objectives into an express 
obligation strengthened the legal force of the ICESCR.618 Others, however, declared 
that the word progressively did not add any substance to the Covenant but, rather, 
provided an excuse for not implementing it;619 and that it dealt inappropriately with 
low-income countries.620 This formulation, nonetheless, was adopted by 11 votes 
against 5.621 The UN Committee issued various General Comments since, clarifying 
the content of this obligation while highlighting the need to take into account 
practical difficulties states can face when implementing the Covenant.622 However, 
the expectation weighing upon states is clearly to ‘improve’ the enjoyment of the 
right to health, to reach towards its ‘full realisation’.623 
Regional human rights instruments also require that states progressively realise and 
thus improve the enjoyment of ESCR (including the right to health), although less 
explicitly than the ICESCR. The drafters of the ESC, second focus of this thesis, 
clearly recognised the need to incorporate the notion of progressivity. The 
Rapporteur to the Committee on Social Questions mentioned in his first report that 
the harmonisation and coordination of social policies between Member States would 
necessitate flexibility, and a long-term approach to be carried out ‘progressively’.624 
                                                
617 ECOSOC Commission on Human Rights, ‘Summary Record of the 271st Meeting' (1952) 
UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR.271, p 12 (Mrs. Roosevelt, USA). 
618 ECOSOC Commission on Human Rights, ‘Summary Record of the 233rd Meeting' 
(1951) UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR.233, p 8 (Mr. Azmi Bey, Egypt; and Mr. Cassin, France). 
619 Commission on Human Rights, ‘271st Meeting 1952’ (n 617), pp. 5 and 11 (Mr. Azkoul, 
Lebanon). 
620 ECOSOC Commission on Human Rights, ‘Summary Record of the 273rd Meeting' 
(1952) UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR.273, p 7 (Mr Morozov, USSR) and p 14 (Mr Jevremovic, 
Yugoslavia). 
621 Commission on Human Rights, ‘Report to the Economic and Social Council on the 
Seventh Session of the Commission, Held at the Palais Des Nations, Geneva, from 16 April 
to 19 May 1951’, para 54 <http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=E/1992> 
[accessed 8 September 2015]. 
622 E.g. UNCESCR, ‘General Comment 3’ (n 211), para 9: ‘It is on the one hand a necessary 
flexibility device, reflecting the realities of the real world and the difficulties involved for 
any country in ensuring full realization of economic, social and cultural rights’. 
623 UNCESCR, ‘GC14’ (n 21), paras 30 to 32. 
624 CoE, ‘Collected Travaux Préparatoires ESC, Volume I’ (n 328), Report Presented by Mr 
Heyman on behalf of the Committee on Social Questions on the request made by the 
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Whilst the ESC has no equivalent to Article 2(1) ICESCR, its preamble declares that 
the CoE aims at facilitating the economic and social ‘progress’ of its States parties, 
who must strive to ‘further’ realise human rights. It also asserts that States parties are 
bound to ‘improve’ the standards of living of their populations. 625 Finally, Article 11 
requires that States parties provide the ‘highest possible standard of health 
attainable’, by removing and preventing diseases ‘as far as possible’. 626 
Nevertheless, no interpretative guidelines have been published regarding the 
requirement to ‘improve’ such standard. It is worth noting that the Inter-American 
and the African systems have also embraced the notion of progressivity and 
improvement in the realisation of ESCR. The African Charter provides for the ‘best 
attainable’ standard of health,627 and Article 1 of the Protocol of San Salvador reads: 
The States Parties to this Additional Protocol to the American 
Convention on Human Rights undertake to adopt the necessary measures, 
both domestically and through international cooperation, especially 
economic and technical, to the extent allowed by their available 
resources, and taking into account their degree of development, for the 
purpose of achieving progressively and pursuant to their internal 
legislations, the full observance of the rights recognized in this 
Protocol.628 
Recognition by SNHRBs: focus on the UN and the European Committees 
While human rights instruments clearly require that states progressively improve 
individuals’ enjoyment of their right to health, it is worth asking whether SNHRBs 
also recognise this requirement in their jurisprudence. The examples of the UN and 
the European Committees will respond positively to this question. 
Out of the sixty Concluding Observations examined in the 2008-2012 sample, the 
UN Committee only urged states three times to comply with their obligation to 
                                                                                                                                     
Committee of Ministers for an opinion on the memorandum by the Secretariat General (18 
September 1953), Document 188, p 17. 
625 ESC 1961 (n 92), Preamble; ESC 1996 (n 92), Preamble. 
626 ESC 1961 (n 92), Art 11; ESC 1996 (n 92), Art 11. 
627 African Charter (n 92), Art 16. 
628 Protocol of San Salvador (n 92), Art 1. 
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progressively realise the right to health by referring expressly to Article 2(1) 
ICESCR. In these instances, states were prompted to increase their healthcare 
expenditure on the basis such figures had decreased or stagnated, while the overall, 
resource availability had improved.629 Nevertheless, the UN Committee clearly 
expects states to ‘progress’ in the field of healthcare, through its reporting procedure. 
Firstly, it often asks states to submit data demonstrating their progress in the health 
sector.630 Secondly, it regularly expresses satisfaction when this data shows an 
improvement. 631  Thirdly, when the information provided does not demonstrate 
sufficient progress or when no information is provided, the UN Committee can 
require that further measures be undertaken.632 Furthermore, Chapter 2 demonstrated 
that the UN Committee attempted to carry out follow-ups from one reporting cycle to 
the next. This follow-up, however, lacks greatly in coherency and transparency, and 
has not led to the development of any norms with regard to the improvement of 
states’ performance in health.  
In contrast, the European Committee often refers to the notion of ‘progress’ to assess 
states’ conformity to Article 11 ESC in its reporting procedure,633 and applies a much 
stricter follow-up than the UN Committee. For this purpose, it reviews the evolution 
of states’ legislation, regulations and measures in public health by using the same 
thematic health indicators in each reporting cycle.634 Furthermore, the European 
                                                
629  UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations DRC 2009’ (n 61), para 16; UNCESCR, 
‘Concluding Observations Cambodia 2009’ (n 219), para 27; UNCESCR, ‘Concluding 
Observations Philippines 2008’ (n 220), para 17. 
630  E.g. UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations Ecuador 2012’ (n 216), para 30: ‘The 
Committee requests the State party to provide information on the progress made in the field 
of mental and psychosocial health in its next periodic report’. 
631 E.g. UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations Sri Lanka 2010’ (n 187), para 5: the UN 
Committee commended Sri Lanka for ‘its significant progress towards the achievement of 
the Millennium Development Goals, especially in the field of health’. 
632 UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations Kenya 2008’ (n 218), para 20: the UN Committee 
asked Kenya to progressively extend the scope of its health insurance in order to reimburse 
hospitalisation fees and to cover the entirety of workers and unemployed persons. 
633 For the first time in ECSR, ‘Conclusions III (1973)’, Cyprus. 
634 Such review is also applied in the complaint procedure, as the Committee explicitly 
declares that it ‘assesses the efforts made by states with reference to their national legislation 
and regulations and undertakings entered into with regard to the European Union and the 
United Nations’, in Marangopoulos Foundation for Human Rights v Greece (ECSR) (n 372) 
[204] (referring inaccurately to Conclusions XV-2, Italy, Article 11§3, pp. 307-312). 
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Committee has held states several times in breach of Article 11 ESC for not having 
improved sufficiently their performance in the health sector,635 for having let such 
performance declined, 636  or for not having demonstrated any progress. 637  It 
nonetheless usually encourages states to improve the realisation of the right to health 
if they have made considerable efforts, even if such performance remains low 
compared to other States parties.  
In its collective complaint procedure, the European Committee refers even more 
explicitly to states’ obligation to progressively realise the right to health. In its Merits 
Decisions FIDH v Greece and Marangopoulos v Greece, the European Committee 
found the state in breach of Article 11 ESC for not having taken timely measures 
against the health hazards caused by river pollution and by lignite mining.638 To 
reach these decisions, it expressly referred to two standards specific to the 
progressive realisation of the Charter, developed in previous case law. Firstly, the 
European Committee declares that when a right is particularly complex and 
expensive to realise, states should take measures that aim at achieving the objectives 
set by the ESC ‘within a reasonable time, with measurable progress and to an extent 
consistent with the maximum use of available resources.’639 Secondly, it affirms that 
in order to ensure constant progress towards the objectives set in the ESC, states 
should not only change their laws, they should also make resources available and 
take the measures necessary to give full effect to this instrument.640 
                                                
635 E.g. ECSR, ‘Conclusions XIX-2 (2009)’, Latvia: finding of non-conformity to Article 
11(1) for insufficient efforts to address mortality rate and life expectancy; ECSR, 
‘Conclusions 2009’, Turkey: finding of non-conformity to Article 11(1) for insufficient 
efforts to address maternal and infant mortality. 
636 ECSR, ‘Conclusions XV-2 (2001)’, Belgium: finding of non-conformity to Article 11(3) 
for having let immunisation coverage decline. 
637 E.g. ECSR, ‘Conclusions 2009’, Ireland: finding of non-conformity to Article 11(3) for 
absence of evidence showing progress to prevent accidents. 
638 International Federation for Human Rights International Federation for Human Rights 
(FIDH) v Greece [2013] Complaint No. 72/2011, Decision on the Merits (ECSR); 
Marangopoulos Foundation for Human Rights v Greece (ECSR) (n 372). 
639  International Association Autism-Europe (IAAE) v France [2003] Complaint No. 
13/2002, Decision on the Merits (ECSR) [53]. 
640 International Movement ATD Fourth World v France [2008] Complaint No. 33/2006, 
Decision on the Merits (ECSR) [61]. 
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To conclude, while the UN Committee benefits from a clearer textual basis than the 
European Committee to assert states’ obligation to progressively realise the right to 
health, its monitoring methods are weaker and its follow-up is insufficient. The high 
number of States parties to the ICESCR and the low level of resources available to 
the UN Committee can partially explain this situation. This has impeded the 
development of international legal standards. The role of regional systems in 
monitoring states’ obligation to progress in healthcare and interpreting its substance 
is thus crucial. The precision of the European Committee’s follow-up and 
jurisprudence regarding states’ obligation to progressively realise Article 11 ESC can 
be used as an example of success in that regard, since they enabled the refinement of 
the legal content of the right to health in the CoE.  
5.1.1.2 The contingency of progress upon resources 
The extent to which states can guarantee the enjoyment of the right to health 
effectively depends on resource availability. This means that the realisation of the 
right to health may take time and is likely to be ‘progressive’ as a result. Such 
contingency upon resources appears in Article 2(1) ICESCR and in GC14, as both 
documents mention states’ obligation to meet the standards set by the Covenant to 
the ‘maximum of their available resources.641 It also appears in regional instruments.  
Whilst the text of the ESC does not mention the importance of resource availability, 
its Travaux Préparatoires explicitly do so:  
‘[...] the standard of living depends on the sum of available resources, 
which again is conditioned by economic factors’.642  
Furthermore, the Protocol of San Salvador declares that states must guarantee rights 
‘to the extent allowed by their available resources’,643 and the African Commission 
                                                
641 ICESCR (n 4), Art 2(1); UNCESCR, ‘GC14’ (n 21). 
642 CoE, ‘Collected Travaux Préparatoires ESC, Volume I’ (n 328), Memorandum by the 
Secretariat General of the Council of Europe on the role of the Council of Europe on the 
social field (16 April 1953) Doc SG (53)1, para 6 p 5. 
643 Protocol of San Salvador (n 92), Art 1. 
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affirms that the notion of progressive realisation must be understood ‘within the 
resources available’ to states.644 
Such contingency upon resources and a long-term approach have often been heavily 
criticised for not sufficiently guaranteeing an effective enjoyment of individuals’ 
rights, including the right to health. During the drafting of the ICESCR, various 
states’ representatives were already concerned that the notion of progressive 
realisation could become an excuse for non-compliance,645 and make the work of the 
UN Committee meaningless. 646 Many academics have also warned against the 
vagueness of this obligation, arguing it tarnished the legal force of ESCR. When 
defending core obligations, Chapman declares that the notion of progressive 
realisation complicates both the conceptualisation of those rights and their 
monitoring.647 Moreover, Felner argues that NGOs are reluctant to deal with states’ 
obligation to progressively realise ESCR. He outlines that they do not have adequate 
tools to assess compliance in that regard and fear states may use it as an excuse for 
breaching human rights law. As a result, NGOs presumably focus on immediate 
obligations instead, to counter critiques that ESCR are not ‘real’ rights, and be more 
efficient in their primary work of ‘naming and shaming’.648 
While such criticisms reflect some degree of truth, three arguments should be made. 
Firstly, saying that states’ obligation to progressively realise the right to health is 
impossible to monitor, is unhelpful. The adequacy of the law is not solely based on 
its simplicity. As outlined in this thesis, in order to interpret the right to health 
adequately, SNHRBs must: (1) ensure an effective enjoyment of this right; (2) set 
reasonable expectations upon states; (3) be sensitive to the context in which it will be 
implemented; and overall (4), guarantee principled consistency. Not taking into 
                                                
644 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, ‘Principles and Guidelines on the 
Implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights’ (2011), paras 13 to 15. 
645  Commission on Human Rights, ‘271st Meeting 1952’ (n 617), p 11 (Mr Azkoul, 
Lebanon). 
646 ibid, p 8 (Mr Morozov, USSR) (it was called the ‘Commission’ at the time). 
647 Chapman and Russell (n 234) 7–8. 
648 Felner (n 125) 405–408. 
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account the resources available to the state would fail to meet the second and fourth 
principle of interpretation. Furthermore, monitoring this obligation may be complex 
but not impossible. The ICESCR, the ESC and the comparative analysis of their 
monitoring procedures, point at two fundamental stages in that regard. The first stage 
requires that SNHRBs evaluate both the resources available to the state and its 
progress towards realising fully the right to health. The second stage requires that 
they materialise the notion of progressive realisation through two findings of 
violation: either based on insufficient improvement, or on decline of states’ 
performance under the right to health. However, human rights literature and 
jurisprudence remain hesitant on these issues and little material clarifies what either 
stage entails. 
Secondly, and as argued by Alston, the word ‘progressively’ should not be 
understood out of context. SNHRBs should read it in conjunction with the 
requirements that first, states use the maximum level of resources available and 
second, aim to fully realise the right to health.649 Such requirements appear explicitly 
in Article 2(1) ICESCR,650 and are reaffirmed by the UN Committee in General 
Comment 3.651 They can also be read in the ESC or the Protocol of San Salvador, 
and represent guidelines of implementation for the African Charter.652 Moreover, 
GC14 specifies that states must realise the right to health ‘as expeditiously and 
effectively as possible’ and that retrogressive measures constitute a prima facie 
violation of the Covenant. 653 
Finally, the notion of progress is not solely restricted to a long-term approach, since 
states’ obligation to progressively realise the right to health also embraces immediate 
obligations. According to the UN Committee in GC14, such obligations include: 
taking steps towards the realisation of the right to health; and guaranteeing the 
                                                
649 Alston and Quinn (n 126) 172–173. 
650 ICESCR (n 4), Art 2(1). 
651 UNCESCR, ‘General Comment 3’ (n 211), para 9. 
652 ESC 1961 (n 92); ESC 1996 (n 92); Protocol of San Salvador (n 92), Art 1; African 
Commission, ‘Principles and Guidelines on the Implementation of ESCR’ (n 644), paras 13 
to 15, and 20. 
653 UNCESCR, ‘GC14’ (n 21), paras 31 and 32. 
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principle of non-discrimination in its enjoyment.654 The African and the Inter-
American Commissions consider minimum core obligations to be of an immediate 
nature, in which case they would depart from the obligation to progressively realise 
the right to health.655 This thesis, however, will refute this argument in section 5.2. 
To conclude, SNHRBs should and have interpreted the obligation to progressively 
realise the right to health as requiring that states improve their performance in 
healthcare, depending on the availability of their resources. However, it is still 
uncertain how they ought to approach the elements of progress and resources in their 
monitoring procedures. This should thus be clarified to optimise their interpretation 
of the nature of states’ obligations to realise the right to health. 
5.1.2 Monitoring the obligation to progressively realise the right to health  
Whilst states’ obligation to improve individuals’ enjoyment of their right to health is 
well recognised in human rights law, it is still unclear how this requirement should 
be implemented and, thus, monitored. This thesis contends that in order for SNHRBs 
to optimise their interpretation of states’ obligation to progressively realise the right 
to health, they must evaluate the progress of states’ performance in health 
adequately. Therefore, two methods are indispensable. These include: an assessment 
of states’ use of resources to realise the right to health, and the use of thematic health 
indicators. 
5.1.2.1 Evaluating states’ resources to monitor potential  
Evaluating states’ resources to monitor their potential to realise the right to health 
involves two questions. First, what are the resources to be evaluated; and second, 
                                                
654 ibid, para 30. 
655 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, ‘Guidelines for Preparation of Progress 
Indicators in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights' (2008) OEA/Ser.L/V/II.132 
Doc. 14 Rev. 1, para 67: ‘significant dimensions of social rights are immediately enforceable 
before the domestic courts’; African Commission, ‘Principles and Guidelines on the 
Implementation of ESCR’ (n 644), para 16: ‘[Immediate] obligations include but are not 
limited to the obligation to take steps, the prohibition of retrogressive steps, minimum core 
obligations and the  obligation  to prevent discrimination in the enjoyment of economic, 
social and cultural rights’. 
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how should they be evaluated in order to monitor adequately the realisation of the 
right to health? 
What are the resources to be evaluated? 
It is widely recognised amongst human rights lawyers that the notion of ‘resources’ 
should be interpreted comprehensively, and should not be restricted to budgetary 
considerations.656 This view was also expressed by states’ representatives during the 
drafting of the ICESCR.657 Although it is futile to list every single resource necessary 
to realise the right to health, main categories may be listed for clarity purposes. As 
highlighted by Robertson, ESCR require: financial, human, technological, 
information, and natural resources (to which should also be added logistical 
resources).658 In the context of health, these can be translated into: a budget allocated 
to health (financial resources); as well as health personnel and researchers in the field 
of health (human resources). Resources also include: medical equipment, facilities, 
and services (technological and logistical resources); health-related information; and 
any natural resources essential to health (e.g. food, water, and air of good quality).  
Furthermore, such resources can be sourced either nationally or internationally. The 
importance of international cooperation and international aid are recognised at the 
international and regional levels: in the ICESCR, the ESC, the African Charter, and 
the Protocol of San Salvador.659 However, international assistance and cooperation 
                                                
656 The International Commission of Jurists, the Urban Morgan Institute on Human Rights 
and the Centre for Human Rights of the Faculty of Law of Maastricht University, ‘Masstricht 
Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1997), para 10: ‘[the] 
full realization of the rights may depend upon the availability of adequate financial and 
material resources’; See also Sigrun Skogly, ‘The Requirement of Using the “Maximum of 
Available Resources” for Human Rights Realisation: A Question of Quality as Well as 
Quantity?’ (2012) 12 Human Rights Law Review 393, 398–404. 
657 Commission on Human Rights, ‘271st Meeting 1952’ (n 617), p 5 (Mr Azkoul, Lebanon) 
and p 6 (Mr Cassin, France): ‘The resources of a state should be interpreted broadly to 
include budgetary appropriations and also technical assistance, international co-operation 
and other elements’. 
658 Robert E Robertson, ‘Measuring State Compliance with the Obligation to Devote the 
“Maximum Available Resources” to Realizing Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights’ 
(1994) 16 Human Rights Quarterly 693, 703–713. 
659 ICESCR (n 4), Art 2(1); ESC 1961 (n 92), Part I; ESC 1996 (n 92), Part I: ‘The Parties 
accept as the aim of their policy, to be pursued by all appropriate means both national and 
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do not represent a legal obligation per se. As a result, only resources that have been 
offered by sovereign states, international organisations or private donors, and that are 
under the control of the receiving state, can be assessed. It is important to note that 
the resources transferred through foreign aid can be of similar nature than those 
deployed by the state itself: health funds, health personnel, medical facilities, 
medical goods, etc.  
Lack of expertise, as well as time and financial constraints prevent SNHRBs from 
carrying out in-depth reviews of each type of resources each state can access to 
realise the right to health.660 However, SNHRBs often work alongside agencies that 
have the capacity to conduct such assessment. This includes, for instance, the WHO 
and the World Bank in the UN; or Eurostat (although affiliated with the European 
Union) and the Commissioner for Human Rights in the CoE. Interestingly, the UN 
Committee relies on ‘Core documents forming part of the reports of States parties’, 
common to all treaty bodies, to contextualise the environment in which the right to 
health is implemented. These documents could facilitate a review of the availability 
of resources by welcoming contributions from expert agencies. Core documents, 
nonetheless, are prepared by states (reliable data is thus not guaranteed) and do not 
provide a detailed account of their available resources. It is worth noting that the 
European Committee sometimes uses data published by expert agencies, but more to 
evaluate states’ efforts under Article 11 ESC than to examine resource availability. 
In the light of the above, I contend that SNHRBs should rely more often on the 
expertise of supranational agencies to contextualise resource availability. Accessing 
reliable data produced by expert agencies would improve supranational monitoring, 
since it promotes a more effective enjoyment of the right to health and sets more 
                                                                                                                                     
international in character’; African Charter (n 92), Preamble; African Commission, 
‘Principles and Guidelines on the Implementation of ESCR’ (n 644), para 13; Protocol of 
San Salvador (n 92), Art 1. 
660 Such constraints are clearly outlined in the literature, e.g.: Evatt ‘Ensuring effective 
supervisory procedures: the need for resources’ in Alston and Crawford (n 144); Suzanne 
Egan, ‘Strengthening the United Nations Human Rights Treaty Body System’ (2013) 13 
Human Rights Law Review 209. See also OHCHR, ‘Resources in Support of the Human 
Rights Treaty Body System -Human Rights Programme’ (2012) 
<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/TB/HRTD/NY/HRTDBudgetPaper310112.pd
f> [accessed 8 September 2015]. 
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reasonable reporting expectations upon states. For that purpose, it would be helpful if 
SNHRBs could access short summaries on the main categories of resources available 
in each state (financial, human, technological, information, natural, and logistical). 
Those summaries should focus on the resources necessary to realise the various 
ESCR recognised by human rights law, including the right to health. Themes 
examined would thus include: work and trade unions; social security; food; water 
and sanitation; housing; health; education; and cultural life. Furthermore, those 
summaries should be regularly updated by the relevant supranational agencies on an 
online database, which could be managed at an international level and receive 
regional inputs. This suggestion is especially relevant when Committee members, 
whether in the UN or in regional systems, work on a voluntary basis and often have 
full-time professional commitments elsewhere.661  
Evaluating the availability of resources: practical difficulties  
Considering human rights law obliges states to use the maximum of their available 
resources to realise ESCR,662 monitoring the obligation to progressive realise the 
right to health seems, at first glance, to imply an evaluation in three stages. Firstly, 
SNHRBs would assess the resources potentially available to the state. Secondly, they 
would evaluate the resources effectively invested towards the realisation of this right. 
Thirdly, SNHRBs would conclude whether this is sufficient to be able to comply 
with the right to health. In this third stage, they would justify their decisions of non-
compliance by specifying which resources should have been obtained (if 
unavailable) or unblocked (if available), to avoid arbitrary rulings. This subsection 
will however demonstrate, through the examples of the UN and the European 
Committees, that SNHRBs fail to respect these three steps when monitoring the right 
to health, due to problems inherent to such evaluation. 
                                                
661 Issue picked up during Interviews UN Committee members (n 190).  
662 ICESCR (n 4), Art 2(1). The European Committee first established this standard in 
International Association Autism-Europe v France (n 639) (ECSR) [53]: ‘When the 
achievement of one of the rights in question is exceptionally complex and particularly 
expensive to resolve, a State Party must take measures that allows it to achieve the objectives 
of the Charter within a reasonable time, with measurable progress and to an extent consistent 
with the maximum use of available resources’. 
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The European Committee usually skips the first and the third stages in its comments, 
i.e. assessing the resources available, and concluding whether those used to realise 
the right to health are sufficient for compliance. Instead, it provides an in-depth 
evaluation of the second stage (resources effectively deployed in health), thanks to 
the indicators developed in its reporting procedure on Article 11 ESC. It often 
examines the use of financial resources, by looking at the proportion of GDP spent 
on healthcare, and the proportion of public and private funding in the health sector, 
through the indicator ‘access to healthcare’. It regularly assesses the human resources 
deployed to realise the right to health, by reviewing the number of general 
practitioners, specialists, dentists, and pharmacists per 1,000 inhabitants, under the 
indicator ‘healthcare professionals’. The European Committee also evaluates the 
logistical resources used in the health sector, by reviewing the legislation, monitoring 
systems, and equipment in place, through most indicators. It examines the 
informational resources deployed to implement Article 11 ESC by assessing the 
provision of health education in schools and the organisation of awareness-raising 
campaigns within the population, under the corresponding indicators. Finally, it 
evaluates the appropriateness of natural resources crucial to health under the 
indicators ‘Air pollution’, ‘Water pollution’, ‘Asbestos’, ‘Ionising radiation’, ‘Noise 
pollution’, and ‘Food safety’. However, the European Committee fails to review 
resource availability. Therefore, when it holds a breach of Article 11 ESC, it rarely 
comments on what resources the state should have used to prevent such violation, or 
what resources the state should use to remedy the situation (third stage). Its 
comments are limited to declaring that the resources deployed in public health are 
insufficient, and to briefly asking for improvement in the next report. For instance, in 
its 2009 Conclusions, the European Committee observed that the proportion of 
Azerbaijan’s GDP devoted to healthcare was the lowest in Europe, and held a breach 
of Article 11 ESC.663 No comment was made as to what unused resources were 
available to the state, or as to what health budget it should aim for. The European 
Committee, nonetheless, does carry out further analysis in some instances. When it 
reviews the maternal and infant mortality of a population, for example, it takes into 
consideration states’ level of income by explicitly setting higher standards for the 
                                                
663 ECSR, ‘Conclusions 2009’, Azerbaijan pp. 98–101; see also ECSR, ‘Conclusions 2013’, 
Azerbaijan pp. 5-7. 
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wealthier ones. It requires that states take measures bringing maternal and infant 
deaths down to zero risk,664 especially those with highly developed healthcare 
systems.665 The European Committee has subsequently warned several ‘wealthy’ 
states against unacceptably high maternal mortality rates. However, it decided to 
defer its conclusions rather than hold a violation of Article 11 ESC.666  
The UN Committee, unlike the European Committee, often goes through the three 
stages prompted by the obligation to use the maximum resources available to realise 
the right to health in its comments, but superficially so. Firstly, it is not clear how 
thoroughly the UN Committee assesses the resources available to each state. 
Common Core Documents are limited,667 and Concluding Observations do not 
explicitly recognise resources constraints as being relevant factors or difficulties 
impeding the implementation of the ICESCR. Interviews conducted with a few 
Committee members highlight that they carry out individual research through 
reliable sources, but this is neither guaranteed nor transparent. Secondly, the UN 
Committee usually tries to assess the resources deployed by states in health, by 
asking questions to the government prior to drafting its Concluding Observations. 
This is reflected in lists of issues, replies to lists of issues, and summary records of its 
sessions. 668  However, those findings do not always appear in Concluding 
Observations. Thirdly, the UN Committee sometimes declares that the levels of 
resources deployed are insufficient to comply with the right to health. Nevertheless, 
its rationales are unclear. Comments are often limited to declaring that the objectives 
set by Article 12 ICESCR are not met, without providing any technical support on 
how to obtain or unblock the resources needed to remedy such situation. This is 
                                                
664 First established in ECSR, ‘Conclusions XV-2 (2001)’, Belgium p 94. 
665 First established in ECSR, ‘Conclusions 2003’, France p 147 (standard reiterated in more 
‘formal’ terms, in cycles XIX-2 (2009) and 2009). 
666  ECSR, ‘Conclusions XV-2 (2001), Addendum 1’, Luxembourg pp. 77-80; ECSR, 
‘Conclusions XVII-2 (2005)’, Netherlands pp. 594-596. 
667 E.g. UN International Human Rights Instruments, ‘Common Core Document Forming 
Part of the Reports of States Parties: United Republic of Tanzania' (2012) UN Doc. 
HRI/CORE/TZA/2012, para 7: financial resources are summarised in only eight lines. 
668 All documents relating to the reporting procedure of the UN Committee can be found 
online: 
<http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/SessionsList.aspx?Treaty=CESCR
> [accessed 8 September 2015]. 
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surprising for a SNHRB that usually prioritises constructive dialogue. It is worth 
noting that the Concluding Observations of the UN Committee sometimes engage 
systemically with resource availability or resource allocation, but not consistently 
enough. Until 2010, the Concluding Observations of the UN Committee often 
included a section entitled ‘Factors and difficulties impeding the implementation of 
the Covenant’, but the latter tended to review armed conflicts, and not even 
systematically. 669  In its 2015 reporting cycle, the UN Committee integrated a 
paragraph on ‘Maximum available resources’ in each Concluding Observations, but 
it is uncertain whether this will continue.670 
To conclude, the UN and the European Committees sometimes express concern or 
reach findings of violation when they consider that the resources effectively devoted 
to the realisation of the right to health are insufficient. Nevertheless, they often fail to 
assess the resources available to the state. This leads to two observations. First, the 
Committees cannot conclude with precision whether sufficient resources have been 
invested to implement the right to health, since they have not investigated what 
resources were available beforehand. As a result, they rarely outline which resources 
should have been used to avoid such situations, or how to unblock them in the future. 
Second, the Committees tend to focus on whether the standards set by the right to 
health have been achieved, regardless of states’ resources. This review fails to 
acknowledge states must use their maximum available resources, a requirement 
recognised by both the UN and the CoE.671 However, such minimum core approach 
can set unreasonable expectations, as I will argue in section 5.2.  
                                                
669 E.g. UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations DRC 2009’ (n 254), paras 6 and 34: the UN 
Committee acknowledges the challenge that the conflict represents to obtain the resources 
needed to realise ESCR, but criticises the state for mismanaging the resources that are 
already accessible (e.g. foreign aid and composition of the budget), urging an allocation of 
15% of its budget to build a sustainable health system. 
670 All documents relating to the reporting procedure of the UN Committee can be found 
online: 
<http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/SessionsList.aspx?Treaty=CESCR
> [accessed 8 September 2015]. 
671 UNCESCR, ‘General Comment 3’ (n 211), paras 9 and 10; International Association 
Autism-Europe v France (ECSR) (n 639) [53]. 
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It is crucial to understand why both Committees fail to evaluate whether states use 
the maximum resources available, as this problem may be relevant to other SNHRBs. 
First, the UN and the European Committees may be reluctant to interfere in resource 
allocation, a matter intricately connected to states’ sovereignty. This thesis, however, 
does not pretend to address this issue for it represents another research project. 
Second, the UN and European Committees may consider the evaluation of states’ 
resources as a complex and daunting exercise that impedes their ability to promptly 
decide whether the targets set by the right to health are met. It is therefore 
fundamental that this thesis clarifies how such evaluation should be carried out. 
The problem of an analysis focusing primarily on the availability of resources in 
order to evaluate whether their use is maximum, is twofold. Firstly, such analysis 
fails to provide a standardised model, as it works entirely on an ad hoc basis, 
reviewing the situation of each country disjointedly from one other. Secondly, such 
analysis tends to view resources as needing to be deployed in order to realise the 
right to health. Whilst this is true on various accounts, it is certainly not automatic. 
The United States, for instance, is one of the countries spending the most money on 
healthcare worldwide.672 However, 14.7% of its population (45.5 million persons) 
cannot afford any health insurance, representing 40% of poor American adults.673 
Therefore, injecting more money does not necessarily ensure an equal access to 
appropriate care for everyone, as required by the right to health. Money can be easily 
spent on items that do not benefit potential or existing patients, namely right-holders 
(e.g. excessively high salary for physicians).674  
                                                
672 World Bank, ‘Health Expenditure’ (n 174); WHO, ‘Interactive Chart on Health Financing 
(per Capita Total Expenditure on Health at Average Exchange Rate in US$: 2012)’ 
<http://gamapserver.who.int/gho/interactive_charts/health_financing/atlas.html?indicator=i3
&date=2012> [accessed 8 September 2015]. In 2012, the United States spent 17.9% of its 
GDP on healthcare and $8,895 per capita. Both figures amount to the highest in the world 
(except Norway who spends §9,055 per capita but its healthcare expenditure represents 9% 
of its GDP). However, access to (private) health system remains expensive and unequal.  
673 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Health Statistics, 
'Health Insurance Coverage ' (n 111). 
674 U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, ‘Physicians and Surgeons: Pay (Occupational Outlook 
Handbook)’ <http://www.bls.gov/ooh/healthcare/physicians-and-surgeons.htm#tab-5> 
[accessed 8 September 2015]. 
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This thesis does not pretend to advise how resources should be deployed in 
healthcare. This question should be left to experts in medicine, public health, health 
economics, and ethics. However, I argue that the obligation to progressively realise 
the right to health clearly imposes two duties in terms of resources, as interpreted by 
the African Commission.675  
The first of those duties is to mobilise resources to fund an adequate health system 
without excluding vulnerable sections of the population from accessing it, whether 
directly or indirectly. This can be done, for instance, by establishing an effective and 
fair taxation system to collect the financial resources necessary to realise the right to 
health. The Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights recently 
published a report in which she outlines the key role of fiscal policies in the 
realisation of ESCR.676 She specifies that tax structures that have a disproportionate 
impact on the poorest sections of the population, as well as untaxed exploitation of 
natural resources, can indicate a failure to mobilise adequate resources. Therefore, 
such policies may constitute a breach of states’ obligation to progressively realise 
ESCR, including the right to health.677 Such view is also reflected in the work of 
various academics, and more particularly Nolan, O’Connell and Harvey.678 SNHRBs 
can monitor this obligation relatively easily, by asking states’ officials and 
independent experts (e.g. academics) to describe the health insurance coverage for 
vulnerable groups, or the proportion of public funding to the health sector. It is worth 
noting that these elements are often monitored by the European or the UN 
Committees, but not consistently. 
                                                
675 African Commission, ‘Principles and Guidelines on the Implementation of ESCR’ (n 
644), para 15. 
676  Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, Magdalena Sepúlveda 
Carmona, ‘Report to the Human Rights Council (Main Focus: Taxation and Human Rights)’ 
(2014) UN Doc. A/HRC/26/28. 
677 ibid, paras 5 and 72. 
678 Saiz ‘Resourcing Rights: Combating Tax Injustice from a Human Rights Perspective’, in 
Aoife Nolan, Rory O’Connell and Colin Harvey (eds), Human Rights and Public Finance: 
Budgets and the Promotion of Economic and Social Rights (Hart 2013); Rory O’Connell, 
Aoife Nolan, Colin Harvey, Mira Dutschke, Eoin Rooney (eds), Applying an International 
Human Rights Framework to State Budget Allocations: Rights and Resources (Routledge 
2014); Aoife Nolan (ed), Economic and Social Rights after the Global Financial Crisis 
(Cambridge University Press 2014). 
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The second duty deriving from states’ obligation to progressively realise the right to 
health (in the context of resources’ evaluation), is to give this right due consideration 
in the distribution of resources, through the budgeting process.679 The UN and the 
European Committees often review the percentage of states’ GDP devoted to the 
health sector. Whilst it is a good indicator of whether states prioritise the realisation 
of the right to health or not in their budget allocation, it remains a very general tool. 
What if a state spends an adequate percentage of its GDP to healthcare but overfunds 
one service to the detriment of others? The approach developed by Anderson and 
Foresti is particularly helpful for monitoring this. Instead of asking what resources 
are available and whether they are sufficiently deployed towards healthcare, which 
this thesis demonstrates is unhelpful, their approach asks questions the other way 
around. What must be done? How much does it cost? Is it affordable?680 Therefore, 
this model coincides better with states’ obligation to identify the health needs of their 
population (developed in Chapter 4), than an analysis based primarily on resource 
availability. Furthermore, it places the burden of proof on states, enabling SNHRBs 
to focus on procedural questions regarding the allocation of resources rather than to 
examine the vast issue of their availability. Four steps should lead this evaluation. 
First, SNHRBs should assess whether states have identified the health needs of their 
populations. This argument was developed in Chapter 4 and requires that states 
collect data regarding various aspects of health, which can be translated into thematic 
indicators. If states did not identify such needs, SNHRBs may find a violation of 
their obligation to realise the highest standard of health. 
Second, if states have identified the health needs of their populations, SNHRBs 
should verify whether they have subsequently evaluated the measures necessary to 
meet those needs in order to improve the realisation of the right to health. It is worth 
noting that states need econometrics and public health expertise to detect what goods 
or services are necessary to meet the health needs of their populations, and what 
                                                
679 African Commission, ‘Principles and Guidelines on the Implementation of ESCR’ (n 
644), para 15. 
680  Edward Anderson and Marta Foresti, ‘Assessing Compliance: The Challenges for 
Economic and Social Rights’ (2009) 1 Journal of Human Rights Practice 469, 471–475. 
 
224 
factors restrict access to the latter.681  If states did not carry out such analysis, 
SNHRBs may find them in violation of their obligation to progressively realise the 
right to health.  
Third, if states have evaluated the measures necessary to meet the health needs of 
their populations, SNHRBs should assess whether they have appraised how much 
such measures would cost. This means states should have determined the health 
goods and services to be purchased, their prices once purchased, and their prices 
once user-fees have been subtracted.682 If states did not undertake such costing 
exercise, SNHRBs may find them in breach of their obligation to progressively 
realise the right to health.  
Fourth, if states have calculated the costs of the measures deemed necessary to meet 
the health needs of their populations, SNHRBs should verify whether they have 
subsequently determined whether such costs were affordable. It requires that states 
follow what Anderson and Foresti call an assessment on ‘rules of thumb’.683 This 
involves measuring whether the direct effects of a measure initially aimed at 
improving the realisation of the right to health, are superior to the indirect effects 
arising from having to raise the necessary revenue. If the positive and direct effects 
are superior, the measure is considered affordable, and the state cannot justify its 
inaction by an unavailability of resources. If states did not carry out this analysis, 
SNHRBs may find them in violation of the obligation to progressively realise the 
right to health. Finally, if states did carry out this analysis, they must prove why such 
measure was unaffordable, shifting the process-orientated aspect of such monitoring 
to a merits-based decision.  
Several shortcomings arise from this monitoring nonetheless. Firstly, it is inexistent. 
Neither the UN nor the European Committees verifies such budgeting process; and 
the African or the Inter-American systems do not seem familiar with it either. 
Secondly, this cost-benefit analysis is based on an economic approach, inadequate 
                                                
681 ibid 471–472. 
682 ibid 472–473. 
683 ibid 471–475. 
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and insufficient to measure the realisation of human rights. Certain health services 
must be guaranteed, regardless of the income they eventually generate (e.g. primary 
healthcare for detainees). The right to health cannot rely on a utilitarian approach 
since it primarily aims at protecting human dignity. Such monitoring, however, does 
not pretend to address the issue of minimum core or healthcare prioritisation 
(discussed later in this chapter), but that of affordability. Thirdly, Anderson and 
Foresti’s approach focuses on the affordability of a specific measure but fails to 
consider the possibility for resources to be spent on other measures, or on other 
considerations than ESCR. It is realistically impossible to evaluate the costs of each 
measure necessary to realise each ESCR in every country. However, it is possible for 
SNHRBs to point at clearly insufficient allocation of resources to social sectors, and 
more precisely, at excessively low healthcare budgets.684 Both the UN and the 
European Committees can express their concern or hold states in violation of the 
right to health for excessively low health expenditures.685 This should not lead to 
comparing the level of resources allocated to healthcare with that allocated to other 
sectors, as implicitly suggested by Robertson.  
Robertson claims that the realisation of human rights takes priority over all other 
considerations and that this should be reflected in resources allocation.686 Such 
argument is nonetheless over-simplistic and impractical for three reasons. First, 
Robertson does not take into account the occurrence of conflict of rights, as realising 
one right might contravene another. For instance, the right to health obliges states to 
promote SRH among teenagers, while the right to freedom of religion may require 
that states protect catholic schools’ right to promote SRH themselves (and possibly, 
abstinence). Second, Robertson fails to acknowledge that (certain) states are unlikely 
to be able to fully realise every human right they are bound to while having resources 
left to run the rest of their duties (e.g. foreign affairs, legislature etc.). For instance, a 
high defence budget might be essential to protect civilians in times of armed conflict 
and may not be the only reason why the state devoted insufficient resources to 
                                                
684 E.g. UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations on Gambia’s Initial Report’ (2015) UN Doc 
E/C12/GMB/CO/1, paras 10 and 27. 
685  E.g. ECSR, ‘Conclusions 2013’, Azerbaijan pp. 5-7; UNCESCR, ‘Concluding 
Observations DRC 2009’ (n 61), para 16. 
686 Robertson (n 658) 700. 
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health.687 Third, Robertson dismisses the need for states to deploy resources in other 
areas that represent a source of taxation financing the realisation of human rights 
(e.g. business start-up grants).  
To conclude, measuring states’ use of resources to realise the right to health is a 
complex exercise but the obligation to progressively realise this right cannot be 
monitored fairly without engaging with it. Furthermore, the (quasi) judicial function 
of SNHRBs transfers upon them the duty to reach decisions that are justified with a 
transparent rationale. The burden of proof, however, lies upon states. SNHRBs can 
thus focus on the procedural aspect of the budgeting process but request expertise 
from states’ representatives, local NGOs, relevant agencies and independent experts, 
if and when reviewing merits. While fairness and transparency are fundamental to 
monitor the right to health through principled consistency, one of the principles of 
interpretation advocated by this thesis, consistency is also of utmost importance. 
5.1.2.2 Using health indicators to monitor progress 
In order to respond to the concerns expressed against progressive realisation and to 
provide a framework in which states’ resources to realise the right to health can be 
evaluated consistently, SNHRBs must use indicators and benchmarks. Such 
argument is well supported in the human rights community, including by Hunt in 
both his academic and (former) UN capacity.688 This thesis, however, will not outline 
which indicators states must perform adequately against to comply with the right to 
health. Whilst certain indicators are clearly essential to the realisation of this right 
(e.g. the proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel),689 listing them all 
                                                
687 E.g. UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations DRC 2009’ (n 254), para 16: ‘The Committee 
is also concerned about the continuous decrease over the past decade of the resources 
allocated to social sectors, notably health and social protection, whereas budgetary 
allocations to defence and public security have increased considerably to reach 30 per cent of 
State expenditures’.  
688 Hunt and McNaughton (n 226) 308: ‘there is no alternative but to use indicators to 
measure and monitor the progressive realization of the right to the highest attainable standard 
of health’; Special Rapporteur of the right to health, 'Annual Report 2003' (n 225); Special 
Rapporteur on the right to health, 'Annual Report 2006' (n 227). 
689 Special Rapporteur on the right to health, 'Annual Report 2006' (n 227), paras 39–47. 
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falls beyond the scope and expertise of my thesis,690 and would freeze the content of 
this right. As argued in Chapter 4, indicators must be designed and updated through 
the guidance of medical and public health experts, in order to reflect the scope of 
interests of the right to health adequately. Therefore, what I recommend is the use of 
thematic indicators by SNHRBs, pointing at areas in which states must demonstrate 
their efforts (e.g. maternal mortality). Health indicators present numerous 
advantages, as highlighted by Welling and when comparing the reporting procedures 
of the European and the UN Committees.691 
Firstly, thematic indicators enable SNHRBs to monitor the obligation to 
progressively realise the right to health more adequately. As demonstrated by 
Chapters 2 and 3, the European Committee follows up relatively well states’ progress 
under Article 11 ESC, thanks to the consistent use of the same indicators in each 
reporting cycle. The UN Committee, however, never uses any indicators and its 
monitoring of Article 12 ICESCR is erratic. The information reviewed by the 
European Committee is more comprehensive, of better quality, and easier to compare 
between different periods of time or between different states. Furthermore, the use of 
indicators facilitates a systematic methodology, which contributes to the creation of 
norms, thus strengthening the legal content of the right to health. These enabled the 
European Committee to develop a precise jurisprudence on Article 11 ESC and to 
clarify its legal content. The absence of thematic health indicators from the 
Concluding Observations of the UN Committee, however, is associated with a dearth 
of jurisprudence and a vague legal content of Article 12 ICESCR.  
Secondly, thematic health indicators reinforce transparency and legal certainty for 
States parties to ESCR treaties, by clarifying what they must report on and what they 
must achieve, to fulfil their obligation to progress. They also reflect more accurately 
states’ efforts to comply, enable them to denounce illegitimate expectations, and can 
help them in improving the realisation of the right to health. Once again, the 
comparison between the UN and the European Committees explicitly points this out. 
                                                
690 Hunt and MacNaughton (n 226), 304–330: this model is sixteen pages long for SRH 
alone. 
691 Welling (n 204) 940–947. 
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Thanks to the indicators used by the European Committee, Article 11 ESC benefits 
from a precise jurisprudence, which states can access to through various documents. 
These include: reporting guidelines,692 a Case law Digest,693 and a factsheet on the 
right to health.694 States are thus aware of the data they must submit and the 
objectives they must meet under this provision. The UN Committee, nevertheless, 
does not offer any precise guidelines on Article 12 ICESCR to States parties.  
Thirdly, the use of health indicators clarify the legal content of the right to health by 
enabling SNHRBs to develop norms or set thresholds, and thus reach findings of 
non-conformity. As a result, they materialise the notion of progressive realisation 
into a violation approach benefiting both NGOs and individuals, as it facilitates the 
recognition of victims and the possibility of redress in parallel complaint procedures. 
This statement is confirmed when comparing the monitoring procedures of the 
European and the UN Committees. From 1969 to 2000, before it had started using 
any health indicators, the European Committee reached only one decision of non-
conformity to Article 11 ESC through its reporting procedure. Since it started using 
health indicators in 2001, the European Committee has held nearly fifty findings of 
violation through this procedure. The UN Committee refuses to explicitly adopt a 
violation approach, but expresses its dissatisfaction when standards deriving from the 
right to health are unmet. By facilitating a more comprehensive monitoring of Article 
12 ICESCR than what is currently left to chance, health indicators would contribute 
to identifying more efficiently victims of situations where standards are ‘unmet’.  
Finally, the use of disaggregated data under certain indicators enables SNHRBs to 
identify victims of a breach of the right to health based on discrimination. The UN 
Committee monitors the realisation of the right to health for numerous vulnerable 
groups, by using data disaggregated on multiple grounds. Nevertheless, it does not 
do so consistently as it does not use any indicators. Furthermore, to date, the 
                                                
692 CoE Committee of Ministers, ‘Form for the Reports to Be Submitted in Pursuance of the 
European Social Charter (revised) (2008)’, pp. 26–27 
<http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/socialcharter/ReportForms/FormIndex_en.asp> 
[accessed 8 September 2015]. 
693 ECSR, ‘Case Law Digest 2008’ (n 353).  
694 ESC Secretariat, 'The right to health and the ESC' (n 323). 
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Conclusions of the European Committee only scrutinise women, children, persons 
living in rural areas, and (more rarely) Roma people’s health. Further disaggregated 
data is thus needed in both systems to identify appropriately potential victims of 
health discrimination, through the use of indicators.  
Despite its benefits, the use of indicators also presents challenges in human rights 
monitoring, as argued by Barsh and Green,695 and as observed in the reporting 
procedure of the European Committee on Article 11 ESC, studied in Chapter 3. 
These issues must be addressed in order to evaluate adequately the obligation to 
progressively realise the right to health. Problems such as unclear definitions, 
unreliable sources of data, or inappropriate aggregation of information, 696  can 
sometimes arise in the monitoring of Article 11 ESC. The reporting guidelines and 
the jurisprudence developed under the indicator ‘access to healthcare’, for instance, 
do not specify what information states must submit in their reports.697 Moreover, 
nothing guarantees that data is accurately collected, or accurately disaggregated 
according to the relevant vulnerable groups existing in each state. Other issues such 
as the risk for indicators to favour quantitative information, or to measure states’ 
compliance more than individuals’ enjoyment of their right to health, were also 
identified. The European Committee, nevertheless, uses both quantitative and 
qualitative data comprehensively in its Conclusions. Furthermore, while this tool 
may emphasise states’ obligations more than individuals’ rights, the inherent purpose 
of the reporting procedure is to assess states’ compliance with Article 11 ESC, not to 
provide remedies. Certain questions remain unanswered nonetheless: are eighteen 
thematic health indicators too few or too many to follow-up the progress of states in 
the field of healthcare? What distinguishes right to health indicators from 
development indicators?698 Finally, when discussing issues arising from monitoring 
ESCR, Anderson and Foresti declare that ‘no real guidance has yet been offered on 
                                                
695  Russel Lawrence Barsh, ‘Measuring Human Rights: Problems of Methodology and 
Purpose’ (1993) 15 Human Rights Quarterly 87; Maria Green, ‘What We Talk About When 
We Talk About Indicators: Current Approaches to Human Rights Measurement’ (2001) 23 
Human Rights Quarterly 1062 
696 Barsh (n 695) 99–103. 
697 CoE Committee of Ministers, 'Form for Reports' submission under the ESC' (n 692), pp. 
26–27.  
698 Green (n 418) 1084–1094. 
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how to judge whether the benchmarks set by governments are sufficiently 
challenging’.699 However, one could add that no real guidance has been provided on 
how to assess whether such targets are too challenging either. 
To conclude, in order to monitor and interpret adequately states’ obligation to 
progressively realise the right to health, SNHRBs ought to evaluate states’ use of 
resources rather than availability, and they ought to use indicators to measure states’ 
progress in healthcare. While it is important to understand the challenges inherent to 
both methods when applied to the right to health, so that SNHRBs can optimise their 
interpretation of the latter, it is equally important to remember what they aim at: for 
SNHRBs to highlight inadequate progress, and thus, to find violations. 
5.1.3 Holding violations of the obligation to progressively realise the right to 
health  
This thesis contends that in order for SNHRBs to optimise their interpretation of 
states’ obligation to progressively realise the right to health, not only must they rely 
on a framework enabling them to clarify and monitor adequately its substance, they 
must also give it a meaning by holding violations when it is unfulfilled. Since states 
are obliged to progressively improve the realisation of the right to health (and to take 
steps immediately), two actions can constitute a violation of this obligation, 
following an adequate monitoring. These include: stagnation or excessively slow 
improvement; and retrogression in the realisation of this right.  
5.1.3.1 Violations based on an insufficient improvement in the realisation of the 
right to health 
While states must progressively realise the right to health, this does not mean that the 
timeframe in which such progress must be performed is indefinite, or that any 
progress can be considered sufficient. GC14 even declares that states must progress 
‘as expeditiously and effectively as possible towards the full realization of article 12 
[ICESCR]’.700 However, few human rights instruments on which SNHRBs may rely 
clarify this assertion. It is a comparative analysis between the monitoring of the UN 
                                                
699 Anderson and Foresti (n 680) 471. 
700 UNCESCR, ‘GC14’ (n 21), para 31. 
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and the European Committees, the focus of this thesis, that point towards frequent 
reprimands for stagnation or excessively slow improvement in the realisation of the 
right to health. 
The UN Committee tends to criticise states for having insufficiently improved the 
realisation of the right to health on three accounts, implicitly pointing at an 
incompatibility with their obligation to progressively realise this right. Firstly, the 
UN Committee regularly declares that the measures taken by the state since the last 
report are inadequate to improve an existing health issue. For instance, it expressed 
concern over insufficient measures to improve the situation of elderly persons in 
nursing homes in Germany701 (which was considered unsatisfactory in previous 
Concluding Observations).702  Secondly, the UN Committee often observes that 
although the state has taken measures since its last review, the health situation 
remains inadequate. In its 2015 Concluding Observations on Paraguay, for example, 
it noted the progress achieved in access to healthcare through the introduction of 
services free of charge, but declared that the quality of healthcare, as well as 
financial and human resources devoted to it, remained insufficient.703 Finally, the UN 
Committee may also (more rarely) express its concern over a general absence of 
improvement regarding a health issue, i.e. stagnation. For instance, it highlighted that 
a high maternal mortality rate persisted in Dominican Republic, due to the overall 
poor standard of maternal care704 (referring implicitly to similar comments made in 
previous Concluding Observations).705  
The European Committee, in contrast with the UN Committee, developed more 
precise legal standards regarding the timeframe in which states should progress 
towards the realisation of the right to health. In its Merits Decisions International 
                                                
701 UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations Germany 2011’ (n 205), para 27. 
702 UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations on Germany’s Fourth Periodic Report’ (2001) UN 
Doc E/C12/1/Add68, para 24. 
703 UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations on Paraguay’s Fourth Periodic Report’ (2015) UN 
Doc E /C12/PRY/CO/4, para 28. 
704 UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations Dominican Republic 2010’ (n 239), para 28. 
705  UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations on Dominican Republic’s Second Periodic 
Report’ (1997) UN Doc E/C12/1/Add16, para 15. 
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Association Autism-Europe IAAE v France,706 and International Movement ATD 
Fourth world v. France, 707  it set two general principles Firstly, the European 
Committee recognises that the realisation of certain rights can be particularly 
complex and expensive. States parties, therefore, must take measures ‘within a 
reasonable time, with measurable progress and to an extent consistent with the 
maximum use of available resources’.708 Secondly, in order to ensure ‘constant’ 
progress towards the objectives set by the Charter, it requires that states change their 
laws, make resources available, and take the measures necessary to give full effect to 
this instrument.709 The European Committee has since applied those two principles to 
Article 11 ESC, in the context of environmental pollution.710 In Marangopoulos v 
Greece and FIDH v Greece, it conceded that overcoming pollution could only be 
achieved gradually. However, it held the state in breach of the right to health in both 
cases, considering Greece had not improved the situation within a reasonable time.711 
In Marangopoulos v Greece, Greece had granted a 40% rise of greenhouse gas 
emission from 2005 to 2010, while the Kyoto Protocol had set a target of 25% rise 
from 1990 to 2010.712 In FIDH v Greece, Greece had left health hazards resulting 
from river pollution unmanaged for 40 years. 713  Furthermore, the European 
Committee has started ruling on the first requests for immediate measures,714 but not 
in the context of emergency medical care so far.  
                                                
706 International Association Autism-Europe v France (ECSR) (n 639) [53]. 
707 International Movement ATD Fourth World v. France (ECSR) (n 640) [61]. 
708 International Association Autism-Europe v. France (ECSR) (n 639) [53]. 
709 International Movement ATD Fourth World v France (ECSR) (n 640) [61]. 
710 International Federation for Human Rights v Greece (ECSR) (n 638) [129 and 133]; 
Marangopoulos Foundation for Human Rights  v Greece (ECSR) (n 372) [204]. 
711 Marangopoulos Foundation for Human Rights v. Greece (ECSR) (n 372) [194–221]; 
International Federation for Human Rights v Greece (ECSR) (n 638) [131–154]. 
712 Marangopoulos Foundation for Human Rights v Greece (ECSR) (n 372) [204–207]. 
713 International Federation for Human Rights v Greece (ECSR) (n 638) [127–130]. 
714  ECSR, ‘Rules of the Committee (as of 9 September 2014)’, rule 36 
<http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/socialcharter/ESCRrules/Rules_rev_en.pdf> 
[accessed 8 September 2015]; ECSR, ‘Activity Report 2013’, p 6 and see Annex 5 
<http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/socialcharter/Presentation/ActivityReport2013_en.pdf
> [accessed 8 September 2015]. 
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The European Committee also reaches findings of violation through its reporting 
procedure, when states fail to improve the realisation of the right to health. The 
rationales used in this concern are similar to what the UN Committee expresses 
concern on. Firstly, the European Committee often finds states in violation of Article 
11 ESC for not having taken sufficient measures to improve compliance with this 
provision since the last review. For instance, it declared that Bulgaria had failed to 
implement adequate measures to improve Roma communities’ access to 
healthcare,715 since a Merits Decision the year before.716 Secondly, the European 
Committee may also (more rarely) reach a decision of non-conformity when a health 
situation is inadequate, regardless of the measures taken by the state. In its recent 
Conclusions on Azerbaijan, for example, it considered that although Azerbaijan had 
implemented measures to improve perinatal care, maternal and infant mortality rates 
were still too high. However, unlike the UN Committee, the European Committee 
justified its decision. It specified that while these rates were decreasing (e.g. 12.1 
infant deaths per 1,000 live births in 2007, against 10.8 in 2011), they remained 
significantly above the European average (i.e. EU-27 rate in 2010 was 4.1 infant 
deaths per 1,000 live births).717  
To conclude, both the UN and the European Committees expect states to sufficiently 
improve the enjoyment of the right to health between each review. Nevertheless, the 
European Committee sets clearer limitations than the UN Committee. Its 
jurisprudence explicitly imposes time limits under the obligation to progressively 
realise the right to health. Moreover, thanks to its thematic health indicators, the 
European Committee identifies more easily insufficient progress, and places the 
burden of proving an improvement in the realisation of the right to health on states. 
When observing an insufficient improvement in the progressive realisation of the 
right to health, SNHRBs should thus find states in breach of their obligation to give 
meaning to the latter, and enhance their interpretation as a result. It is worth noting 
that both Committees sometimes reprimand inadequate performance in healthcare, 
regardless of the progress realised by the state. However, such minimum core 
                                                
715 ECSR, ‘Conclusions 2009’, Bulgaria pp. 160–162. 
716 European Roma Rights Centre European Roma Rights Centre v Bulgaria (ECSR) (n 399). 
717 ECSR, ‘Conclusions 2013’, Azerbaijan pp. 5-7. 
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approach diverges from the obligation to progressively realise the right to health, and 
does not rely on any transparent criteria (as will be discussed in Section 5.2). 
5.1.3.2 Violations based on retrogression in the realisation of the right to health 
Since the obligation to progressively realise the right to health requires that states 
sufficiently improve their health systems, it also prohibits a decrease in their 
performance. This is confirmed by GC14, which declares that ‘there is a strong 
presumption that retrogressive measures taken in relation to the right to health are 
not permissible’ in the context of progressive realisation.718 This subsection will thus 
discuss states’ obligation to not retrogress in the realisation of the right to health; and 
the justifications they can exceptionally raise before SNHRBs to legitimise such 
measures. 
The prohibition to retrogress in the field of healthcare 
Until recently, states’ obligation to progressively realise ESCR was mainly discussed 
through the concepts of indicators and resources rather than retrogression. Legal 
scholars have started exploring this issue in response to austerity measures affecting 
access to social services worldwide,719 but no clear guidelines exist as to how 
SNHRBs should address retrogression. A comparative analysis between the UN and 
the European Committee, however, contributes to delineating what retrogression 
entails, with regard to the realisation of the right to health. 
Whilst the ICESCR is silent on the issue of retrogression, the UN Committee 
explicitly prohibits states from taking retrogressive measures in its General 
Comments. It declares that ‘any deliberately retrogressive measures in that regard 
would require the most careful consideration […]’ in General Comment 3;720 and 
                                                
718 UNCESCR, ‘GC14’ (n 21), para 32. 
719 E.g. Nolan, Lusiani and Courtis, ‘Two steps forward, no steps back? Evolving criteria on 
the prohibition of retrogression in economic, social and cultural rights’, in Nolan (n 678) ; 
Academic Network on the European Social Charter and Social Rights, ‘Brussels’ Document: 
The Future of the Protection of Social Rights’ (2015) 
<http://www.coe.int/T/DGHL/Monitoring/SocialCharter/Doc_Bruxelles_version_EN_FR_D
EF.pdf> [accessed 8 September 2015]. 
720 UNCESCR, ‘General Comment 3’ (n 211), para 9.   
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goes further in GC14 by affirming that such measures are strongly presumed to be 
impermissible.721 Sepúlveda argues that the word ‘deliberate’, used in those two 
General Comments,722 imply that retrogressive measures must be intentional to be 
prohibited.723 This argument, however, is problematic for two reasons. First, only 
retrogressive measures lowering health standards intentionally are prohibited, not 
those creating a decline involuntarily. Therefore, inactions that could be understood 
as decisions not to act or as negligence are allowed. Second, the burden of proving 
states’ intention thus relies on the UN Committee. Considering the nature of the 
obligation to progressively realise the right to health, i.e. improving health systems, 
and the complexity already embodied by the concept of resource availability, such 
limitations are undesirable.  
In its reporting procedure, the UN Committee nonetheless interprets states’ 
obligation to progressively realise the right to health as prohibiting both deliberate 
retrogressive measures as well as declines in health standards. This assertion relies 
on two observations. Firstly, the UN Committee sometimes criticises states that take 
deliberate retrogressive measures under Article 12 ICESCR. In such instances, it 
tends to express concern over cuts in health budgets and legislation curtailing access 
to healthcare. For example, the UN Committee expressed concern over budget cuts 
in healthcare in Iceland, which resulted in the closure of health facilities, the 
reduction of health staff, and a decrease in the quality and availability of health 
services.724 It also expressed dissatisfaction over the repeal by Nicaragua of a 
                                                
721 UNCESCR, ‘GC14’ (n 21), para 32. It is worth noting that the UN Committee recognises 
the negative impact of austerity measures but surprisingly, does not recognise that they 
represent a prima facie breach of the Covenant in: UNCESCR, ‘Open Letter to States Parties 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Context of the Economic and Financial 
Crisis’ (2012) 
<http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cescr/docs/LetterCESCRtoSP16.05.12.pdf> 
[accessed 8 September 2015]; UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations on Portugal’s Fourth 
Periodic Report’ (2014) UN Doc E/C12/PRT/CO/4, para 6. 
722 See also UNCESCR, ‘General Comment 4’ (n 492), para 11: ‘a general decline in living 
and housing conditions, directly attributable to policy and legislative decisions by States 
parties, and in the absence of accompanying compensatory measures, would be inconsistent 
with the obligations under the Covenant’. 
723 Sepúlveda (n 152) 323–324. 
724 UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations on Iceland’s Fourth Periodic Report’ (2012) UN 
Doc E/C12/ISL/CO/4, para 17. 
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legislation authorising therapeutic abortion in certain conditions, as it resulted in the 
death of pregnant women who underwent clandestine abortions.725 In both instances, 
the UN Committee failed to mention the prohibition to take retrogressive measures, 
as provided by GC14. Secondly, the UN Committee often criticises states whose 
performance under Article 12 ICESCR is decreasing, even if no deliberate measure 
is involved. For instance, it expressed concern against the Democratic Republic of 
Congo on the basis that the state had neglected to treat persons with preventable 
diseases during the conflict, leading to millions of deaths.726  
Unlike in the UN, no human rights document explicitly prohibits states from taking 
retrogressive measures in the CoE. However, the European Committee clearly 
recognises such prohibition in its monitoring procedures on Article 11 ESC. Two 
observations are worth making in this regard.  
Firstly, the systematic use of thematic indicators enables the European Committee to 
follow the evolution of health standards consistently, and to often criticise declines in 
states’ performances. In such cases, and comparably to the UN framework, the 
‘deliberate’ aspect of retrogression is irrelevant. For instance, in 2001 the European 
Committee found Portugal in breach of Article 11 on the ground that ‘certain 
indicators reveal[ed] negative developments in the health care system’. In this 
instance, the number of deaths due to AIDS had risen, the number of hospital beds 
had declined, and the proportion of beds in the private sector had increased (but the 
intention of the state was irrelevant).727  
Secondly, the European Committee sometimes holds states in breach of Article 11 
ESC on the basis a deliberate retrogressive measure has been taken, but this is rare. 
Prior to its 2013 Conclusions, most of its comments were limited to request 
information on the impact of health reforms.728 However, due to the recent increase 
                                                
725 UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations on Nicaragua’s Second, Third and Fourth Periodic 
Reports’ (2008) UN Doc E/C12/NIC/CO/4, para 26. 
726 UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations DRC 2009’ (n 254), paras 16 and 34. 
727 ECSR, ‘Conclusions XV-2 (2001)’, Portugal pp. 491–495. 
728 European Roma Rights Centre v Bulgaria (ECSR) (n 399); ECSR, ‘Conclusions 2009’, 
Bulgaria pp. 160–162: up to its 2009 reporting cycle, the European Committee had only held 
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of austerity policies resulting in a restrictive access to healthcare, the European 
Committee has started taking a stronger stand. In its 2013 Conclusions, it held that if 
Spain had not repealed its new legislative amendment by the next reporting cycle, it 
would be found in violation of Article 11 ESC (the amendment reduced access to 
healthcare to emergency services for migrants in irregular situation).729 Its recent 
comments on Latvia are also worth noting. Latvia responded to the economic crisis 
by reforming its health system, substantially reducing the number of hospitals. 
Whilst the majority of the European Committee members asked for further 
information to be provided, two members declared, in a dissenting opinion, that a 
violation should have been found on the basis Latvia had taken ‘measures that 
pose[d] a serious and direct threat to the effective fulfilment of Latvia’s obligations 
under Article 11’.730  
To conclude, the prohibition of retrogression is not explicitly recognised by the CoE, 
and is only recognised in the context of deliberate retrogressive measures in the UN. 
However, both the UN and the European Committees have interpreted states’ 
obligation to progressively realise the right to health as prohibiting: deliberate 
retrogressive measures and declines in states’ performances. Neither Committees 
explicitly prohibit retrogression but both seem to review it as a prima facie breach of 
the right to health. Future developments arising in response to austerity measures 
may clarify such assertion, and encourage such approach being adopted by other 
SNHRBs. 
Justifying retrogression in the field of healthcare 
A prima facie breach of the right to health allows states to bring forward 
justifications for their non-compliance before SNHRBs, and to subsequently decline 
                                                                                                                                     
one violation in this regard (against Bulgaria, whose legislative amendment restricted access 
to health insurance for socially vulnerable persons). 
729 ECSR, ‘Conclusions XX-2 (2013)’, Spain pp. 12–14: this legislative amendment occurred 
in 2012, outside the referencing period (2008-2011). 
730 ECSR, ‘Conclusions XX-2 (2013)’, Latvia pp. 5-7 and 20-21. 
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their responsibility if these are found to be legitimate.731 However, since there is no 
clear jurisprudence prohibiting the retrogression of health standards in human rights 
law, there is even less clarity on the circumstances that may justify it. Several 
comparative elements of the UN and the European Committees’ interpretations, 
nonetheless, are worth mentioning. 
At the international level, the UN Committee recognises that retrogressive measures 
represent a prima facie violation of the ICESCR and, as a result, reviews strictly their 
justifications. For instance, GC14 declares that in order to justify retrogressive 
measures, states must demonstrate that they have carefully considered all other 
alternatives and taken retrogressive measures at last resort, after having used the 
maximum of their available resources on realising all other ESCR.732 It is unrealistic 
to expect states to prove the latter (and the UN Committee, to verify it), as argued in 
subsection 5.1.2.1. However, the UN Committee has clarified its position since, by 
setting criteria that could assist other SNHRBs. 
In a 2007 Statement, the UN Committee listed six criteria which retrogressive 
measures should meet to be deemed justifiable by resources constraints.733 I have 
organised them chronologically for clarity purposes, following the conceptual 
framework developed in Chapter 5. The first criterion requires that the UN 
Committee consider the severity of the breach of the right to health caused by the 
retrogressive measure. Whilst such review is logical, it should not lead to GC14’s 
suggestion according to which if the breach concerns a minimum core obligation, a 
violation will be found regardless of the resources constraints experienced by the 
state.734 As I will argue in section 5.2, this would fail to set reasonable expectations 
upon states. The second, third, and fourth criteria suggest that the UN Committee 
                                                
731 See International Law Commission, ‘Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts' (2001), Annex to General Assembly Resolution 56/83 (Corrected by Document 
A/56/49 (Vol. I)/Corr.4), Chap V on ‘circumstances precluding wrongfulness’. 
732 UNCESCR, ‘GC14’ (n 21), para 32; see also UNCESCR, ‘General Comment 3’ (n 211), 
para 9. 
733  UNCESCR, ‘Statement: An Evaluation of the Obligations to Take Steps to the 
“‘Maximum of Available Resources’” under an Optional Protocol to the Covenant’ (2007) 
UN Doc E/C12/2007/1, para 9. 
734 UNCESCR, ‘GC14’ (n 21), para 48. 
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evaluate the resources available to the state in order to find whether a justification 
based on resources constraints applies. This includes evaluating the country’s level 
of development; its current economic situation; and the existence of other serious 
claims justifying resources constraints (e.g. natural disaster, armed conflict). 
However, as discussed in subsection 5.1.2.1, SNHRBs should evaluate the use of 
resources rather than their availability, to monitor the right to health adequately. The 
affordability of a measure being inextricably related to resource availability, 
economic indicators such as GDP per capita, government debt as percentage of GDP 
etc. are relevant, but insufficient. This is where the fifth and sixth criteria interfere: 
the UN Committee must assess whether the retrogressive measure has been taken at 
last resort. It must verify whether the state has attempted to identify low-cost options 
(fifth criterion). It must also verify whether the state has tried to obtain, or at least 
has accepted, international cooperation and assistance aimed at realising the right to 
health (sixth criterion).735 Such review sets reasonable expectations upon states, 
promotes an effective enjoyment of the right to health, and is applicable to 
supranational monitoring. Nevertheless, it relies on states’ willingness to provide 
accurate data. 
In an Open Letter to States parties to the ICESCR, the UN Committee establishes 
that in times of economic crisis, retrogressive measures are only permissible if they 
respect four cumulative criteria. First, the measure must be temporary; second, it 
must be necessary and proportionate; third, it must be non-discriminatory and thus 
must not affect the most vulnerable; and fourth, it must not impede the core content 
of the right.736 Whilst the latter element is problematic, as argued in section 5.2, these 
guidelines simplify even further the process described in the 2007 Statement, which 
could inspire other SNHRBs.  
At the regional level, the European Committee does not recognise the prohibition of 
retrogression as clearly as the UN Committee. As a result, its interpretation of what 
can justify retrogressive measures is imprecise. To date, the European Committee 
has never explicitly accepted any justification to retrogression under Article 11 ESC, 
                                                
735 UNCESCR, ‘Statement on Maximum Available Resources 2007’ (n 733), para 9.  
736 UNCESCR, 'Open letter on ESCR in Financial Crisis 2012' (n 721).  
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whether in its Conclusions or Merits Decisions. However, two aspects of its 
jurisprudence regarding Articles 11 and 12(3), on the right to health and social 
security, delineate what justifications it may accept to consider.  
Firstly, in its reporting procedure on Article 11 ESC, the European Committee 
expects states to justify why their performance is declining but fails to set criteria in 
that respect. For instance, in its 2009 Conclusions, the European Committee asked 
Andorra to explain the decline of its immunisation coverage rates, and deferred its 
decision until the next reporting cycle.737 In 2013, it took note of the updated 
information (presumably, an increase of the coverage rates) and found the situation 
acceptable.738 Such comments, however, do not set light on what instigated a decline 
in the first place and whether it is excusable. Instead, they highlight the flexibility of 
the European Committee, in allowing states to remedy a decline of health standards 
from one reporting cycle to the next without holding a breach of Article 11.  
Secondly, the European Committee has developed a specific jurisprudence on 
retrogression under Article 12(3) ESC. This provision obliges states to ‘raise 
progressively the system of social security to a higher level’,739 and requires inter 
alia that they progressively improve health insurance and sickness benefits. The 
European Committee has clearly interpreted Article 12(3) as prohibiting 
retrogression in the General Introduction to its 1998 Conclusions.740  However, in 
that same statement, it allows states to make certain alterations to their social security 
systems. It allows retrogressive measures to be justified by the need to ‘consolidate 
public finances in times of economic crisis, in order to ensure the maintenance and 
sustainability of the existing social security system’.741 Such comments, nevertheless, 
are specific to the right to social security, although declines in health insurance and 
in sickness benefits are related to the affordability of healthcare. Furthermore, such 
                                                
737 ECSR, ‘Conclusions 2009’, Andorra p 55. 
738 ECSR, ‘Conclusions 2013’, Andorra pp. 21–22. 
739 ESC 1961 (n 92), Art 12(3); ESC 1996 (n 92), Art 12(3). 
740 ECSR, ‘Conclusions XIV-1 (1998), General Introduction’, p 47 (para 39). 
741 General Federation of employees of the national electric power corporation (GENOP-
DEI) / Confederation of Greek Civil Servants’ Trade Unions (ADEDY) v Greece [2012] 
Complaint No. 66/2011, Decision on the Merits (ECSR) [46 and 47]. 
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comments are too vague to represent adequate guidelines. The criteria set by the UN 
Committee are, therefore, more helpful and could be easily transposed to regional 
frameworks such as the CoE, where no precise interpretation has been developed in 
that regard. 
Limits to what can justify retrogressive measures 
It is worth noting that both Committees agree on the fact that no justification may be 
brought in the event of a retrogression affecting the ‘essence’ of the right to health.  
In GC14, the UN Committee stresses that states cannot justify deliberate 
retrogressive measures affecting the minimum core of this right, since such measures 
automatically violate Article 12 ICESCR.742 This view was reiterated in the 2012 
Open Letter, in which the UN Committee declares that austerity measures should 
guarantee ‘the protection of this core content [of the ICESCR] at all times’;743 and in 
recent Concluding Observations.744 The UN Committee, nonetheless, refuses to 
adopt a violation approach in its reporting procedure, and has not held any decision 
yet on retrogression or on Article 12 through its communications procedure. It is thus 
uncertain which justifications the UN Committee refuses to review. 
Interestingly, the jurisprudence of the European Committee on Article 11 and Article 
12(3) ESC points at a similar approach to GC14, i.e. the impossibility for states to 
justify retrogressive measures affecting minimum levels of healthcare. Two 
observations should be made. 
Firstly, the European Committee recently declared in its reporting procedure on 
Article 11 ESC that ‘the economic crisis cannot serve as a pretext for a restriction or 
denial of access to health care that affects the very substance of the said right’.745 In 
                                                
742 UNCESCR, ‘GC14’ (n 21), para 48. 
743 UNCESCR, 'Open letter on ESCR in Financial Crisis 2012' (n 721).  
744 UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations Portugal 2014’ (n 721), para 6; UNCESCR, 
‘Concluding Observations on Ukraine’s Sixth Periodic Report’ (2014) UN Doc 
E/C12/UKR/CO/6, para 5. 
745 ECSR, ‘Conclusions XX-2 (2013)’, Spain pp. 12–14. 
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this case, Spain had reduced access to healthcare for migrants in irregular situation, 
to emergency care, maternal care, and healthcare for minors. It is too early to tell 
whether this nascent jurisprudence prohibits justifications based on financial 
restraints when the right of everyone to access basic primary healthcare is at stake. 
However, such statement clearly contradicts FIDH v France (2004).746 In this Merits 
Decision, the European Committee found that France was complying with Article 13 
on the right to medical assistance because although its legislative amendment 
restricted irregular migrants’ access to healthcare, it retained emergency care.  
Secondly, in the General Introduction to its 1998 Conclusions, the European 
Committee sets two limitations to the alterations states are allowed to make to their 
social security systems under Article 12(3) ESC.747  It declares that states should not 
progressively restrict their social security to a system of minimum assistance, and 
should not reduce individuals’ protection against social and economic risks.748 Such 
limitations have since become part of the jurisprudence of the European Committee 
on Article 12(3). They have been used to hold states in breach of their obligation to 
improve their social security systems in both the reporting,749 and the complaint 
procedures.750 In the Merits Decision GENOP-DEI and ADEDY v. Greece (2012), 
the European Committee even expressly referred to the concept ‘retrogressive 
measures’ for the first time.751 In this case, the complainant alleged that the new 
legislation introducing special apprenticeship contracts between employers and 
young individuals restricted considerably social security coverage, as it excluded 
sickness allowances and the reimbursement of prescription charges.752 Greece argued 
                                                
746 International Federation of Human Rights Leagues v France (ECSR) (n 600). 
747 ECSR, ‘Conclusions XIV-1 (1998), General Introduction’, p 47 (para 39). 
748 ibid.  
749 E.g. ECSR, ‘Conclusions XVIII-1 (2006)', Netherlands pp. 557–559: the Committee 
found the Netherlands in violation of Article 12 ESC and of its obligation to progressively 
improve the system of social security, on the basis that it had abolished a legislation 
providing for sickness benefits to self-employed persons, resulting in an absence of health 
protection for this group of individuals. The European Committee held that it had restricted 
‘the personal scope of the social security system’. 
750 GENOP-DEI and ADEDY v Greece (ECSR) (n 741) [45]. 
751 ibid [47].  
752 General Federation of employees of the national electric power corporation (GENOP-
DEI) / Confederation of Greek Civil Servants’ Trade Unions (ADEDY) v Greece [2011] 
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that its new legislation was excluding these allowances in order to address the 
structural problems of its social security, public health, and welfare systems. It 
declared that this retrogression was resulting from the reduction of contributions, 
caused by the high level of unemployment and the demographic crisis of the 
country. 753 The European Committee, nonetheless, held that such retrogressive 
measure failed to meet the minima required under Article 12(3): a core framework 
and a protection against serious economic and social risks. It concluded that this 
constituted a ‘deterioration’ of the social security scheme, and found Greece in 
violation of Article 12(3).754 This case highlights that retrogressive measures limiting 
access to healthcare constitute a violation of the ESC when they fail to respect a 
minimum. Two elements in this case are yet worth noting. First, Greece did not 
specifically refer to Article 12(3) in its submissions; it is thus unclear whether its 
comments correspond to a formal justification under this provision.755 Second, if 
such retrogressive measure was prohibited because it infringed the ‘core content’ of 
Article 12(3), why did the European Committee asked for more information 
regarding the necessity of this measure and the results obtained through its 
implementation?756 In light of these elements, it is difficult to assert the recognition 
of a ‘core content’ of the right to health against which no alterations can be 
justifiable (here, the affordability of basic occupational health).  
To conclude, the UN Committee prohibits unconditionally deliberate retrogressive 
measures that breach the core content of the right to health in GC14, but such 
approach is not explicitly reflected by its reporting procedure. The European 
Committee, on the contrary, does not automatically prohibit retrogression when 
minimum levels of healthcare are at stake but rather, reviews such retrogression 
strictly. However, recent developments under Article 11 ESC and limits set under 
                                                                                                                                     
Complaint No. 66/2011, Case document No. 1, Complaint (ECSR) [4]; GENOP-DEI and 
ADEDY v. Greece (ECSR) (n 741) [43]. 
753 General Federation of employees of the national electric power corporation (GENOP-
DEI) / Confederation of Greek Civil Servants’ Trade Unions (ADEDY) v Greece [2011] 
Complaint No. 66/2011, Case document No. 5: Submissions of the Government on the 
merits (ECSR), p 3. 
754 GENOP-DEI and ADEDY v. Greece (ECSR) (n 741) [45 to 49]. 
755 ibid [44]. 
756 ibid [46]. 
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Article 12(3) seem to point at similar approach than GC14. Is it desirable that 
SNHRBs adopt such approach when interpreting what states’ obligation to realise the 
right to health entails? 
 
5.2  Minimum core obligations to realise the right to health and 
reasonableness test 
Whilst states’ obligation to progressively realise the right to health is limited to 
resource availability, the idea that states must realise a ‘minimum core content’ 
regardless of available resources has triggered debates amongst human rights 
lawyers. SNHRBs such as the UN and the European Committees have embraced this 
approach in order to strike a fairer balance between their desire to avoid setting 
unreasonable expectations upon states, and promote an effective enjoyment of the 
right to health. However, the minimum core approach raises legitimate concerns, 
which must be reviewed against the principles of interpretation developed by this 
thesis. Firstly (5.2.1), I assert the recognition of minimum core obligations to realise 
the right to health in both the UN and the CoE. Secondly (5.2.2), I argue that such 
obligations are not and cannot be determined by criteria meeting the principles of 
interpretation set by this thesis. Thirdly (5.2.3), I suggest that SNHRBs interpret and 
monitor the right to health through a test of reasonableness instead, in order to set 
reasonable expectations upon states. I however concede that a core approach may 
(heuristically) facilitate its monitoring in Europe. 
5.2.1 The notion of minimum core  
The concept of minimum core obligations, i.e. obligations to realise the minimum 
levels of a specific right, does not appear in any legally binding human rights 
instrument. It emerged instead in the literature on ESCR in the 1980s.757 However, 
certain SNHRBs have started embracing this notion in their monitoring procedures, 
whether implicitly or explicitly. When examining how the right to health is 
interpreted through their monitoring procedures, a comparative analysis between the 
                                                
757 Chapman and Russell (n 234) 8. 
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UN and the European Committees highlights that both have adopted a minimum core 
approach, but to a different degree and through different means. Whilst the UN 
Committee explicitly attributes a core content to Article 12 ICESCR on paper, it is 
uncertain whether such concept is monitored in practice. The European Committee, 
on the contrary, does not recognise the existence of a core content under Article 11 
ESC, but its monitoring procedures implicitly reflect minimum core obligations. 
The UN Committee mentioned the notion of minimum core obligations for the first 
time in 1990, in its General Comment 3 on the nature of States’ obligations under 
Article 2(1) ICESCR. In this document, it describes them as ensuring ‘at the very 
least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights’ and representing the ‘raison 
d’être’ of the Covenant.758 It also specifies that in the context of health, such minima 
correspond to ‘essential primary health care’.759 Ten years later, in GC14 on the 
right to health, the UN Committee goes further. It declares that minimum core 
obligations are non-derogable and therefore, nothing can justify breaching them.760 It 
also interprets minimum core obligations expansively, through the following non-
exhaustive list:  
- The prevention, treatment and control of epidemic and endemic diseases;  - The provision of essential medicines (as defined by WHO guidelines);  - The provision of basic levels of food, water, shelter, housing, and sanitation; - The implementation of a national health strategy;  - The provision of reproductive, maternal and child healthcare;  - The provision of immunisation programmes against major infectious diseases;  - The organisation of health promotion campaigns on main health problems; and  - The training of health personnel.761   
                                                
758 UNCESCR, ‘General Comment 3’ (n 211), para 10. 
759 ibid. 
760 UNCESCR, ‘GC14’ (n 21), para 47. 
761 ibid, paras 43 and 44. 
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This list, however, can be and has been challenged on various accounts. First, it can 
be criticised for inflating the content of minimum core obligations and, thus, for 
being unachievable for states with very low income.762 Second, it can be criticised 
for neglecting complex theoretical questions and, as a result, for merging moral and 
practical considerations without any rationale.763 Thirdly, and subsequently to the 
latter point, this list can also be criticised for not including crucial aspects of 
healthcare, e.g. essential surgical care.764 Finally, what is the most surprising is that it 
is almost never used in practice. 
In recent guidelines specific to its communications procedure, the UN Committee 
outlined how it intended to monitor minimum core obligations.765  This, however, 
remains to be seen since the Optional Protocol establishing this procedure has 
recently come into force and no decision involving a breach of Article 12 ICESCR 
has been reached yet.766 Furthermore, in its reporting procedure on Article 12 
ICESCR, the UN Committee rarely refers to the notion of minimum core content. 
From 2008 to 2014, the UN Committee only mentioned this term a couple of times, 
and only once under Article 12. In the latter instance, it urged the Netherlands to 
‘meet its core obligations’ by providing undocumented migrants with minimum 
essential levels of healthcare. 767  Nevertheless, when commenting on situations 
incompatible with what GC14 happens to list as ‘core obligations’, the UN 
Committee urges states to act ‘immediately’ or ‘without delay’ in its Concluding 
Observations (as discussed in Chapter 2). Although it does not explicitly recognise 
that such situations represent a ‘breach’ of ‘core obligations’, one could argue that 
the UN Committee interprets the core content of the right to health as requiring 
immediate implementation. This remains uncertain, since Concluding Observations 
                                                
762 Tobin (n 19) 240. 
763 Young (n 139) 152, 155–156.  
764 Paul E Farmer and Jim Y Kim, ‘Surgery and Global Health: A View from Beyond the 
OR’ (2008) 32 World Journal of Surgery 533: the authors characterise surgery as ‘the 
neglected stepchild of global public health’ in low-income countries. See also WHO Global 
Initiative for Emergency and Essential Surgical Care, launched in 2005 to address this issue. 
765 UNCESCR, ‘Statement on Maximum Available Resources 2007’ (n 733), paras 6 and 
10(b). 
766 OP to ICESCR (n 101). 
767 UNCESCR, ‘Concluding Observations Netherlands 2010’ (n 205), para 25(b). 
 
247 
avoid using legal terminology, do not lead to findings of non-conformity, and are 
often worded vaguely.  
In the CoE, minimum core obligations are not as clearly recognised as in the UN, 
although the Commissioner on Human Rights recently referred to their existence in 
the context of austerity.768 However, the European Committee implicitly adopts a 
minimum core approach in its monitoring procedures on the right to health. Such a 
statement is based on three observations. Firstly, the European Committee consents 
to the general idea that states should meet minimum thresholds when realising the 
ESC. This can be established by the use of indicators such as poverty thresholds, 
minimum levels of social assistance, and minimum wages or pensions in its 
Conclusions on Articles 12, 13, 23, and 30 ESC.769 Secondly, and as argued in 
Chapter 3, the European Committee formulates and reviews the obligation to reduce 
maternal and infant mortality rates more strictly than other standards developed 
under Article 11 ESC. In its reporting procedure, it declares that maternal and 
mortality rates are a decisive factor when determining states’ compliance with the 
right to health.770 Moreover, the number of violations found under this standard is by 
far the highest out of the eighteen indicators developed under Article 11 (i.e. 21 
decisions of non-conformity out of a total of 93).771 One could thus presume that the 
obligation to reduce maternal and infant mortality represents a core obligation to 
realise the right to health. Thirdly, the European Committee recently prohibited 
retrogressive measures that affect ‘the very substance’ of the right to health. In this 
case, it identified such ‘substance’ as everyone’s right to access healthcare (beyond 
                                                
768  CoE Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Safeguarding Human Rights in Times of 
Economic Crisis’ (2013) 
<https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&Inst
ranetImage=2664103&SecMode=1&DocId=2215366&Usage=2> [accessed 8 September 
2015]. 
769 ESC 1961 (n 92), Art 12 and 13; ESC 1996 (n 92), Art 12, 13, 23, 30.  
770 First established in ECSR, ‘Conclusions XV-2 (2001)’, Belgium p 94. 
771 Figure based on all Conclusions drafted from 1969 to 2013 inclusive, and based on all 
Merits Decisions up to Complaint 90/2013.  
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emergency services), including irregular migrants.772 This nascent jurisprudence 
clearly embraces the existence of non-derogable minimum levels of health. 
To conclude, the approach developed by the UN and the European Committees 
(whether explicit or implicit) does not justify what should constitute the core content 
of the right to health. What criteria does the UN Committee use to list certain aspects 
of health as core and not others, in GC14? Why does the European Committee 
consider that states’ compliance with standards on maternal and infant mortality is 
decisive, and not compliance with immunisation standards? What is the right balance 
between recognising too many core obligations and too few? Such issues remain 
unclear in human rights law and literature, threatening the requirement of principled 
consistency in SNHRBs’ interpretation. It is thus crucial to explore what criteria 
should determine the core content of the right to health to assist SNHRBs in 
optimising their interpretation in this respect. 
5.2.2 Determining the minimum core content of the right to health 
Whilst it is clear that core obligations to realise the right to health aim at 
guaranteeing minimum levels,773 how can SNHRBs determine what such levels are? 
The issue of basic or minimal human rights has been widely discussed by legal 
philosophers but no principled argument has answered this question, at least in the 
context of healthcare. This thesis will thus examine the adequacy of the two criteria 
most often suggested by the literature, for supranational monitoring purposes. These 
include: (5.2.2.1) survival; as well as (5.2.2.2) low cost and wide-scale measures. 
5.2.2.1 Life-saving healthcare 
Determining minimum core obligations through survival? 
In GC14, the UN Committee does not justify why certain aspects of health ought to 
represent core obligations and not others. It simply declares that the core content of 
the right to health corresponds to minimum levels, ‘including essential primary 
                                                
772 ECSR, ‘Conclusions XX-2 (2013)’, Spain p 14. 
773 UNCESCR, ‘General Comment 3’ (n 211), para 10; UNCESCR, ‘GC14’ (n 21), para 43. 
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health care’.774 Therefore, when deriving a list of core obligations from Article 12 
ICESCR, the UN Committee fails to provide any rationale explaining its selection 
(although GC14 draws inspiration from the Declaration of Alma-Ata on International 
Primary Health Care).775 Instead, it refers to basic primary care (essential drugs, 
maternal and child care, immunisation programmes, care against epidemic or 
endemic diseases); and basic health policies (e.g. training of health personnel, health 
education).776 One could argue that the UN Committee associates the core content of 
the right to health with care that primarily aims at protecting individuals’ survival, 
rather than at improving their wellbeing. However, nothing explains why, for 
instance, emergency services do not appear on this list since they serve a similar 
purpose;777 or why health education, on the contrary, is included. 
The legitimisation of healthcare prioritisation through human survival or through the 
right to life finds more explicit support in the literature, as outlined by Young. 778 
Bilchitz, prominent in this discourse, justifies the progressive realisation/minimum 
core dichotomy by suggesting a distinction between ‘minimal interests’, i.e. survival, 
and ‘maximal interests’, i.e. flourishing.779  
His first threshold corresponds to individuals’ freedom from general threats to 
survival, and represents a starting point without which no human right can be 
effectively enjoyed. Bilchitz argues that states should thus prioritise realising entirely 
those minimum conditions first, which he considers ‘unconditional obligations’. 780 
                                                
774 UNCESCR, ‘GC14’ (n 21), para 43; UNCESCR, ‘General Comment 3’ (n 211), para 10. 
This formulation is peculiar since the WHO already defines primary healthcare as ‘essential’, 
see Declaration of Alma-Ata (n 255), item VI. 
775 Declaration of Alma-Ata (n 255), item VII (3). 
776 UNCESCR, ‘GC14’ (n 21), paras 43 and 44. 
777 Wim Van Damme, Wim Van Lerberghe and Marleen Boelaert, ‘Primary Health Care vs. 
Emergency Medical Assistance: A Conceptual Framework’ (2002) 17 Health Policy and 
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778 Young (n 139) 128–133. See also James L Cavallaro and Emily J Schaffer, ‘Less as 
More: Rethinking Supernational Litigation of Economic and Social Rights in the Americas’ 
(2004) 56 Hastings Law Journal 217, 278–279.  
779 David Bilchitz, Poverty and Fundamental Rights: The Justification and Enforcement of 
Socio-Economic Rights (Oxford University Press 2008) 187–189. 
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The first threshold could potentially justify the existence of a right to minimum 
health conditions without which human life cannot be sustained, when applied to the 
right to health.  His second threshold corresponds to individuals’ right to live in 
adequate conditions in order to ‘flourish’ and achieve their goals, once their survival 
is not threatened anymore. Logically, such threshold can only be met once states 
have achieved the first, i.e. guaranteeing human survival, but since it is not confined 
to such ‘minimum’, it has a broader scope. Bilchitz thus contends that states should 
meet these conditions as much as possible, but not necessarily entirely.781 The second 
threshold could potentially justify the existence of an obligation of progressive 
realisation, when applied to the right to health. 
Bilchitz’ argument embodies well suggestions according to which human survival 
should be used as a criterion to determine the content of minimum core obligations to 
realise ESCR, including the right to health. However, these thresholds can be 
criticised on several accounts, making them inadequate for supranational monitoring 
purposes.  
Challenging the ‘survival’ threshold 
Firstly, King argues with good reason that Bilchitz dismisses the reasonableness test 
too swiftly and thus fails to address the potential consequences of an ‘aggressive’ 
judicial review.782 If courts ordered remedies for every minimum core obligation 
violated, following potential SNHRBs’ recommendations, they would run the risk of 
allocating resources to the well-off who can access justice systems more easily, 
depriving others from similar needs. Additionally, it is unreasonable to expect states 
to provide essential levels of health to everyone without delay. 783 This, however, 
does not prevent courts (and SNHRBs) from holding findings of non-conformity, as 
long as they design remedies accordingly to states’ capability. 
                                                
781 ibid 189–191. 
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Secondly, one can wonder whether states with very low-income can realistically 
realise every core obligation of every ESCR (including the right to health), whenever 
human survival is at stake, as Bilchitz seems to suggest. For instance, what should 
SNHRBs expect from Eritrea, who had a GDP per capita of $544 and spent 3% of its 
GDP on health in 2013; while France had a GDP per capita of $42,560 and spent 
11.7% of its GDP on health that year.784 How tangible is the core substance of an 
obligation that cannot be realised? At the same time, how tangible is the core 
substance of a right that is dictated by resources? 
Thirdly, it is unclear how SNHRBs should understand the notion of survival 
defended by Bilchitz to define core obligations in health. Should it correspond to 
healthcare that directly or indirectly prevents death? How likely must the occurrence 
of death be and in what timeframe? Such distinctions are unclear, even in the realm 
of biological survival.785 I will demonstrate this through the example of water 
contamination due to river pollution.  
Essential medicines can be easily considered as a direct means to physically avoid 
the potentially deadly consequences of water contamination, e.g. antimicrobials 
treating diarrhoea. However, what about information notifying individuals of river 
pollution and of its dangers to human health? Such information may be unhelpful in 
cases where contamination has occurred but it directly prevents its occurrence and, 
thus, the occurrence of a water-related disease and its lethal effects. This, 
nonetheless, quickly becomes a slippery slope: a better monitoring of water quality 
would have also prevented the occurrence of river pollution and thus, human deaths. 
Should the latter be considered as a core obligation to realise the right to health? If 
not, why? Should minimum healthcare only aim at saving human lives that are 
already endangered, not those likely to be threatened? 
Even if the answer was positive, SNHRBs would face other questions unanswered: 
how likely must be the death of an individual who has been contaminated, and after 
                                                
784  World Bank, ‘GDP per Capita (current US$) 2010-2014’ 
<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD> [accessed 8 September 2015]; 
World Bank, ‘Health Expenditure’ (n 174).  
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how long must it occur, for the provision of healthcare to be considered a core 
obligation? The likelihood for an individual to die from water-related diseases such 
as diarrhoea or cancer depends on a multitude of factors requiring medical expertise, 
public health statistics, as well as an insight into the social conditions of the patient. 
It is therefore difficult to evaluate precisely the causal link between the provision of 
healthcare and the prevention of human deaths. This does not mean that every health 
service protects biological survival in similar efficiency and numbers. Immunisation 
programmes can obviously not be compared to ophthalmology consultations. What it 
means is that listing health services that protect human survival at a similarly high 
degree in every country and for everyone, is an extremely difficult task, which does 
not offer any significant benefits against an ad hoc review for SNHRBs. Moreover, 
the timeframe in which death occurs after contamination can greatly affect the length 
and, thus, the cost of treatment. Water contaminated by human or animal faeces often 
causes diarrhoea which, when untreated, can kill within a few days (e.g. cholera); 
whereas water contaminated by chemicals such as arsenic or chlorine can cause 
longer-term deadly diseases (e.g. cancer).786 Should SNHRBs compare long and 
costly life-saving treatments with short and non-expensive care, when determining 
the core content of the right to health? 
Finally, how many lives must be at stake to consider the provision of a specific 
health service, a minimum core obligation? This issue has been widely discussed in 
the context of healthcare rationalisation by medical experts, economists, 
philosophers, and, particularly following the Soobramoney case, (human rights) 
lawyers.787 This thesis does not pretend to answer this question, but rather, to point at 
the lack of potential consensus on this issue, as illustrated by the absence of 
guidelines in the human rights law of the UN and the CoE. It is not desirable that 
SNHRBs specify how many lives must be at stake for states to be obliged to provide 
essential levels of healthcare. This could grant states the right to neglect a certain 
number of human lives when resources are lacking.  
                                                
786 RD Morris, ‘Drinking Water and Cancer’ (1995) 103 Environmental Health Perspectives 
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To conclude, using the criterion of human survival to delineate the existence of a 
minimum core obligation to realise the right to health is an excessively complex and 
controversial exercise. SNHRBs should thus abstain from doing so. Literature, 
however, highlights another criterion, which deserves to be discussed: low-cost and 
wide-scale (life-saving) healthcare.  
5.2.2.2 Low-cost, wide-scale, non-discriminatory (and life-saving) healthcare 
No such thing as free healthcare  
Reflecting mainstream human rights scholarship, Chapman and Russell declare that: 
‘[S]ince the obligation to respect is fundamental and apparently cost-free, 
it is a short step to assign the respect-bound obligations to the category of 
minimum State obligations.’788  
This argument, however, fails to verify whether the obligation to respect is 
effectively cost-free (which this thesis refutes), and to justify its assignment to a 
minimum core content. According to GC14, the obligation to respect prohibits states 
from directly or indirectly impeding equal access to preventive, curative, and 
palliative health.789 It even elevates the principle of non-discrimination to the core 
content of the right to health.790 However, assuming that this obligation is cost-free 
assumes that everyone has similar access to health services in the first place, which is 
obviously inaccurate. Whilst vulnerable groups may be entitled to access healthcare 
on the same basis as the rest of the population de jure, it is not always the case de 
facto. This is outlined by the UN and the European Committees, who have 
repeatedly expressed concern over de facto discrimination in their monitoring 
procedures. Their comments clearly point to the need for states to provide additional 
care to vulnerable communities suffering from de facto health inequalities, in order 
to comply with their obligation to respect everyone’s right to equal access to 
                                                
788 Chapman and Russell (n 234) 11. 
789 UNCESCR, ‘GC14’ (n 21), paras 33 and 34. 
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health.791 Therefore, there is no such thing as a cost-free obligation to respect in 
health.  
Some measures, nevertheless, are certainly less costly than others. For instance, in 
low- and middle-income countries, health promotion campaigns that use mass media 
to encourage better diet and physical activity cost less than US$0.10 per person; 
while screening performed through primary healthcare to detect risks of cardio-
vascular disease among persons over 40 years old, costs between US$3 to US$4.792 
However, the cost of a measure does not necessarily determine the urgency with 
which it must be undertaken. Implementing awareness campaigns on contraception is 
cheaper than providing trained obstetric staff for every childbirth, but the latter is 
evidently subject to a tighter timeframe. While the notion of urgency morally 
demands that priority is given to health services that are particularly lifesaving, how 
can SNHRBs avoid Bilchitz’ shortcomings? I considered that it was inadequate for 
SNHRBs to use the criterion of survival alone to delineate the core content of the 
right to health, as it set unreasonable expectations upon states. However, this 
criterion could be useful if SNHRBs were to associate it with other criteria. 
Following a costs-benefits analysis in the context of resources constraints, lifesaving 
measures should logically have two features. They should be as wide-scale as 
possible, in order to benefit a maximum number of patients;793 and as low-cost as 
possible, in order to take into consideration the state’s capability. 
                                                
791 E.g. Médecins du Monde v France (ECSR) (n 399) [163]: ‘The particular situation of 
migrant Roma requires the Government to take specific measures in order to address their 
particular problems. Treating the migrant Roma in the same manner as the rest of the 
population when they are in a different situation constitutes discrimination’. UNCESCR, 
‘Concluding Observations on Romania’s Third to Fifth Periodic Reports’ (2014) UN Doc 
E/C12/ROU/CO/3-5, para 21:‘The number of community nurses and Roma Health 
Mediators should be increased and all cases of discrimination and segregation of patients 
should be severely punished’. 
792 WHO, ‘Scaling up Action against Non-communicable Diseases: How Much Will It 
Cost?’ (2011), pp. 20–22 and 26–27 
<http://www.who.int/nmh/publications/cost_of_inaction/en/index.html> [accessed 8 
September 2015]. 
793 This also fits the definition of primary care given in Declaration of Alma-Ata (n 255), 
item VII(2): ‘[primary care] addresses the main health problems in the community’. 
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Whose lives do we save? 
The exercise of health prioritisation and budgeting raises other issues in 
supranational monitoring. The following examples are simplified, but illustrate the 
types of discrimination that healthcare rationing inevitably results in, by prioritising 
certain health services or patients over others. Should a state prioritise providing 
penicillin to 1,000 ill children or to 1,000 ill elderly persons, by considering their 
remaining years of life? Should it choose to provide penicillin to 1,000 adults with 
pneumonia or to 1,000 adults with pneumonia and strong diabetes, by considering 
their subsequent quality of life? Should a state prioritise providing penicillin to 1,000 
ill adults or providing maternal healthcare to 100 pregnant women, by considering 
their vulnerability? Who or what should SNHRBs consider as having to be 
prioritised? 
Firstly, rationing by patients involves either favouring persons who will benefit the 
most from the care provided, or giving the same ‘healthcare package’ to everyone.794 
Favouring patients who will benefit the most from the care provided discriminates 
against persons with fewer years of life ahead (e.g. older persons), or persons with a 
lower quality of life following the treatment (e.g. persons with diabetes). However, 
giving the same healthcare package to everyone discriminates against persons with 
chronic diseases and disabilities, in need of more regular care. Since such type of 
rationing corresponds to a direct discrimination, contrary to the cornerstone principle 
of equality in human rights law, it should be considered at last resort, when states 
experience general shortages of resources (e.g. natural disaster, war). 
Secondly, rationing healthcare often implies prioritising the provision of certain 
services over others.795 For instance, states may allocate more funds to emergency 
medicine than to ophthalmology, as the former directly protects everyone’s 
biological survival. Nevertheless, rationing by services can discriminate against 
individuals to the same extent as rationing by patients, when it affects health services 
                                                
794  David Orentlicher, ‘Destructuring Disability: Rationing of Health Care and Unfair 
Discrimination against the Sick’ (1996) 31 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 
49, 52–53. 
795 ibid. 
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explicitly targeting specific groups of individuals. For example, underfunding 
paediatrics, geriatrics, obstetric, or oncology can lead to health discrimination based 
on age, gender, or health status. Discrimination can also occur when rationing health 
services that implicitly target certain groups of individuals. For instance, women use 
family planning centres more often than men since most contraceptives are designed 
for women. Underfunding such services could thus lead to health discrimination 
based on gender. Rationing per services should thus focus on the lifesaving aspect of 
the care provided; and when it involves a direct discrimination, it should be 
considered at last resort, based on a general shortage of resources.  
Finally, healthcare prioritisation and rationing is an incredibly complex exercise, 
which human rights law cannot and should not address alone.796 Expertise in 
medicine, ethics, public health, and health economics is crucial. SNHRBs, however, 
can contribute to interpreting and monitoring such process in three ways. First, they 
can verify that rationing measures are taken at last resort, following requirements set 
by the principle of non-retrogression (see subsection 5.1.3.2). Second, SNHRBs can 
verify that rationing measures are as non-discriminatory as possible. Third, they can 
verify that the decision-making process in healthcare prioritisation is principled, 
evidence-based, consultative, transparent, and evaluative, as suggested by Tobin;797 
and that it produces measures guaranteeing an effective enjoyment of the right to 
health, reasonable expectations upon states, context-sensitivity, and principled 
consistency. As suggested by this thesis, this would entail for SNHRBs giving 
priority to measures that are the most lifesaving, low-cost and wide-scale, and the 
least discriminatory (which I will call ‘core measures’ for matters of clarity). 
However, no list of what such measures might represent can be drawn up. Therefore, 
their review can only be ad hoc and cannot operate through a non-derogable 
approach. 
                                                
796 Tobin (n 19) 71–73: the author highlights the concerns raised by Griffin, O’Neill and 
Daniels through his analysis of the macro/micro resource allocation dilemma. The literature 
on healthcare prioritisation is rich, e.g. Keith Syrett, Law, Legitimacy and the Rationing of 
Health Care: A Contextual and Comparative Perspective (Cambridge University Press 
2007); Norman Daniels and James E Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly: Learning to Share 
Resources for Health (Oxford University Press 2008). 
797 Tobin (n 19) 71–73. 
 
257 
To conclude, the criteria on which SNHRBs could potentially rely to determine what 
constitute the core content of the right to health, cannot generate a list of measures 
that states would have to implement, regardless of any constraints they may face. 
Therefore, it is desirable that SNHRBs interpret what this thesis calls ‘core 
measures’ (measures that are life-saving, low cost, wide-scale, and non-
discriminatory), through a reasonableness test instead. 
5.2.3 The reasonableness test 
Determining a universal minimum core content of the right to health presents 
insurmountable dilemmas, especially when setting non-derogable obligations. I thus 
suggest SNHRBs interpret and monitor ‘core measures’ through a reasonableness 
test, enabling a fairer process while guaranteeing strict scrutiny (5.2.3.1). However, 
this thesis concedes that minimum core obligations can represent a heuristic tool for 
SNHRBs monitoring states with high levels of income and with more or less akin 
features, such as European states (5.2.3.2). 
5.2.3.1 Reasonableness over minimum core 
If a measure was lifesaving, low-cost, wide-scale, and non-discriminatory, one could 
argue that states would be at a loss for valid reasons explaining why they did not 
implement it; and therefore, they should not be able to derogate from it. However, 
two issues arise in the light of supranational monitoring. Firstly, and as outlined in 
subsection 5.2.2, those four criteria are rarely gathered all at once. Translating them 
into a list of non-derogable measures common to all states is unrealistic. Secondly, 
what if states experience a general shortage of resources due to a force majeure 
event, i.e. natural disaster or war? While external, unpredictable, and ‘irresistible’ 
circumstances do not automatically justify inaction, it would be unfair and 
detrimental to the credibility of the right to health to dismiss them when reviewing 
states’ compliance.798 Therefore, SNHRBs must follow a case-by-case analysis and 
allow derogations, even if reviewed strictly, when deciding whether states should 
implement such measures. As outlined by Quinot and Liebenberg, reviewing social 
rights through a test of reasonableness promotes transparency, justification, fairness, 
                                                
798 See criticism of absolutist approach in Quinot and Liebenberg (n 32).   
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and contributes to delineating their content.799 Those advantages suitably embody the 
purpose of this thesis, i.e. clarifying the right to health through supranational 
monitoring, and the principles set in its introduction. Four observations however 
should be made. 
First, if SNHRBs review failures to implement lifesaving, low-cost, wide-scale, and 
non-discriminatory measures through the reasonableness test, they are likely to reach 
similar decisions than if they had reviewed them through the non-derogable core 
approach. Realistically, states are unlikely to be found complying with the right to 
health if they fail to implement ‘core measures’, as very few arguments may justify it 
in practice. However, the reasonableness test respects a fairer procedure, as it 
considers the occurrence of force majeure events causing general shortages of 
resources. It thus avoids setting non-derogable obligations that are impossible to 
fulfil.  
Second, the reasonableness test enables SNHRBs to understand ‘minimum core 
obligations’ through the conceptual framework of progressive realisation, thus 
enabling them to set more realistic expectations in terms of time and resources. 
Vaccines against major serious diseases affecting the community, for instance, are 
clearly lifesaving, low-cost, wide-scale and non-discriminatory. However, it would 
be unrealistic for SNHRBs to expect the poorest states to immediately provide such 
vaccines regardless of other imperative needs, whether in healthcare (e.g. providing 
basic maternal care) or in other sectors (e.g. civilians’ protection in the midst of 
conflict). Whilst states must prioritise such measures through resources (rationing 
process) and through time (expeditious process),800 they cannot implement them 
overnight. Understanding ‘core measures’ through the prism of progressive 
realisation enable SNHRBs to set achievable standards for all states, not simply those 
with a higher income.801 However, this means that once low-income countries have 
                                                
799 ibid 641. 
800 UNCESCR, ‘General Comment 3’ (n 211), para 10 mentions the notion of priority in 
relation with minimum core obligations ‘it [a state] must demonstrate that every effort has 
been made to use all resources that are at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of 
priority, those minimum obligations’. 
801 Craven (n 152) 143–144.  
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funded such measures, they may have very little left to fund specialised and 
expensive treatments. 802  This approach accepts the distinction between 
‘infringements’ of the right to health (when it has not been fulfilled for legitimate 
reasons); and ‘violations’ (when it has not been fulfilled for illegitimate reasons).803 
Third, applying a reasonableness test to ‘core measures’ in supranational monitoring 
enables the prioritisation process to be principled (e.g. giving priority to lifesaving, 
low-cost, wide-scale, and non-discriminatory healthcare). Such an outcome is well 
supported by the literature, which suggests that healthcare prioritisation must follow 
a fair decision-making process. In their ‘accountability for reasonableness’ 
framework, for instance, Daniels and Sabin contend that such process should be 
based on justifiable reasons; that grounds for decisions should be made public; that 
decisions should be revisable in light of new evidence and arguments; and that 
respect of procedures should be guaranteed. 804  This also enables SNHRBs’ 
interpretation to reach the requirement of principled consistency and to clarify the 
legal content of the right to health. Neverteheless, as Quinot and Liebenberg reminds 
us when discussing the South African model, it is important to avoid falling in an 
excessively procedural and thus, meaningless administrative process when human 
rights are at stake.805 A right balance should be struck by SNHRBs, since excessively 
substantive models can also fail to set realistic and principled obligations (e.g. 
GC14). In the event where ‘core measures’ are not implemented, SNHRBs should 
thus verify that the prioritisation process is adequately principled and aims at 
guaranteeing an effective enjoyment of the right to health.  
Fourth and finally, SNHRBs should apply the reasonableness test with stricter 
scrutiny when ‘core measures’ are at stake, since their lifesaving, low-cost, wide-
scale, and non-discriminatory aspects require for them to be prioritised. This thesis 
                                                
802 A comparison can be drawn with the Soobramoney case (n 787). 
803 A.M. Viens, ‘Interdependence, Human Rights and Global Health’ Health Care Analysis 
(2015, forthcoming). However, this distinction is initially made by Judith Jarvis Thomson, 
The Realm of Rights (Harvard University Press 1990); and by Joel Feinberg, ‘Voluntary 
Euthanasia and the Inalienable Right to Life’ (1978) 7 Philosophy & Public Affairs 93. 
804 Daniels and Sabin (n 796), Chapter 4. 
805 Quinot and Liebenberg (n 32): see the shift of the South African jurisprudence towards a 
more substantive conception of review, following criticisms against its procedural focus. 
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thus suggests SNHRBs adopt a prima facie approach, according to which states 
ought to prove that they have implemented such measures and if they have failed to 
do so, can bring very few excuses to justify their non-compliance. Whilst such 
approach is endorsed by the European Committee, it is still absent from the 
monitoring procedures of the UN Committee. However, obligations to realise Article 
12 ICESCR cannot be materialised and victims, identified, without a violation 
approach.806  
It is worth noting that these comments are specific to the concept of minimum core 
as developed by GC14: a non-derogable aspect of the right to health.807 In later 
General Comments, the UN Committee avoided endorsing such approach,808 perhaps 
due to criticisms following GC14. However, it declares in these documents that such 
obligations are immediate, which is also problematic. As argued above, ‘core 
measures’ must be prioritised in time, but they cannot be implemented overnight. As 
a result, it is not desirable that SNHRBs interpret the nature of states’ obligation as 
being non-derogable or immediate when reviewing ‘core measures’. Instead, they 
should review such measures through the prism of progressive realisation and 
healthcare prioritisation, by applying a test of reasonableness. 
5.2.3.2 Minimum core obligations: a heuristic tool in Europe? 
As discussed, SNHRBs would interpret and monitor states’ obligations to provide 
‘core measures’ in health more adequately by applying a reasonable approach than a 
non-derogable core approach. However, the latter may represent a useful tool in 
practice, which this thesis acknowledges through the European model.  
The interpretation of the European Committee regarding Article 11 ESC implicitly 
highlights the adoption of a non-derogable core approach, as discussed in Chapter 3. 
Such an approach seems to rely on the presumption that European states all have 
                                                
806 Leckie (n 212) 95–96. 
807 UNCESCR, ‘GC14’ (n 21), para 47: ‘It should be stressed, however, that a State party 
cannot, under any circumstances whatsoever, justify its non-compliance with the core 
obligations set out in paragraph 43 above, which are non-derogable.’ 
808 Except in UNCESCR, ‘General Comment 15’ (n 492). 
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access to a certain degree of resources enabling the fulfilment of minimum standards 
in health systems. In subsection 5.2.1, I criticised the European Committee for using 
opaque or incoherent criteria to determine the core content of the right to health. 
However, non-derogable standards have also enabled it to sharpen its jurisprudence 
and thus, to clarify the legal content of the right to health to a certain extent. The 
European Committee systematically finds states in violation of Article 11 ESC when 
their performance in healthcare falls far behind the European average; or when these 
report significantly poor maternal and infant mortality,809 or health discrimination.810 
By having to justify such findings of non-conformity, the European Committee has 
thus delineated ‘thresholds’ or standards under which states are not allowed to 
perform, clarifying subsequently the legal content of the right to health. For instance, 
it recently prohibited retrogressive measures that affected ‘the very substance’ of the 
right to health, understood as everyone’s right to access healthcare beyond 
emergency services, including irregular migrants.811 
Nevertheless, three observations should be made. Firstly, the non-derogable core 
approach raises issues of principled consistency in SNHRBs’ interpretation, 
including in Europe. It remains heavily criticised in the literature, has no textual 
support in the CoE, and receives mitigated endorsement from the UN Committee 
(whether in recent General Comments or in Concluding Observations). Furthermore, 
the European Committee has not yet explicitly recognised the adoption of a non-
derogable core approach under Article 11 ESC and even less so, justified it. As a 
result, its application in Europe lacks transparency and presents no clear rationales. 
Secondly, the reason why the European Committee has been able to develop a 
precise interpretation of Article 11 ESC primarily lies in the use of indicators, not the 
                                                
809 See the standard ‘States must undertake measures to bring maternal and infant deaths 
down to zero risk, especially countries with highly developed healthcare systems’ (and its 
implicit recognition as being non-derogable), first established in ECSR, ‘Conclusions XV-2 
(2001)’, Belgium p 94; and in ECSR, ‘Conclusions 2003’, France p 147. 
810 See the standard ‘Healthcare systems must be accessible to everyone, and potential 
restrictions on the application of Article 11 must not impede access to healthcare for 
disadvantaged groups’, first established in ECSR, ‘Conclusions XV-2 (2001)’, Cyprus p 25; 
in ECSR, ‘Conclusions XVII-2 (2005)’, Statement of interpretation on Article 11, para 5; 
and in ECSR, ‘Conclusions 2005’, Statement of interpretation on Article 11, para 5. See also 
ESC 1996 (n 92), Art E (non-discrimination clause). 
811 ECSR, ‘Conclusions XX-2 (2013)’, Spain p 14. 
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use of European averages, or the strict wording and review of maternal mortality 
standards. The ability of thematic health indicators to clarify the legal content of the 
right to health and the need for SNHRBs to use them in order to optimise their 
interpretation, have been highlighted multiple times in this thesis, based on the 
positive example set by the European Committee. Thirdly, a non-derogable core 
approach may be helpful for SNHRBs monitoring states with high income and 
relatively harmonious features, as is the case in Europe, but this may not be 
successful in other regions. What non-derogable minimum standards should be set 
for states with very low-incomes such as the sub-Saharan Africa region, where 550 
women die for every 100,000 live births?812 What non-derogable minimum standards 
should be set for continents displaying great disparity such as Africa, where 46 
women die for every 100,000 live births in Tunisia, while 1,100 die in Sierra 
Leone?813 States’ failures to provide basic healthcare should thus be reviewed 
primarily through a reasonableness test, although applied with strict scrutiny.  
To conclude, SNHRBs ought to review ‘core measures’ through a reasonableness 
test in order to ensure a fairer process; and while the non-derogable approach may 
present (heuristic) benefits in Europe, it is not sufficiently decisive to be encouraged. 
 
Conclusion 
In this Chapter, I clarified how the nature of states’ obligations to realise the right to 
health should be interpreted in supranational monitoring, by focusing on the 
timeframe in which states must implement this right. This key and complex question 
remained unanswered in Part I. For this purpose, I used the relevant doctrine and 
analysed comparatively the UN and the European Committee’s interpretations, in 
order to develop a theoretical framework based on the principles of interpretation this 
thesis advocates, and to enable SNHRBs to optimise their interpretation. In Section 
5.1, I explored how the obligation to progressively realise the right to health should 
be interpreted in supranational monitoring. Firstly, I demonstrated that this obligation 
                                                
812 WHO, ‘Trends in Maternal Mortality: 1990 to 2013’ (n 476), p 25. 
813 ibid, pp. 31–35. 
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should be and had been interpreted by SNHRBs such as the UN or the European 
Committees, as requiring that states improved their performance in healthcare, 
depending on their available resources. Secondly, I argued that SNHRBs should 
monitor this obligation by evaluating adequately states’ use of resources, and using 
health indicators. Thirdly, I asserted that to give substance to the obligation to 
progressively realise the right to health, SNHRBs had to hold violations when states 
insufficiently improved the standards of their health systems, or when the latter 
retrogressed. Section 5.2 then analysed how SNHRBs should approach the notion of 
minimum core obligations to realise the right to health. First, I demonstrated that this 
concept was explicitly recognised in the UN but not in the CoE, and implicitly 
endorsed by SNHRBs such as the UN and the European Committee. Second, I 
however challenged the possibility for SNHRBs to delineate the legal content of non-
derogable core obligations. For this purpose, I challenged the possibility for potential 
criteria such as lifesaving, wide-scale, low-cost and non-discriminatory measures, to 
generate a clear list of measures constituting the core content of the right to health. 
Third, I thus concluded that SNHRBs ought to review the implementation of such 
measures through a test of reasonableness instead, to ensure their interpretation meet 
the requirements of principled consistency and fairness. Finally, whilst I 
acknowledged that a non-derogable approach might represent a heuristic tool in 
Europe, I found its benefits insufficiently convincing. 
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Chapter 6 Concluding remarks: key challenges to conceptual 
clarity across SNHRBs 
Introduction 
As demonstrated by Chapters 4 and 5, the normative scope of the right to health and 
states’ obligations to realise it can be clarified in a manner enabling SNHRBs to 
interpret adequately the legal content of this right. This involves following the 
principles of interpretation developed in this thesis, i.e. SNHRBs should promote an 
effective enjoyment of the right to health; set reasonable expectations upon states; 
offer context sensitivity through its implementation; and overall, guarantee 
principled consistency. However, various elements challenge the conceptual clarity 
of the legal content of the right to health, as delineated by my theoretical framework 
(i.e. through supranational monitoring), which can in turn affect its implementation. 
How can SNHRBs coherently and, thus, effectively interpret a universal right subject 
to different human rights regimes, and different quasi-judicial monitoring avenues? 
To what extent can SNHRBs align theory with practice if they cannot bring the legal 
content of the right to health to life through enforcement procedures? 
It is fundamental that such questions be clarified, or at least that the challenges they 
represent be acknowledged, in order to optimise SNHRBs’ interpretation of the right 
to health and ensure principled consistency at each level of protection. Such 
consistency is essential for two reasons, both related to an adequate implementation 
of the right to health. First, by constructing their interpretation in a principled 
manner, SNHRBs justify their decisions through states’ consent and through moral 
considerations of equality and dignity, cornerstones of human rights law. Second, by 
constructing their interpretation consistently, SNHRBs ensure a reasonable degree of 
legal certainty, pillar of the rule of law. Therefore, Chapter 6 will explore how the 
conceptual framework developed in Chapters 4 and 5 can operate coherently across 
all levels of supranational monitoring. It will examine how the international and 
regional interpretations of the right to health should interact with each other to 
promote an adequate and effective realisation of this right.  
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Numerous legal philosophers have discussed the role of coherence in legal 
reasoning,814 its desirability,815 and its limits.816 While it is not the purpose of this 
thesis to discuss such vast issues, the increasing number of instruments, 
jurisprudences, procedures, and political contexts through which the right to health is 
interpreted, incontestably challenge the ability of international human rights law and 
particularly, SNHRBs, to promote coherently an effective enjoyment of this right 
worldwide. Various legal scholars have written about the substance and the 
monitoring of the right to health in international systems,817 or (fewer) in regional 
systems.818 However, little to no research discusses the coexistence of such aspects 
across both frameworks, and the role of SNHRBs in this respect.819 Tobin, however, 
developed a comprehensive definition of what he calls the ‘principle of coherence’, 
supposed to ensure consistency when interpreting the right to health.820 Nevertheless, 
his in abstracto analysis does not shed light on the issues identified as being 
particularly problematic through the empirical research conducted in Chapters 2 and 
3, or through the comparison carried out in Chapters 4 and 5. 
Chapter 6 will thus discuss the key challenges that enhancing the conceptual clarity 
of the right to health across different levels of supranational monitoring represent, to 
assess whether and how SNHRBs can optimise their interpretations as a result. In 
Section 6.1, I will argue that in response to the fragmentation of human rights law, 
SNHRBs should harmonise the normative scope of the right to health in order to 
                                                
814 E.g. Dworkin 1986 (n 27). 
815 E.g. Barbara Baum Levenbook, ‘The Role of Coherence in Legal Reasoning’ (1984) 3 
Law and Philosophy 355. 
816 E.g. Joseph Raz, ‘The Relevance of Coherence’ (1992) 72 Boston University Law 
Review 273. 
817 E.g. Toebes 1999a (n 1). 
818 E.g. Roscam Abbing (n 320). 
819 The few existing publications focus on CPR: Monica Pinto, ‘Fragmentation or Unification 
among International Institutions: Human Rights Tribunals’ (1998) 31 New York University 
Journal of International Law and Politics 833; Vassilis P Tzevelekos, ‘The Use of Article 
31(3)(C) of the VCLT in the Case Law of the ECtHR: An Effective Anti-Fragmentation 
Tool or a Selective Loophole for the Reinforcement of Human Rights Teleology - Between 
Evolution and Systemic Integration’ (2009) 31 Michigan Journal of International Law 621; 
Marjan Ajevski (ed), Fragmentation in International Human Rights Law: Beyond Conflict of 
Laws (Routledge 2015). 
820 Tobin (n 19) 100–110. 
 
266 
guarantee they all interpret and thus monitor an effective enjoyment of this right. I 
will examine how international law can encourage SNHRBs to interpret 
comprehensively what adequate health systems entail, and to reconcile conflicts of 
norms affecting the protection of non-nationals’ right to health. This section will thus 
assess whether the conceptual framework developed in Chapter 4 can operate 
coherently across all SNHRBs. In Section 6.2, I will contend that in the light of 
diverse quasi-judicial avenues through which the right to health is monitored, 
SNHRBs should maintain some flexibility to set realistic expectations upon states 
under review. I will therefore discuss the importance for SNHRBs to balance the 
individual and collective dimensions of the right to health according to the 
monitoring procedure at stake; and to adapt their compliance approach to the level of 
monitoring they represent. This section will thus assess whether the conceptual 
framework developed in Chapter 5 can operate coherently across all SNHRBs. 
Finally, in Section 6.3, I will highlight SNHRBs’ limited ability to bring their own 
interpretation to life through enforcement procedures, and to coherently align theory 
with practice as a result.  
 
6.1 Fragmentation of human rights law and harmonising the normative scope 
of the right to health  
As discussed in Chapter 4, SNHRBs should understand the right to health as a right 
for everyone to access an adequate health system that is responsive to the needs of 
the population and to the culture in which it is to be implemented. However, the 
increasing number of international and regional treaties recognising a right to health 
increases the likelihood for different interpretations to be developed, threatening the 
coherence of its substance (and subsequently, of its implementation). In the light of 
such fragmentation of human rights law,821 it is fundamental that SNHRBs promote 
an effective enjoyment of the right to health across all systems of human rights 
protection. Furthermore, harmonising the normative scope of the right to health 
                                                
821 Formulation first used by the Study Group of the International Law Commission chaired 
by Martti Koskenniemi. The fragmentation of human rights law and its impact on ESCR has 
generated little research; as mentioned in footnote 819, the few existing publications focus 
on CPR.. 
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across SNHRBs guarantees principled consistency for states members of both 
international and regional frameworks, and for right-holders living in such states. 
Subsection 6.1.1 will thus highlight the compatibility of supranational interpretations 
of the highest standard of health attainable; but will suggest that SNHRBs use the 
principle of external system coherence to ensure a comprehensive scope of interests. 
Subsection 6.1.2 will then study the conflict of norms arising between supranational 
human rights instruments regarding the recognition of non-nationals’ right to health; 
and will offer a framework enabling SNHRBs to reconcile such scope of protection. 
6.1.1 Towards a common interpretation of the highest standard of health 
attainable: the right to an adequate health system 
Subsection 6.1.1 aims at examining whether the meaning given to the ‘highest 
standard of health attainable’ at the international and regional levels of human rights 
protection, is compatible. Firstly (6.1.1.1), I will highlight similarities between the 
international and regional systems, whether in right to health provisions or their 
interpretation by relevant SNHRBs. Secondly (6.1.1.2), I will suggest that SNHRBs 
use the principle of external system coherence to fill the potential or existing gaps in 
their jurisprudences, in order to ensure a more comprehensive interpretation. 
6.1.1.1 Similarities between international and regional frameworks 
Definition  
The scope of interests of the right to health is defined in similar terms in both 
international and regional human rights instruments, as briefly mentioned in 
subsection 4.1.1.2. These instruments all require that states achieve the ‘highest 
standard of health attainable’ and, more specifically, provide adequate health 
systems through appropriate medical assistance. At the international level, Article 12 
ICESCR requests that states achieve ‘the highest attainable standard of physical and 
mental health’ and provide medical assistance in the event of diseases or sickness.822 
It is worth noting that 164 states are bound to this provision.823 At the regional level, 
                                                
822 ICESCR (n 4), Art 12. 
823 UN Treaty Collection, ‘Status of OP to ICESCR’ (n 101).  
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similar requirements can be found in the European, African and Inter-American 
systems of human rights protection. Articles 11 and 13 ESC urge states to remove 
‘as far as possible’ the causes of ill-health and to guarantee the right to adequate 
medical assistance.824 The African Charter refers to a right to enjoy ‘the best 
attainable state of physical and mental health’ and to benefit from medical attention, 
in its concise Article 16.825 Finally, Article 10 of the Protocol of San Salvador 
recognises the right to ‘the highest level of physical, mental and social well-being’, 
and the right to measures ensuring appropriate healthcare.826 It is also worth noting 
that 43 states are parties to the ESC,827 53 to the African Charter,828 and 16 to the 
Protocol of San Salvador.829 Such numbers highlight a strong consensus amongst 
states regarding the scope of interests of the right to health. Finally, it is worth noting 
that similar requirements can be found in human rights instruments of the League of 
Arab States and ASEAN. Article 39 of the Arab Charter, ratified by 14 states,830 
embraces a right to ‘the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health’ 
and to access medical services and facilities.831 As for Article 29(1) of the ASEAN 
Human Rights Declaration, it recognises that everyone has a right to ‘the highest 
attainable standard of physical, mental and reproductive health’, as well as to access 
affordable healthcare and facilities.832 However, these instruments do not have the 
same importance as those present in the European, African and American systems. 
The Arab Charter has been criticised for deviating from international human rights 
                                                
824 ESC 1961 (n 92), Art 11 and 13; ESC 1996 (n 92), Art 11 and 13.  
825 African Charter (n 92), Art 16. 
826 Protocol of San Salvador (n 92), Art 10.  
827 CoE, ‘Table of Accepted Provisions of the ESC’ (n 337). 
828  African Commission, ‘Ratification Table: African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights’ (n 99). 
829  OAS, ‘Signatories and Ratifications of the Protocol of San Salvador’ 
<http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/a-52.html> [accessed 8 September 2015]. 
830 Mattar (n 97) 94. No further information can be found on the website of the League of 
Arab States. 
831 Arab Charter (n 92), Art 39.  
832 ASEAN, ‘Human Rights Declaration’ (2012) <http://aichr.org/documents/> [accessed 8 
September 2015]. 
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standards;833 and its Human Rights Committee, for its lack of transparency.834 As for 
the ASEAN Declaration, it has been criticised for not being legally binding; and its 
Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights, for being a window-dressing 
institution lacking independence.835 Moreover, neither ASEAN nor the League of 
Arab States benefit from human rights monitoring procedures at present, as showed 
in subsection 1.1.3.2. As a result, this chapter will not examine these systems. 
Interpretation 
International and regional human rights instruments define the scope of interests of 
the right to health in similar terms. However, the compatibility of their 
interpretations remains to be determined for most frameworks, as few SNHRBs 
monitor this right at the regional level. Only the European and the African systems 
have had the opportunity to develop a regional jurisprudence on the right to health. 
Therefore, it is fundamental to examine whether their interpretations of what 
constitutes an adequate health system are compatible with international standards.  
As demonstrated in Chapter 4, both the UN and the European Committees 
understand the right to health as entitling individuals to adequate health systems, 
which standards must be as high as possible, depending on states’ resources. Few 
differences can be noted and when these arise, they correspond to areas monitored by 
one Committee and not the other, rather than a conflict between both interpretations. 
For instance, the UN Committee clearly considers that mental health as well as SRH 
are essential to adequate health systems, since it regularly and comprehensively 
assesses them in its Concluding Observations on Article 12 ICESCR. Such a review 
does not appear in the Conclusions of the European Committee on Article 11 ESC. 
                                                
833  UN Press Release, ‘Statement by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on the 
Entry into Force of the Arab Charter on Human Rights’ (2008) 
<http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/view01/6C211162E43235FAC12573E00056E
19D?opendocument> [accessed 8 September 2015]: the Commissioner raised concerns 
regarding death penalty for children, women’s and non-citizens’ rights, and the equation of 
Zionism with racism. 
834 Rishmawi (n 97). 
835 Briefly summarised by John D Ciorciari, ‘Institutionalizing Human Rights in Southeast 
Asia’ (2012) 34 Human Rights Quarterly 695. 
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Nevertheless, this does not suggest the European Committee considers mental health 
and SRH should not belong to the normative content of the right to health. On the 
contrary, it has recently recognised children’s right to SRH education in its 
complaint procedure; as well as women’s right to access abortion services that have 
been legalised.836 Furthermore, the European Committee sometimes cites Article 12 
ICESCR and GC14 as ‘relevant law’ in Merits Decisions involving Article 11 ESC, 
pointing towards compatibility.837 Since SRH is only partially monitored and mental 
health remains largely unmonitored, this cross-fertilisation process might encourage 
the European Committee to recognise more explicitly their importance in health 
systems and subsequently, states’ duty to guarantee them under Article 11 ESC. 
Examining thoroughly how the African Commission delineates the legal content of 
the right to health in its reporting and complaint procedures falls outside the scope of 
this chapter. This thesis focuses on the European system for a valid reason: it is the 
only regional framework that offers a rich jurisprudence on the right to health. 
However, the interpretation of what constitutes an adequate health system under 
Article 16 of the African Charter, suggests a compatibility with the UN framework 
on two accounts. Firstly, the format of the Concluding Observations of the African 
Commission is entirely inspired from that of the Concluding Observations of the UN 
Committee and, therefore, unlikely to produce legal standards which could 
subsequently clash. It expresses concern when facing poor health standards; 
expresses satisfaction when observing progress; and (sometimes) formulates 
recommendations for improvements. Its comments are usually vague, not driven by a 
clear legal reasoning or terminology, and rely on an ad hoc approach. For instance, in 
2012 the African Commission praised Togo for doubling its medical personnel 
within 6 years,838 which is significant in a country with a GDP per capita of $359-
                                                
836 International Centre for the Legal Protection of Human Rights v Croatia (ECSR) (n 368); 
International Planned Parenthood Federation European Network v Italy (ECSR) (n 546). 
837  Marangopoulos Foundation for Human Rights v Greece (ECSR) (n 372) [196]; 
International Federation for Human Rights v Greece (ECSR) (n 638) [13 and 
14]; International Planned Parenthood Federation European Network v Italy (ECSR) (n 546) 
[37 and 38].  
838 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, ‘Concluding Observations on the 
Republic of Togo’s Combined Third, Fourth and Fifth Periodic Report on Implementation of 
the ACHPR’ (2012), paras 19 and 69; All the Concluding Observations of the African 
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$503 at the time.839 The Commission nonetheless declared this insufficient, without 
specifying what number of physicians per 1,000 inhabitants Togo should aim for.840 
Since the African Commission fails to set standards on what the highest standard of 
health attainable means, logically its interpretation is unlikely to be restrictive and to 
clash with international standards. Secondly, the interpretation of the African 
Commission of what the normative scope of the right to health entails suggests a 
compatibility with the international framework, because its Merits Decisions on 
Article 16 of the African Charter systematically refer to UN standards. (This 
assertion is based on decisions reached post 2001, as the Commission only started to 
effectively delineate the normative content of the right to health that year.)841 In 
Social and Economic Rights Action Center and Center for Economic and Social 
Rights v. Nigeria, for instance, the African Commission used Article 12 ICESCR to 
declare that the right to health obliged states to take steps to secure a healthy 
environment.842 In Purohit and Moore v The Gambia, it referred to the UN Principles 
for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and Improvement of Mental Health 
Care to contend that the right to health of mental health patients included special 
treatment enabling them to reach independence. 843  In Sudan Human Rights 
Organisation & Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions v Sudan, the African 
                                                                                                                                     
Commission can be found online on <http://www.achpr.org/states/reports-and-concluding-
observations/> [accessed 8 September 2015]. 
839 World Bank, ‘GDP per Capita’ (n 784): see Togo in 2004-2008 (to put such figures into 
perspectives, in 2010 the GDP per capita in the United Kingdom amounted to $36,425). 
840  WHO, ‘Interactive Chart on the Density of Physicians (total Number per 1000 
Population): Latest Available Year’ 
<http://gamapserver.who.int/gho/interactive_charts/health_workforce/PhysiciansDensity_To
tal/atlas.html> [accessed 8 September 2015]. As of 2008, Togo only had 0.053 physicians 
per 1,000 persons, and was thus one of the 15 states with the least doctors per inhabitants on 
the planet (while the United Kingdom, for instance, had 2.809 in 2013). 
841 Mbazira (n 121) 342–357; Ssenyonjo (n 121) 367–370 and 375–377. This is true for all 
Merits Decisions post-2001, except Democratic Republic of Congo v Burundi, Rwanda, 
Uganda [2003] Communication No. 227/99, Decision on the Merits (African Commission 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights) [88]. In this case, the Commission simply declared a 
violation of the right to health. 
842 Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) and Center for Economic and Social 
Rights (CESR) v Nigeria [2001] Communication No. 155/96, Decision on the Merits 
(African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights) [50–53]. 
843 Purohit and Moore v The Gambia [2003] Communication No. 241/01, Decision on the 
Merits (African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights) [77–85]. 
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Commission referred to GC14 to assert that the right to health included underlying 
determinants of health.844 Finally, in Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights and 
INTERIGHTS v Egypt, it used Article 25 UDHR and GC14 to highlight states’ 
obligation to provide medical attention to victims of sexual violence.845  
It is also worth noting that whilst the right to health cannot be litigated in the Inter-
American system, the Inter-American Commission recently declared that the 
ICESCR and UN General Comment 3 could be used as sources of interpretation in 
decisions involving ESCR matters. 846  Following this, the Court reviewed 
retrogressive measures (i.e. reduction of pensions) ‘in the same line of thought’ than 
the UN Committee, by referring to its General Comment 3 and to its 2007 
Statement.847 A compatibility with UN standards can therefore be highlighted. 
To conclude, it is clear that regional human rights bodies all delineate the scope of 
interests of the right to health by referring to the interpretation of the UN Committee, 
at least partially. Such cross-fertilisation process mitigates the possibility for 
incompatibilities to arise and thus protect the coherence of the right. However, it is 
uncertain whether ASEAN and the League of Arab States will perpetuate such 
practices through their relevant bodies, if and when they start monitoring the right to 
health efficiently. Furthermore, while the absence of clash enables SNHRBs’ 
interpretation to meet the requirement of principled consistency more easily, it does 
not guarantee that they will promote comprehensively the enjoyment of this right.  
                                                
844 Sudan Human Rights Organisation & Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) 
v Sudan [2009] Communication No. 279/03-296/05, Decision on the Merits (African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights) [208–212]; UNCESCR, ‘GC14’ (n 21). 
845 Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights and INTERIGHTS v Egypt [2013] Communication 
No. 323/06, Decision on the Merits (African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights) 
[257–267]. 
846 National Association of Ex-employees of the Peruvian Social Security Institute et al v 
Peru [2009] Case No. 12.670, Decision on Admissibility and the Merits (Inter-American 
Commission of Human Rights) [70, 135, 136]; UNCESCR, ‘General Comment 3’ (n 211). 
847 Case of Acevedo Buendía et al (‘Discharged and Retired Employees of the Comptroller’) 
v Peru [2009] Series C No. 198, Decision on the Merits (Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights) [20, 102, 103]; UNCESCR, ‘General Comment 3’ (n 211); UNCESCR, ‘Statement 
on Maximum Available Resources 2007’ (n 733). 
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6.1.1.2 Mind the gap: the principle of external system coherence 
Subsection 6.1.1 highlights that conflicts of norms are almost non-existent at the 
supranational level, when it comes to understanding what health systems states 
should ideally guarantee under the right to health. What arise more frequently, 
however, are the gaps generated by interpretations that are more comprehensive than 
others. In order for such gaps to be filled and, thus, to enable a more protective 
jurisprudence of the right to health, it is desirable SNHRBs apply the principle of 
external system coherence.  
According to this principle, called ‘external system coherence’ by Tobin,848 and 
‘systemic integration’ by the International Law Commission,849 SNHRBs should 
interpret the right to health by examining international human rights law holistically. 
This principle derives from the rules of treaty interpretation set in Article 31 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.850 Article 31(1) and (2) requires that a 
treaty be interpreted according to the context in which it was signed; and that 
instruments formally connected to this treaty be examined. However, Article 31(3) 
goes further by stating that the system to which the treaty pertains must also be 
considered (i.e. agreements, practices and relevant rules of international law).851 This 
was reaffirmed by the International Court of Justice in Legal Consequences for 
States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia.852 In this case, the 
Court declared that international instruments should be interpreted and applied 
‘within the framework of the entire legal system prevailing at the time of the 
interpretation’.853 The principle of external system coherence thus guarantees the 
right to health is adequately protected during the cross-fertilisation process, as it 
                                                
848 Tobin (n 19) 104–110. 
849 Study Group of the International Law Commission, ‘Fragmentation of International Law: 
Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law (finalised 
by Martti Koskenniemi) (long version)’ (2006) UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682, Section F. 
850 VCLT (n 602), Art 31. 
851 ibid, Art 31(1), (2), and (3). 
852 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia 
(South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) [1971] ICJ 
Reports 1971, p 16, Advisory Opinion (International Court of Justice). 
853 ibid [53]. 
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enables SNHRBs to interpret this right in the light of more comprehensive 
interpretations, developed in other human rights systems. 
When SNHRBs interpret the right to health, they must consider the principle of 
external system coherence altogether with that of lex specialis derogat legi generali, 
cornerstone in treaty interpretation.854 This logically includes three steps. First, 
SNHRBs must use the right to health provision they are mandated to supervise. 
Second, they may also use other instruments, either formally connected to this 
provision, or drafted within the framework to which this provision pertains. Third, if 
this is insufficient, SNHRBs can interpret the right to health by examining provisions 
of other frameworks to which the state belongs. It is at this third stage that the 
principle of external system coherence and the process of cross-fertilisation become 
relevant.  
For instance, if the European Committee received a complaint alleging that the Irish 
ban on abortion breached women’s right to health, based on the dangers of 
clandestine abortion procedures, it should follow three steps. First, it should use the 
wording of Article 11 ESC and its own jurisprudence on this provision.855 Second, it 
should also use CoE Resolution 1607 (2008), which recognises that bans on abortion 
lead to clandestine procedures and to a rise of maternal mortality.856 Finally, if the 
European Committee considered that Article 11 ESC and Resolution 1607 were 
insufficient to reach a decision, it should refer to Article 12 ICESCR to cast light on 
the broader context in which this provision should be understood, as Ireland ratified 
this treaty. It could subsequently refer to the numerous Concluding Observations of 
the UN Committee, which interpret Article 12 ICESCR as imposing an obligation to 
reduce maternal mortality and, thus, as prohibiting general bans on abortion. This 
would enable the European Committee to develop a more protective jurisprudence 
                                                
854 Early recognition in Ambatielos case (jurisdiction) [1952] ICJ Reports 1952, p 28, 
Judgment of 1 July 1952 (International Court of Justice), Dissenting Opinion of Judge Hsu 
Mo p 88: ‘It is a well-recognized principle of interpretation that a specific provision prevails 
over a general provision’; International Law Commission, ‘Draft Articles on Responsibility 
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries’ (2001) UN Doc. A/56/10, 
Art 55. 
855 ESC 1961 (n 92), Art 11; ESC 1996 (n 92), Art 11. 
856 CoE Parliamentary Assembly, 'Resolution 1607' (n 394), para 4.  
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on SRH. However, thanks to its precise jurisprudence on Article 11 ESC, the 
European Committee is less likely to need the principle of external system coherence 
to optimise its interpretation, than other SNHRBs. 
The African system applies the principle of external system coherence in its nascent 
jurisprudence on the right to health, since its Merits Decisions often refer to UN 
standards (see subsection 6.1.1.1). This practice ensures legal certainty for States 
parties to both the African Charter and UN treaties, and a reinforced monitoring for 
right-holders. However, this should not impede the development of regional 
instruments on health and human rights issues within the African system. Such 
instruments may cast light on issues specific to African countries (e.g. Ebola virus 
disease), with more expertise and speediness than the UN. Moreover, it would be 
unhelpful for the African Commission to follow the jurisprudence of the UN 
Committee on the right to health, since the latter avoids developing precise standards 
in this concern. Chapter 2 and interviews with the members of the UN Committee 
highlight that its approach focuses on a constructive dialogue with states instead, due 
to the international nature of this forum. Therefore, regional tools developed within 
the African system are fundamental to a better monitoring and adjudication of the 
right to health, provided these do not deviate from international human rights law.  
The principle of external system coherence could be particularly helpful to the Inter-
American system, as its jurisprudence on the right to health is limited. Most ESCR 
enshrined in the Protocol of San Salvador, including the right to health, cannot be 
subject to complaints before the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights;857 
and cannot be brought to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights at a later 
stage.858 As a result, the right to health tends to be adjudicated through an integrated 
approach using two provisions of the American Convention on Human Rights: 
Articles 4 and 26.859 Two comments should be made regarding the importance of 
applying the principle of external system coherence in this regard.  
                                                
857 Protocol of San Salvador (n 92), Art 19. 
858 American Convention on Human Rights 1969, Art 44, 51, 61. 
859 ibid, Art 4 and 26. 
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Firstly, Article 4 of the American Convention on Human Rights on the right to life 
has enabled the Inter-American Court to rule in favour of victims of right to health 
violations.860 After recognising that the right to life encompassed the right to a 
dignified existence in the Street Children case, 861  the Court considered that 
inadequate access to health could constitute a breach of the right to life.862 Whilst 
such an integrated approach protects certain elements of the right to health, it leaves 
non-life threatening issues unmonitored, e.g. promotion of SRH in schools. 
However, this limitation cannot be overcome by applying the principle of external 
system coherence since the competence of the Court is restricted to CPR in theory.  
Secondly, Article 26 of the American Convention on Human Rights sets a different 
light on this issue. It requires that states fully realise ‘the rights implicit in the 
economic, social, educational, scientific, and cultural standards set forth in the 
Charter of the Organization of American States’.863 This provision is enforceable and 
is often used in adjudication involving ESCR.864 Furthermore, Article 26 has not 
been the object of any reservation nor denunciation, contrarily to Article 4.865 
Research shows nonetheless that in most cases, the textual basis of Article 26 is 
insufficient to offer an appropriate legal content for each ESCR, and that UN sources 
are often used instead.866 Such application of the principle of external system 
                                                
860 ibid, Art 4; Steven R Keener and Javier Vasquez, ‘A Life Worth Living: Enforcement of 
the Right to Health through the Right to Life in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ 
(2008) 40 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 595. 
861 Case of the ‘Street Children’ (Villagran-Morales et al) v Guatemala [1999] Series C No. 
63, Decision on the Merits (Inter-American Court of Human Rights). 
862 Case of the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v Paraguay [2005] Series C No. 125, 
Decision on the Merits (Inter-American Court of Human Rights); Case of the Sawhoyamaxa 
Indigenous Community v Paraguay [2006] Series C No. 146, Decision on Merits (Inter-
American Court of Human Rights); Case of Ximenes-Lopes v Brazil [2006] Series C No. 
149, Decision on the Merits (Inter-American Court of Human Rights). 
863 American Convention on Human Rights (n 858), Art 26. 
864 ibid, Art 26; Oswaldo R Ruiz-Chiriboga, ‘The American Convention and the Protocol of 
San Salvador: Two Intertwined Treaties - Non-Enforceability of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights in the Inter-American System’ (2013) 31 Netherlands Quarterly of Human 
Rights 159. 
865  OAS, ‘American Convention on Human Rights, Signatories and Ratifications’ 
<http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_B-
32_American_Convention_on_Human_Rights_sign.htm> [accessed 8 September 2015]. 
866 Ruiz-Chiriboga (n 864) 171. 
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coherence can be beneficial. It assists the Inter-American Court in interpreting the 
right to health in accordance with international standards, i.e. protection of the 
highest standard of health attainable; and it ensures legal certainty for both duty-
bearers and right-holders. However, three conditions must be respected. First, the 
Court must ensure that it does not develop a jurisprudence differing from that of the 
Inter-American Commission, who monitors Article 10 of the Protocol of San 
Salvador on the right to health. Second, the application of the principle of external 
system coherence must not prevent the design of health and human rights 
instruments by the Organisation of American States. As explained in the context of 
the African system, regional tools can be highly beneficial to the monitoring and 
adjudication of the right to health as they deal with health issues specific to the 
region. Third, it would be unhelpful for the Court to try following the jurisprudence 
of the UN Committee regarding the right to health, as the latter does not offer any 
precise standards, as explained above. 
To conclude, the scope of interests of the right to health is defined similarly across 
human rights instruments and no specific clash seems to arise amongst SNHRBs 
with regard to its interpretation. However, to avoid the adverse effects of 
fragmentation on the coherence of this right, SNHRBs should fill the gaps of their 
incomplete jurisprudences by using the principle of external system coherence. What 
is nonetheless more problematic in this harmonisation exercise, aimed at optimising 
SNHRBs’ interpretation of the right to health, is the task of reconciling its scope of 
protection. 
6.1.2 Reconciling the scope of protection of the right to health: non-nationals 
As suggested by Tobin, the principle of external system coherence highlights tools 
that SNHRBs can use to interpret what the right to health means, when the provision 
they supervise the application of is not sufficiently precise. 867  However, this 
principle presumes that no conflict of norms arises with respect to the right to health 
in international human rights law. This is true in most cases, as supranational human 
rights instruments define its scope of interests in similar terms. Nevertheless, as 
                                                
867 Tobin (n 19) 104–110. 
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outlined in Chapter 4, supranational human rights instruments define right-holders 
differently, to the extent that incompatible frameworks coexist. It is therefore 
fundamental that SNHRBs harmonise this question, to ensure that duty-bearers 
benefit from a better legal certainty, and right-holders, from a better protection. 
Firstly (6.1.2.1), I will highlight the tensions between the international and regional 
systems in that regard. Secondly (6.1.2.2), I will suggest how SNHRBs can resolve 
this conflict of norms to optimise their interpretation. 
6.1.2.1 Tensions between international and regional frameworks 
Divergences of definitions 
The UN and the Inter-American systems both recognise a universal right to health. 
Their preambles and their right to health provisions declare that everyone is entitled 
to this right on the basis of their inherent attributes as human beings.868 This wording 
reflects the universalist approach inherent to human rights law and advocated by this 
thesis, as discussed in Chapter 4. 
However, divergences exist within the UN, the European and the African 
frameworks, as mentioned in subsection 4.3.1. Article 2(3) ICESCR allows 
developing countries to provide a restricted protection to non-nationals;869 and 
Article 28 ICMW only recognises a right to emergency healthcare for migrants.870 
Furthermore, the European and the African systems authorise States parties to restrict 
the application of the right to health to their nationals. The ESC excludes explicitly 
foreigners residing or working illegally in Europe, from the scope of protection of 
Article 11.  
                                                
868 ICESCR (n 4), Preamble, Art 2 and Art 12; Protocol of San Salvador (n 92), Preamble, 
Art 3 and Art 10. 
869 ICESCR (n 4), Art 2(3). 
870 ICMW (n 93), Art 28. 
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Its Appendix declares: 
[the persons covered by Article 11] include foreigners only in so far as 
they are nationals of other Parties lawfully resident or working regularly 
within the territory of the Party concerned.871  
The African Charter is less definite but could potentially be interpreted restrictively. 
Whilst its Article 16 declares that every individual should enjoy the highest standard 
of health attainable, it obliges States parties to protect the health of ‘their people’, 
and declares that every ‘citizen’ has the right of equal access to the public services of 
her country.872  
In theory, these formulations allow states to deny migrants, stateless persons and 
asylum-seekers the right to access adequate healthcare without having to justify why. 
Nevertheless, both de jure and de facto discrimination based on nationality are 
incompatible with the universalist premise of human rights law, and health 
discrimination are prohibited at all supranational levels of ESCR protection.873 
Moreover, Chapter 4 demonstrated that whilst human rights law may allow states to 
differentiate nationals from non-nationals, excluding the latter from the scope of 
protection of the right to health is not based on an objective justification and is 
indefinite in time. Therefore, the scope of the ICMW, the ESC and the African 
Charter is highly problematic, and the restrictions they allow seem disproportionate. 
It is worth noting that a restrictive scope of protection is particularly problematic in 
the context of regional human rights bodies for three reasons. Firstly, they set 
standards over numerous States parties (47 States parties to the ESC and 53 to the 
African Charter).874 Secondly, such standards are susceptible to having a greater 
impact on the application of the right to health than those developed in UN 
                                                
871 ESC 1961 (n 92), Appendix; ESC 1996 (n 92), Appendix. 
872 African Charter (n 92), Art 13(2) and 16. 
873 ICESCR (n 4), Art 2(2); ESC 1961 (n 92), Preamble; ESC 1996 (n 92), Art E; African 
Charter (n 92), Art 2; Protocol of San Salvador (n 92), Art 3.  
874 CoE, ‘Signatures and Ratifications of the ESC and Its Protocols’ (n 100): Switzerland, 
however, has only signed the ESC; African Commission, ‘Ratification Table: African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (n 99). 
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institutions. Regional human rights bodies often have stronger enforcement 
mechanisms and closer ties with States parties, due to the fact they share more 
similar features than within an international forum. Moreover, under the lex specialis 
principle, regional instruments such as the ESC or the African Charter would 
logically take precedence over the ICESCR. Thirdly, regional human rights bodies 
have an impact on the broader international human rights community. The interviews 
conducted with the members of the UN Committee show that its Concluding 
Observations on Article 12 ICESCR are increasingly inspired by various external 
sources, including regional human rights standards. Therefore, it is fundamental that 
the wording of Article 11 ESC and Article 16 of the African Charter is interpreted 
more comprehensively in order to provide a more adequate scope of protection and 
promote everyone’s effective enjoyment of this right.  
Efforts to reconcile jurisprudences 
The European Committee has greatly mitigated the conflicts arising between the 
scope of protection of Article 12 ICESCR and that of Article 11 ESC, through its 
jurisprudence on migrants’ health. This was discussed in depth in Chapter 4. In 
International Federation of Human Rights Leagues v. France, it recognised that 
irregular migrants had the right to minimal medical assistance, and that their children 
had the right to access healthcare on a similar basis as the rest of the population.875 It 
grounded this decision on the principle of good faith, set in the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties,876 by declaring that the ESC was based on the values of 
dignity, autonomy, equality and solidarity; and that ‘health care [wa]s a prerequisite 
for the preservation of human dignity’.877 In Médecins du Monde International v 
France,878 and in its 2013 Conclusions on Spain,879 the European Committee further 
extended the scope of protection of Article 11. It recognised that adult migrants, 
whether in regular or irregular situation, had the right to access adequate healthcare 
                                                
875 International Federation of Human Rights Leagues v. France (ECSR) (n 600). 
876 VCLT (n 602), Art 31(1). 
877 International Federation of Human Rights Leagues v. France (ECSR) (n 600) [26 to 32]. 
878 Médecins du Monde v France (n 399).  
879ECSR, ‘Conclusions XX-2 (2013)’, Spain pp. 12-14. 
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and that this was not limited to emergency services. As a result, Article 11 ESC (the 
right to protection of health) and Article 13 ESC (the right to medical assistance) 
now apply to irregular migrants.880  
Contrarily to the European Committee, it is unclear whether the African Commission 
interprets the right to health as entitling non-nationals to access healthcare on the 
same basis as nationals. None of the five Merits Decisions involving Article 16 of 
the African Charter concerns issues of migrants’ access to healthcare. Moreover, no 
research has been carried out with regard to the protection of non-nationals by the 
African Charter, except in the context of mass expulsions.881 However, two Merits 
Decisions on Article 16 recognise the right to health as that of the ‘citizens’ of the 
state, although presumably to describe the litigants’ status.882 Such formulation is 
more restrictive than the text of Article 16, which requires that States parties protect 
the health of their ‘people’, not their ‘citizens’.883 These decisions do not necessarily 
mean that the African Commission wishes to exclude non-nationals from the scope 
of protection of the right to health. In Institute for Human Rights and Development in 
Africa v Angola, the latter held that the absence of medical attention to migrants in 
detention camps constituted a cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. 884 
Nevertheless, nothing was said regarding their right to health. It is therefore desirable 
that the African Commission clarifies the scope of the right to health in its 
jurisprudence by expanding it to non-nationals, similarly to the European Committee.  
Finally, at the international level, the UN Committee has clearly interpreted the 
scope of protection of Article 12 ICESCR as being universal, subsequently 
                                                
880 ESC 1961 (n 92), Art 13(1) and (4); ESC 1996 (n 92), Art 13(1) and (4). 
881 Prohibited by the African Charter (n 92), Art 12(5). See Gina Bekker, ‘Mass Expulsion of 
Foreign Nationals: A Special Violation of Human Rights - Communication 292/2004 
Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa v. Republic of Angola’ (2009) 9 
African Human Rights Law Journal 262. 
882 Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights and INTERIGHTS v Egypt (African Commission) 
(n 845) [258 and 264]; Social and Economic Rights Action Center and Center for Economic 
and Social Rights v Nigeria (African Commission) (n 842) [52]. 
883 African Charter (n 92), Art 16. 
884 Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa (on behalf of Esmaila Connateh & 
13 others) v Angola [2008] Communication No. 292/04, Decision on the Merits (African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights) [51 and 87]. 
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disregarding Article 2(3) ICESCR and Article 28 ICMW. In fact, the UN Committee 
frequently highlights health discrimination committed against non-nationals in its 
reporting procedure, may they be migrants in regular situation, undocumented 
migrants, asylum-seekers, refugees, or stateless persons. Out of the sixty Concluding 
Observations examined, it reviewed their situation fifteen times under Article 12 
ICESCR. However, since the UN Committee does not use any thematic indicators 
and has no methodology in its reporting procedure, it does not systematically review 
non-nationals’ access to health. 
6.1.2.2 Resolving conflict of norms  
Conflicts of norms regarding the scope of protection of the right to health can arise 
between regional and international instruments (i.e. between the UN and the 
European or African systems), or within the same framework (i.e. the UN). 
However, as discussed in Chapter 4 or as declared by the European and the UN 
Committees, denying non-nationals their right to health violates human rights law. 
Therefore, it is important to study which principles of interpretation SNHRBs should 
apply to ensure their interpretation conform to the universal scope of the right to 
health.  
Two customary principles of international law are commonly applied to resolve 
conflict of norms at a supranational level: lex specialis and lex posterior. In the first 
instance, if a conflict of norms opposes a general provision and a specific provision, 
the specific provision prevails (lex specialis).885 As a result, a regional provision 
specifying the scope of the right to health (i.e. Article 11 ESC or Article 16 African 
Charter) should prevail over an international provision not specifying its scope 
(Article 12 ICESCR). In the second instance, if a conflict of norms opposes two 
provisions within the same framework, the most recent provision prevails (lex 
posterior).886 As a result, recent right to health provisions in the UN (Article 28 
ICMW, adopted in 1990) should prevail over older ones (Article 12 ICESCR, 
adopted in 1966). However, the ESC, the African Charter and the ICMW, which 
                                                
885 Ambatielos case (jurisdiction) (ICJ) (n 854), Dissenting Opinion of Judge Hsu Mo p 88; 
ILC, 'Draft Articles on Responsibility of States with Commentaries' (n 854), Art 55. 
886 VCLT (n 602), Art 30; derived from UN Charter (n 25), Art 103. 
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these principles give prevalence to, fail to protect non-nationals’ right to health, 
contrarily to the ICESCR. Therefore, the principles lex specialis and lex posterior are 
inadequate to address conflict of norms arising from the fragmentation of 
international human rights law, since they can reduce its scope of protection and thus 
impact negatively on individuals’ enjoyment of their right to health.887 Moreover, 
they do not address instances where two provisions clash within the same instrument, 
i.e. Art 2(3) and Art 12 ICESCR. 
When a conflict of norms arises between various right to health provisions, and the 
application of the principles lex specialis or lex posterior narrows the scope of 
protection of the right to health, two alternatives should be considered. These 
alternatives are suggested by the 2006 Fragmentation Report of the International 
Law Commission,888 and reflect the doctrine of external system coherence studied in 
subsection 6.1.1.2.  
The first alternative requires that the general law rules out the special law, or that the 
old law rules out the recent law, if ‘third party beneficiaries may be negatively 
affected’ by lex specialis or lex posterior. 889 In the European and the African 
frameworks, irregular migrants are clearly affected by the special law (the ESC and 
the African Charter), since it does not protect them. Therefore, the general law (the 
ICESCR) should rule it out. Furthermore in the UN framework, regular migrants are 
clearly affected by the recent law (the ICMW), since it restricts their right to health. 
As a result, the older law (the ICESCR) should prevail.  
The second alternative offered by this report, which also provides a rationale to the 
first, is to preclude the application of the special law or the recent law if it ‘might 
                                                
887 Anja Lindroos, ‘Addressing Norm Conflicts in a Fragmented Legal System: The Doctrine 
of Lex Specialis’ (2005) 74 Nordic Journal of International Law 27: in this article, the author 
shows that the lex specialis principle is not suitable for all conflict of norms, due to the 
fragmentation of the international legal system. 
888 Study Group of the ILC, 'Fragmentation Report (long version)' (n 849); Study Group of 
the International Law Commission, ‘Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties 
Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law (short version)’ (2006) 
UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.702. 
889 Study Group of the ILC, 'Fragmentation Report (short version)' (n 888), conclusions 10 
and 27 (para 14).  
 
284 
frustrate the purpose of the general law’. 890  Since human rights law aims at 
protecting individuals based on their inherent quality of human beings,891 human 
rights are universal per se. Individuals’ migration status should thus not interfere 
with the exercise of their right to health in theory.  
This thesis suggests that SNHRBs use the alternatives proposed by the 
Fragmentation Report if a conflict of norms arises and that the subsequent 
application of the lex specialis or lex posterior principles restricts the scope of 
protection of the right to health. Finally, for cases that neither alternative addresses, 
the International Law Commission is of the general view that ‘[i]n regard to conflicts 
between human rights norms, […] the one that is more favourable to the protected 
interest is usually held overriding.’892 Therefore, this would give precedence to 
Article 12 ICESCR over Article 2(3) ICESCR. 
To conclude, the scope of protection of the right to health is defined differently 
across human rights instruments, although various SNHRBs have attempted to 
reconcile those divergences in their monitoring procedures. Nevertheless, to prevent 
the adverse effects of fragmentation on the coherence of this right, SNHRBs should 
resolve those conflicts of norms by using the alternatives offered in the 
Fragmentation Report. This, nonetheless, is not to say that the legal content of the 
right to health should be crystallised. On the contrary, in the light of the diverse 
quasi-judicial avenues through which the right to health can be monitored, SNHRBs 
must ensure that they adapt their review of states’ obligations to the context in which 
they are set, to ensure coherence between theory and practice. 
                                                
890 ibid, conclusions 10 and 27 (para 14); See also Study Group of the ILC, 'Fragmentation 
Report (long version)' (n 849), part C, section 5 on regionalism.  
891 E.g. UDHR (n 3), Preamble: ‘recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and 
inalienable rights of all members of the human family’. 
892 Study Group of the ILC, 'Fragmentation Report (long version)' (n 849), para 108.  
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6.2 Diversity of quasi-judicial monitoring avenues and adapting the review of 
states’ obligations to practical realities  
As discussed in Chapter 5, to interpret the obligation to progressively realise the right 
to health adequately, SNHRBs must carry out particular monitoring, reach specific 
findings of non-conformity, and apply a reasonableness test. However, the diversity 
of quasi-judicial avenues through which the right to health can be monitored and that 
of states monitored, increase the likelihood for different interpretations to be 
developed (and subsequently, for different expectations to be set). In the light of such 
diverse reviews, it is essential SNHRBs promote an effective enjoyment of the right 
to health worldwide, while being able to adapt their approach to the practical realities 
of their monitoring. Such flexibility is fundamental to transcend the substance of the 
right to health into practical standards for SNHRBs, and reasonable expectations for 
states. Subsection 6.2.1 will thus contend that SNHRBs should balance the individual 
and collective dimensions of the right to health differently, depending on the 
procedure at stake (i.e. reporting or complaint procedure). Subsection 6.2.2 will then 
argue that SNHRBs should adapt their compliance approach to the level of 
monitoring they represent (i.e. regional or international). 
6.2.1 Adapting the dimension of the right to health to the monitoring procedure  
SNHRBs monitor the realisation of the right to health through various procedures, 
outlined in subsection 1.1.3.2. It has however become apparent in this thesis that the 
dimension of the right to health changes according to the procedure used to review it. 
Reporting procedures inevitably embrace a more collective dimension, focusing on 
population’s health; while complaint procedures inevitably embrace a more 
individual dimension, focusing on petitioners’ health. It is nevertheless important 
that SNHRBs balance the two dimensions adequately in each procedure, as 
neglecting one dimension can adversely impact the coherence of the right to health. 
Such a statement acknowledges criticisms formulated against the programmatic 
aspect of this right,893 or against the misuse of resources in litigation (e.g. in 
                                                
893 Dennis and Stewart (n 11). 
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Brazil).894 Subsection 6.2.1.1 thus argues that while reporting procedures primarily 
measure states’ compliance with their obligations, SNHRBs must also measure 
individuals’ enjoyment of their right to health. Subsection 6.2.1.2 then argues that 
while complaint procedures primarily focus on petitioners, SNHRBs must also 
consider broader public health interests, especially in the context of healthcare 
prioritisation. 
6.2.1.1 Reporting procedures: focus on duty-bearers of the right to health 
Reporting procedures require that states periodically report to SNHRBs on the 
implementation of the right to health (e.g. every 5 years for the ICESCR; every 4 
years for the ESC). To review the overall realisation of this right within each 
country, SNHRBs use states’ reports as well as other sources (e.g. NGOs’ shadow 
reports) before formulating comments, recommendations or sometimes, holding 
findings of non-conformity. However, due to the collective dimension of this process 
focusing on populations’ health, SNHRBs can fail to recognise the notion of victim. 
The research carried out in previous Chapters highlights the difficulty for both the 
UN and the European Committees to define right-holders precisely when interpreting 
the right to health in reporting procedures. Various factors contribute to this 
situation. Firstly, reporting procedures do not involve petitioners and do not provide 
remedies. In certain cases, SNHRBs do not even reach findings of non-conformity  
(e.g. UN Committee, African Commission). As a result, the notion of victim 
becomes diluted when breaches of the right to health arise. Secondly, the data states 
must submit under right to health provisions and the indicators SNHRBs use, if any, 
focus on population’s health overall. For instance, the European and the UN 
Committees often assess life expectancies or maternal mortality rates. Such review, 
however, can translate human rights monitoring into summaries of countries’ general 
levels of development if not combined with access and availability issues, as those 
highlight more explicitly violations of individuals’ right to health. Thirdly, the 
involvement of civil society, and more particularly NGOs representing individuals’ 
health rights, can be limited in reporting procedures. For example, neither the 
European Committee nor the UN Committee receive a high number of NGOs’ 
                                                
894 Octavio Luiz Motta Ferraz, ‘The Right to Health in the Courts of Brazil: Worsening 
Health Inequities’ (2009) 11 Health and Human Rights 33; Ferraz 2010 (n 18).  
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shadow reports regarding health issues. Therefore, violations of the right to health 
might be left unmonitored. 
While it is the nature of reporting procedures to focus on states’ compliance with 
their obligations rather than to provide victims with remedies, their purpose remains 
to identify violations of the right to health. Identifying violations, however, 
necessarily involves identifying victims. In order for the notion of victim to avoid 
being excessively diluted through reporting procedures, this thesis recommends that 
SNHRBs design indicators by using a human rights-based approach to health.895 As 
demonstrated in previous chapters, general indicators are acceptable as long as 
accessibility or availability indicators are used in parallel, to highlight potential 
impediment of individuals’ right to health. For instance, it is insufficient to review 
maternal mortality rate, SNHRBs must also evaluate whether maternal care exists 
and whether it is affordable. This thesis also recommends a greater involvement of 
the civil society in the reporting process. This entails: for SNHRBs, to raise 
awareness about their procedures amongst NGOs; and for states, to respect and work 
alongside local and international NGOs. Finally, while this procedure is not a forum 
where remedies can be provided, stronger enforcement mechanisms should be set up 
to bring to life the substance given to this right in the course of quasi-judicial 
monitoring procedures.  
6.2.1.2 Complaint procedures: conflict between the collective and the individual 
dimensions of the right to health 
Complaint procedures enable individuals (or NGOs representing their interests) to 
bring complaints before SNHRBs if they believe the state has breached their right to 
health. SNHRBs review facts and laws relevant to the situation denounced in the 
complaint and invite states to respond. They then reach a decision by holding a 
finding of conformity or non-conformity and, sometimes, provide recommendations 
to the state and remedies to the victims. Therefore, due to the individual dimension 
of this process focusing on petitioners’ health, complaint procedures recognise the 
notion of victim more clearly than reporting procedures. While the UN Committee 
has not reviewed any communication involving Article 12 ICESCR yet, the research 
                                                
895 Welling (n 204); Hunt and McNaughton (n 226). 
 
288 
carried out in Chapter 3 on the European Committee confirms a better identification 
of victims when interpreting the right to health through the complaint procedure.  
However, litigation initiated by individuals can fail to integrate the collective 
component of the right to health and can subsequently impede access to healthcare 
for the rest of the population. Ferraz and Wang highlight two pitfalls in particular, 
when discussing right to health litigation before Brazilian courts. Firstly, petitioners 
in right to health litigation tend to have a level of education and wealth enabling 
them to access judicial procedures. As a result, requesting that states provide 
remedies to such petitioners while basic healthcare remains unavailable for poorer 
sections of the population can increase health inequalities. Secondly, petitioners in 
right to health litigation can sometimes ask for expensive treatments benefiting a 
minority of patients. Therefore, ordering states to provide such treatments for free 
can take away resources for inexpensive treatments benefiting the majority. 896  
Such pitfalls have been nuanced by authors such as Yamin, Gloppen, Gauri and 
Brinks, who highlight in detail the positive contributions that right to health litigation 
can represent for individuals in their edited collections.897 However, it is important 
that SNHRBs avoid reproducing the issues highlighted by Ferraz and Wang at the 
international or regional level when interpreting the right to health, as the latter 
protects everyone’s right to the highest standard of health attainable. First, by 
guaranteeing that their procedures are accessible to everyone (e.g. publication of 
clear online guidelines, links to NGOs providing legal support etc.). Second, by 
reviewing health prioritisation matters through a reasonableness test focusing 
primarily on the decision-making process, based on resource availability within 
states, and taking into account vulnerable groups to health discrimination. Following 
the example of Brazil, this can involve public hearings with relevant experts to 
establish criteria under which states must fund certain treatments (e.g. effectiveness, 
safety, necessity, costs).898 Issues of compliance remain nonetheless. Once SNHRBs 
                                                
896 Ferraz 2010 (n 18); Wang and Ferraz (n 18); Wang (n 443) 77–78 (the case referred to is: 
Brazilian Federal Supreme Court, AgRg No. RE 271286). 
897 Yamin and Gloppen (n 133); Gauri and Brinks (n 18). 
898 Wang (n 443) 81–90. 
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reach a decision, follow-ups are neither well documented nor subject to an 
enforcement mechanism, affecting the strength of their complaint procedures.899 
To conclude, SNHRBs must preserve some degree of flexibility when monitoring 
the right to health, in order to adapt its content to practical realities such as the limits 
of their procedures, and optimise their interpretation. Reporting procedures 
inevitably focus on the individual dimension of this right while complaint procedures 
inevitably focus on its collective dimension. However, SNHRBs must strike a right 
balance between both dimensions to preserve the coherence of what this right intends 
to protect. Such flexibility should nonetheless also consider the coherence of this 
right with practical realities such as the context in which its review takes place, 
affecting SNHRBs’ compliance approach to states’ obligations. 
6.2.2 Adapting the compliance approach to the level of monitoring of the right to 
health 
SNHRBs monitor the realisation of the right to health at different levels: 
international and regional. It has however become clear in this thesis that the 
approach adopted by SNHRBs varies according to the level of monitoring they 
operate at. International bodies such as the UN Committee are drawn towards a more 
lenient approach to states’ compliance than regional bodies such as the European 
Committee, which may develop a stricter approach. It is nonetheless essential to 
discuss the reasons for such differentiation as well as its consequences, since these 
can affect either adversely or positively the interpretation of the right to health. 
Section 6.2.2.1 will thus explore what approach to compliance may be adopted by 
international bodies, while section 6.2.2.2 will explore what approach may be 
adopted by regional bodies.  
                                                
899 See Frans Viljoen and Lirette Louw, ‘State Compliance with the Recommendations of the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1994-2004’ (2007) 101 American 
Journal of International Law 1, 24. 
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6.2.2.1 Compliance at the international level 
A weak approach to compliance 
When it reviews states’ obligations to realise the right to health, the UN Committee 
rarely uses legal terminology such as ‘obligation’, ‘violation’ or ‘compensation’.900 
Instead, it expresses concern over issues relevant to Article 12 ICESCR, and 
formulates recommendations to remedy the situation. Chapter 2 demonstrates that 
the UN Committee refuses to endorse a judicial function, and the interviews 
conducted with four of its members highlight the desire to preserve a constructive 
dialogue with States parties to the Covenant. Such weak approach to states’ 
compliance, nonetheless, impedes the development of a jurisprudence on the right to 
health and subsequently prevents delineating its legal content with precision.  
But all is not lost. Considering the practical realities to which the UN Committee is 
confronted, prioritising a constructive dialogue with states can be a heuristic 
approach to states’ compliance in international monitoring procedures, for two 
reasons. First, the diversity of States parties to the ICESCR does not favour a strict 
approach to compliance. 164 states have ratified the Covenant, among which many 
of the worst human rights offenders and many of the poorest worldwide. It would be 
unfair and pointless to evaluate the realisation of the right to health in Eritrea on the 
same basis as in France, considering their GDP per capita is, respectively, $540 and 
$42,560.901 Second, the absence of an enforcement mechanism within the UN 
framework (frequent in ESCR monitoring, as observed in subsection 1.1.3.2) does 
not allow for a strict approach to compliance. What is the use of holding a state in 
violation of the right to health, if the state is under no obligation to take measures to 
redress the situation? 
                                                
900 Whilst the word ‘obligation’ is sometimes used, little terminology reflects the intention to 
seek legal compliance. It is interesting to note that all four members of the UN Committee 
whom I interviewed believed they were using a legal terminology. 
901 World Bank, ‘GDP per Capita’ (n 784) (see figures of the year 2013); World Bank, 
‘Health Expenditure’ (n 174)  (their health expenditure varied between 3% and 11.7% of 
their GDP that same year). 
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I suggest throughout Chapters 4 and 5 that SNHRBs adopt what this Chapter will call 
a flexible legal approach to monitor the realisation of the right to health. This 
approach enables SNHRBs such as the UN Committee to assess whether the health 
needs of the population have been evaluated, and whether the maximum level of 
available resources has been used to guarantee them, depending on the state under 
review. Such interpretation enables an ad hoc and flexible approach to states’ 
compliance, particularly valuable for international bodies such as the UN Committee, 
who faces a greater diversity of abilities or desires to cooperate amongst states. 
However, a flexible legal approach also requires that the UN Committee reach 
findings of non-conformity when states fail to perform adequately. Clarifying what 
can or cannot justify the non-fulfilment of right to health standards is essential to 
interpret and monitor it as a legal right. Furthermore, as demonstrated by Chapters 4 
and 5, the obligation to progressively guarantee adequate health systems can be 
applied to all states, regardless of their levels of income. For instance, it is possible 
for states with very low income to comply with the right to health, as long as they 
demonstrate sufficient efforts to obtain international support and an appropriate use 
of such support. Therefore, the main issue does not lie in the theoretical framework 
itself. It lies instead in the practical aspect of identifying the health needs of the 
population, reviewing the obligation to progressively realise the right to health, and 
being confronted to states in which the realisation of the right proves to be difficult.  
Theoretical framework and practical considerations  
In practice, states with low or very low income are more likely to lack the resources 
needed to develop strong governance structures.902 As a result, they are more prone 
to be affected by corruption issues, and less so to identify adequately the health 
needs of their populations or to fund appropriately the health sector. 903  This, 
nonetheless, potentially represents a failure to fulfil the obligation to progressively 
guarantee adequate health systems. Therefore, SNHRBs may find my theoretical 
                                                
902 C Raj Kumar, ‘Corruption, Human Rights, and Development: Sovereignty and State 
Capacity to Promote Good Governance’ (2005) 99 Proceedings of the Annual Meeting 
(American Society of International Law) 416. 
903 The literature on health, human rights and governance is dense, see for instance the 
arguments laid out by Friedman and Gostin ‘Pillars for progress on the right to health’, in 
Zuniga, Marks and Gostin (n 131).  
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framework unhelpful on two aspects, when reviewing the realisation of the right to 
health in such states.  
Firstly, it may be difficult for SNHRBs to evaluate health needs and resource 
availability in states with very low income and/or affected by corruption. Such 
exercises require that accurate data be collected, necessitating resources and 
transparency from state agencies. However, both resources and transparency tend to 
be adversely affected by corruption. Furthermore, whilst I argue that the UN 
Committee should use data collected by UN agencies, states may be unwilling to 
cooperate, and time or money constraints within the UN may be insufficient.  
Secondly, the benefits of reaching findings of non-conformity against states with 
very low income and/or affected by corruption can be limited for SNHRBs. It takes 
time for states to build governance structure and to thus eventually comply with the 
right to health. Systematically holding a state in breach of its obligations does not 
ensure better governance or better compliance with human rights law. This is 
especially relevant considering the absence of enforcement mechanism within the 
UN Committee. Therefore, prioritising a constructive dialogue may be preferable to 
endorsing a judicial role. It enables the UN Committee to explore the sources of the 
problem, by providing states with the technical support necessary to combat 
corruption and increase health expenditure. Nevertheless, to justify the absence of a 
legal approach to states’ compliance, constructive dialogue and technical support on 
health matters must be appropriate.  
This thesis does not pretend to assess the adequacy of the UN technical support in 
health, as this would necessitate expertise in public health, health economics, 
medicine, etc. However, it argues that the dialogue established between the UN 
Committee and key actors is insufficient to monitor and, subsequently, interpret 
adequately the right to health. Constructive dialogue demands an appropriate degree 
of communication between the UN Committee, relevant UN agencies or treaty 
bodies, state authorities, civil society, and National Human Rights Institutions 
(NHRIs). Whilst the interviews conducted with UN Committee members highlight 
positive interactions with key actors, they also highlight deficiencies. Three points 
should thus be made, highlighting the failure of the UN Committee to develop a 
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constructive dialogue that offsets the absence of legal approach, and that generates 
monitoring tools facilitating an adequate interpretation of the right to health. 
First, the UN Committee should review the implementation of the right to health 
more holistically, by collaborating with relevant UN agencies and UN treaty bodies 
who have the expertise required.904 This would contribute to promoting an effective 
enjoyment of the right to health. For instance, when assessing children’s health, the 
UN Committee should use the expertise of WHO, UNICEF, and the Committee on 
the Rights of the Child. The interviews I conducted highlight a regular dialogue 
between UN institutions, mainly orchestrated by the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights. However, interviewees also reported a lack of 
coordination and coherence with other treaty bodies, as well as time constraints 
playing against it since members work on a voluntary basis. Moreover, according to 
one interviewee, WHO is rarely involved in the reporting procedure, although it is 
involved in drafting General Comments. UN agencies and treaty bodies cannot be 
omnipresent, considering the time and financial constraints weighing on the UN. A 
minimum degree of collaboration, nonetheless, is fundamental to enable SNHRBs to 
optimise their interpretation of the right to health, especially at the international 
level. Consultation with agencies such as WHO or UNDP; and collaboration with 
other treaty bodies, are necessary to drafting reporting guidelines, designing thematic 
health indicators, and identifying health priorities, on which the interpretation of the 
UN Committee inevitably builds upon. This requires time to be set aside for periodic 
meetings; shared databases classifying general human rights-related information per 
country to be created; etc.905  
Second, interactions between the UN Committee and states’ authorities are 
indispensable to understand the health issues specific to the country under review 
                                                
904 It is worth noting that internal collaborations are also explicitly encouraged in the Inter-
American system. Protocol of San Salvador (n 92), Art 19(4): ‘The specialized organizations 
of the inter-American system may submit reports to the Inter-American Economic and Social 
Council and the Inter-American Council for Education, Science and Culture relative to 
compliance with the provisions of the present Protocol in their fields of activity’. 
905 See early recommendations in the seminal article: Anne F Bayefsky, ‘The UN Human 
Rights Treaties: Facing the Implementation Crisis’ (1996) 15 Windsor Yearbook of Access 
to Justice 189, 251–255. 
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and the measures taken to address them. This enables realistic expectations to be set, 
and context-sensitivity to be considered in the implementation of the right to health. 
States’ representatives are systematically invited to present their reports and to 
answer questions asked by members of the UN Committee,906 as recorded in the 
summary records of each session.907 Interviews confirmed the regularity of such 
interactions during the reporting procedure (i.e. through reports, lists of issues, 
replies, dialogue). However, they also highlighted that constructive dialogue could 
only occur if states’ delegations attended sessions, as the UN Committee does not 
rely on simple statements. This is not always the case. Furthermore, since such 
meetings are systematically held in Geneva, it may privilege states with a certain 
level of income and a certain geographic proximity. 
Third, contributions from civil society and NHRIs are fundamental to develop an 
adequate monitoring and thus, interpretation of the right to health. As pointed by 
Gallagher, they can draw attention to violations of the right to health states may 
attempt to hide, and help translating universal principles into measures that are 
context sensitive, thanks to their work on the ground.908 However, their contributions 
can be mixed. The members of the UN Committee whom I interviewed recognised 
unanimously the importance of NGOs’ participation in the reporting procedure; but 
highlighted two problems. Firstly, the level of dialogue with NGOs tends to be 
irregular, considering they may find it difficult to travel to Geneva for geographic or 
financial reasons. Interviewees reported that the UN Committee often dealt with the 
same NGOs, primarily (but not exhaustively) those based in Geneva. Reporting 
procedures should thus accommodate a more representative portion of civil society 
to monitor the right to health adequately (e.g. introducing video conferences).909 
                                                
906 UNCESCR, ‘Rules of Procedure 1993’ (n 98), rule 62. 
907 E.g. UNCESCR, ‘Summary Record of the 32nd Meeting: Consideration of Reports 
Submitted by the United Republic of Tanzania' (2013) UN Doc E/C.12/2012/SR.32, see 
paras 11 to 31 recounting the discussions held between UN Committee members and state 
representatives on Articles 10 to 12. 
908 Gallagher, ‘Making Human Rights Treaty Obligations a Reality: Working with New 
Actors and Partners’, in Alston and Crawford (n 144). 
909  OHCHR, ‘Annual Report’ (2013), p 98 
<http://www2.ohchr.org/english/OHCHRReport2013/WEB_version/allegati/downloads/1_T
he_whole_Report_2013.pdf> [accessed 8 September 2015]. 
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Secondly, the other problem interviewees pointed at was the potential subjectivity of 
NGOs’ shadow reports. The issues brought to light, ignored, or the angle they are 
presented in, can vary according to the quality of the research, the agenda of the 
organisation, the funding received, etc. Therefore, it is essential the UN Committee 
maintain a high degree of impartiality when dealing with NGOs. This is also true 
regarding NHRIs, although interactions remain insufficient in supranational 
monitoring. 910  Some interviewees stressed that despite the Paris Principles, 911 
NHRIs were not always independent,912 and were subsequently viewed as states’ 
agencies. However, their contributions to optimising the interpretation of the UN 
Committee should not be underestimated. They can facilitate communication 
between the UN Committee and states’ representatives, and can assist in states in 
reporting on the adequacy of their health systems. 
To conclude, one can be sympathetic of the time and financial constraints weighing 
on UN treaty bodies such as the UN Committee, but the promise of a constructive 
dialogue does not effectively offset the absence of a legal approach in its reporting 
procedure. In order for such dialogue to encourage a coherent monitoring and 
interpretation of what the right to health entails, key actors must be actively 
involved. This is not always the case. The complaint procedure may, in the future, 
enable the UN Committee to adopt a flexible legal approach while maintaining the 
dialogue facilitated by the reporting procedure. This remains to be seen. 
                                                
910 See Gallagher (n 908). 
911 UNGA, ‘Principles Relating to the Status of National Institutions' (1993) UN Doc. 
A/RES/48/134, Annex.  
912 See discussions on the degree of political pressure put on these institutions and the 
difference between independence de jure and de facto (e.g. through appointment procedures 
or resources allocation) in Colm O’Cinneide and Neil Crowther, ‘Bridging the Divide? 
Integrating the Functions of National Equality Bodies and National Human Rights 
Institutions in the European Union’ (Nuffield Foundation 2013), pp. 50–53 
<http://www.edf.org.uk/blog/?p=29767> [accessed 8 September 2015]. 
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6.2.2.2 Compliance at the regional level 
A strong approach to compliance 
SNHRBs have a greater ability to adopt a strong approach to compliance when 
reviewing states’ obligations to realise the right to health at a regional level, for 
various reasons adequately summarised by Sarkin.  
Consensus is easier to achieve because regions are often relatively 
homogenous. As far as their processes are concerned, regional systems 
for many reasons are more accessible, cheaper for litigants, and more 
effective in the work they do than international courts. They are more 
likely to achieve greater enforceability of their decisions partly because 
of the political will, at least in some regions, to do so by the regional 
system itself.913 
As recognised by Helfer and Slaughter, the cultural and political homogeneity is 
stronger in regional monitoring than it is in international monitoring, thus facilitating 
the definition (and enforcement) of shared objectives.914 However, similar questions 
arise: how can right to health standards be coherently defined and interpreted when 
applying to states with different levels of income, political regimes and cultural 
perceptions of health?  
As studied in Chapter 3, the European Committee interprets precisely the right to 
health thanks to tools promoting an adequate compliance approach: thematic 
indicators, averages (although this is debatable), and findings of non-conformity. The 
European Committee systematically uses the same eighteen indicators in its reporting 
procedure, i.e. in each reporting cycle and for each State party. Such repetition has 
assisted the formulation of precise standards (now used in both reporting and 
complaint procedures), resulting in the adoption of a violation approach. Thematic 
indicators also enable a rigorous follow-up of states’ obligation to progressively 
                                                
913  Jeremy Sarkin, ‘The Role of Regional Systems in Enforcing State Human Rights 
Compliance: Evaluating the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights and the 
New African Court of Justice and Human Rights with Comparative Lessons from the 
Council of Europe and the Organization of American States’ (2008) 1 Inter-American and 
European Human Rights Journal 199, 209–210. 
914  Laurence R Helfer and Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘Toward a Theory of Effective 
Supranational Adjudication’ (1997) 107 Yale Law Journal 273, 335–336. 
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guarantee adequate health systems. The European Committee rarely fails to monitor 
problematic health issues from one reporting cycle to the next. Furthermore, when a 
state repeatedly fails to provide the information required, the European Committee 
frequently defers its decision and reaches a finding of non-conformity if it persists. 
Findings of non-conformity are also facilitated by the use of European averages, 
which are used to identify and analyse the worst performances in Europe rather than 
to simply point at states falling below the average. Moreover, the European 
Committee sometimes uses averages according to the level of income of the states 
assessed, to compare progress in healthcare and request they achieve the highest 
standard possible. These tools, therefore, do not set definite standards. Instead, they 
focus on states’ compliance with their obligations to progressively guarantee 
adequate health systems and to report on such progress.  
Similar obligations exist in the Inter-American, the African (and the Arab) systems. 
However, their SNHRBs have adopted a weak approach to states’ compliance (if 
any) and, subsequently, have developed weak jurisprudences on the right to health. 
This is not necessarily justified considering the relative homogenous context in 
which states’ obligations are to be reviewed. Therefore, these bodies may wish to 
adopt similar tools than those used by the European Committee, in order to achieve 
further coherence and conceptual clarity when interpreting the right to health. 
However, certain conditions must be met.  
Theoretical framework and exporting monitoring tools 
Firstly, this thesis recommends that regional bodies use thematic health indicators 
corresponding to areas in which states must demonstrate appropriate performances. 
The indicators used by the European Committee are sufficiently general to be 
exported to other regional systems of human rights protection, although perhaps 
restricted to reporting procedures. Chapter 3, however, highlights two themes 
missing: SRH and mental health. The need to access contraception, abortion, 
counselling or psychiatric services is universal and should thus be monitored in every 
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region (including Europe).915 Saying that mental health, SRH, or other types of 
healthcare are universal, nevertheless, does not mean that needs for such services are 
the same everywhere, as discussed in Chapter 4. For instance, the numbers of unsafe 
abortions registered in Africa and Asia are considerably higher than in Europe or 
North America.916 The measures needed to redress the SRH situation in these regions 
are thus greater. However, as mentioned in Chapter 5, thematic indicators aim at 
avoiding listing measures states ought to take to comply with the right to health. 
Such box-ticking exercise freezes its legal content and falls beyond the scope of my 
thesis. Instead, thematic indicators point towards areas in which states must take 
adequate measures, according to the health needs of their populations and their 
available resources. Therefore, thematic health indicators are mainly beneficial on 
two accounts. First, they give substantive meaning to the procedural obligation to 
report. By forcing states to collect data on specific aspects of their health systems, 
SNHRBs enable them to identify the health needs of their populations, as discussed 
in Chapters 3 and 4. Second, they give life to the obligation to progressively realise 
the right to health. By setting benchmarks against which progress should be 
evaluated, SNHRBs engage coherently with the content of the right, as discussed in 
Chapter 5.  
Secondly, this thesis recommends that regional bodies use (sub)regional averages as 
a heuristic tool, provided these apply to states with comparable resources and do not 
result in a non-derogable core approach, which Chapter 5 considered inappropriate. 
As shown in Chapter 3, the use of regional averages enables the European 
Committee to enforce states’ obligation to progressively realise the right to health. 
However, it is unsure whether this monitoring tool would be as beneficial in other 
regions. The first reason why averages may not be beneficial in non-European 
regions is because they tend to reflect a minimum core approach. In Chapter 5, I 
challenged this approach on the ground that what constitutes minimum levels of 
                                                
915 E.g. WHO Regional Office for Europe, 'Policies and Practices for Mental Health in 
Europe: Meeting the Challenges' (2008), p 1 <http://www.euro.who.int/en/health-
topics/noncommunicable-diseases/mental-health/publications/2008/policies-and-practices-
for-mental-health-in-europe.-meeting-the-challenges> [accessed 8 September 2015]. This 
document highlights that in Europe, suicide rates are high and neuropsychiatric disorders 
rank as the first cause of years lived with disability.  
916 WHO, ‘Unsafe Abortion’ (n 534), p 19 (table 5).  
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health worldwide cannot be determined, and their non-derogable aspect disregards 
force majeure events. This is especially relevant for non-European countries, which 
are more likely to be confronted to general shortages of resources and thus entail a 
reasonableness test instead. The second reason why regional averages may not be 
beneficial in regions outside Europe is because greater differences exist among 
States parties to the Organisation of American States or the African Union, than 
among States parties to the CoE. For example, discrepancies of revenues and health 
expenditure are much wider in Africa and in the Americas than in Europe, when 
comparing states with the highest and the lowest figures in each region. The GDP per 
capita of Azerbaijan is 18% that of France, and its percentage of GDP spent on 
health is half of France’s. However, the GDP per capita of Eritrea is only 8% that of 
South Africa, and its percentage of GDP spent on health is a third of South Africa’s; 
with similar gaps observed between Bolivia and the United States for instance.917 
Therefore, regional averages may be insufficiently precise for European countries, 
but even more for African or American countries. The African and the Inter-
American Commissions should thus consider using sub-averages for states with 
comparable income (as well as the European Committee). 
Thirdly, this thesis recommends that regional human rights bodies use findings of 
non-conformity in both reporting and complaint procedures, to strengthen the legal 
force of the right to health. Findings of non-conformity belong to four main 
categories, as suggested in Chapters 4 and 5, and are limited by resource availability. 
First, regional bodies should reach findings of non-conformity when states fail to 
identify the health needs of their populations. Similarly, they should also reach 
findings of non-conformity when states fail to submit data requested, since collecting 
data is essential to identifying such needs. Second, regional bodies should hold 
violations of the right to health when states fail to address the health needs of their 
populations. Such failure can be observed when their health systems are not 
responsive, context-sensitive, or accessible to everyone. These two suggestions were 
made in Chapter 4. Third, regional bodies should reach findings of non-conformity 
when states have not sufficiently improved their performance under the right to 
                                                
917 World Bank, ‘GDP per Capita’ (n 784); World Bank, ‘Health Expenditure’ (n 174) (based 
on 2013 figures). 
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health. This can include stagnation or excessively slow progress. Fourth, regional 
bodies should hold violations of the right to health when states have taken 
retrogressive measures in its implementation. These should be particularly strictly 
reviewed. These two suggestions were made in Chapter 5. However, whether such 
approach will encourage states’ compliance and cooperation in implementing the 
right to health remains uncertain. 
To conclude, it is important SNHRBs preserve some flexibility when monitoring the 
right to health, in order to adapt its content to practical realities such as the context in 
which they review states’ obligations, and thus optimise their interpretation. Whilst 
the weak approach to compliance developed by the UN Committee could be 
hypothetically justified by the desire to maintain dialogue with a wide range of 
states, the constructive dialogue carried out with key actors must be reinforced to 
offset the absence of a legal approach. Regional bodies, however, represent further 
potential for consensus and homogeneity, and should thus adopt a stronger approach 
to compliance, based on the example of the European Committee. However, 
conceptual clarity and coherence in SNHRBs’ interpretation of the right to health can 
seem pointless if its legal content cannot be brought to life through enforcement. 
 
6.3 Enforcement and SNHRBs’ limits in giving life to their own interpretation 
SNHRBs do not benefit of sufficient enforcement procedures, particularly when 
dealing with ESCR. This phenomenon has been widely discussed and acknowledged 
in legal scholarship.918 Enforcement, however, is crucial to give life to SNHRBs’ 
interpretation of what the right to health should entail, and to strengthen the legal 
force of its content through implementation. States can often refuse to redress human 
rights violations in supranational monitoring, and domestic courts might refuse to 
apply international human rights law in their proceedings.919 Several limits to the 
                                                
918 Numerous academics have expressed concern in this regard, e.g. Alston and Crawford (n 
144); Gauthier de Beco (ed), Human Rights Monitoring Mechanisms of the Council of 
Europe (Routledge 2013). 
919 See for instance McGeoch (AP) (Appellant) v The Lord President of the Council and 
another (Respondents) (Scotland) (2013) UKSC 63 (UK Supreme Court). In this case, the 
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capacity of SNHRBs in building a substantive meaning of the right to health that is 
enforceable in practice can be highlighted.  
At the international level, two main factors contribute to such a situation. Firstly, the 
UN Committee has not processed any communications involving the right to health 
yet, due to the recent entry into force of the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR.920 
Furthermore, this complaint procedure does not benefit from any enforcement 
mechanism. If the UN Committee observes a violation of the right to health, it can 
only send suggestions to the state. Such suggestions simply require a written 
response from the state within six months and no mechanism obliges the state to 
enforce them.921 Secondly, the reporting procedure is not particularly satisfactory 
either. Not only does the UN Committee adopt a weak legal terminology in its 
Concluding Observations, for the sake of preserving a ‘constructive dialogue’ with 
states; it also fails to use any methodology guiding its review. Moreover, no 
procedure guarantees that the recommendations formulated in Concluding 
Observations will be enforced.922 
At the regional level, similar factors impede SNHRBs’ capacity to give life to the 
interpretation of the right to health they developed, by ways of enforcement 
procedures. Two main points should be made. Firstly, complaint procedures do not 
generate sufficient findings. In theory, the right to health can be adjudicated through 
complaint procedures in the European and African systems. However, such 
procedures were either established too recently (1995 in Europe), or only started 
clarifying the normative content of this right in recent years (2001 in Africa), for 
SNHRBs to have produced substantive jurisprudence. 923  Furthermore, those 
                                                                                                                                     
UK Supreme Court considered not applying the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights on prisoners’ right to vote. 
920 OP to ICESCR (n 101). 
921 ibid, Art 9: the UN Committee may follow up progress on the implementation of Article 
12 through the reporting procedure but the procedure goes in circles since there is no 
enforcement mechanism for the complaints procedure either. 
922 Research shows that Concluding Observations tend to be ignored, here through the 
example of the Netherlands, New Zealand and Finland: Jasper Krommendijk, ‘The 
(In)effectiveness of UN Human Rights Treaty Body Recommendations’ (2015) 33 
Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 194. 
923 Ssenyonjo (n 121). 
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procedures do not benefit from any enforcement mechanisms and as outlined in 
subsection 1.1.3.2, the Inter-American system does not review communications 
involving alleged violations of the right to health.924 Secondly, reporting procedures 
are not always satisfactory. The style of the Concluding Observations of the African 
Commission being very alike that of the UN Committee’s, similar criticisms can be 
raised (i.e. weak approach to states’ compliance). As for the comments of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights through this procedure, they tend to focus 
on CPR.925 Finally, none of those three systems benefit from an enforcement 
mechanism. For instance, when the European Committee finds a state in violation of 
the right to health in its Conclusions, it has to wait for the Committee of Ministers to 
consult with the Consultative Assembly and to make ‘suggestions’ to the state.926 
Moreover, nothing guarantees the state will respect these suggestions.  
It is also important to note that out of the existing 198 states, only 112 are parties to 
‘functional’ regional systems of human rights protecting the right to health,927 i.e. 
mainly African, American and European countries. Therefore, 86 states cannot 
access any adequate regional protection of the right to health, and more than 20 of 
those are in geographical areas that are not attached to any regional frameworks.928 
The latter include states or territories from Southern Asia, Eastern Asia, Central 
Asia, as well as Oceania.929 Moreover, among the 20 states not governed by any 
regional framework, many are inhabited by exceptionally high populations (e.g. 
China, India). As a result, the only supranational definition and safeguard of the right 
                                                
924 Except through the integrated approach or, more rarely, through Article 26 of the 
American Convention on Human Rights (n 858).  
925  See the reports of the Inter-American Commission on 
<http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/country.asp> [accessed 8 September 2015]. 
926 ESC 1961 (n 92), Art 29; ESC 1996 (n 92), Art C. 
927 ESC: 43 ratifications; Protocol of San Salvador: 16 ratifications; African Charter: 53 
ratifications. 
928 Forty-four when including small islands, see UN Statistics Division, ‘Composition of 
Macro Geographical (continental) Regions, Geographical Sub-Regions, and Selected 
Economic and Other Groupings, Revised 31 October 2013’ 
<https://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm> [accessed 8 September 2015]. 
929 ibid. 
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to health in these areas derive from a weak UN framework and do not benefit from 
the double regional-international protection.  
Finally, regardless of SNHRBs’ interpretation and procedures through which the 
latter takes place, the right to health is a social right that embraces complex ethical, 
economic and legal issues. As a result, building its substance is bound to be an 
extremely difficult exercise, especially since it ought to apply to different states. 
Expertise is thus required beyond that of SNHRBs to assess parameters such as 
populations’ health needs, cultural environments, or resource availability. These 
parameters, specific to each state, have been shown in this thesis to be paramount to 
an adequate interpretation of the right to health. Such interpretation should ensure: an 
effective enjoyment of the right to health; reasonable expectations upon states to 
realise it; context sensitivity in its implementation; and overall, principled 
consistency in its content. Therefore, not only is it essential that the right to health be 
protected in domestic adjudication, the role of national courts in appreciating specific 
parameters and in building content is significant. Furthermore, special mechanisms 
and non-judicial institutions in the field of human rights, such as the Special 
Rapporteur on the right to health at the UN level; the Commissioner for Human 
Rights in the CoE; the Working Group on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 
the African Union; or the Unit on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the 
Organisation of American States; can also bring to life SNHRBs’ interpretation. Not 
only can they assist SNHRBs in evaluating the parameters specific to the state under 
review and thus enable the legal content of the right to health to be adequately 
delineated, they can also encourage its enforcement amongst reluctant states. 
 
Conclusion 
In this Chapter, I outlined how the conceptual framework developed in Chapters 4 
and 5 could operate coherently across all SNHRBs, in order to ensure the right to 
health is interpreted (and later, realised) adequately at both international and regional 
levels. Therefore, I argued that the normative scope of the right to health should be 
interpreted harmoniously across all frameworks, but that SNHRBs should retain 
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sufficient flexibility to review states’ obligations adequately in the light of practical 
realities in monitoring. In Section 6.1, I explored the importance for SNHRBs to 
harmonise the normative scope of the right to health across different levels of 
monitoring, in response to the fragmentation of human rights law. I argued that the 
scope of interests of the right to health was defined in compatible terms in both 
international and regional systems, but that SNHRBs should use the principle of 
external system coherence to enhance the comprehensiveness of their interpretation. 
I then studied the conflict of norms arising from supranational human rights 
instruments regarding the scope of protection of the right to health for non-nationals. 
I suggested as a result that SNHRBs use the alternatives highlighted by the 
Fragmentation Report of the International Law Commission. In Section 6.2, I 
outlined the importance for SNHRBs to retain a degree of flexibility when 
monitoring states’ obligations to realise the right to health, in the light of practical 
realities. I thus argued that SNHRBs should adapt their interpretation in two ways. 
First, they should balance the individual and collective dimensions of the right to 
health according to the monitoring procedure at stake; and second, they may adapt 
their approach to states’ compliance according to the level of monitoring they 
represent. Finally, I highlighted the limits of SNHRBs to bring to life their own 
interpretation through enforcement, and thus highlighted the importance of national 
adjudication and supranational non-judicial human rights institutions to that effect. 
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PART II: 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This thesis seeks to clarify the legal content of the right to health through 
supranational monitoring, in order to attempt remedying its conceptual vagueness. In 
Part I, this thesis explored how SNHRBs could effectively contribute to clarifying 
the legal content of the right to health in the course of their quasi-judicial monitoring 
procedures. In Part II, this thesis studied how SNHRBs’ interpretation could be 
optimised for that purpose. 
Based on the methodology and findings of my thesis, and based on the principles of 
interpretation it advocates, I thus developed a theoretical framework enabling 
SNHRBs to develop a clear and enhanced interpretation of the right to health. I argue 
hereupon that the legal content of the right to health should be understood through 
first, its normative scope and second, the nature of the obligations it creates, while 
acknowledging key challenges that seeking conceptual clarity through supranational 
monitoring, represents.  
In order for SNHRBs to delineate more precisely the normative scope of the right to 
health, Chapter 4 recommends they translate the requirement to achieve the highest 
standard of health attainable into a requirement to set up adequate health systems, 
which obliges states to identify the health needs of their populations. It also suggests 
SNHRBs adopt a context-sensitive approach when dealing with cultural issues, and 
that they protect the right to health of non-nationals. In order for SNHRBs to 
delineate more precisely states’ obligations to realise the right to health, Chapter 5 
then recommends they use indicators to monitor the progressive realisation of this 
right and recognise specific violations when this obligation is not met. Furthermore, 
it suggests SNHRBs use the reasonableness test instead of minimum core 
obligations, as these cannot be clearly defined. Finally, Chapter 6 emphasises that 
attempting to clarify the legal content of the right to health through supranational 
monitoring represents key challenges. In order for SNHRBs to preserve its principled 
consistency across different human rights frameworks, it suggests they interpret the 
normative scope of the right to health harmoniously, while leaving room for practical 
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realities of monitoring. However, such exercise is limited by the lack of enforcement 
procedures available to SNHRBs, necessary to bring to life their interpretation. 
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CONCLUSION 
The need to remedy the lack of conceptual clarity surrounding the legal content of 
the right to health is highlighted by criticisms regularly raised by legal scholars, and 
confirmed by the excessive vagueness of its substance in human rights law. Such 
vagueness, nonetheless, can affect key actors in its realisation and hinder its 
implementation: how can states, SNHRBs and NGOs contribute towards realising a 
right the meaning of which they are unaware? It is thus fundamental to look for 
further conceptual clarity. However, legal scholarship has failed to provide or at least 
agree on a comprehensive framework clarifying what the right to health entails, and 
has widely ignored the potential of SNHRBs to that effect, as well as the authority of 
their interpretation. 
Therefore, this thesis assesses how SNHRBs can contribute to clarifying the legal 
content of the right to health in the course of their quasi-judicial monitoring 
procedures, and how their interpretation can be optimised for that purpose. While 
these two questions are intertwined to a certain extent, I divided them in two parts for 
the sake of clarity. Part I examines the potential that SNHRBs represent in furthering 
conceptual clarity; and Part II suggests how this potential can be maximised. 
Throughout six chapters, thus, I evaluate how two particular SNHRBs (i.e. the UN 
and the European Committees) interpret the right to health, and I suggest a 
theoretical framework aimed at optimising SNHRBs’ interpretation during 
monitoring procedures. My arguments are based on four principles of interpretation, 
encouraging SNHRBs to seek conceptual clarity while: (1) promoting an effective 
enjoyment of this right; (2) setting reasonable expectations upon states; (3) offering 
context sensitivity through its implementation; and overall, (4) guaranteeing 
principled consistency. 
Part I, therefore, provides a critical overview of how the right to health is currently 
recognised and interpreted in international human rights law, by seeking potential 
conceptual clarity amongst SNHRBs, through their monitoring of this right 
In Chapter 1, I contextualise the recognition of the right to health in international 
law, since it is essential to understand where this right comes from and what 
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challenges it currently faces, before arguing how SNHRBs can and should define its 
legal content. I first discuss the historical relevance of the right to health in 
international human rights law. I demonstrate that millennia of states’ involvement in 
public health paved the way for the recognition of a right to health in the WHO 
Constitution (1946) and later, in human rights instruments. However, I then highlight 
that the right to health is not defined with sufficient conceptual clarity. I argue that 
excessive vagueness currently surrounds its legal content in human rights law and 
hinders its realisation as a result; and that legal scholarship has failed to engage 
thoroughly with its substance, as few authors attempted to clarify it and to explore 
the potential of SNHRBs in this concern. This Chapter concludes that it is thus 
necessary to turn towards SNHRBs and assess their contribution to clarifying the 
right to health, since they represent its most authoritative interpretation and provide 
an ‘adjudicatory’ platform through their quasi-judicial monitoring procedures. 
In Chapter 2, I explore whether and how the UN Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights clarifies the right to health when interpreting Article 12 ICESCR 
through its monitoring procedures, for it represents the most authoritative 
international interpretation of this right. After having briefly described this provision 
and the procedures through which it can be monitored (so far, limited to the reporting 
procedure), I argue that the UN Committee does not delineate the normative scope of 
the right to health precisely. The topics that it reviews tend to be randomly 
monitored, and while the AAAQ framework could potentially clarify the legal 
content of the right to health, it fails to do so in practice. I then contend that the UN 
Committee defines the nature of states’ obligations to realise the right to health 
slightly more clearly. Whilst it does not always explicitly recognise the obligation to 
progressively realise the right to health and minimum core obligations in its reporting 
procedure, it follows up states’ progress and urges them to fulfil ‘immediate’ 
obligations. This Chapter concludes that the lack of methodology characterising the 
Concluding Observations of the UN Committee weakens its interpretation of the 
right to health and fails to echo the principles this thesis advocates, but that it leaves 
a degree of flexibility beneficial for constructive engagement purposes. However it is 
necessary to examine how the right to health is interpreted at the regional level, to 
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identify whether international and regional standards are compatible, and to highlight 
‘best practice’. 
In Chapter 3, I examine the interpretation of the right to health in a region with high 
levels of income and strong human rights record, and assess whether and how the 
European Committee of Social Rights clarifies it when monitoring Article 11 ESC. 
After having briefly described this provision and the procedures used to monitor it 
(i.e. reporting and complaint procedures), I argue that the European Committee 
delineates clearly the normative scope of the right to health. The use of thematic 
indicators enables the European Committee to develop express standards under 
Article 11, and the use of findings of non-compliance, to draw their boundaries. 
Furthermore, I contend that the methodology used by the European Committee in its 
reporting procedure implicitly highlights an obligation for states to collect data and 
to perform comparably with European averages. Both point towards the adoption of 
progressive realisation and minimum core approaches. I conclude this Chapter by 
discussing how the indicators and express standards used by the European 
Committee, as well as the (sometimes) defective evaluation of Article 11 ESC, affect 
its interpretation of the right to health. However, the legal content of this right as 
developed by the European Committee is more precise and substantial than that 
developed by the UN Committee, and it attempts more successfully to meet the 
principles this thesis advocates.  
Part II, therefore, builds upon the shortcomings identified in Part I, to produce a 
theoretical framework bringing further conceptual clarity on how the legal content of 
the right to health should be read in monitoring procedures, in order to optimise 
SNHRBs’ interpretation. 
In Chapter 4, I develop a theoretical account assisting SNHRBs in clarifying what 
the normative scope of the right to health consists of when monitoring it, based on 
the principles of interpretation underlying this thesis. For that purpose, I identify 
three key questions that yet remain unanswered in previous chapters: what is the 
highest standard of health; does it mean the same regardless of the cultural 
environment in which it ought to be implemented; and who can benefit from it? 
Firstly, I outline the unrealistic or incoherent standards defining the ‘highest standard 
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of health attainable’, suggesting that SNHRBs understand the scope of interests of 
the right to health as a right to an adequate health system instead. I argue that 
SNHRBs should translate the latter into legal requirements by inviting expertise, by 
creating an obligation to identify (and address) health needs, and by understanding 
social determinants of health through the principle of the interdependence of rights. I 
then use this framework to assess how SNHRBs such as the UN and the European 
Committees conceptualise health, highlighting the comprehensiveness of one 
interpretation and the clarity of the other. Secondly, I discuss how SNHRBs ought to 
interpret the scope of application of the right to health by exploring its interactions 
with cultural considerations. I demonstrate that on one hand, cultural environments 
cannot be used to justify a breach of this right, but on the other, they can enhance its 
implementation. I eventually conclude that the monitoring of the UN Committee 
accommodates the adoption of such a context-sensitive approach, but not that of the 
European Committee. Thirdly, I outline that it is unclear in human rights law to what 
extent non-nationals are entitled to benefit from the right to health, reflecting 
tensions between universalism and states’ sovereignty in its scope of protection. I 
highlight that restricting migrants’ right to health can be a disproportionate measure 
to control migration flux, in the light of human rights law, and that SNHRBs such as 
the European and the UN Committees should (and have) expanded their protection. 
In Chapter 5, I continue my theoretical account but this time to assist SNHRBs in 
clarifying the nature of states’ obligations to realise the right to health, a well-
established notion in human rights law which content yet remains unclear from the 
reading of previous chapters. Using again the principles of interpretation underlying 
this thesis, I focus on the timeframe in which obligations must be implemented, for it 
avoids crystallising inadequately the content of these obligations. I thus start by 
examining what the obligation to progressively realise the right to health means, and 
discuss its recognition by human rights instruments and SNHRBs. However, since 
this obligation is often criticised for its contingence upon resources, I argue that 
SNHRBs must inject substance through monitoring. I suggest such monitoring 
includes an evaluation of states’ resources based on their use rather than their 
availability; as well as indicators measuring states’ progress, following the example 
of the European Committee. Furthermore, I suggest SNHRBs translate the obligation 
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to progressively realise the right to health into specific legal requirements, through 
findings of non-conformity based on insufficient improvement or retrogression. Such 
findings remain too rare in the interpretation of the UN and the European 
Committees. I then discuss the notion of non-derogable minimum core obligations, 
and its recognition by the ICESCR and the ESC. I argue that it is impossible to 
determine a core content of the right to health, as all potential criteria for doing so 
embody insurmountable dilemmas. Instead, I contend that SNHRBs should 
understand the core content of this right through the prisms of healthcare 
prioritisation and progressive realisation, and review it through the test of 
reasonableness (although a core approach may represent a heuristic tool for the 
European Committee). 
In Chapter 6, I discuss the key challenges that enhancing the conceptual clarity of 
the right to health through supranational monitoring represent, in order to enable 
SNHRBs to guarantee principled consistency at both regional and international 
levels, through my theoretical framework. Firstly, and to avoid the adverse effects of 
the fragmentation of human rights law, I suggest that SNHRBs harmonise their 
interpretation of what the normative scope of the right to health entails. Whilst I 
highlight that SNHRBs tend to interpret the scope of interests of the right to health 
similarly, they should fill the gaps of their jurisprudences by using the principle of 
external system coherence. I argue, however, that in human rights law, the scope of 
protection of the right to health is inconsistent regarding non-nationals, and contend 
that SNHRBs can reconcile these tensions through the alternatives offered by the 
Fragmentation Report of the International Law Commission. Secondly, I suggest that 
to ensure coherence despite the diverse quasi-judicial avenues used to monitor the 
right to health, SNHRBs adapt their review of states’ obligations to the practical 
realities they encounter. I outline the importance for SNHRBs to balance adequately 
the individual and collective dimensions of the right to health, depending on what 
monitoring procedure is at stake. I also outline the importance for SNHRBs to adapt 
their approach to states’ compliance, depending on what level of monitoring they 
represent. Finally, I highlight that despite such suggestions, the powers of quasi-
judicial collegial SNHRBs to bring to life their own interpretation of what the right 
to health entails, are limited. They do not benefit from any enforcement mechanism, 
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and the right to health being inherently complex, interpreting it remains an extremely 
difficult task. However, national courts, as well as other international or regional 
human rights mechanisms and institutions, can also contribute to delineating what 
this right means, and bring to life SNHRBs’ interpretation by encouraging reluctant 
states to realise it. 
This thesis demonstrates that SNHRBs can contribute to clarifying the legal content 
of economic, social and cultural rights, and it assisted them in optimising their 
interpretation for that purpose, through the example of the right to health. However, 
the lack of literature attempting to clarify what those rights entail represents both a 
cause and a symptom of the criticisms they are subject to. Therefore, it is essential 
researchers exploit the potential offered by SNHRBs, and develop conceptual 
frameworks clarifying the legal content of economic, social and cultural rights to 
assist their monitoring. This will enable us, as human rights lawyers, to assist key 
actors such as SNHRBs, judges, or NGOs in realising these rights, and to promote a 
more effective enjoyment of human rights standards amongst individuals. 
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APPENDIX 
List of questions asked to members of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights during the interviews held in Geneva on 26-28 May 2015 
I. Scope of the right to health 
1. My research shows that when the CESCR Committee reviews the 
implementation of Article 12 ICESCR in its Concluding Observations, it 
reviews certain aspects more often than others; do you know why?  
(Example: sexual and reproductive health and mental health are mentioned in 
respectively 75% and 50%, while vaccination and life expectancy are only 
mentioned in 3 and 6% of the Concluding Observations studied) 
2. What influence do NGOs’ shadow reports have, if any, on the issues brought to 
light –or ignored– by the CESCR Committee, in its reporting procedure on 
Article 12?  
3. How helpful do you find the Availability Accessibility Acceptability Quality 
framework when evaluating the implementation of the right to health?  
4. Under which right(s) do you consider issues related to inadequate food, water, 
hygiene, housing should be reviewed? 
5. Is the right to health the same for everyone: 1) within the same country; and 2) 
between different countries? 
II. Progressive realisation/minimum core 
6. How do you follow up states’ progress in healthcare, according to their 
obligation to progressively realise the right to health? Would you consider 
using health indicators? 
7. Do you evaluate states’ available resources? If yes, how? 
8. Do you consider that a retrogression of health standards (e.g. increase of 
maternal mortality) is a breach of the right to health to the same extent than 
deliberate retrogressive steps (e.g. closing maternal wards)? 
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9. What justifications would you accept to consider in presence of retrogressive 
measures, if any? 
10. What do you think about minimum core obligations?  
11. Why do Concluding Observations rarely refer to ‘core obligations’ (at least in 
the context of Article 12)? Do requests to take ‘immediate steps’ to redress a 
health crisis indicate the existence of a minimum core obligation? 
III. Legal approach/constructive engagement 
12. How important is states’ obligation to report on their implementation of the 
right to health?  
13. Why does the CESCR Committee avoid using a legal terminology (e.g. 
‘obligation’, ‘violation’ etc.) and avoid reaching decisions of non-conformity?  
14. What can you say about the constructive engagement approach of the CESCR 
Committee? 
15. During the reporting procedure, how often do you consider that the CESCR 
Committee collaborate with the following actors:  - UN agencies:  - State authorities:  - Civil society:  - National Human Rights Institutions:  - UN/regional human rights bodies:  - Others:  
16. Do you believe it is possible for the UN Committee to adopt a more legal 
approach while keeping similar levels of constructive dialogue with states?  
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